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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this thesis is to explore the possibility of applying Hans Robert 
Jauss' hermeneutic of reception theory to biblical interpretation. The traditional 
methods employed in biblical interpretation involve a two-way dialogue between the 
text and the reader. Reception theory expands this into a three-way dialogue, with 
the third partner being the history of the text's interpretation and application. This 
third partner has been ignored by biblical interpreters but recently the need to 
include this has gained some attention. In the first part of the thesis, the work of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer will be examined in order to provide the philosophical 
hermeneutical framework for reception theory and its significance for biblical studies. 
In the second part, this framework will be fleshed out by Hans Robert Jauss' 
conception of reception theory. Jauss not only builds upon Gadamer's work but his 
literary hermeneutic provides a model which is applicable to the biblical text and its 
tradition of interpretation. In the final part, the parable of the Wedding Feast in 
Matthew 22: 1-14 and its Wirkungsgeschichtewill be considered as a case study. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reception theory offers hermeneutical resources and insights which, I believe, can 
serve the valuable role of providing a hermeneutical model which relates biblical exegesis, 
the history of biblical interpretation, and church history to each other. From an 
exegetical perspective, reception theory rescues the Bible from being approached like 
other ancient texts, as a relic from the past. At the corporate level, it provides a means 
for us to engage the heritage of biblical interpretation in the Christian tradition in a 
manner that not only allows us to grasp how our tradition has shaped who we are but 
also to realise that we are active participants in the ongoing process of that living 
tradition. The call for an approach along these lines is a rather recent development in 
church history and begins less than one hundred years ago. 
A Voice Crying in the Wilderness 
Ernst von Dobschütz was a man ahead of his time. In 1909, he wrote an article 
entitled "The Bible in the Church" in which he asked the question: what effect has the 
Bible had upon the church? 1 Dobschütz found it rather incredulous that even though 
more has been written on the Bible than any other book "no one as yet has made a 
comprehensive investigation of the influence which it has exerted upon the Christian 
Church and the life of the Christian peoples as a whole. "2 While others before him had 
examined the exposition of the Bible and the history of texts and translations, Dobschütz 
attempted to examine the effect or influence of the Bible. Martin Kähler's, Die 
Geschichte der Bibel in ihrer Wirkung auf die Kirche, ein Vorschlag (1902), precipitated 
Dobschütz's work, but it was too general in nature and confined itself to demonstrating 
the significance of the Bible for the church. Dobschütz proposed to refine Kähler's idea 
James Hastings ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1909), s. v., "Bible in the Church, " by Ernst von Dobschütz, 579-615. 
2 Ibid., 2.579-80. 
2 
by working out the details through the application of a purely historical method. 3 Some 
of the most significant material in his article concerns the effect of the Bible on worship, 
public and private reading of the Bible, and the Bible's influence on language, art, and 
law. 4 A half century would pass before the questions which Dobschütz raised would be 
given serious consideration. 
Ebeling, "Church History as the History of the Exposition of Scripture" 
It was not until 1964 that questions about the post-history of the biblical text or 
its Wirkungsgeschichte received any degree of meaningful discussion. The turning point 
came with the publication of Gerhard Ebeling's book, Word of God and Tradition. 
According to Ebeling, the most significant contribution to theology since the 
Enlightenment "has been the result of historical work, both in the field of exegesis and in 
the field of Church history and the history of doctrine. "5 This returned theology back to 
its real subject matter 
- 
Jesus Christ, and protected theology from sliding into 
Scholasticism or Gnosticism and from the intrusion of outside schools of philosophical 
thought. 6 However, the real significance of historical study is found in the concept of 
Geschichte, "the dialogue between the objective event in the past and the subjective 
understanding of the past event in the present. "7 This means that not only will church 
history always remain an unfinished exercise, but biblical exegesis will as well. 
This idea should not be foreign to theology. The seed for such an approach dates 
back to the Reformation and is evidenced in the manner that the framers of the 
Augsburg Confession's made an explicit link between the Bible, the church, and history 
in Article VII 
.8 The church is guided 
by its interpretation of the Bible, is actualised by 
3 Ibid., 2.580. 
4 Ibid., 601-15. 
5 Gerhard Ebeling, The Word of God and Tradition: Historical Studies Interpreting the Divisions 
of Christianity, trans. S. H. Hooke (London: Collins, 1968), 14. 
6 Ibid., 14-5. 
7 Ibid., 17. 
8 "Also they teach that one holy Church is to continue forever. The Church is the congregation 
of saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the Sacraments are rightly 
administered. And to the true unity of the Church it is enough to agree concerning the 
doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments. Nor is it necessary 
that human traditions, that is, rites or ceremonies, instituted by men, should be 
3 
its obedience to the Word of God, and as a result, is an assembly which is constantly 
constituted anew in each historical horizon. "The communication of the Word of God 
is not a continuous process, but is only given in the constantly renewed interpretation of 
Holy Scripture. This interpretation is not to be separated from it relation to the actual 
assembly of those who hear it, and as hearers fulfill it. "9 
This weds church history to the Bible and biblical interpretation to the church. 
On the side of church history, the traditional approach which emphasises the history of 
dogma must "be corrected by a fresh attention to the history of hermeneutics and the 
exegesis of Scripture. ' " On the exegetical side, the interpretation of the Bible needs to 
be expanded from commentaries and doctrines to include church policies, organisational 
structures, politics, and the "doing and suffering" of the church. "The concept of 
interpretation has therefore a range whose extent cannot be grasped. " 1t 
Ebeling also realised that this view of history (Geschichte) raised the question of 
how we could posit any form of continuity to the Christian tradition since its history is 
characterised by elements of discontinuity. Models of church history or the history of 
interpretation based on a cumulative understanding of the Scriptures were no longer 
tenable. Evolutionary models of theological development are being replaced by views 
that take the situatedness of the interpreter more into account and which highlight 
aspects of historical discontinuity. Ormond Rush testifies to the implications of this shift 
and the need to address them, 
Emerging out of a nineteenth century understanding of history, the evolutionary 
notion of development, with its emphasis on and confidence in continuity, unity, 
clarity, and normativity, breaks down when we read doctrinal history from our 
twentieth century, post-modern horizon. A more adequate model is required 
that enables us to face also the issues of discontinuity, plurality, ambiguity, and 
relativity that persist in our Christian past, present and future. 12 
everywhere alike. As Paul says: One faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all, etc. 
Eph. 4,5.6. " Augsburg Confession, Article VII, "Of the Church. " trans. F. Bente and 
W. H. T. Dau, in Triglot Concordia: The Symbolic Books of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921). 
9 Ebeling, 26. 
10 Ibid., 29. 
1I Ibid., 28. 
12 Ormond Rush, "Reception Hermeneutics and the "Development" of Doctrine: An 
Alternative Model, " Pacifica, 6 (1993), 126. 
4 
For Ebeling, the continuity of Christianity is constituted by the self-same subject- 
matter of the tradition: Jesus Christ, who is the same yesterday, today, and forever. 
However, the church's understanding of Jesus will be characterised by manifold 
developments and diverse expressions in its history because the church will always 
understand Jesus from a particular historical perspective. 13 
From the theological point of view the remarkable thing about this course of 
events is that the church, although she remains one and the same, undergoes a 
manifold change of form; thus the witness to Jesus Christ in the history of the 
Church does not consist in the mere repetition of Holy Scripture and in the 
imitation of the way in which the disciples followed him; but in interpretation, 
that is, in ever new usages and forms, thoughts and decisions, sufferings and 
victories, and hence in an unfolding of the richness and power of the Word of 
God, and in ever new victories for the hidden kingdom of God. 14 
Froehlich, "Church History and the Bible" 
The same call for biblical exegesis and church history to include the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the Bible was echoed in the Anglo-American tradition by Karlfried 
Froehlich in his article "Church History and the Bible". 15 Like Ebeling, Froehlich 
retrieves the Reformer's position that there could be no church without the Bible and 
that there could be "no Bible without the church 
- 
the church which received the 
apostolic witness, selected the canon, and gave the biblical witness unity by its 
interpretation. "16 According to Froehlich, Ebeling's revolutionary contribution to 
theological studies was his thesis that we need to grasp the normative power of the 
biblical language and its interaction with the different horizons of understanding. This 
should "encourage a style of history writing that would expose this normative power of 
the biblical language not only as past-factum reflection or rationalization but also as the 
historical start for thought and action. "17 As such, the Christian tradition is not a barrier 
13 Friedrich De Boor, "Kirchengeschichte oder Auslegungsgeschichte? " Theologische Literaturzeitung 
(June 1972), 406. 
14 Ebeling, 31. 
15 Elfried Froehlich, "Church History and the Bible, " in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical 
Perspective: Studies in Honor of Kar ed Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday, eds. Mark S. 
Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 1-15. 
16 Ibid., 7. 
17 Ibid., 13. 
to Christ but serves to point to him. In order to realise this, church history and the 
history of biblical interpretation must be incorporated into biblical hermeneutics, and the 
biblical interpretation into church history. 18 While Froehlich speaks positively of 
Ebeling's proposal, he thinks the results of the research which Ebeling's work stimulated 
has been rather disappointing so far. 19 One of the weaknesses of Ebeling's approach is 
that the interpreter did not know what he or she should be looking for in the post- 
history of a text. As a result, the "tracing of random texts in their history of exposition 
yield at best interesting details and the impression of a bewildering zigzag course. "20 
This problem is unavoidable. Because of the vast amount of material written on the 
Bible, there will be a disproportionate number of false starts and dead-ends as in any new 
field of research. At the same time, Froehlich argues that studies on the 
Wirkungsgeschichteof a text should attempt to illuminate the historical development of 
understanding the text. The degree of success of diachronic studies such as this will 
depend to a large extent on the careful selection of texts. "The success, it is maintained, 
depends entirely on the selection of a good passage, one which has made history rather 
than just havingone. "21 
The rewards of this approach outweigh the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
study the effect of a particular biblical text for Froehlich. At the institutional level, it 
helps to overcome the artificial divisions between biblical studies and church history. At 
the corporate and personal levels, this type of research will hopefully help the 
contemporary church arrive at a deeper self-understanding and of its position in the 
18 See ch. 6, "`Sola Scriptura' and Tradition, " in Ebeling, Word of God and Tradition, 102-47. 
White the historical critical method may have made the most significant contribution to 
theology in the past two hundred years according to Ebeling, it is also responsible for the 
artificial division between church history and biblical exegesis. Froehlich, 8. 
19 Froehlich, 9; dc Boor, "Kirchengeschichte oder Auslegungsgeschichte" 406-9. 
20 Froehlich cites Childs' commentary on Exodus as an example and criticises it for the manner 
in which he thinks that Childs has contrived his sources and does not demonstrate from 
them any form of development in the exegetical understanding of the book. Froehlich, 
10; Brevard Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical Theological Commentary, Old 
Testament Library (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1974). 
21 Froehlich, 10. De Boor is more critical, claiming that if one attempted to pursue an approach 
which considers the history of the influence of the Bible in other fields besides the 
history of interpretation, one will "sink in the material. " de Boor, 409. 
6 
Christian tradition. "For the understanding of the Christian tradition as a whole, the 
history of biblical interpretation is as important as the biblical texts themselves. "22 
Incorporating the history of biblical interpretation into church history and our exegetical 
practices "holds out the promise of something really new, of seeing really new light, of 
becoming open to truly new horizons, of experiencing change in ourselves, precisely 
because we cannot change the past. History itself in its inexhaustible universal horizon is 
the given, and as such the best dialogue partner to help us discover that life never needs 
to be dull. "23 
A Traditional Way to Write a Commentary 
In the past few years there have been several very promising developments which 
would probably appease Froehlich's earlier disappointment with the research results. The 
most promising of these has been the publication of the Evangelisch-Katholischer 
Kommentar zum Neuen Testament series in which the post-history of the text occupies a 
central element of the discussion of the text's meaning. Ulrich Luz's three volume 
commentary on the Gospel of Matthew has been more successful at achieving this goal 
than other volumes in the series. 24 Luz not only practices a wirkungsgeschichtliche 
approach but he is a strong advocate and apologist for it as well. Hermeneutically, Luz's 
model is based on Gadamer's work and at the same time stands within the trajectory of 
thought launched by Ebeling. 
The Bible and the history of its effects are related in two ways according to Luz. 
First, the biblical texts are the products of the history of effects themselves. The New 
Testament is the result of the early church's interpretation and preaching of God's 
revelation in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 25 And second, "the biblical 
22 Idem, "Which Paul? Observations on the Image of the Apostle in the History of Biblical 
Exegesis, " in New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of John 
Meyendorf, ed. Bradley Nassif (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 279. 
23 Idem, "Church History and the Bible, " 6. 
24 Ulrich Luz, Matthew: A Continental Commentary, trans. Wilhelm C. Linss, 3 vols., 
Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Joachim Gnilka, Norbert 
Brox, Ulrich Luz, and Jürgen Roloff eds. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989-). 
25 Ebeling made this same observation, especially in relation to the formation of the canon. 
Ebeling, Word of God and Tradition, 108,110-21. 
7 
texts have a history of effects, namely, the history of the churches and their confessions 
after them and, through them, the history of the whole Christian world. "26 Texts possess 
a potential for meaning which are disclosed or concretized in the history of their 
reception. As such, both the New Testament and the history of its effects are witnesses 
to the creative power of the transmission of the gospel message in new historical 
situations. 
A biblical text is not a reservoir or cistern, with a fixed amount of water in it that 
can be clearly measured. Rather it resembles a source, where new water emerges 
from the same place. This means that the history of interpretation and effects 
that a text creates is nothing alien to the text itself, as if the text with its meaning 
existed at the beginning and then only afterward and secondarily had 
consequences and created a history of interpretation. 27 
The history of a text's effects and interpretation should be an integral part of a 
commentary and should not be treated as material to be tucked away into an appendix or 
serve as occasional illustration to make the commentary more readable or interesting. 
The reception history of the text exposes the interpreter to the "great treasury of 
experience" which other Christians have found in the Bible. 28 This not only helps us to 
learn from previous interpretations but it also reveals to us why we approach the text the 
way we do. History reveals to us what we owe to those who preceded us. We are like "a 
person who must investigate the water of a river while sitting in a boat which is carried 
and driven by this same river. "29 Or to cite another metaphor, one which has a long 
history of reception, we are like the far-sighted dwarf standing on the shoulders of 
giants. 30 
26 Ulrich Luz, Matthew in History: Interpretation, Influence, and Effects (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994), 23. 
27 Ibid., 19. At another point he explains the same idea in this manner. "I would propose to 
understand the meaning of a biblical text as an interaction of a `kernel of meaning, ' 
which corresponds to the given structure of a text, and a 'directional meaning, ' which 
gives a present direction to the readers on their way to new lands. " Ibid., 20. 
28 Idem, Commentary, 99. 
29 Ibid., 96. 
30 This metaphor can be traced all the way back to Bernard of Chartres in the 12th century. 
Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Mod'rniry, 2nd edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987) 15-18. 
8 
Where does this tradition go from here? 
The need for improving or developing the work which Ebeling, Froehlich, and 
Luz have done in this area is important for two reasons. First, if the post-history of the 
text functions as a hermeneutical bridge between our contemporary understanding of the 
Bible and the text itself, then we ignore this historical dimension at our own peril. 
Markus Bockmuehl complains about the inattention given to the Christian tradition's 
rich history of biblical interpretation. "For the last century and a half, however, we have 
not been building and improving a road on which to travel back and forth, but have 
attempted to slash a wide swath through the woods with picks and machetes and, one 
suspects, often without much sense of direction or sensitivity to the terrain"31 The 
history of the Bible's reception presents a challenge to biblical scholarship which is 
dominated by questions concerning the origin of the text. This is not to deny the value 
of such research, but asks why such a disproportionate amount of research in biblical 
studies is devoted to historical reconstruction while so little is given to the text's history 
of a text's interpretation and effects. 32 
Second, while Ebeling, Froehlich, and Luz's work is impressive, I think that it 
can be strengthened and advanced by incorporating recent work in philosophical 
hermencutics and literary theory. Is it worth the effort to examine the history of the 
Bible's interpretation and influence in our exegetical practices? "If, 
... 
the answer is yes, 
great care should be devoted to the construction of a proper theoretical framework for 
the pursuit. "33 
The goal of this study is to critically examine the hermeneutical resources of 
reception theory to see if it can provide an adequate theoretical framework. To facilitate 
this, I have divided the thesis into three parts. Part I will consist of an exploration of 
31 Markus Bockmuehl, "A Commentator's Approach to the 'Effective History' of Philippians, " 
Journal for the Study of the New Testament, 60 (1995), 58. 
32 "But the effective history also presents a challenge to biblical scholarship which is still mainly 
concerned with origins.... Of course, some people should always specialize in origins, 
but is it reasonable that thousands do it all the time? " Heikki Räisanen, "The Effective 
'History' of the Bible: A Challenge to Biblical Scholarship?, " Scottish Journal of Theoloo 
45 (1992), 323-4. 
33 Ibid., 324. 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. The first chapter will focus on 
Gadamer's rehabilitation of tradition and, more specifically, how we actually engage 
tradition in a dialogue and what type of knowledge we can hope to learn from such a 
dialogue. The second chapter will build upon this and will probe three issues which 
involve roles which tradition plays in understanding a text. Because the range of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is vast and has generated numerous studies on various aspects of 
his thought, it is not possible to discuss the entire breadth of his thought. Therefore, I 
have had to limit my discussion of his work to those aspects which are particularly 
relevant to reception theory. I have also attempted to select areas of Gadamer's work 
which have not received the same amount of attention as have other areas of his thought. 
Part II will consider the contribution which Gadamer's student, Hans Robert 
Jauss, offers through his literary and hermeneutical theory of Rezeptionsgeschichte. Once 
again it is beyond the scope of this work to do justice to Jauss' entire hermeneutical 
theory. In the third chapter, I will attempt to present a critical introduction to the 
background of Jauss' work and an overview of the main themes behind his concept of 
reception theory. The relationship between Jauss' reception theory and Gadamer's 
hermeneutic will be examined in the second half of the third chapter. In the fourth 
chapter, I will look at the role of paradigm shifts and classic texts in reception theory and 
biblical interpretation. Special attention in both chapters will be given to those areas in 
which Jauss makes a unique contribution and which have a special relevance for biblical 
interpretation. 
And finally, lest I become guilty of Jeffrey Stout's complaint that all too often 
modern theology has "been reduced to seemingly endless methodological foreplay", I 
shall attempt to demonstrate the relevance of reception theory for biblical studies. While 
the burden of my argument rests in the discussion of Gadamer and Jauss' hermeneutic in 
chapters one through four, the fifth chapter will attempt to serve as an extended 
exploration of the fecundity of reception theory. Chapter five will therefore be devoted 
10 
to considering the reception of Matthew 22: 1-14, the parable of the Wedding Feast from 
the early church to the Reformation. 34 
I recognise that there are a number of major questions that the subject matter of 
my work raises which I do not address specifically. Criteria as to what counts as an 
appropriate or inappropriate interpretation is an example of one such question. While I 
do not discuss the issue of criteria directly, the sections on the subject matter of the text 
(die Sache), the logic of question and answer, and performance do touch on this question, 
but there is room for more work to be done in this area. Luz argues that there are two 
criteria by which we can judge an interpretation: (1) it must demonstrate a 
"correspondence with the essentials of the history of Jesus, " and (2) that the fruit of an 
interprctation should be an expression of love. His two criteria represent a promising 
starting point for further discussion concerning this question 35 However, the goal of 
this work is to examine the hermeneutical contributions which reception theory can 
make to biblical studies. 
34 Jeffrey Stout, The Flight from Authority: Religion, Moras r and the Quest for Autonomy (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 147. 
35 Luz, Matthew in History, 82-97. 
PART I: GADAMER'S HERMENEUTIC 
CHAPTER 1: THE CULTIVATION OF TRADITION 
Heracleitus was quoted by Socrates as saying, "all things move and nothing 
remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot 
step twice into the same stream. "1 Descartes, however, believed that he could climb out 
of the river and onto solid land. As such, he thought he found a place to stand outside 
and above the flow of history and tradition in reason and doubt. For Gadamer, there is 
no solid ground on which an observer can stand alongside this river; we are always 
captives of its current. In Truth and Method Gadamer has two goals. Negatively, he 
wants to demonstrate that there is no fixed shore or vantage point from which one could 
gain a fixed viewpoint to look down from and survey the flow of history. Positively, he 
attempts to construct a hermeneutic which is not only cognizant of our being carried 
along in the river, but also to show how this situation is actually constitutive of how we 
understand our world and what is handed down to us from the past. 
To raise the question about Gadamer's significance for any hermeneutical theory 
may seem almost facile. Richard Bernstein writes, "Building on the work of Heidegger, 
or rather drawing on themes that are implicit in Heidegger and developing them in novel 
ways, Gadamer's book is one of the most comprehensive and subtle statements of 
meaning and the scope of hermeneutics to appear in our time. "2 However, Gadamer's 
work plays two extremely important roles in reception theory. First, Gadamer's work 
laid the foundational brickwork which all contemporary hermeneutical theories either 
build upon or engage in dialogue. Second, and even more significantly, he was Hans 
Robert Jauss' mentor. Thus, we must understand Gadamer as a prelude to Jauss whom 
we shall look to for the hermeneutical model of reception theory in the second part of the 
theoretical discussion, (chapters three and four). At the same time, it is the 
Plato, Cratylus, 402b. 
Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 34. Even E. D. Hirsch confesses 
that "Hans-Georg Gadamer has published the most substantial treatise on hermeneutic 
theory that has come from Germany this century. " E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in 
Interpretation (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1967), 245. 
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hermeneutical issues which Jauss focuses on which have determined to a large extent 
which aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutic I will focus on in the next two chapters. 
The outline for this chapter is broken down into four sections. In the first 
section, I hope to show how Gadamer rehabilitates the concepts of tradition and the role 
of prejudices from the antithesis which the Enlightenment set up between tradition and 
reason. The second section will focus on Gadamer's appropriation of two of Hegel's 
ideas. He employs Hegel's concepts of experience and sublation to explain the process of 
understanding and how knowledge is historically transmitted. Hegel's thought on the 
open nature of dialogue is appropriated by Gadamer to illustrate how we should 
approach our tradition and the texts which are handed down in it. The relevance of 
Collingwood's logic of question and answer for hermeneutics is the subject of the third 
section. This plays a central role not only in Gadamer's hermeneutic, but as we shall see 
in subsequent chapters, it plays a central role in Jauss' work as well. The final section will 
examine the question, what form of knowledge does hermeneutical knowledge consist? 
The central theme of this chapter is: what does our knowledge of the past consist of and 
how is this shaped and handed down within a tradition according to Gadamer? 
I. THE REHABILITATION OF TRADITION 
A. An Ontological Approach to Tradition 
Tradition has not enjoyed a very positive reception in philosophical thought since 
the dawn of the Enlightenment. For Descartes and other Enlightenment thinkers, errors 
in thought, irrational ideas and prejudices were the result of either the hastiness of 
thought or were handed down by authority and tradition 
.3 Because these prejudices 
lacked methodological justification they were an unreliable and unfounded source of 
knowledge. Gadamer sums up their view toward tradition and the prejudices contained 
in it, "there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the 
fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, 
which denies tradition its power. "4 This view is not limited to the period of the 
Enlightenment but continues to this day. "The category of tradition is essentially feudal 
3 This idea is also found in Schleiermacher's work. Error comes about from the lasting 
prejudices of partiality and the momentary mistakes of overhastiness. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Second, 
revised ed. (N. Y.: Crossroad, 1989), 278. 
4 Ibid., 270. 
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.... 
Tradition is opposed to rationality, even though the one took shape in the other. "5 
The result of this line of thought has been that (1) we have lost the innocence by which 
we once appropriated traditional concepts and (2) we now view the Western 
philosophical tradition as fragmented tradition 
.6 
In contrast, Gadamer views prejudices as a constitutive element of our 
"thrownness, " they are always part of human existence and, as such, the prejudices we 
inherit are neither negative or positive in nature. Gadamer took the German concept of 
Vorurteil (pre-judgement) and incorporated it into Heidegger's fore-structure of 
understanding (Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgrif 
. 
Gadamer's use of the term prejudice, 
Vorurteih "refers to certain conditions that are operative in our thinking already at a 
preconceptual level. "T And in a manner similar to Heidegger's analysis of the fore- 
structure of understanding prejudice has a three-fold character in Gadamer's work: (1) 
we inherit them from our tradition, (2) they constitute who we are now, and (3) they 
have an anticipatory nature in that they allow us to project possibilities for 
understanding. 8 Gadamer sees our belonging to a tradition as part of the ontology of our 
existence. "Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self- 
examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and the 
state in which we live.... The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the 
closed circuits of historical life. "9 In this sense, prejudice is the pre-conscious cumulative 
effect of all judgements we have made and inherited in our tradition which we may not 
be aware of but constitute our horizon. The important point for Gadamer is that we are 
aware of our dwelling within a tradition and our prejudices so that when we approach a 
text which has been handed down from the past it can present its own truth against our 
fore-meanings. 1° "The general structure of understanding is concretized in historical 
5 Theodore W. Adorno, "On Tradition, " Telos 94 (Winter 1992-93), 75. Adorno views 
tradition as being conformist and decadent at best. "Adorno's advice is to keep a distance 
from traditions, which must remain subterranean in order to remain viable. " Paul 
Piceone, "The Actuality of Traditions, " Telos 94 (Winter 1992-93 1992-83), 100. 
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxiv. 
7 Jeff Mitscherling, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and `The Tradition', " Man and Worla; 22 
(1989), 249. 
8 Richard J. Bernstein, "From Hermeneutics to Praxis, " in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, 
ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (Albany: SUNY, 1986), 90. 
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 276. 
10 Ibid., 269-71. 
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understanding, in that the concrete bonds of custom and tradition and the corresponding 
possibilities of one's own future becomes effective in understanding itself. "t t 
One of the major challenges which Gadamer seeks to address is that the 
traditional notion of historical consciousness views everything as historically conditioned 
and, as a result, historical knowledge is characterised by a relativity of opinions. 12 This is 
our inheritance from nineteenth century historicism. Historical positivism rejected 
Hegel's notion that there was a higher order of rationality governing history. 13 Instead it 
focused on the individual events or elements of history, not universal history. "Historical 
consciousness is interested in knowing, not how men, people, or states develop in 
general, but, quite on the contrary, how this man, this people, or this state became what 
it is; how each of these particulars could come to pass and end up specifically there. " 14 
The result is that we suffer from a historical self-estrangement from our own past and a 
fragmentation of the chain of tradition into a series of unrelated, broken segments. 15 
One of the more significant points of Heidegger's thought for Gadamer is not 
that he solved the problem of historicism, but the way in which he interpreted human 
existence and history by means of absolute temporality. He pushed the idea of our 
temporal existence to its logical conclusion. "What being is was to be determined from 
within the horizon of time 
.... 
But it was more than that. Heidegger's thesis was that 
being itself is time. "16 History is not something that we can transcend, rather we exist 
historically. Heidegger fully developed the historical nature of human existence and 
provided a phenomenological epistemology to justify such an approach. Our historical 
existence allows us to study the past and it is also the common ground between the 
knower and the known. This does not mean that there is some form of `homogeneity' 
11 Idem, 264; idem, "The Heritage of Hegel, " in Reason in the Age of Science, trans. Frederick 
G. Lawrence, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought ed. Thomas McCarthy, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1992), 41. roc 
12 Idem, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " trans. Jeff L. Close, in Interpretive Social 
Research: A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), 110. 
13 Idem, "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects, " in Reason in the Age of Science, 26; Dilthey 
also correctly rejected Hegel's concept of absolute spirit. Idem, Truth and Method, 198- 
201. 
14 Idem, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " 116. 
15 Idem, "The Heritage of Hegel, " 44. "Das heif{t nicht nur, daßDistanznahme zu den 
Traditionen, in denen man aufgewachsen ist, in eine moderne Identitätgleichsam eingebaut 
ist; es heißt auch, daft' in der Moderne selbst durch existierende Traditionen 
Orientierungswissen nur in eigentümlich gebrochener Verbindlichkeit wiedergereicht wird " 
Bernd Auerochs, "Gadamer über Tradition, " Zeitschrift Ar philosophische Forschung 49 
(2,1995), 295. 
16 Gadamer, Truth and Method 257. 
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between the knower and the known, which would lead to a psychological hermeneutic 
along the lines of Schleiermacher or Dilthey. Instead it is based on the idea that both the 
knower and the known share a common mode of being, "they both have the mode of 
being ofhistoricity. "17 It is precisely because we `belong' to history and a tradition that we 
have an interest in studying history. '8 
The tradition a person belongs to constitutes his or her self-understanding and, 
as a result, every interpretative act is performed in a certain historical horizon with 
prejudices that are related to that horizon. 
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and the state in which we live. The focus 
of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only 
a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the 
individual far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his 
being. 19 
Tradition is part of our `thrownness' and it is essential that we recognise our place in our 
tradition and cultivate it according to Gadamer. "Even the most genuine and pure 
tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be 
affirmed, embraced, cultivated. "20 To understand a text is to participate in an event of 
tradition, a process in which the past and the present are mediated. Following 
Heidegger, Gadamer shows how every act of understanding is projective by nature. The 
interpreter projects a meaning from the possibilities which he sees from within his 
horizon. 21 "The general structure of understanding is concretized in historical 
understanding, in that the concrete bonds of custom and tradition and the corresponding 
possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. "22 
B. The Rehabilitation of Prejudice and Tradition 
The conclusion which Gadamer reaches is that "the abstract antithesis between 
tradition and historical research, between history and the knowledge of it, must be 
17 Ibid., 261. 
18 "`Belonging' is a condition of the original meaning of historical interest not because the 
choice of theme and inquiry is subject to extrascientific, subjective motivations 
..., 
but 
because belonging to tradition belongs just as originally and essentially to the historical 
finitude of Dasein as does its projectedness toward future possibilities itself. " Ibid., 262. 
19 Ibid., 276-77. 
20 Ibid., 281. 
21 Ibid., 264. 
22 Ibid., 264; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, trans. Francis 
McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 163-65. 
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discarded. "23 The mistake made in the Enlightenment's doctrine of tradition and 
prejudice was to assume that it was an untrustworthy source of knowledge. They 
believed that mistakes in thought arose from two main sources: externally, our respect for 
others and their authority led us into error just as effectively as overhastiness in our 
thinking did internally. The field in which this was felt the most was biblical 
interpretation. The radical thrust of the Enlightenment movement was to "assert itself 
against the Bible and dogmatic interpretation of it. " This movement was not primarily 
aimed against tradition but rather its goal was to understand the Bible "rationally and 
without prejudice. "24 As a result, reason became the ground for authority and the arbiter 
of the truth claims of a text or tradition. Tradition became an object to study and 
critique. 
The influence of the Enlightenment in this area is still felt today even though it 
was transfigured by Romanticism. In contrast to the Enlightenment's striving to free 
itself from the dogma of tradition, Romanticism embraced the earlier ages of myth as 
reflecting Christian chivalry and a society closer to nature. "These romantic revaluations 
give rise to historical science in the nineteenth century. It no longer measures the past by 
the standards of the present, as if they were absolute, but it ascribes to past ages a value of 
their own and can even acknowledge their superiority in one respect or another. "25 
However, in broad terms, Romanticism shared the same goal as the Enlightenment, the 
objective knowledge of the historical world which was `on par' with the objective 
knowledge in the natural sciences. The result is the same for both movements, a break in 
the continuity of meaning passed down in tradition. What could not be accepted as true 
according to reason must be understood historically. 26 
Gadamer criticises Romanticism, and Herder in particular, for the manner in 
which it views a text as an expression of genius of the author. Herder reduced the text to 
that of an objectified residue left behind by the creative spirit, like footprints in the sand. 
"Texts, works of art and the like were thus no longer considered claims to truth but 
rather seen as the concrete embodiment of creative genius. "27 As a result the text was an 
objectified construct which was always less than the creative thought which produced it. 
23 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 282. 
24 Ibid., 272. This criticism of the Enlightenment can be traced as far back as Hegel. Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of SpiriA with analysis of the text and forward 
by J. N. Findlay, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 329-334. 
25 Gadamer, Truth and Method 275. 
26 Ibid., 275-76. 
27 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1987), 73. 
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Understanding a text was a matter of retracing the path from the text back to the creative 
thought of the author. 28 Schleiermacher is an excellent example of this approach to a 
text in Gadamer's opinion. "Schleiermacher's particular contribution is psychological 
interpretation. It is ultimately a divinatory process, a placing of oneself within the whole 
framework of the author, an apprehension of the `inner origin' of the composition of a 
work, a re-creation of the creative act. "29 
There is an underlying Cartesian program in Romantic hermeneutics. By 
objectifying what ought to confront you, the text, you emasculate it. The text is 
detached from the creative act by defining it as a deposit of genius. One the one hand, 
Gadamer praises the Romantic tradition's stress on creativity. On the other hand, he 
criticises Romanticism, because in the end, it is only left with the traces or relics of the 
creative mind, like the vapour trails of a jet in the sky. This objectification of the 
elements which are handed down in tradition was picked up by nineteenth-century 
historiography. The result was the same for both Romanticism and historicism when it 
came to interpreting a text. "The individual text has no value in itself but only serves as a 
source 
- 
i. e., only as material conveying knowledge of the past historical context, just 
like other silent relicsof the past. "30 The legacy of Romanticism and historicism's 
objectification of the text is still felt today in biblical studies. "The best modern 
commentary series continue to produce technical studies of biblical books as ancient texts 
and as objects of detached critical analysis. "31 
The Enlightenment movement saw a "mutually exclusive antithesis between 
authority and reason. "32 This assumption was justified if authority displaced one's use of 
reason. But it overlooked the fact that truth can be found in authority. This was the 
28 Warnke makes the observation that this hermeneutic concept can still be seen exercising an 
influence in the works of critics like E. D. Hirsch. Ibid. 
29 Gadamer, Truth and Method 187. This criticism is valid of Schleiermacher's later work, but 
Kimmerle's edition of Schleiermacher's notes on hermeneutics from 1805-1819 reveal 
that his earlier work was more concerned with the identity of thought and language. 
Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts by F. D. 
Schleiermacher, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman, American Academy of Religion: 
Text and Translation Series, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1977); Richard 
E. Palmer, Hermeneutics. Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and 
Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 92-94. Warnke observes 
that Gadamer's emphasis on divination in Schleiermacher's hermeneutic is based on the 
influence of this on those who followed Schleiermacher, especially Dilthey. Warnke, 
Gadamer, 13-14. 
30 Gadamer, Truth and Method 198 italics mine. 31 Markus Bockmuehl, "A Commentator's Approach to the 'Effective History' of Philippians, " 
Journal for the Study of the New Testament, 60 (1995), 57. 
32 Ibid., 277. 
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mistake of the Enlightenment, it understood authority as blind obedience. While it is 
true that distortions and false prejudices may be handed down through a tradition, a 
tradition also passes on truth. Therefore, the acceptance of the authority of tradition is 
not blind obedience but the acknowledgement that those who precede us may have had 
better insights and judgements than we do. It is an acknowledgement of our finitude 
and that the knowledge passed down in tradition may contain a wider perspective or be 
better informed about the subject-matter 33 
It [authority] rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself 
which, aware of its limitations, trusts to the better insight of others. Authority in 
this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to 
commands. Indeed, authority has to do not with obedience but rather with 
knowledge. 34 
Underpinning this concept of authority and tradition is the idea that what is passed 
down is not irrational or arbitrary but contains truth which can be discovered as true. 35 
In this manner, Gadamer presents an apology for tradition based on epistemological 
considerations. 
If the Enlightenment represents one extreme in respect to tradition, Romanticism 
represents the opposite. Romanticism defended the authority which tradition has over 
our behaviour and attitudes. For example, morality was not based on reason but was 
handed down in tradition and received by us. Tradition was the antithesis to the 
Enlightenment's concept of the freedom which reason delivered. In this respect, 
tradition was a constitutive element of human life, much like nature was. "And in fact it 
is to romanticism that we owe this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a 
justification that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines our 
institutions and attitudes. "36 
However, once again, there is an underlying antithesis between reason and 
tradition which makes this position untenable. 37 Romanticism held to a faith in the 
growth and development of tradition which was independent and superior to reason. In 
reply to this, Gadamer argues that reason operates within a tradition and that tradition is 
not as dominant as Romanticism believed. "Even the most genuine and pure tradition 
does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, 
33 Ibid., 278-80. 
34 Ibid., 279. 
35 Ibid., 280. 
36 Ibid., 281. 
37 Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of "Truth and Method"(New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 169. 
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embraced, cultivated 
.... 
But preservation is an act of reason, though an inconspicuous 
one. "38 Tradition does not exist simply because it is part of the past, it needs to be 
preserved and this requires that reason and freedom are operative in the transmission of a 
tradition. 39 
There is a great deal of debate over how to understand Gadamer at this point. 
Habermas criticises Gadamer for subordinating the power of reason and reflection to 
tradition. For Habermas, prejudices are often shackles on our mind which need to be 
submitted to critical scrutiny. 40 Thus, there needs to be a separation between reason and 
tradition if we are going to have any possibility of criticising our tradition 41 Richard 
Rorty basically agrees with Habermas' point but celebrates it. Because of the temporal 
and cultural conditioning of all knowledge, he argues that there is no common ground 
on which rationality can operate. Therefore, philosophical discourse is reduced to 
talking about what looks like a reason from our perspective. 42 Both of these views miss 
Gadamer's position concerning the operation of reason in tradition. I will discuss this 
area in greater depth later in this chapter in the section on Gadamer's appropriation of 
Hegel's dialectic. But for now, it is enough to say that Gadamer rejects any form of 
polarisation between reason and tradition. This can be seen in the way he defends 
tradition with an epistemological argument. Tradition is a valid form of knowledge 
because it is reasonable to accept that someone may possess more and better information 
than we do. 43 Our relationship to tradition is not one of passive obedience by active 
dialogue, which requires the use of reason. However, as opposed to Descartes or 
Habermas, the goal of reflection is not the undermining of tradition's influence but to 
connect us with it in a more appropriate manner according to Gadamer. 44 
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method 281. 
39 Gadamer adds the qualification that he does not think that the pre-reflective effect of 
tradition is diminished as a result of the operation of reason within tradition or as a 
result of historical study. Ibid., 283 note 208. 
40 Graeme Nicholson, "Answers to Critical Theory, " in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 156. 
41 Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth andMethod" in Understanding and Social 
Inquiry, Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy eds. (Notre Dame and London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 358-63. 
42 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 364-65. 
43 Theodore Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology: The Current Debate in German 
Philosophy, " Philosophy Today, 14 (1970), 152-57. 
44 Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " 111; Idem, "Truth in the Human 
Sciences, " trans. Brice R. Wachterhauser, in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice R. 
Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 29. 
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After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism's views of tradition, Gadamer searches for a more adequate approach. One 
which does justice to both tradition and reason. There must be a unity between the 
"effect (Wirkung) of a living tradition and the effect of historical study. "45 In order to do 
justice to this concept, we cannot conceive of tradition as a radically new element being 
added to the hermeneutical sciences. Rather we must regard it as "a new element in what 
has always constituted the human relation to the past. In other words, we have to 
recognize the element of tradition in historical research and inquire into its hermeneutic 
productivity. "46 Historical research is not some abstract discipline but is intimately 
connected with the object of its study. In order to solve this question, Gadamer turned 
to Hegel. 
H. GADAMER'S APPROPRIATION OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC 
A. Hegel's Dialectic: Experience and Sublation 
One of the problems which Gadamer faced was how to overcome the view that 
the subject is a detached, neutral interpreter who approaches tradition as an object and 
reinstate a living relationship between interpreter and tradition? "And so it remained for 
me to decide 
- 
between the alternatives of the `psychological reconstruction of past 
thought' 
- 
against the `integration of past thought into one's own thought' 
- 
against 
Schleiermacher and in favor of Hegel. "47 While Schleiermacher and Hegel were both 
concerned with the problem of estrangement from tradition which resulted from the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism, they proposed two very different solutions. 
Schleiermacher argued that we must reconstruct the original context in which the work 
was originally understood. If the original context was removed from consideration in 
interpretation then the work lost some of its significance because the intelligibility of the 
work was tied to its original context. If we accept the idea that a text or work of art is 
not a timeless aesthetic object but its significance is grounded in its belonging to a `world' 
then this would appear to imply that we must reconstruct the original context in order to 
reveal the true meaning of the text or work. "According to Schleiermacher, historical 
knowledge opens the possibility of replacing what is lost and reconstructing tradition, 
45 Idem, Truth and Method, 282. 
46 Ibid., 283, italics mine. This is important since Gadamer defines hermeneutics in the 
following manner: "Hermeneutics may be precisely defined as the art of bringing what is 
said or written to speech again. " Idem, "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical 
Task, " in Reason in the Age of Science, 119. 
47 Idem, "The Heritage of Hegel, " 40. 
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inasmuch as it restores the original occasion and circumstances. "48 The problem with 
this approach for Gadamer is that the historicity of our existence makes the goal of this 
approach an illusion. What we end up with is a second creation 
- 
we do not end up 
with the original meaning of the text but rather "it acquires only a derivative, cultural 
existence. " It is like taking a painting out of a museum and placing it back in the 
medieval church from which it was taken. What is reconstructed is not what once was 
but a tourist attraction. 49 The reconstruction of the original context will always be a 
reconstruction from within the horizon of the interpreter and will not be the same as the 
original context of understanding. 
Hegel, in contrast to Schleiermacher, takes the perspective that our relationship 
to works from the past is analogous to fruit picked from a tree. Fate presents these works 
to us like "beautiful fruit already picked from the tree, 
... 
as a girl might set the fruit 
before us. " They are no longer connected to the "tree which bore them" but are handed 
to us through "the veiled recollection of that actual world. "50 Historical research as a 
reconstruction of the past will always remain an external activity and does not allow us to 
put the work back into its original context nor does it create a living relationship with the 
past. "They remain fruit torn from the tree. " This does not mean that Hegel denies the 
value of historical research which give us an idea of the original in our imagination. 
What Hegel is claiming is that tradition is not handed down to us through the process of 
historical reconstruction 
- 
it does not allow us to "enter into their very life. "51 
Gadamer follows Hegel in this area. Historical reconstruction of the original context of a 
text is important to understand the text but it should not be taken as the ground or 
primary aspect for understanding. "Integration, not restoration, is the true task of 
hermeneutics. "52 
48 Idem, Truth and Method, 166. 
49 Ibid., 167. 
50 Hegel, Phenomenology of SpiriA 455. 
51 Ibid., 456. 
52 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 186. 
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The manner in which works of art and texts are passed down is analogous to the 
maid servant who serves us fruit. Just as she is "more and higher" than nature which 
produced the fruit, so also "the spirit of destiny which gives us these works of art is 
greater than the ethical life and reality of a particular people, for it is the interiorizing 
recollection (Er-innerun j of the still externalized spirit manifest in them. "53 Gadamer 
understands Hegel to be claiming that the problem of understanding is not located at the 
level of reconstruction as Schleiermacher thought. That was a manifestation of what 
Hegel termed the Unhappy Consciousness. Unhappy Consciousness is the result of the 
loss of the meaningfulness of past art, culture, and religion which is exemplified in 
historicism which studies the past in an external, lifeless way and builds up pictorial 
images of the past. 54 According to Hegel, what is alive cannot be known by objective 
methods and that self-understanding arises from our involvement in life. 
Hegel quite rightly derives self-consciousness from life. What is alive is not such 
that a person could ever grasp it from outside, in its living quality. The only way 
to grasp life is, rather, to become inwardly aware of it.... Life is experienced only 
in the awareness of oneself, the inner consciousness of one's own living. 55 
In contrast to the objective goals of historicism, our connection with the past is 
constituted by our remembering and internalising it. For Hegel, this remembering and 
internalising took place at the philosophical level of absolute mind or knowledge. The 
self-consciousness of the spirit grasps the truth of a text or work of art in a "higher way" 
than the contextual relationships in which it originally stood. And it is the self- 
penetration of the spirit through history which performs the process of passing on this 
understanding. 56 Thus, our interpretation of the past is more significant than the past 
itself. This is an important point for Gadamer. 
In it [Hegel's dialectic] the historical approach of ideative reconstruction is 
transformed into a thinking relation to the past. Here Hegel states a definite 
53 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 168. Miller translates this section which Gadamer is citing 
from Hegel in a slightly different manner. Between the two translations it is easier to 
grasp Hegel's point here. "[T]he Spirit of Fate that presents us with those works of art is 
more than the ethical life and the actual world of that nation, for it is the inwarthzingin 
us of the Spirit which in them was still [only] outwardly manifested. " Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spiri; 456. 
54 Hegel, 454-56; J. N. Findlay, "Analysis of the Text, " in Phenomenology of Spirit 585. 
55 Gadamer, Truth and Method 253. For a fuller explication of Hegel's thought here in 
relation to the concept of self-consciousness see Gadamer's article "Hegel's Dialectic of 
Self-consciousness" in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical 
Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 54-74. 
56 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 167-68. 
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truth, inasmuch as the essential nature of the historical spirit consists not in the 
restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary life. 57 
1. Hegel'$ Dialectic 
The means by which this is achieved is through Hegel's dialectic. "For Hegel the 
point of dialectic is that precisely by pushing a position to the point of self-contradiction 
it makes possible the transition to a higher truth which unites the sides of that 
contradiction: the power of spirit lies in synthesis as the mediation of all 
contradictions. "58 Beginning with concept A, we find that it contains the contradictory 
concept B when we conceptually analyse A. And in the same manner concept B contains 
concept A. The dialectical result of this form of analysis is concept C which unites 
concepts A and B59 Both A and B are sublated into the higher concept C The strength 
of Hegel's dialectic is its "reflexive and integrating power" which solves the problems 
inherent in hermeneutics of reconstructing the original meaning of a text. 60 
For Gadamer, Hegel's concept of sublation, Aufhebung provides an explanation 
for the continuity we experience in history61 Hegel realised that this term possessed the 
broad semantic range of meaning from "negating" to "preserving". However, his 
primary use of the term focused on how concepts, ideas, or truth were preserved through 
this process of negation 62 "For Hegel, however, the meaning shifts and comes to imply 
57 Ibid., 168-69. 
58 Gadamer, "Hegel and Heidegger, " in, Hegel's Dialectic, 105. 
59 Michael Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method, " in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. 
Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge Companions, (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 131-2. "In a 
wide sense Hegel's dialectic involves three steps: (1) one or more concepts or categories 
are taken as fixed, sharply defined and distinct from each other. This is the stage of 
UNDERSTANDING. (2) When we reflect on such categories, one or more 
contradictions emerge in them. This is the stage of dialectic proper, or of dialectical or 
NEGATIVE REASON. (3) The result of this dialectic is a new, higher category, which 
embraces the earlier categories and resolves the contradiction involved in them. This is 
the stage of SPECULATION or positive reason. " Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionarfi 
The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), s. v. "Dialectic, " 
81-2. 
60 Manfred Frank, "Limits of the Human Control of Language, " trans. Richard Palmer, in 
Destruktion and Deconstruction, eds. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 157. 
61 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 98. Hegel was attempting to address the "confusion 
of human affairs, in this up and down of inconsistency, nothing lasting could maintain 
itself was familiar to the eighteenth century. " Gadamer, "Hegel's Philosophy and Its 
Aftereffects, " 35. 
62 We must be careful to note that Hegel does employ both uses of the term, to "negate, cancel, 
suspend" and also "to keep, save, preserve. " However, Hegel understands both 
meanings are implied in the second meaning. "What results from the sublation of 
something, e. g. the whole in which both it and its opposite survive as moments, is 
invariably higher than, or the TRUTH of, the item(s) sublated. " A Hegel Dictionary, s. v. 
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preservation of all the elements of truth, which assert themselves within the 
contradictions and even an elevation of these elements to a truth encompassing and 
uniting everything true. "63 Contradictions and oppositions in thought and the real 
world are capable of being mediated and sublimated through the power of synthesis in 
reason. The process of sublation, Aufhebung results in a modification to the original 
meaning or sense of the original categories (A and B). It is this modification in meaning 
which allows the original categories or ideas to no longer be contradictory and also allows 
the new category (C) to contain them 
. 
64 Hegel's dialectic provides an explanation for 
diversity (and contradictions) in history while, at the same time, it provides an impulse 
through the dialectical process toward the creation of unity. There is a continuity to 
history because reason is capable of reconciling "the most alien, inscrutable, and inimical 
forces of history". 65 Hegel's dialectic also escapes the problem of Romanticism which 
reduces the text to an externalised, objectified construct from the past of the creative 
genius of the author, a relic. By contrast, Hegel's dialectical method is always moving 
forward. An idea or thought is overtaken in sublation before it is objectified, before a 
decision can be made about it. In his system, a text is never reduced to a relic but is part 
of the ongoing dialectical process of history. 
The relevance of the concept of sublation can be seen in the way that parallel 
ideas are picked up and developed by others such as in Heidegger's conception of Dasein. 
Dasein does not have a fixed nature. "Dasein is constantly `more' than it factually is, 
... 
Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its 
potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet. "66 In the process of projective understanding, Dasein 
develops itself (sich auszubilden) through interpretation. In the projection of possibilities 
there is a counter thrust upon Dasein which requires a reconciliation of these possibilities 
with our pre-understanding (Vorhabe, Vorsicht, and Vorgriff. "This development of 
understanding we call `interpretation'. In it the understanding appropriates 
understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does 
not become something different. It becomes itself. "67 
"Sublation, " 284. For an example of how Hegel uses this term in different manners see: 
G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1969), 106-8. 
63 Gadamer, "Hegel and Heidegger, " 105. 
64 Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method, " 132-3 
65 Gadamer, "Hegel and Heidegger, " 105. 
66 Heidegger, Being and Time, 185-86. 
67 Ibid., 188. 
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2. Gadamer s Sublotion of Hegel 
In his appropriation of Hegel, Gadamer is not interested in reinstating Hegel's 
philosophy but in attempting to learn something from him. 68 This can be seen by the 
manner that Gadamer adapts Hegel's ideas in all three parts of Truth and Method. In the 
first part, Hegel's concept of Aufhebung is incorporated in Gadamer's concept of 
Bildung the term Gadamer chose to best express the type of understanding involved in 
the Geisteswissenschaften. The concept of the hermeneutic circle, which includes an 
outward and returning movement, is employed to explain how understanding takes 
place. In the outward movement, we recognise ourselves in what is alien, we find a place 
to be at home in it. In the returning movement, we realise that we have changed in the 
process of understanding and are no longer the same, our horizon has shifted or 
expanded. 
Life is defined by the fact that what is alive differentiates itself from the world in 
which it lives and with which it remains connected, and preserves itself in this 
differentiation. What is alive preserves itself by drawing into itself everything 
that is outside it. Everything that is alive nourishes itself on what is alien to it. 
The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation. Differentiation, then, is at 
the same time non-differentiation. The alien is appropriated 69 
Like Hegel's concept of Aujiebung Bildung is not fixed but involves a movement of 
alienation (negation) and reversal in which it expands or is transfigured. 7° All life is 
characterised by the hermeneutical circle of excursion and return, differentiation and 
assimilation. Thus, experience is dialectical in nature. When we assimilate the alien, our 
preconceptions are negated, restructured, or expanded. In the spiral of the hermeneutical 
circle our awareness, understanding of the world, and self-understanding are constantly 
restructured. 7' 
Gadamer repeats many of these themes in part two of Truth and Method in the 
concept of the fusion of horizons. The basic movement of understanding is the 
hermeneutical circle, a constant movement from whole to the part and then back to the 
whole again. We construct a provisional understanding of a sentence or text before we 
68 Gadamer, "Hegel's Philosophy and its Aftereffects until Today, " 27. The approach that 
Gadamer takes toward Hegel is exemplary of Gadamer's approach toward every author 
and text. For example, when he is referring to Hegel it is often difficult to determine 
where he ends his review of Hegel's work and begins to advance his own ideas. This 
follows his view that all historical knowledge is not just knowledge of the past, or the 
observer's understanding, but is a mediation between the two in which both participate 
in an event of disclosure. 
69 Idem, Truth and Method 252. 
70 Ibid., 10-18. 
71 Gadamer, "Hegel's Dialectic of Self-consciousness, " 54-74. 
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read it. This expectation is open to correction as we read the text and a new expectation 
of the text is shaped in the interaction between the reading process and our prior 
expectations. 72 Since every interpreter `belongs' to a tradition, the meaning of a text is 
co-determined by the historical situation of the interpreter and the text and the 
hermeneutic circle takes on a temporal dimension. It takes place in the mediation 
between the claims of the text and the interpreter's horizon. "That is why understanding 
is not merely a reproductive activity but always a productive activity as well. "73 In our 
encounter with a text, our prejudices may be called into question and we encounter a 
tension between our present and the past of the text. Understanding occurs when we are 
able to experience a fusion of horizons which involves our rising to a wider horizon, one 
in which we are able to encompass both horizons. "In a tradition this process of fusion is 
continually going on, for the old and new are always combining into something of living 
value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other. "74 
Pan three of Truth and Method centres on Gadamcr's philosophy of language. 
For Gadamer, language is not only the locus of our belonging in the world, language is 
also "the universal medium in which understanding occurs. "75 While our experience of the 
world is bound to our language, this does not mean that our language prescribes a 
circumference to the limits of what or how we can understand. Instead, language is what 
gives us the "capacity to embrace the most varied relationships of life. "76 Gadamer uses 
the analogy of what occurs in translation to explain the linguistic nature of 
understanding. Understanding always involves the coming to an agreement about the 
subject-matter in the medium of language. For the translator, this task is complicated by 
the fact that she must bring into her language the subject-matter which the text is 
pointing to in its language. In doing this, the translator must make a choice since she 
realises that she is not able to express all the features contained in the original text in her 
72 Gadamer, " Vom Zirkeldes Verstehen. " in Martin Heidegger zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag 
(Tübingen: Günther Neske Pfullingen, 1959), 24,28. 
73 Idem, Truth and Method 296. 
74 Ibid., 306. "To think historically means, in fact, to perform the transposition that the concepts of 
the past undergo when we try to think in them. To think historically always involves 
mediating between those ideas and one's own thinking. " Ibid., 397. 
75 Ibid., 389; idem, "The Language of Metaphysics, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 239. 
"Language completely surrounds us like the voice of home which prior to our every 
thought of it breathes a familiarity from time out of mind. Heidegger refers to language 
as the `house of being, ' in which we dwell with such ease. " Idem, "The Idea of Hegel's 
Logic, " in Hegel's Dialectic, 97. 
76 Idem, Truth and Method 448. 
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language. She must decide which elements to highlight, flatten out, or clarify. 77 In this 
process of translation, or interpretation, understanding "takes place in the medium of 
language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the 
interpreter's own language. "78 In this process, the language of the interpreter is 
transposed, or mediated, with the subject-matter which is expressed in the text's original 
language. The words and terms which the interpreter possessed before the act of 
translation undergo an expansion of meaning as they are used in the translation to 
express the subject-matter of the text. Thus, "understanding always includes an element 
of application and thus produces an ongoing process of concept formation. "79 
However, there are several conceptual problems in Hegel's system which 
Gadamer seeks to resolve. For Hegel, the dialectical process of history is a dialectical 
movement of the Spirit (Geists in history. The problem is that this dialectical process 
leads to the self-objectification of consciousness and is, therefore, subjective in nature. In 
our experience of the world, we continually undergo a reversal of consciousness as part of 
the dialectical process. For Hegel, this experience of consciousness naturally leads to a 
higher form of knowledge in which there eventually will be nothing other or alien to 
itself. "That is why the dialectic of experience must end in that overcoming of all 
experience which is attained in absolute knowledge 
- 
i. e., in the complete identity of 
consciousness and the object. "$° Gadamer appeals to Heidegger to correct Hegel at this 
point. Heidegger opposed the seductive appeal of dialectic which domesticated 
conflicting concepts into its own thinking. 81 Against Hegel's concept of absolute 
knowledge, Heidegger juxtaposed the finitude of human knowledge and existence. 82 
While there is a great deal of insight in Hegel's concept of experience, Gadamer 
contends that the dialectical process should be seen in terms of "the linguistically of 
human being in the world, " not in terms of self-consciousness. 83 Once again, Gadamer 
77 Ibid., 385-87. 
78 Ibid., 389. 
79 Ibid., 403 italics mine. "Words are the tradition of their application: they preserve the 
occasion and subject matter of specific occasions of utterance. The historical world 
leaves an indelible mark on the word, so that language cannot be understood if divorced 
from what it says. " Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 113-14. 
80 Ibid., 355. 
81 Gadamer sees this as part of the background to Heidegger's concept of the levelling power of 
tradition. Gadamer, "Destruktion and Deconstruction, " in Destruktion and 
Deconstruction, 108-9. 
82 Heidegger, Being and Time, 79-80,385-7. 
83 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 165-66. 
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appeals to Heidegger to modify Hegel. According to Heidegger, the history of reason, 
logos, in the western metaphysical tradition from Plato to Hegel represents a forgetting or 
obviousness to the question of Being. "In this light Heidegger's historical self- 
consciousness appears as the most extreme counterthrust possible against the project of 
absolute knowledge and the complete attainment of free self-consciousness 
- 
the project 
which Hegel makes basic to his philosophy. "84 For Gadamer, the result of experience is 
not that "someone knows everything or knows better than anyone else. "85 Instead, 
experience should teach us to be open to new experiences and equip us to learn from 
them. "The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge 
but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself. "86 
Experience is part of the historical nature of human existence and, as such, it is part of 
the finite nature of human existence and should reveal this finitude to us. 
According to Gadamer, the historical nature of human existence is characterised 
by experiences which negate our expectations. "Real experience is that whereby man 
becomes aware of his finiteness. In it are discovered the limits of the power and the self- 
knowledge of his planning reason.... Genuine experience is experience of one's 
historicity. "87 In this way, we gain the insight that the future is open to us (since our 
expectations and plans are limited) and that we should be open to the past as well. 
Again, Gadamer transposes Hegel's dialectic into the encounter we have with tradition, 
between our horizon and that which is passed down to us. "Hermeneutical experience is 
concerned with tradition. "88 
Collingwood's view of how knowledge and tradition are handed down helps to 
illustrate Gadamer and Heidegger's point about the finitude of human knowledge in 
relation to sublation. Collingwood develops his concept from the point of view that the 
historian is primarily concerned with `processes' of history and not events or ideas. 
`Traces' from the past are part of our present reality because they live on in the form of 
historical processes. Unlike an event, a process does not have a clear beginning or end. 
84 Gadamer, "Hegel and Heidegger, " 107. For Heidegger, there is always an element of 
concealment in every revealing. Thus, truth (alkthala) of something is always 
characterised by some degree of concealment. Therefore, Hegel's project of absolute 
knowledge is doomed from the start. Gadamer, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy, " in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 226-7. 
85 Idem, Truth and Method 355. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 357: 
88 Ibid., 359. 
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Rather processes are transformed and transfigured into new processes. As process P1 is 
transfigured into process P2 there is no point at which we can divide them. 
If P1 has left traces of itself in P2 so that an historian living in P2 can discover by 
the interpretation of evidence that what is now P2 was once PI, it follows that the 
`traces' of Pl in the present are not, so to speak, the corpse of a dead P1 but 
rather the real Pl itself, living and active though incapsulated within the other 
form of itself P2.89 
Thus, the history is constantly moving and carrying along with it the reality of the past in 
the present according to Collingwood. When taken in conjunction with what I said 
earlier about sublation and the negative character of experience, we can see that tradition 
(and the knowledge it passes down) is not a cumulative process for Gadamer. It is not a 
steady march towards a more correct or `true' understanding of a text or the past. The 
knowledge tradition passes down takes a serpentine path, with twists and turns taking 
place as a result of the interaction between the past and present. "It is enough to say that 
we understand in a different way, if we understand at all. "90 
B. I/Thou and Slave/Master 
We do not experience tradition as we experience an object or process which we 
can learn to govern. A better analogy to explain our experience of tradition is that of a 
dialogue with another person. Just as we come to know the otherness of our dialogue 
partner through conversation, so we realise the historical distance between us and the 
past when we engage our tradition in dialogue. "In the hermeneutical sphere the parallel 
to this experience of the Thou is what we generally call historical consciousness. "91 
Weinsheimer summarises Gadamer's argument in the following manner: 
Tradition is not simply a series of events that one comes to know; it is expression 
that one comes to understand. Historical tradition is language and expresses 
itself like a Thou who is the other that self-knowledge requires for self- 
understanding. Hermeneutic experience consists in dialogue with tradition 
... 
9Z 
In order to clearly explicate his position, Gadamer discusses three different kinds 
of experience of the Thou. The first kind is where we learn to make predictions about 
the other's character based on our experiences of them. The problem with this is that we 
89 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 98. 
90 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 297. 
91 "Historical consciousness knows about the otherness of the other, about the past in its 
otherness, just as the understanding of the Thou knows the Thou as a person. " Ibid., 
360. 
92 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 205. 
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reduce the other to a means to reach our ends. This runs into Kant's categorical 
imperative that the other should never be treated as a means to an end. 93 We objectify 
tradition if we approach it in this manner. Since this approach can only recognise what 
is typical or regular, it limits what we can learn from tradition. The result is that it 
flattens out and constrains what is possible in hermeneutical experience. The second 
kind of experience of the Thou is where we claim to know what the other is saying from 
their point of view or even claiming to understand the conversation partner better than 
they understand themselves. However, this robs the other of his individuality and is a 
reflection of our effort to dominate others. "The claim to understand the other person in 
advance functions to keep the other person's claim at a distance. "94 This takes place 
when we approach tradition by trying to understand it according to general laws and not 
as something which is historically unique. 
The third kind of experience of the Thou is that which characterises effective- 
historical consciousness. In this kind of experience, we recognise the Thou by letting the 
other truly say something to us. This involves a two way openness. Experience of this 
type is based on Hegel's argument concerning the independence and dependence of self- 
consciousness on others. According to Hegel, self-consciousness is independent and 
dependent on its relationships with others, inasmuch as, the other is acknowledged. This 
takes place in the dialectical (or hermeneutical) movements of (1) recognising the other 
or the outward movement by which we find ourselves at home in the other, and (2) then 
superseding this outward movement when self-consciousness returns to itself and cancels 
out the otherness of the other and its own `other self-consciousness'. Thus, the final 
movement sublates (cancels out and yet still preserves) the outward and returning 
movements of self-consciousness in relation to the other person. 95 In coming to know 
the other, the self comes to a greater realisation and more complete self-understanding. 
In the transmission of this concept from Hegel to Gadamer, we can see that the 
importance of this was not lost on Heidegger. 
93 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals trans. James W. Ellington 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), 36. 
94 Gadamer, Truth and Metho4 360. 
95 Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpiri4 111-12. A people, nature, and history unfold or develop 
according to three movements. The analogy Hegel uses is that of a rose plant. In the 
development of a plant from seed to rose plant, it proceeds from the simple state of its 
inner potentiality (as a seed) to its explicit actuality (as a mature plant). The final state it 
reaches, `in and for itself takes place when it reproduces seeds (a return to its original 
simplicity). In a similar manner, people develop from their simple potentiality (in itself) 
to their explicit actuality (for itself) and finally return to a "being at home with itself', a 
state of self-consciousness and freedom. A Hegel Dictionary, s. v. "Development, " 79. 
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Hearing is constitutive for discourse 
.... 
Listening to 
... 
is Dasein's existential 
way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the 
primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality- 
for-Being 
- 
as in hearing the voice of a friend whom every Dasein carries with it 
Being-with develops in listening to one another [Aufeinander-hören], which 
can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the 
privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. 96 
According to Gadamer, we should engage tradition in a manner similar to the way in 
which we genuinely engage someone in dialogue. The result is that the interpreter in 
reading or studying a text (or any other element of tradition) comes to a greater 
realisation and more complete understanding of himself and his horizon. 
However, an individual cannot carry out this process by him or herself. It 
requires two participants. 97 The lord/bondservant or master/slave relationship 
exemplifies what happens if this dialectical relationship between two people is 
unbalanced. 98 One of them is reduced to that of a thing, or servant. The lord's self- 
consciousness is related to the things he or she consumes which are produced by the 
servant. 99 The servant, on the other hand, is held in subjection by the power of the lord 
over the thing and over himself. While Hegel was interested in providing a sociological 
critique of human interaction (a person is fully self-conscious only when they recognise 
the consciousness and freedom of the other) Gadamer picks up these ideas to illustrate 
the relationship between us and tradition. 100 The reduction of the other person to 
thinghood, Hegel's lord/servant relationship, is illustrative of the first two kinds of the 
I/Thou experience. This reduction takes place through the imposition of the methods, 
such as the principles of historicism. Gadamer comments, "When two people 
understand each other, this does not mean that one person `understands' the other. 
Similarly, `to hear and obey' (auf jemanden hören) does not mean simply that we do 
blindly what the other desires. We call such people slavish (hörig). "toi A 
96 Heidegger, Being and Time, 206. 
97 "Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and 
therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one 
side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both. 
... 
They recognize themselves as mutually recognizingone another. " Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit 112. 
98 "But for the recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other 
he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the 
other. The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal. " Ibid., 116. 
99 Ibid., 115. 
100 Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology, " 154. 
101 Gadamer, Truth and Method 361. The reduction to the slave/master relationship is a 
criticism Gadamer levels against method, especially in the sciences. "Each science, as a 
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methodological approach to history and blind obedience to tradition are forms of the 
slavish attitude according to Gadamer. 
By contrast, the third form of experience is characterised by a mutual openness 
and interaction between each of the partners. It means that we must be open to the 
claims which the other makes. "I must allow tradition's claim to validity, not in the 
sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has 
something to say to me. " 102 In contrast to the methods of historicism, Gadamer argues 
that: 
Historically effected consciousness rises above such naive comparisons and 
assimilations by letting itself experience tradition and by keeping itself open to 
the truth claim encountered in it. The hermeneutical consciousness culminates 
not in methodological sureness of itself, but in the same readiness for experience 
that distinguishes the experienced man from the man captivated by dogma. 103 
It is interesting to note how both Habermas and Gadamer develop Hegel's 
thought on the lord/servant relationship in different directions. For Habermas, the idea 
that `A man is not free until all men are free' is the utopian impulse to his critique of 
ideology. 104 Gadamer uses this same concept in Hegel to illustrate our relationship to 
tradition. We must be open to the claims of tradition and must be wary of method since 
it constrains the possibilities for understanding. Habermas starts from a position which 
views tradition negatively, as dominating and distorting our understanding. 105 Gadamer 
rejects this because it is a form of slavishness. Rather he grants tradition its position 
based on an epistemological argument: we recognise that someone may possess 
knowledge that is superior to our own. "Authority is rooted in acceptance as a 
hermeneutical process. "106 While Habermas criticises Gadamer for not possessing an 
science, has in advance projected a field of objects such that to know them ,& to govern 
them 
... 
Once a scientist has discovered the law of a natural process, he has it in his 
power. " Ibid., 452-53 italics mine. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 361-62. Gadamer cites Friedrich Schlegel's 25th "Lyceum Fragment" as an example 
of the imposition of the historiographical principles of correlation and analogy which 
restricts our understanding of texts before we even read them. Ibid., 452-3. 
104 For Habermas, the critique of ideology is primarily oriented towards the "emancipation 
from the quasi-natural forces of history and society. " Jürgen Habermas, "Knowledge 
and Interest, " trans. Guttorm Florstad, Inquiry, IX (1966): 295. Michael Forster 
presents a concise survey of the difFerent ways in which Hegel has been interpreted. 
According to his classification, Habermas follows the Marxist reading of Hegel, while 
Gadamer takes a much more balanced approach to Hegel's work. Forster, "Hegel's 
Dialectical Method, " 168-70. 
105 Nicholson, "Answers to Critical Theory, " 156. 
106 Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology, " 152-57, quote on page 156. For 
Habermas' and Gadamer's views on the other's position: Jürgen Habermas, "The 
Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, " trans. Josef Bleicher, in Contemporary 
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ideological critique in his hermeneutic, we can see the seeds of such a critique in 
Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel at this point. In our dialogue with tradition, we must 
be sensitive to instances in which this dialogue may have degraded into a pseudo- 
dialogue in which we are no longer experiencing the third kind of I/Thou encounter. 107 
In summary, the hermeneutical approach to tradition which Gadamer is positing 
is distinguished by its fundamental openness to the truth claim of tradition which is 
illustrated in the third kind of experience of the Thou. While Habermas criticises 
Gadamer for not including any form of ideological critique we can see that Gadamer's 
adoption of the I/Thou relationship to illustrate our relationship to tradition does 
contain the seeds for such a critique. The ideal of the authentic I/Thou experience 
functions as a regulative principle in Gadamer's hermeneutic; an ideal which the 
interpreter should always be hoping to achieve. Before I turn to Gadamer's 
appropriation of Collingwood's logic of question and answer, I would like to probe the 
problem of universal history while I am still discussing Gadamer's appropriation of 
Hegel. 
C. Gadamer's rejection of Universal History 
Gadamer found a model which explained our connection to and understanding 
of the past in a living and active manner which took place in "thoughtful mediation with 
contemporary life" in Hegel's dialectic. 108 However, he does not adopt Hegel's 
teleological program or his idea that historical knowledge is grounded in the idea of a 
complete system 
- 
universal history. Rather than a dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis, Gadamcr bases the mediation of the past and present in the dialogical process 
that is historically and linguistically finite. 109 Experience does not culminate in absolute 
knowledge but in openness to the other which results in an infinite dialogue between 
ourselves and tradition. "If anything does characterise human thought, it is this infinite 
dialogue with ourselves which never leads anywhere definitely and which differentiates us 
Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1980), 181-211; Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26-42. 
107 A similar point is brought out by Ricceur in his essay, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of 
Ideology, " in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser, (Albany: 
SUNY, 1986), 300-39. However, Ricceur make a stronger argument than I am at this 
point. 
108 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 168. 
109 James DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, 
Gadamer, and Ricceur (Charlottesville, VA.: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 94-5. 
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from that ideal of an infinite spirit for which all that exists and all truth lies open in a 
single moment's vision. " 110 
The problem with universal history stems from Hegel's development of the 
concept in Gadamer's estimation. According to Hegel, a historian did not study the 
particulars of history but universal world history. Dilthey and others rejected Hegel's a 
priori universal history but maintained the idea that historical understanding of the parts 
should lead to some form of universal history. 1 t1 There are two main problems with 
Hegel's view in Gadamer's estimation. First, the concept of absolute spirit which draws 
every position into itself through dialectical sublation, is not justified. 112 Second, the 
finitude of human existence places limitations on human knowledge and contradicts 
Hegel's concept of absolute spirit. 113 Hegel was caught in the contradiction between 
open progress in history and a "conclusive apprehension of its meaning. " 114 
At the same time, Gadamer acknowledges that an essential aspect of our temporal 
existence is the need for some form of universal history. Both Christians and non- 
Christians have this need. Even in our finitude, we are constantly moved to questions 
that are beyond us. 115 However, our concept of universal history must be provisional 
and open to constant revision since it is a concept which we project from within our 
historical horizon. "Each projection of universal history has a validity that does not last 
much longer than the appearance of a flash momentarily cutting across the darkness of 
the future as well as of the past as it gets lost in the ensuing twilight. ", 6 This is what he 
terms the "bad infinite" in "which the end keeps delaying its arrival" in the ceaseless 
dialogue which we have with tradition. ' 7 "Gadamer does justice to our urge for unity, 
110 Gadamer, "Supplement II: To What Extent does Language Perform Thought? " in Truth 
and Method, 543. "Yet no less important than Gadamer's rehabilitation of the Hegelian 
concept of objective spirit is his repudiation of the possibility of absolute spirit. " 
Weinsheimer, Gadamer s Hermeneutic, 38. 
111 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 197-8. 
112 Ibid., 344-45. 
113 Ibid., 356-57; Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " in Basic 
Questions in Theology: Collected Essays, vol. 1, trans. Paul J. Achtemeier (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1970), 121. 
114 Gadamer, "Heritage of Hegel, " 40. The teleological dimension to Hegel's thought is not 
open to the novel and "unfinished character of history. " Peter C. Hodgson, "Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, " in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West vol. 1, 
ed. John Clayton, Ninian Smart, Patrick Sherry and Steven T. Katz (Cambridge: CUP, 
1985), 110. 
115 Gadamer, "Heritage of Hegel, " 51. 
116 Ibid., 61. 
117 Ibid., 40. 
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but also to the frustration of not achieving it. There is in the bad infinite at once infinite 
hope and infinite deferral. " 118 
D. Pannenberg's Defence of Universal History 
Pannenberg believes that the logical conclusion of Gadamer's view should lead to 
a form of universal history. "I myself, induced by H. G. Gadamer's hermeneutic, have 
tried to show that the task of interpretation as an attempt to fuse the horizons of the 
author and the interpreter presupposes the totality of history [Geschichte] as its ultimate 
frame of reference. "119 The essence and structure of all knowledge is historical. 
Therefore, it only makes sense that the fusion of horizons should take place in the same 
context, in history. 120 This continuity does not stop with the present, for the present is 
only understood in light of the future. Hermeneutical understanding shares the same 
basic structure of all human understanding. Just as a person only understands the 
wholeness of his/her life in relation to the whole of reality and his/her effort to be 
conscious of it, we also need to have a provisional understanding of reality as a whole in 
order to understand the particulars of history. 121 "Only a conception of the actual 
course of history linking the past with the present situation and its horizon of the future 
can form the comprehensive horizon within which the interpreter's limited horizon of 
the present and the historical horizon of the text fuse together. "122 
While Gadamer was correct to reject Hegel's concept of the future because it 
ignored the finitude of human existence, he was wrong to dismiss the idea of universal 
history just because Hegel formulated it incorrectly. 123 According to Pannenberg, we are 
justified to use the concept of universal history as long as it is provisional and 
anticipatory in nature. 124 But this raises the theological question of how we can keep the 
118 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 37. 
119 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 284; idem, "Hermeneutics and 
Universal History, " 115 if. 
120 Idem, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " 130-3 1. 
121 Ibid., 120. 
122 Ibid., 130. 
123 Ibid., 134-35. 
124 Pannenberg attempts to synthesise two apparently contradictory ideas: universal truth and 
historically contingent knowledge. First, the subjective, or experiential nature of truth 
requires a unity between man's thoughts and the world. The modern understanding of 
truth in this respect is inherited from our culture's Christian heritage. "The truth, which 
is originally God's truth must become perceptible in the world through man, in the 
sense of a responsible structuring of the world that measures itself by God. " Second, 
truth is not timeless and unchanging but is manifest in the contingencies of historical 
processes and yet "maintains itself through change. " Hegel's conception of the 
historicality of truth is the most significant contribution to this concept in Pannenberg's 
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future open while at the same time affirming the ultimate revelation of God in Jesus' life, 
death, and resurrection? Pannenberg's answer to this question lies in the proleptic nature 
of the Christ event. 
But the Hegelian conception of history is not in fact the only possible one, 
because the end of history can also be understood as something which is itself 
only provisionally known, and in reflecting upon this provisional character of our 
knowledge of the end of history, the horizon of the future could be held open 
and the finitude of human experience preserved. It is precisely this understanding 
of history as something whose totality is given by the fact that its end has become 
accessible in a provisional and anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from 
the history of Jesus in its relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition. Hegel was 
unable to see this because the eschatological character of the message of Jesus 
remained hidden to him, as was the case with New Testament exegesis of his 
time. 125 
The end of history occurred in a preliminary way in the resurrection of Jesus. But at the 
same time, it opened up the possibility of our sharing in it someday based on our 
relationship with Jesus. In the resurrection, we see the historically conditioned nature of 
truth and also an anticipatory, proleptic, understanding of universal history, which is still 
open. t26 
Gadamer felt that Pannenberg's discussion on this point was very useful and 
admitted that every act of interpretation requires some reference to the future, "and a 
universal-historical conception is unavoidably one of the dimensions of today's historical 
consciousness. "127 He does not see any basic difference between his position and 
Pannenberg's at this point except that "for the Christian theologian the `practical 
purpose' of all universal historical conceptions has its fixed point in the absolute history 
of the Incarnation. "128 However, Pannenberg's point is much stronger than this. The 
Christ event is the only feasible formulation of universal history available to us, and 
hermeneutical understanding requires a provisional universal history to function. The 
incarnation is not just a `practical purpose' for the theologian. Pannenberg attempts to 
opinion and is very close to the biblical position. The primary modification that Hegel's 
position requires is to keep the future open to revision. Idem, "What is Truth, " in Basic 
Questions in Theology, 2.531. 
125 Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " 135. 
126 Idem, "What is Truth? " 24-25. 
127 Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection, " in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics ed. David E. Linge (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 
36-37. "There is indeed no disputing that the Christian and non-Christian histories of 
salvation 
... 
are a legitimate need of the human reason explicitly conscious of its 
historical character. " Idem, "The Heritage of Hegel, " 60. 
128 Idem, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection, " 37. 
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present a convergence of philosophical and theological hermeneutics in the concept of 
universal history which is best fulfilled in the Christ event. 
This solution satisfactorily meets the legitimate objections against Hegel, since it 
protects the openness of the future and the contingency of events, and still holds 
fast to the ultimacy of what appeared in Jesus, which makes possible the unity of 
truth. That it alone founds the unity of truth means, however, the demonstration of 
the truth of the Christian message itself. This is the sole possible proof of its 
truth. l29 
The difference between Gadamer and Pannenberg is more than just a matter of 
degree of emphasis. If Pannenberg's argument is correct, it means that any 
hermeneutical theory must place more emphasis on the future; it must consider three 
horizons: the past, the present, and the future. 130 This is especially important for biblical 
hermeneutics. "Interpretation in the New Testament, however, clearly includes, perhaps 
even stresses, the horizon of the future and its influence upon interpretation. "131 But 
this idea is not just limited to theological hermeneutics as Pannenberg claims, "the whole 
of reality can be understood more deeply and more convincingly through Jesus than 
without him. " 132 This means that Christianity cannot be considered in isolation from 
wider questions but must be understood in relation to the whole of history. 133 The 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ also gives us a historical perspective from which we can 
make better projections, though still provisional, about the universal horizon. "However, 
if Jesus rose from the dead, and if he is in fact the self-revelation of God, then we will be 
looking through the right prism, our interpretations will have a focus, and the 
hermeneutical circle we experience will truly be ` already' a spiral toward that definitive 
meaning and truth which has ` not yet' arrived. " 134 
In conclusion, Gadamer appropriates Hegel's dialectical approach and the 
I/Thou relationship to explain our living and active relationship to the past. At the same 
time, he rejects Hegel's absolute spirit and universal history in favour of the bad infinite. 
Theologically, this position does not do justice to the incarnation. While Pannenbcrg's 
proleptic view of universal history is provisional, it is much less transitory than 
129 Pannenberg, "What is Truth? " 26. 
130 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of 
Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 337. 
131 James Clark McHann Jr., The Three Horizons: A Study in Biblical Hermeneutics with Special 
Reference to Woart Pannenberg(Ph. D. Thesis: University of Aberdeen, 1987), 14. 
132 Pannenberg, "Focal Essay: The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, " in Theology as 
History, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, vol. 3 (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 
1967), 133. 
133 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 296, McHann, 388. 
134 McHann, 392. 
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Gadamer's "flash momentarily cutting across the darkness of the future. "135 
Pannenberg's appeal to the Christ event as a proleptic eschatological event which 
necessarily introduces the question of universal history serves as a needed modification to 
Gadamer's hermeneutic. 
III. THE EXPANSION OF COLLINGWOOD'S LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER 
A. The Return of the Question in Experience 
Hegel's philosophy provides one of the starting points for Gadamer's 
hermeneutic. However, it soon becomes apparent that his hermeneutical approach 
differs from Hegel's in several significant aspects. In the last section, I tried to show how 
Gadamer abandoned Hegel's concepts of universal history in favour of his `bad infinite' 
and how this was not incompatible with Pannenberg's concept of a provisional view of 
universal history constructed on the eschatological character of Jesus' life and death. In 
the section before that, I examined Gadamer's adoption of Hegel's dialectical approach 
and the I/Thou relationship. What I propose to investigate in the present section is how 
Gadamer uses Collingwood's logic of question and answer to explain the interrogative 
nature of our encounter with tradition. Because Collingwood's approach plays a central 
role not only in Gadamer's hermeneutic but is one of the leading elements of Jauss' 
reception theory as we shall see in chapters three and four, it is essential that we have an 
accurate understanding of the logic of question and answer. 
We build up generalisations of our knowledge of the world through our 
experiences (Erfahrung). However, this process tends to produce false generalisations 
which are continually being negated by new experiences. Hegel explained this through 
the dialectical process that consciousness performs. 136 "According to Hegel, experience 
has the structure of a reversal of consciousness and hence, it is a dialectical 
movement. "137 Experience is characterised by negation. Our original fore-conceptions 
of what the object will be are negated through our experience. What we learn through 
such an experience transforms our understanding (both in the sense of Vorhabe, Vorsicht, 
Vorgriff; and conscious understanding). Therefore, it is no longer possible for us to 
undergo that experience in the same manner again, we cannot experience the same thing 
twice, we cannot re-experience that same experience of negation. As a result, we say that 
we know better after the experience and in the process both our knowledge and its object 
135 Gadamer, "Heritage of Hegel, " 61. 
136 Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirts 49-57. 
137 Gadamer, Truth and Method 354. 
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have changed. 138 As we saw above, the mistake Hegel made was to argue that conscious 
experience of what was different should eventually lead to universal knowledge in which 
nothing was experienced as alien. 139 
In the pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at 
which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with 
what is only for it, and some sort of `other', at a point where appearance becomes 
identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with 
the authentic Science of Spirit. And finally, when consciousness itself grasps this 
its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself. 140 
In German there are two words that can convey the English term for `experience': 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Dilthey's hermeneutic was built on the term Erlebnis which 
referred to lived, personal experiences which we organise our lives around. They serve to 
either define or transform how we understand the whole of our lives and they revise the 
way we understand our past and how we anticipate the future. Dilthey encountered a 
problem when he tried to move from understanding based on personal experience, 
Erlebnis, to how we understand the experiences of other people in history. He tried to 
argue that the manner in which we understand ourselves through experience is related to 
and parallel to historical understanding. 141 But can we move from the coherence of 
understanding which Erlebnis gives to the individual life to historical coherence which is 
not experienced on an individual level? Can a historian start from smaller units of 
history and build up to a knowledge of universal history? This was the problem Dilthey 
never successfully solved. 142 
In contrast to Dilthey, Gadamer uses the term Erlebnis in a negative manner in 
his criticism of aesthetic experience. 143 The term he prefers to describe our encounter 
with tradition is Erfahrung, as Hegel did. Erfahrungcan be taken in one of two ways. 
First, it can refer to the scientific meaning of the term, an experience which is repeatable. 
This is the way Schleiermacher , Ranke, and Droysen understood the term. 1` 
4 For them, 
138 Ibid., 354,356; Warnke, Gadamer, 26 
139 Bernstein, "From Hermeneutics to Praxis, " 97. 
140 Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, 56-57. 
141 Warnke, Gadamer, 30-31 
142 Dilthey attempted to arrive at universal history in order to guard against the threat of 
relativism. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 224-42. 
143 Ibid., 55-80. 
144 Warnke, 27 The concept of Erlebnis also seems to stand behind one of Troeltsch's three 
principles of history. According to the principle of analogy Troeltsch claimed we were 
only able to make judgments of probability if we assumed that our own present 
experience was not different to the experiences of other people in history. Ernst 
Troeltsch, " Über historische unde gmatirche Methode in der Theologie, " in Gesammelte 
Schriften (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913), 2.729-753; James Hastings ed., Encyclopedia 
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history was an empirical discipline because it could be repeated through the 
reconstruction of the original context. By contrast, Gadamer is interested in the second 
meaning of the term Erfahrung as a learning experience which negates and reverses our 
previous understanding. This results in a person who is more open to other experiences 
and capable of learning from them. 145 As a result, we can say that not every experience is 
an experience (Erfahrung) in the manner in which Gadamer uses the term. Negation, 
the `reversal of consciousness, ' and expansion of our horizon are some of the crucial 
elements which characterise a true experience, Erfahrung. Another crucial difference 
between the two terms is that Erlebnis is first-hand experience while Erfahrung is a form 
of knowledge that can be learned vicariously. 146 Weinsheimer and Marshall provide an 
excellent summary of Gadamer's use of the term Er, fahrung. 
This kind of `experience' is not the residue of isolated moments, but an ongoing 
integrative process in which what we encounter widens our horizons but only by 
overturning an existing perspective, which we can then perceive was erroneous or 
at least narrow. Its effect, therefore, is not simply to make us `knowing, ' to add 
to our stock of information, but to give us that implicit sense of broad 
perspectives, of the range of human life and culture, and of our own limits, that 
constitutes a non-dogmatic wisdom. 147 
Gadamer does not stop at Hegel but incorporates Plato's dialectic and the 
Socratic dialogue in his formulation of the hermeneutical role of experience. 148 
Whenever we experience something, we experience it as either this or that. It is because 
we don't know what our experience will be that we need to ask questions. "We cannot 
have experiences without asking questions. -149 
There are three aspects to the questioning nature of experience which are crucial 
for Gadamer's hermeneutic. The first is that we must recognise our ignorance in order to 
of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1913), s. v. "Historiography, " by Ernst 
Troeltsch, 6.718. 
145 For Gadamer "experience finds its fulfillment not in knowledge per se, but in a knowledge 
that opens onto ever new experiences. Hence Gadamer replaces the Hegelian 
conception of absolute knowledge with the phenomenological conception of experience 
which is finite through and through, whereby philosophy becomes an unending 
hermeneutical exposition rather than the drive toward a consummated system. " Kisiel, 
"Ideology Critique and Phenomenology, " 159. 
146 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 87. 
147 Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, "Translator's Preface, " in Truth and Method, 
xiii. 
148 Gadamer, Truth and Method 464; Frederick G. Lawrence, "Translator's Introduction, " in 
Reason in the Age of Science, xxi; Sullivan documents how these concepts were formulated 
by Gadamer during the very early stages of his academic career from his research on 
Aristotle and Plato. Robert R. Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989). 
149 Gadamer, Truth and Method 362. 
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ask a question which reveals something about the object. There must be an openness to 
the questions we ask because the answer has not yet been settled. In contrast to 
assertions and propositions which flatten and reduce meaning, questions allow meaning 
to emerge through our dialogical experience in a conversation with a partner or text. 150 
Second, an open question contains both positive and negative judgements. This is 
similar to Hegel's thesis and antithesis. However, instead of the sublation of both the 
positive and negative judgements (thesis and antithesis) into a higher synthesis, Gadamer 
argues that knowledge results when we judge something correct and exclude what is 
wrong. 151 "What decides a question is the preponderance of reasons for the one and 
against the other possibility. " 152 The process of gaining knowledge in this way requires 
that we are able to consider and project possibilities for the subject-matter, of its "being 
like this and being like that" which results in the exclusion of other possibilities. 153 
The third aspect to the questioning nature of experience concerns two elements 
or areas from which questions arise. The first area from which questions arise is the 
subject-matter, die Sache. "To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be 
conducted by the subject-matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. "154 
Genuine questioning requires openness for the claims of the other to be considered. This 
creates the hermeneutical space for all the other possibilities of meaning to come into 
play. It does not mean that we leave the subject-matter undecided, but that we ask 
questions about it until the truth emerges. A question must be directed at the subject- 
matter. 155 The advantage to the logic of question and answer is that it is directed toward 
what we can learn from the subject-matter of a text. The second area from which 
questions arise is the horizon of the questioner. Our questions arise from our present 
concerns. This means that our horizon limits the possibilities or openness of the 
150 Ibid., 469. "Thus Gadamer concludes: 'In the assertion, the horizon of meaning of what 
actually wants to be said is concealed with methodical exactitude, ' - precisely by its 
abstraction from the background of what is unsaid. " Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and 
Universal History, " 124. 
151 Sullivan, 85. 
152 Gadamer, 365. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 367. 
155 Gadamer develops this concept from Aristotle and Hegel. From Aristotle, Gadamer argues 
that the appropriate form of knowledge and questioning is conditioned by the subject 
matter which it is addressing. And from Hegel he takes the idea that the dialectical 
movement of consciousness is always directed at a Ye Sache. Bernstein, 107 note 33. "I 
repeat again what I have often insisted upon: every hermeneutical understanding begins 
and ends with the thing itself. " Gadamer, "Problem of Historical Consciousness, " 159. 
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questions which can be asked. 156 Thus, there is a double hermeneutic to the structure of 
question and answer. On the one hand, we have an object or text which is the product 
of a historical situation and on the other hand, we have a questioner who is situated in a 
different historical horizon. Gadamer is taking a very balanced approach here. While he 
argues that our historical horizon definitely determines the perspective from which we 
question the text and as a result reveals certain aspects of the subject-matter, which other 
horizons may not, he also maintains that we can get at what die Sache truly is. 
The important point about effective-historical consciousness, then, is not only 
that inquiry is always oriented by our concerns; although Gadamer makes this 
point, his argument is also that inquiry is always inquiry into a subject-matter 
and that the consensus reached about this subject-matter can reveal something 
`true' about it. 157 
B. Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer 
In order to fully explicate the value of the logic of question and answer for history 
and hermeneutics, Gadamer turned to the person he called the `English Hegelian, ' R. G. 
Collingwood. 158 As Collingwood walked through Kensington Gardens day by day on 
his way to work during World War I, the Alfred Memorial began to obsess him. He 
began to ask himself what the architect had been attempting to accomplish when he 
designed this memorial. "What relation was there, I began to ask myself, between what 
he had done and what he had tried to do? Had he tried to produce a beautiful thing; a 
thing, I meant, which we should have thought beautiful? If so, he had of course 
failed. "t59 From this experience and his archaeological background he derived the 
premise that knowledge arose through asking the right questions. Statements and 
judgements about the past do not constitute historical knowledge by themselves. They 
156 "That an open question is not infinitely open means that it too is a leading question and 
gives direction, but its openness consists in its leading in several possible directions to 
several possible answers. " Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 207. 
157 Warnke, Gadamer, 146. The mistake that Richard Rorty makes in his appropriation of 
Gadamer is that he reduces the double hermeneutic to a single hermeneutic. He ignores 
Gadamer's concern for the subject-matter and as a result "All descriptions rather reflect 
`ways of coping' that refer simply to the purpose of those who forge them. " Ibid., 145; 
Bernstein, 97. See Rorty's arguments on this point in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, 357-359; idem, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 4-9. 
158 While Collingwood does not use the term hermeneutics, his program of history as an 
imaginative reconstruction of the past is hermeneutical. This is done through evidence 
found in the present and a re-enactment of the past thoughts. The goal is to know 
oneself, not to know the past as the past. John P. Hogan, "Hermeneutics and the Logic 
of Question and Answer: Collingwood and Gadamer, " Heythorp Journal 28 (1987), 264. 
159 Collingwood, Autobiography, 29. 
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must be understood in relation to the questions which they sought to answer. "I began 
by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken 
or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of 
language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must 
know what the question was 
... 
to which the thing he has said or written was meant as 
an answer. " 160 
Collingwood's logic of question and answer has a three part structure. First, each 
question and answer must be relevant and appropriate to the context in which it 
occurs. 161 The second and third elements of the logic of question and answer concern 
the `rightness' of the relationship between the question and the answer. 162 The idea that 
each question and answer must be relevant and appropriate to the context in which it 
occurs follows the hermeneutical circle between the part and the whole. As a `part', the 
question or answer belongs to a `whole' context. Gadamer comments, "What convinced 
me about Collingwood's logic of question and answer was not its methodological 
usefulness, which is ultimately trivial, but its validity (that transcends all methodological 
usage) according to which question and answer are utterly entangled with one 
another. "163 As such, the question and answer must be fitting to its position within a 
particular context. The interpreter's problem is that the original question, to which the 
text is an answer, is often left unstated in the text and is forgotten over time. In order to 
find out what the original question was, requires the use of historical methods since it is a 
historical problem. 1M Collingwood also recognises that the interpreter's understanding 
of the question which the text originally sought to answer always arises from within the 
horizon of the interpreter and will not be identical to the original question. 165 
It is not a passive surrender to the spell of another's mind; it is a labour of active 
and therefore critical thinking. The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he 
re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, 
160 Ibid., 31. 
161 Ibid., 37. 
162 See the following section, "The Rightness of the Question, " for a discussion of the second 
and third parts to the logic of question and answer. 
163 Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel, " 46. Question and answer is dialectical by nature. "The 
logic of question and answer proved itself a dialectic of question and answer in which 
question and answer are constantly exchanged and are dissolved in the movement of 
understanding. " Ibid., 47. 
164 Ibid., 39. 
165 Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 29. 
44 
criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can 
discern in it. 166 
This is seen in his third axiom concerning the reenactment of past thought by the 
historian. "Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of past thought incapsulated in a 
context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different 
from theirs. "167 At this point, there is a subtle but significant difference between 
Collingwood and Gadamer. Gadamer criticises Collingwood for attempting to 
reconstruct the original question according to the intentions of the author or agent. 168 
Instead, Gadamer argues that just as the meaning of the text goes beyond what the 
author intended, the interpreter's understanding of the text should be concerned with the 
meaning of the text itself. '69 However, Collingwood's position is not that far from 
Gadamer's on this point. For Collingwood, the historian re-enacts past thought in the 
present by interpreting the evidence available to him -a process that is close to 
Gadamer's interpretation of a text. 170 
1. Substantive and Genetic Understanding 
John Hogan suggests that we can, in a very general way, differentiate their 
approaches by labelling Collingwood's approach `contextualist' and Gadamer's 
`textualist'. 171 Gadamer makes a distinction between two forms of knowledge of truth: 
substantive and genetic. Substantive knowledge occurs when we understand the `truth' 
of something, we understand die Sache of the text. When we see the `truth' of Euclid's 
theorem that the sum of the square of the sides of a right triangle is equal to the square of 
the hypotenuse we have achieved a form of substantive understanding. This is what 
Hogan would term as a textualist form of understanding. Genetic understanding is 
needed when we cannot attain substantive understanding, "when one cannot see the 
point of what someone else is saying or doing that one is forced to explore the conditions 
under which that person says or does it. "172 We must investigate the background 
166 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926-1928, revised ed., Jan van der 
Dussen ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 215. 
167 Collingwood, Autobiography, 114. 
168 Gadamer cites Collingwood's approach to the Battle of Trafalgar as an example of this in, 
Truth and Method 371-73. 
169 Ibid., 350. 
170 Hogan, "Hermeneutics and the Logic of Question and Answer, " 273. 
171 Ibid., 273-274. In a footnote to this section Hogan points out that neither should be 
tagged as a contextualist or textualist. Ibid., 283, note 51. 
172 Warnke, Gadamer, 8. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 180-81; idem, "On the Problem of 
Self-Understanding, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 45-46. 
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conditions as to why someone wrote something, what was the historical situation which 
occasioned their writing what they did, so that we can understand why the author wrote 
what they did. A problem arises in Gadamer's hermeneutic in that he stresses substantive 
form of understanding and reduces the genetic understanding into the former. 
Gadamer fails adequately to distinguish these two senses of agreement, one of 
which entails a concrete unity of judgment and the other reflective and critical 
integration. In reducing the second sense of agreement to the first, moreover, he 
slips from investigation of the conditions of understanding to the basically 
conservative thesis according to which we are not only members of a tradition 
but also its ideological supporters. 173 
Georgia Warnke brings out the point that an interpreter can still be interested in genetic 
questions (background and context) even if he already understands die Sache. For 
example, we may want to understand how the Greeks came to discover geometry even 
after we understand Euclidean theorems. "To this extent Gadamer seems to have 
overstated his case in claiming that genetic questions arise only when understanding in its 
strongest sense has failed. "174 
If this reading of Gadamer is correct, then we must maintain both substantive 
and genetic forms of understanding as playing different yet essential roles in hermeneutic 
understanding. This is one area in which the work of Hans Robert Jauss strengthens the 
hermeneutical tradition he inherits from Gadamer. For Jauss, both forms of 
understanding are crucial; we not only need to pay careful attention to the subject-matter 
of the text, but we must also investigate the conditions in which the text was produced 
and first received if were are to have an adequate understanding of it. 175 
2. Matthew 28: Substantive and Genetic Understanding 
The contrast between Barth, Bultmann, and Jeremias' comments on Matthew 
28: 18-20 provide an illustration into the differences, problems, and values of substantive 
and genetic forms of understanding. 176 Barth's exegesis of the Great Commission 
provides an excellent example of a substantive approach to Matthew 28: 18-20.177 
"Barth's concern was not limited to a detailed historical and exegetical study of the 
173 Warnke, 106. 
174 Ibid., 9. 
175 See my discussion of this point in chapter 3, theses 2-4. 
176 The contrast between Barth's and Bultmann's hermeneutics was brought to my attention in: 
Werner G. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (N. Y.: 
Crossroad, 1991), 129-45. 
177 Karl Barth, "An Exegetical Study of Mt. 28: 18-20, " in The Theology of Christian Mission, ed. 
Gerald H. Anderson (Nashville: Abingdon, 1961): 55-71. 
46 
words, sentences or concepts. Rather he aimed at bringing to light the subject-matter of the 
text. " 178 According to Barth, this passage must be understood in light of the death and 
resurrection of Christ. '79 The resurrection and affirmation of Jesus' authority in 28: 18 is 
the basis for the commission. Jesus has the right and power to command the disciples 
the way he does and those who submit to the commission in Matthew 28: 18-20 fall 
under Jesus' authority in a more intimate manner. 180 "Go therefore and make disciples" 
not only founded the apostolic church, but it is a commission which was designed to be 
renewed with each successive generation. 
In the same manner Jesus 'made' apostles from the first disciples (Mark 3: 14-15), 
the apostles are called to make apostolic Christians of all others.... It is 
constantly renewed as listeners themselves become 'apostolic' and, as new 
disciples, begin to proclaim the good news. " 81 
Barth defined the scope of the commission, "to all nations, " according to two 
principles. First, it referred to people from every nation who were "received into 
discipleship. " These people then bring their respective nations within the reach of Jesus' 
teachings. 182 Second, it referred to people from the Gentile lands along with Israel. 
Jesus' grace was offered to the Gentiles because Israel had rejected it. The result was the 
recapitulation of the old Israel and the birth of the new eschatological community which 
was gathered from Jews and Gentiles. 183 "Baptising" and "teaching" described the 
manner in which disciples were to be made. Baptism was "the priestly function of 
objectively introducing others into the realm of God's reign. " This "messianic power" 
was originally exercised by Jesus; but now it has been delegated to his disciples. The 
baptism phrase was not a liturgical formula but spoke of the particular type of baptism 
that was to be administered. 184 "Teaching" was the transferral of Jesus' prophetic office 
178 Jeanrond, 130. 
179 This was a unique event in history, it was "the presence of the eschaton. " It was the 
"recapitulation of the history of Israel" and the inauguration of Jesus' reign in the church 
and the whole world. Barth., 57. 
180 "As the holder of this exousia Jesus stands behind the command of verse 19; he is the 
authority to those whom he sends out, and as such guarantees the implementation of the 
command to the disciples as well as against interference of third parties. Those who 
accept the command fall under this exousia; they are responsible to and covered by this 
authority. " Ibid., 61. 
181 Ibid., 63. 
182 Ibid., 64. 
183 "As recapitulation and anticipation, revealing the hidden reality of the eschatological 
community, the Great Commission is truly the most genuine utterance of the risen 
Jesus. " Ibid., 67; 64. 
184 "Baptizing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit means to give to 
someone the cleansing bath which certifies to him and to others that he belongs to this 
God. " Ibid., 67. 
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to nurture and guide others in the ways and works of disciples. They were to teach 
without omission the entirety of what Christ had commanded them. Therefore, teaching 
in the church could "only be repetitive of apostolic teaching. "185 In this manner, Barth 
explicates Matthew 28: 18-20 in a substantive manner by discussing the subject-matter of 
the text and the claims which he believes it makes upon the contemporary reader. 186 
In order to illustrate genetic understanding, I would like to make use of two 
different examples. First, Bultmann approached Matthew 28: 18-20 by means of the 
historical-critical method and form criticism. 187 This passage met two needs within the 
early church according to Bultmann. First, it gave them the assurance there was life after 
death. As such, it fell within the category of "Passion" stories, which were developed to 
teach that Jesus was victorious over death. '88 
To this class most particularly belong the Easter stories. It was only natural for 
belief in the resurrection of Jesus to find immediate expression in such stories; 
and doubtless such stories were already in circulation in the Palestinian Church. 
They then grew rapidly and were developed in various ways, and the Easter 
stories which we now read in the Synoptics have all received their form in the 
Hellenistic Church. 189 
Second, as the rite of baptism became more important the early church developed 
`legends' about this ritual. According to Bultmann, Matthew's record of the last 
appearance of Jesus was a legend which provided an authoritative basis for the ritual of 
baptism and was appended to the story of the empty tomb in the second century. 190 
If we compare Bultmann with Barth on this passage, we see that Bultmann's 
genetic approach weakens the claim of the text as expressed in Barth's interpretation. It 
185 "They need to be nurtured in this service in order that their works may become those of 
disciples and a Christian community may exist in the world. It exists only where the 
things commanded by Jesus are 'observed. ' This nurturing of the Gentiles who, by 
baptism, become servants of the Triune God, is the task of the apostles. As the witnesses 
to Jesus' life and resurrection, they are entrusted with the task for all times and in all' 
places. All others receive it only from them secondhand. " Ibid., 69. 
186 The goal of exegesis for Barth was that God might reveal himself through the words of the 
scriptures. "God's revelation in the human word of Holy Scripture not only wants but 
can make itself said and heard. " Karl Barth, Church Dogmatic.; trans. G. W. Bromiley 
and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-1969), 1/2.502. 
187 The presupposition which the interpreter can never dismiss is the historical-critical method 
for studying the Bible. Rudolf Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions 
Possible?, " trans. Schubert M. Ogden, in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf 
Bultmann, ed. Schubert M. Ogden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), 291. 
188 Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (N. Y.: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1963), 288. 
189 Ibid., 305. 
190 "We have indicated how the story of Baptism quickly became a cult legend in the 
Hellenistic Church. We must in the same way also recognize the command to baptize in 
Matt. 28: 16-20 as a cult legend. " Ibid., 306; 151,157,286. 
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also seems to fall prey to Gadamer's criticism that method can constrain the possibilities 
of the text. In this instance, the claim of the Great Commission is not heard because the 
method closed off that possibility in advance. 
Jeremias provides us with the second example of someone seeking a genetic 
understanding of the text when he compares Matthew 28: 18-20 with the cultural 
background of coronation rituals in the ancient East. These rituals consisted of three 
actions: (1) the elevation, (2) the presentation or proclamation, and (3) the 
enthronement of the new king. Jeremias tries to show how these elements are contained 
Matthew 28: 18-20.191 Jeremias saw this coronation of Jesus as a literary device used by 
Matthew to signify that the Kingdom of God had come as a result of Jesus' death and 
resurrection. While his conclusions are similar to Barth's, he arrived at it by investigating 
the historical background in which the text arose, through genetic understanding. 192 In 
this example, substantive and genetic understanding complement one another. Not only 
that, but Jeremias' results strengthen Barth's interpretation by helping the modern reader 
to grasp the expression of the claim to royal authority which the original readers and 
hearers would have experienced in this passage. However, as the example from 
Bultmann demonstrated, we must be careful which methods we employ in genetic 
studies because of the manner in which a method has the possibility of closing off our 
openness to the claims of the text. 
3. The Rightness of the Question 
If the first part of structure of the logic of question and answer is that the 
question and the answers it receives must be relevant and appropriate to the context in 
which it occurs, the second and third parts concern the `rightness' of the question. The 
second part concerns the rightness of the question to the subject-matter under study. 
"Each question had to `arise'. "193 By this Collingwood means that the question must be 
related to and appropriate to the subject-matter of the text. If this dimension of the 
question is missing, then we tend to classify it as a bad question and possibly refuse to 
191 Jeremias is indebted to Otto Michel for recognizing this in Matt. 28: 18-20. Joachin 
Jeremias, Jesus' Promise to the Nations, trans. S. H. Hooke (London: SCM Press, 1958; 
reprint Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 39. 
192 "Hence the implication of Matt. 28: 18-20 is that with the death and resurrection of Jesus 
the eschatological hour has arrived. God no longer limits his saving grace to Israel, but 
turns in mercy to the whole Gentile'world. Henceforth the eschatological people of God 
are to announce to all nations that they too belong to the kingdom of the Son of Man. " 
Ibid.; 39. 
193 Collingwood, Autobiography, 37. 
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answer it, "there must be that about it whose absence we condemn when we refuse to 
answer a question that it `doesn't arise'. " 194 
Third, the answer must be the `right' answer for the question. Collingwood is 
very careful in his choice of the term `right' to describe the relation between question and 
answer 
. 
By `right' he does not mean `true'. Rather, "The `right' answer to a question is 
the answer which enables us to get ahead with the process of questioning and 
answering. "195 Collingwood uses the example of a question which Socrates asked, 
"would you rather play draughts with a just person or a person who knows how to play 
the game? " The true answer, based on logic, would be the just person since it assumes 
that justice and playing a game of draughts are compatible. However, the right answer is 
the second person since it forms a link with the chain of questioning in that they move 
the process forward through correlation or clarification. 196 Collingwood's logic of 
question and answer redefines how we view terms such as truth and meaning. "Whether 
a given proposition is true or false, significant or meaningless, depends on what question 
it was meant to answer; and anyone who wishes to know whether a given proposition is 
true or false, significant or meaningless, must find out what question it was meant to 
answer. " 197 
The basis for this is found in Collingwood's criticism of propositional logic. The 
mistake propositional forms of logic make is that they link truth and meaning with 
grammar. And grammar is further reduced to the unit of thought found in the indicative 
sentence. Instead, Collingwood argues that every proposition is an answer to a question 
and you cannot understand the truth value or meaning of a proposition unless you know 
the question which it answers. 198 "It seemed to me that truth, if that meant the kind of 
thing which I was accustomed to pursue in my ordinary work as a philosopher or 
historian 
... 
something that belonged not to any single proposition, nor even, as the 
coherence theorists maintained, to a complex of propositions taken together; but to a 
194 A question which is related to or appropriate for the subject matter "is what we ordinarily 
call a sensible or intelligent question, not a silly one, or in my terminology it `arises'. "
Ibid., 37-38. 
195 Ibid., 38. 
196 Ibid., 37-38. 
197 Ibid., 39 
198 Ibid., 33-37. For Collingwood the meaning of a statement is not a constant, "but is a 
variable which depends on the question it comes to answer. Even the truth value of a 
statement, he was bold enough to assert, can vary from question to question. " Joseph 
Agassi, "Questions of Science and Metaphysics, " The Philosophical Forum, 5 (1974), 
536. 
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complex consisting of questions and answers. " 199 Collingwood gives the following two 
statements as an example: "The contents of this box are one thing" and "The contents of 
this box are many things". According to propositional theories of truth and logic, these 
statements appear to be contradictory. However, if we look at them from the logic of 
question and answer the contradiction disappears because they may have been the answer 
to the following two questions: "Are the contents of the box one chess set or many? " and 
"Are the contents of the box one chess piece or many? " The contradiction which a critic 
may have accused the person of making in their statements was never part of the person's 
thought or answers. Rather, the contradiction was "foisted upon it by the critic. "too 
This is a significant point for the history of a text's interpretation or influence. 
The logic of question and answer helps to explain how we may have different 
interpretations of a passage of scripture through a tradition without being contradictory 
or being reduced to incommensurable paradigms of interpretation. If interpretations are 
judged on the basis of their rightness, then there can be more than one `right' interpretation. 
This stands in opposition to the traditional view that the interpretation should be ` true, 
implying that there is only one correct interpretation. However, just because there can be more 
than one right interpretation it does not mean that there are no wrong interpretations. 
While Collingwood does not explicitly define his view of history as 
hermeneutical, his logic of question and answer is very hermeneutical. For Collingwood, 
the past has no value until it is interpreted by someone in the present. "The questioning 
process, under the influence of history, goes on, forming a spiral gradually replacing error 
with truth, but remaining essentially open. "201 This is very compatible with Gadamer's 
concept of the process of the transmission of a tradition and our interpretations of the 
texts within that tradition. In this process, our prejudices undergo a filtering process as 
inappropriate prejudices or questions are replaced with appropriate ones. The 
questioning process possesses the characteristics of Gadamer's ` bad infinite' also. "Each 
generation and each individual raises new questions and gains a different perspective on 
history. For that reason the questioning process goes on, and history must be re-written by 
each generation. "202 
199 Collingwood, Autobiography, 37. 
200 Ibid., 40-41. 
201 Hogan, "Hermeneutics and the Logic of Question and Answer, " 269. 
202 Collingwood, Autobiography, 86 emphasis mine. 
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C. Gadamer's Dialogical Question and Answer 
Like Heidegger and Hegel, Collingwood's influence on Gadamer is difficult to 
underestimate. "Gadamer's enthusiasm for Collingwood's logic of question and answer 
is almost total. "203 However, Gadamer moves beyond Collingwood in two particular 
lines of thought. The first concerns the dialogical nature of understanding and the 
second concerns the expansion of horizons which the logic of question and answer 
enables. 
1. Gadamer s Devaluation of Answers 
As we saw above, Gadamer attempts to seek a balance between the subject- 
matter, die Sache, and the interpreter and her horizon. This involves a double 
hermeneutic. This is the first adaptation Gadamer makes to Collingwood's logic of 
question and answer. Gadamer agrees with Collingwood's axiom that we can only 
understand a text or statement when we have understood it as a question. However, for 
Gadamer, not only does the historian ask questions about the text but at the same time 
he or she is questioned by the text. "I have moved a step beyond the logic of question 
and answer as Collingwood had developed it, in that not only does one's world 
orientation, as he held, find expression in what develops between the speaking of 
question and answer; it also happens to us from the side of the things [Dingen] that are 
the topic of conversation. That is to say, the subject-matter [Sache] `raises questions' 
[' ibt Fragen auf]. "204 He adopts Collingwood's argument that we must understand the 
question to which the text is a response. But then he goes beyond Collingwood 
- 
to 
understand a text as a question we must see it as a real question for us also. 205 
For Collingwood, the questioning process is initiated from the interpreter's side, 
questions only arise from `real' life situations of the interpreter. 206 However, at the same 
time we can see that the seeds of Gadamer's dialogical approach are inherent in 
Collingwood. The question which arises from the practical life situations of the 
203 Hogan, 270. Gadamer considered Collingwood's Autobiography so significant he is 
responsible for its translation and publication in German. Gadamer, "The Heritage of 
Hegel, " 64-65, note 14; Truth and Method, 370, note 315. 
204 Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical journey, " trans. Richard E. Palmer, in The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Library of Living 
Philosophers, vol. 24, Paul Arthur Schilipp and Lewis Edwin Hahn eds. (Chicago and 
London: Open Court, 1997), 43. 
205 Georgia Warnke, "Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: A Gadamerian Critique of Rorty, " 
Inquiry, 28 (1985), 349. 
206 "Every historical problem ultimately arises out of `real' life. " Collingwood, Autobiography, 
114. 
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interpreter may lead to the questions which the text originally sought to answer or may 
raise new questions which the interpreter must answer. As the interpreter asks questions 
of the text, new questions arise in response to the answers he receives. Collingwood 
touches on this in his discussion of Lord Nelson's asking whether he should remove his 
military decorations in the midst of a battle. "No question that arises in this primary 
series, the series constituting my `real' life, ever requires the answer `in honour I won 
them, in honour I will die with them. " However, a question from the primary series of 
`real' life situation of the interpreter may lead to questions of another dimension, "and 
there live a life in which I not merely think about Nelson but am Nelson, and thus in 
thinking about Nelson think about myself. " 
Such secondary questions are 'incapsulatcd' according to Collingwood. By 
incapsulation, he means that such questions or thoughts are "perfectly alive" but are not 
part of the real life of the interpreter. There is a distance between the interpreter and the 
text or historical event of the past, a distance of which the interpreter remains conscious. 
At the same time, the processes and elements of our tradition which are passed down to 
us are incapsulated in the present 207 This is summarised in Collingwood's third axiom 
about history, "Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of past thought incapsulated in a 
context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from 
theirs. "208 Incapsulation can be seen as the means by which the text of the past 
contradicts, negates, challenges, or questions the horizon of the interpreter in a certain 
sense. In my discussion ofHegel's concept of sublation, I mentioned that Collingwood 
makes a parallel argument in that history is constituted by processes which are constantly 
being transformed and re-configured into new processes. In this way, the `traces' of the 
past are truly present in the contemporary world. The past lives on in the present by 
being incapsulated in it. One of the tasks of the historian or interpreter of a text from 
the past is to raise to consciousness how the past is incapsulated in the present. 
But suppose the past lives on in the present; though incapsulated in it, and at first 
sight it is hidden beneath the present's contradictory and more prominent 
features, it is still alive and active; then the historian may very well be related to 
the non-historian as the trained woodsman is to the ignorant traveller. `Nothing 
207 Ibid., 113,141-42. Collingwood makes the analogy to a person who stops smoking but the 
desire to smoke remains incapsulated in him. The same phenomenon happens within 
cultures. We may think that once a society denounces something like warfare the 
residue of such thoughts will be gone within a generation or two. However, while the 
first generation may give it up, it is still incapsulated in what is passed down to future 
generations in the shape of stories about heroism or the glories of a just war. Ibid., 142. 
208 Ibid., 114 italics mine. 
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here but trees and grass', thinks the traveller, and marches on. `Look', says the 
woodsman, `there is a tiger in the grass. ' The historian's business is to reveal the 
less obvious features hidden from a careless eye in the present situation. What 
history can bring to moral and political life is a trained eye for the situation in 
which one has to act. 209 
In pointing out the tiger in the grass, the way in which the traveller looks upon the forest 
is changed. His previous understanding has been negated and this situation will never 
appear the same way to him again. Thus, Gadamer's work can be seen to be a genuine 
development or expansion of Collingwood's thought in this particular area. 
Is Gadamer's idea that the logic of question and answer is dialogical by nature 
- 
not only does the interpreter ask questions of the text but the text asks questions of the 
interpreter 
- 
valid? Pannenberg thinks that while Gadamer is basically correct in his 
thought on this point, his argument needs to be slightly modified. He argues that 
Gadamer has underestimated the value and role which assertions play in any act of 
communication, especially those involving the study of texts from the past. Gadamer 
denies the value of assertions because they disguise the fact that as a statement they are an 
answer to a question and in doing so it "conceals the priority of the question and so also 
its past, the process of conversation by which it arose. "210 Assertions also sever what one 
is attempting to communicate from the totality of its unexpressed horizon of meaning. 
"Thus Gadamer concludes: `In the assertion, the horizon of meaning of what actually 
wants to be said is concealed with methodical exactitude, ' 
- 
precisely by its abstraction 
from the background of what is unsaid. "211 
The problem with assertions and statements for Gadamer is how they are 
employed by `method' to achieve exactness. Giving a statement while under 
interrogation is an example of this. "In a statement the horizon of meaning of what is to 
be said is concealed by methodical exactness; what remains is the `pure' sense of the 
statements. "212 This always results in a flattening and reduction of meaning. However, 
209 Ibid., 100. 
210 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 206. A question also limits the truth claims of an 
assertion. "For what then is a question? Surely something that one has to understand 
and that one does understand only when one understands the question itself in terms of 
something, that is, as an answer; and in doing so one limits the dogmatic claim of any 
proposition. " Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel, " 46-47. 
211 Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " 124. 
212 Gadamer, 469. Gadamer is drawing on Heidegger's concept that assertions are a mode of 
Being-in-the-world but at the same time they restrict the range of understanding. In 
making an assertion we reveal or bring attention to a definite aspect of something. For 
example, we may point out that the hammer is too heavy or broken. At the same time, 
while communicating an aspect of how something shows itself, we also restrict our view 
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Pannenberg is much more positive about the role of assertions and argues that 
communication would not be possible without assertions. 213 In order to restore a text to 
its original context requires the use of assertions to explicate what was written and its 
background. Gadamer's hermeneutic requires the use of assertions if there is to be a 
fusion of horizons according to Pannenberg. Coming to an understanding about a 
subject-matter of a conversation (or fusion of horizons) involves the predicative sense of 
language. But the, predicative character of language is always proportional: it always 
involves a degree of objectivity and subjectivity. 214 This is not the same type of 
positivistic or methodological use of statements that restrict language to which Gadamer 
objected. 215 Thus, Pannenberg's defence of the role of assertions seems to be a valid 
criticism and correction which helps to modify Gadamer's hermeneutic and restore a 
balance between questions and answers from Gadamer's polemical argument in favor of 
the question 216 
2. Gadamer: Questions and Horizons 
The second manner in which Gadamer expands Collingwood's logic of question 
and answer concerns the potential of questions to expand the horizon of the interpreter. 
While this concept can be easily found in Collingwood's work (for example, in his 
illustration of the woodsman and the tiger in the grass), Gadamer elaborates how this 
expansion of horizons occurs. 217 In order to understand how questions function in this 
manner, we need to understand his view of the Socratic dialectic. Socrates based his 
philosophical method on the art of asking questions. In order for two people to have 
conversation with the possibility of reaching a mutual understanding about a subject- 
matter, both partners in the dialogue must realist that they do not possess all the answers 
of it. This restriction of view closes down the possibilities of understanding something. 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 197-99. 
For Heidegger, "assertions modify rather than annihilate the significance-structure of 
interpretation 
- 
it dwindles or is simplified rather than being negated. " Stephen 
Muthall, Heidegger and Being and Time, in Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks, ed. Tim 
Crane and Jonathan Wolff (London and N. Y.: Routledge, 1996), 91. 
213 Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " 125. 
214 Ibid., 127. 
215 Sullivan brings this out very clearly in his discussion of Bildung and Altertumw&senschaias 
the background to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic. Sullivan, Political 
Hermeneutics, 20-52. 
216 Gadamer privileges the quest and question over knowledge and method which seek 
exactness. Gadamer, Truth and Method 362. 
217 Collingwood, Autobiography, 100. 
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but are concerned with finding the answers. 218 If assertions flatten and reduce the 
content of meaning, they also close off the possibility for further conversation and 
questioning. 219 Whereas the openness in the form of the question preserves the 
possibility for further disclosures of truth. In fact, the openness of the question comes 
from the fact that the answer is not yet settled. "Questions always bring out the 
undetermined possibilities of a thing. That is why we cannot understand the 
questionableness of something without asking real questions 
.... 
To understand the 
questionableness of something is already to be questioning. "220 
Questions by nature are restricted and at the same time uncontrolled. They are 
restricted in the sense that they arise from within the horizon of the interpreter. They 
arise from our preconceptions and prejudices. "They [questions] are bounded by a 
horizon. Within this horizon, openness consists in the possibility of the thing's being 
this way or that; but each of these possibilities must have been determined beforehand, 
and their determinacy marks the limits of a question's horizon. "221 The question is also 
restricted by the subject-matter of the text, it must be appropriate to the subject-matter. 
At the same time, the question is not determined or under the control of a subject who 
questions the text. Questions come upon us like a sudden idea, ein EinfalL It is the 
sudden revelation of the question that advances the openness and possibilities of 
understanding and makes an answer possible. 
The real nature of the sudden idea is perhaps less that a solution occurs to us like 
an answer to a riddle than that a question occurs to us that breaks through into 
the open and thereby makes an answer possible. Every sudden idea has the 
structure of a question. But the sudden occurrence of the question is already a 
breach in the smooth front of popular opinion. Hence we say that a question too 
`occurs' to us, that it `arises' or `presents itself more than that we raise it or 
present it. 222 
The interpreter is struck with questions from two directions, they come upon him like a 
sudden idea and they arise from the subject-matter of the text. 
However, Gadamer wants to avoid any dichotomy between subject and object 
and therefore argues that these questions merge with one another in the "play" of reading 
218 Socrates would question his opponents to reveal that their arguments were not as secure or 
sound as they assumed. In this way he placed them on an equal footing with him so that 
they could engage in an open discussion starting from a position of ignorance. Sullivan, 
Political Hermeneutics, 80-83; 104-7. 
219 Ibid., 80-84. 
220 Gadamer, Truth and Method 375. 
221 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 207. 
222 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 366. 
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or interpretation. 223 The interpreter is also the interpreted, in the play of interpretation 
the interpreter questions the text and the text places questions to the interpreter for 
which he/she does not already possess an answer. The question which the text addresses 
to us is related to the question which the text originally answered in such a way that we 
cannot understand the one without the other. "With Collingwood, we can say that we 
understand only when we understand the question to which something is the answer, but 
the intention of what is understood in this way does not remain foregrounded against 
our own intention. Rather, reconstructing the question to which the meaning of a text is 
understood as an answer merges with our own questioning. For the text must be 
understood as an answer to a real question. "224 
This merging or mediation of the question raised by the text and the interpreter 
is part of what Gadamer terms the fusion of horizons. It is important to remember that 
for Gadamer the fusion of horizons involves a double hermeneutic, both the text and the 
interpreter contribute to the fusion of horizons. In this process, not only are new 
possibilities for understanding the subject-matter of the text disclosed but at the same 
time the prejudices of the interpreter's horizon are put at risk by the question of the text. 
"Thus disclosing new possibilities for questions and extending his own horizon by fusing 
it with that of the text 
.... 
being cognizant of his finitude, and realizing that he does not 
have the first word or the last, the interpreter holds himself open to history - that is, to 
the continuing event of truth. "225 Our engagement with the texts which have been 
handed down in a tradition will take the form of a hermeneutical spiral based on the 
double hermeneutic involved in question and answer, and the manner in which the logic 
of question and answer constantly remould the interpretive horizon in which we stand. 
N. HERMENEUTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND TRADITION 
A. Bildung 
In the next chapter, I plan to discuss how Gadamer conceptualises the encounter 
between an interpreter and a text in tradition. Before I move on to discuss those topics, 
there is one final topic I should address in this chapter. What type of knowledge does 
hermeneutical understanding consist of or produce? 
223 Ibid., 374. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 211. 
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The term which Gadamer uses to describe hermeneutical knowledge is `Bildung: 
Richard Rorty translates this as `edification. '226 By this, Rorty refers to the way in which 
we redescribe our world and thus `remake' ourselves in the process. He sees Gadamer 
shifting from "knowledge as the goal of thinking" to that of edification. In doing so, 
Rorty makes a strong distinction between two forms of thought: that of knowledge of 
things (or the real world) and how we use language to continually describe our world. 227 
Is this a fair reading of Gadamer's work? Jeff Mitscherling claims that Rorry is 
taking a very one-sided and superficial reading of Gadamer's work, especially concerning 
the term `Bildung: This term has a rich heritage in the German philosophical tradition 
which Gadamer specifically attempts to engage and to advance.. 228 The importance 
which Gadamer attributes to the concept of Bildung can be clearly seen in how he 
devotes the opening argument of Truth and Method to a discussion of the history and 
relevance of Bildung. 229 
In the German tradition, Bildungwas seen primarily in reference to the 
development of a person in relation to the image of God previous to Herder. 
"Bildwerden ist hier reines Anwesen und Empfangen Gottes, die Geburt des Sohnes in der 
Seele, ein transzendenter Vorgang ohne Mittel"230 After the introduction of Shaftesbury's 
work into German, Bildung took on a much more humanistic tone, the development of 
the human potential. It referred to the formation and development of the individual 
within the new and open society developing in Germany during that time. This can be 
seen in the works of Herder, Hegel, Humboldt, and Heidegger. 231 
For Hegel, the classical texts of antiquity played a crucial role in this formation of 
the individual. As we saw in his dialectic, there is a movement from the self to self- 
226 "Since `education' sounds a bit too flat, and Bildunga bit too foreign, I shall use `edification' 
to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of 
speaking. " Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 360. 
227 Ibid., 358-60. Warnke, Gadamer, 157-59. 
228 Jeff Mitscherling, "Resuming the Dialogue, " in Anti-Foundationalism and Practical 
Reasoning. Conversations between Hermeneutics and Analysis, ed. Evan Simpson 
(Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987), 132; Karsten R. Stueber, 
"Understanding and Objectivity: A Dialogue between Donald Davidson and Hans 
Georg Gadamer, " in Hermeneutics and Truth, 183; Warnke, Gadamer, 159. 
229 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 3-41. 
230 "Being formation is here the pure property and possession of God, the birth of the Son in 
the soul, a transcendental process without means. " Joachim Ritter ed., Historisches 
Wortbuch der Philosophie, vol. 1 (Basel: Scwabe, 1971-1995), s. v. "Bildung, " by E. 
Lichtenstein, 922. 
231 "Der wahren Moral erstes Gesetz'ist jür Humbaa7t. - bih Dich selbst und nur ihre zweites. - 
wirke aufander durch das, was Du bist"' Ibid., 926. This idea is echoed in Heidegger's 
axiom, "Become what you are. " Being and Time, 186. 
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alienation and finally a return to the self which characterises the process of Bildung. 232 
In this instance, self-consciousness "has actuality only in so far as it alienates itself from 
itself; by so doing, it gives itself the character of authentication and actuality. "233 In the 
development of self-consciousness, a person must raise his consciousness above his 
particularity to the level of universality. This takes place within the realm of culture. 234 
In raising above our individuality, we encounter the universal (our culture or tradition) 
which changes us. "This individual moulds itself by culture into what it intrinsically is, 
and only by doing so is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence; the measure of 
culture is the measure of its actuality and power. "235 Hegel found the texts and ideas of 
antiquity especially suited for the development of the individual since they are "remote 
and alien enough to effect the necessary separation" and they possess `actuality and 
power. '236 Gadamer sums up the significance of Hegel's view of Bildungwhcn he writes: 
Every single individual who raises himself out of his natural being to the spiritual 
finds in the language, customs, and institutions of his people a pre-given body of 
material which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own.... Historically, 
Bildung is not to be understood only as the process of raising the mind to the 
universal; it is at the same time the element within which the educated man (Gebildete) moves. 237 
While historical and philological methods may help us to study the past they are 
derivative or specialised forms of understanding. Bildung is the universal form of 
. 
understanding or knowledge which underlies all other forms of understanding, especially 
in history and the Geisteswissenschaften. 
It is not enough to observe more closely, to study a tradition more thoroughly, if 
there is not already a receptivity to the "otherness" of the work of art or of the 
past. That is what, following Hegel, we emphasized as the general characteristic 
of Bildung: keeping oneself open to what is other - to other, more universal 
232 See the discussion of Hegel's slave/master relationship above. Paul Ricceur also brings out 
how our understanding the other results in the growth of the interpreter's "own 
understanding of himself. " Paul Ricaur, The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in 
Hermeneutics ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 17. 
233 Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, 297. 
234 "What, in relation to the single indsvidua' appears as his culture, is the essential moment of 
the substance itself, viz. the immediate passage of the [mere] thought-form of its 
universality into actuality; of culture as the simple soul of the substance by means of 
which what is implicit in the substance, acquires an acknowledged real exsstence" Ibid., 
298-99. 
235 Ibid., 298. 
236 Gadamet', Truth and Method, 14 
237 Ibid. 
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points of view. It embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to 
itself, and hence consists in rising above itself to universality. 238 
Bildung is the cultivation of consciousness to be open, to learn from experiences, and 
tradition. It is a sense which enables the interpreter to perceive in concrete situations the 
possibilities open to him or her. 239 It does not refer to the type of education which 
involves factual knowledge or technical expertise. Instead it refers to the type of 
education which teaches a person to think for him or herself, to make judgements and to 
realise the possibilities and limitations in a situation. Bildungis not just an awareness 
that there are different ways of understanding something or seeing the world, but it also 
involves the ability to discriminate and make judgements. In this sense, it is a "universal 
and common sense" which arises within "an extensive historical context. "240 "Hence, we 
do not simply adopt the views of our object or the tradition; rather, the way we 
understand their truth already involves application to our situation and hence 
modification in line with our circumstances. "241 Gadamer's goal is not to elevate the 
"bygone days regarding the value of a well-rounded education. " Rather his concept of 
Bildungconcerns the manner "in which an individual grows to become an active, 
responsible member of society which is determined by intersubjective values and which 
also develops through the contributions which each member makes. "242 
B. Vico and Sensus Communis 
However, because of the manner in which Hegel's dialectic leads to absolute 
knowledge Gadamer turns to other thinkers to define this term more clearly. 243 
Continuing in his archaeology of the concept of Bildung, Gadamcr turns to Vico for the 
238 Ibid., 17. For Collingwood, the application of historical rules (no matter how carefully they 
are followed) is not what constitutes true historical knowledge. Historical methods 
inherently have a "low potential because they involve a certain blindness to the realities 
of the situation. " Autobiography, 106. What is required is that the historian possess 
insight or intuition so that they may grasp the uniqueness of the historical situation or 
text and be able to apply it to their situation. "It was precisely because history offered us 
something altogether different from rules, namely insight, that it could afford us the help 
we needed in diagnosing our moral and political problems. " Ibid., 101. 
239 Mitscherling defines Gadamer's use of Bildungin the following manner. "Bihdungis that 
process whereby the individual becomes critically self-conscious both of the role played 
by these `handed-down' prejudices in his or her thought and of the practical value of 
these prejudices in the preservation or the attainment of the well-being of the individual 
and society as a whole. " Jeff Mitscherling, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and `The 
Tradition', " Man and Worl4 22 (1989), 249. 
240 Gadamer, Truth and Methoa; 17. Warnke, Gadamer, 160. 
241 Warnke, 96. 
242 Mitscherling, "Resuming the Dialogue, " 132. 
243 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 15. 
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notion of sensus communis in order to show the relation between the individual and 
culture. Sensus communis is not an abstract form of universal reason but is instantiated in 
particular communities or nations at particular times. It allows one to judge what is right 
or wrong and gives the "human will its direction". As a result, it is also what founds a 
community or culture. Not only is the individual developed within his or her 
community's sensus communis, but as the individual is formed the sensus communis is 
also reshaped and developed. 244 
During the nineteenth century, the German philosophical tradition evacuated 
the richness of meaning which was previously contained in the concepts of sensus 
communis and Bildung. 245 Instead of following Vico, Hegel, and Shaftesbury who 
incorporated sensus communis into their philosophical systems, the German philosophical 
tradition pursued the direction set by Kant and Goethe. The philosophical consequences 
of this can be seen in the manner in which Kant reduced senses communis to taste. In 
doing so, sensus communis was reduced to subjectivism and denied, its role in imparting 
knowledge. 246 This is the reason why Gadamer devotes so much attention to these 
concepts, he is attempting to swim against the current of his philosophical tradition. 
The primary work of Vico's which Gadamer cites is On the Study Methods of our 
Time in which Vico attacked the Cartesian method and attempted to defend the role and 
primacy of sensus communis. 247 Vico argued that Descartes pursued a single method for 
truth and in doing he so rejected all other forms of truth. The danger that Vico saw in 
this was that the `old truths' of tradition would be lost. He argued that the classical 
ideals of sapientia, eloquentia, and prudentia were required for social life and these, in 
turn, presupposed some form of sensus communis. A person schooled under the Cartesian 
method would become an expert or scholar, but someone trained in senses communis 
would be a wise man and, according to Vico, the scholar will always depend on the wise 
man. "Thinking well, speaking well, and acting well are crucial to life in the civil 
world. "248 As such, Vico offers a corrective to the methodological approach of the 
244 Ibid., 21-23. 
245 The exception to this was the Pietist movement which maintained the concept of serous 
cammum'r, especially in the works of Christoph Oetinger. Ibid., 27-30. 
246 Ibid., 26,33-34,42-44. 
247 Ibid., 19 note 25; Donald Phillip Verene, "Gadamer and Vico on Sensuf Communirand the 
Tradition of Humane Knowledge, " in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 139. 
248 Verene, 140. For Gadamer, Bildung is connected with tact, judgment and taste. Natural 
science excludes these categories, "But Gadamer's argument is that this is a mistake, that 
tact, taste and judgment instance a practical knowledge of how to discriminate between 
good and bad, right and wrong, important and unimportant and so on. In other words, 
they reflect a capacity for recognizing truth which perhaps cannot be reduced to method 
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humanities of which Gadamer is so critical. He offers a model in which the old truths of 
tradition play an important role in the development of not only the individual, but also 
the continuing formation of the community in which they live. 
C. The Hermeneutical Relevance of Aristotle's Phronesis 
The reduction of the meaning of sensus communis and Bildung in the German 
tradition played a formative role in Gadamer's early work, a role which continued 
throughout his entire career. During the nineteenth century a struggle erupted in the 
Geisteswissenschaften in German universities. The concept of Bildung, as the cultivation 
of great ideas, was exchanged for the methodological approach of the 
Altertumwissenschaft the accumulation of facts from history based on method. The idea 
of the formation of the soul in German education was decimated with the rise of 
Altertumwissenschaft249 As a result, "Modern universities 
... 
tend to be populated by 
savants rather than thinkers. "250 In one of Gadamer's earliest works, "Aristotle's 
Protrepticos and the Historical Mode of Looking at Aristotle's Ethics, " the manner in 
which he interpreted Aristotle and Plato was in part an attempt to address this problem 
in German higher education. 
Gadamer uses Bildung and sensus communis to outline the relationship between 
the individual and the universal, culture or tradition. The task of application is "central 
problem of hermeneutics" and shares a similar structure between the part and the 
whole. 251 In order to explain how universal forms of knowledge (such as rules or goals) 
are related to the particular situations or problems in the movement of application, 
Gadamer incorporates Aristotle's formulation of phronesis. In the essay "Praktisches 
Wissen, " Gadamer demonstrates how Aristotle's concept of phronesis is the capacity which 
enables someone to think on-the-spot. 252 Practical knowledge, phronesis, is a historical 
form of knowledge since it is always employed in concrete situations. 253 Through it "one 
and for which there are no clear rules but which remains a form of knowledge equal to 
modern science itself. " Warnke, Gadamer, 159. 
249 Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics, 20-24,165. Gadamer is not the first to react against this 
trend but stands in the line of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. 
250 Ibid., 112. 
251 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 315. 
252 This early unpublished essay has recently been included in Gadamer's Gesammelte Werke 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1993), 5: 230-48. Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle's were the 
stimulus for Gadamer's interest in Aristotle's ethics. Sullivan, 122; Gadamer, 
"Reflections, " 9. 
253 Gadamer, "Praktisches Wirsen, " 241. 
62 
can accumulate life experience and thus gain a sense of how to act in a unique 
situation. "254 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses three different forms of knowledge, 
episteme, techne and phronesis. 255 Episteme is an exact form of knowledge of unchanging 
truths which can be tested by coherence or correspondence. Because techne and phronesis 
are both intellectual habits which are concerned with application according to Aristotle, 
Gadamer is very interested in the subtle distinctions between the them. 256 Techne is an 
exact form of knowledge but it differs from episteme in that its telos is the application of 
knowledge to a concrete situation. The mastery of a craft or skill, such as throwing 
pottery, is a good illustration of the type of knowledge involved in techne. As such, it can 
be learned through both experience and teaching. The distinction between techne and 
phronesis is not as clear cut. While they are similar, in that both are concerned with the 
question of the application of knowledge to concrete situations, there are several 
significant differences between them. First, while we can learn techne, we can also forget 
it. If we don't practice a craft for a few years we can forget those skills. However, 
phronesis is not a form of knowledge which we possess in advance (like the blueprint a 
craftsman may have for his project). Nor is it something we can leave behind or forget 
since we are always involved in applying it to the concrete situation in which we find 
ourselves. 257 Second, techne is teleological in nature, it is oriented towards the finished 
product or goal. Phronesis on the other hand cannot know the right means or ends in 
advance of the situation. Rather, in the situation phronesis involves the deliberation of 
finding the right means to the end of `well being. '258 And finally, phronesis involves self- 
knowledge, it is determined by and determines the moral well-being of man. It is bound 
to arete and oriented toward it. 259 "All of these examples throw into relief the final point 
of divergence between phronesis and techne: technical knowledge has not intrinsic, . 
254 Sullivan continues by showing how this contrasts with rechne, "But this prior knowledge 
( Vorwissen) is really a kind of 'prejudice, ' for the simple reason that there is no final 
guarantee that it will work. Technical knowledge, viewed as advance knowledge, is not 
really `prejudice' because it is guaranteed by the exactness of the scientific knowledge.... 
In its accumulated, historical form, it is always, at best, approximate, and that is why it is 
a matter of `prejudice. "' Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics, 132; Gadamer, "Prai! t&ches 
Wissen, " 239,241-42. 
255 Sullivan, 122-35; Paul Schuchman, "Aristotle's Phronesis and Gadamer's Hermeneutic, " 
Philosophy Today, 23 (1979), 44-48; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 314-24. 
Rod Coltman, The Language of Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Heidegger in Dialogue, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1998), 4,19. 
257 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 313. 
258 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 11.2; Coltman, 19-24. 
259 Gadamer, "Praktisches EVLssen, " 241-42. 
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existential relationship to the being of the craftsman; one can have techne and yet 
deliberately do a bad job, but if a man deliberately and habitually does what is wrong, he 
does not possess phronesis. "260 In the same manner, Gadamer argues that hermeneutical 
understanding and knowledge is not an abstract form of knowledge (episteme) or the 
result of the application of technical rules and methods (techne). Hermeneutical 
understanding and knowledge is tied to the concrete situations we find ourselves in and is 
bound up with the virtue and character of the interpreter. 
While I agree with most of what Gadamer's says about phronesis, I think his 
distinction between techneand phronesis is too strong and needs to be softened. Techne 
and phronesis are not competing forms of knowledge but techne is part and parcel of 
phronesis. While techne provides the type of knowledge which a craftsman may need to 
decide which methods to employ to reach a certain end, phronesis allows the interpreter 
to decide which skill, craft, or practice to employ in a situation. As such, phronesis not 
only functions after methods come to an end, but it also functions before one has 
decided how one is going to proceed in the situation, before the application of a method. 
Techne and phronesis should be seen as forms of knowledge which are in constant 
dialogue with and inform one another. In any practice, such as music, professionals must 
develop their skills, techne, through instruction, and rehearse the score to be performed. 
Pianists need to practice scales. Singers need voice coaches. The orchestra adheres to the 
conductor. In sports, the more professional one becomes, the more one must submit to 
regulations. In short, the `objective' and techne is inextricably intertwined in the 
performance. At the same time, the athlete in the game and the musician in the 
performance will enter into situations where the rules which they have learned break 
down, or come to an end. The ability to improvise is a highly valued ability in both 
music and sports and is a form of phronesis, to go beyond where the rules leave off. This 
involves the ability to make judgements about what is the best way to proceed in the 
present situation. It is not so much an intellectual judgement, but what is right in a 
practical and intersubjective frame of reference. 
The significance of the relationship between techne and phronesis can be seen 
when we must judge between different interpretative models or theories. The 
interpretive method we choose is not simply related to the aims of interpretation as 
Morgan and Barton argue 261 Rather, we exercise phrenesis before we decide which 
260 Schuchman, 46. 
261 Robert Morgan and John Barton, Biblical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 7,287. 
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method to employ, before we move to techne. At the same time, phronesis complements 
techne in that it enables the interpreter to go on when he or she encounters an exegetical 
problem for which they have not been trained to solve. The exercise of phronesis is not 
solipsistic, but is related to social institutions which determine the standards of excellence 
appropriate to the practice of biblical interpretation. These standards appear to operate 
in a manner similar to Wittgenstein's shared forms of life in the exercise of judgement. 262 
There is a criss-crossing and overlapping between institutions, traditions, and cultures 
which allow others to examine someone else's work and say, "That is truly exceptional 
work, " or "They applied. the wrong exegetical tools in this instance. " 
The relevance of phronesis for Gadamer's hermeneutic is grounded in the 
problem of application. The heart of the problem is how the same tradition is 
understood in different ways in different horizons. It involves the application of the 
universal (tradition or a text from that tradition) to the particular (the horizon of the 
interpreter). 263 The strength of Aristotle's concept of phronesis is that it incorporates all 
the elements involved in the movement of application. "The knowledge of which 
Aristotle speaks is characterised by the fact that it includes perfect application and 
employs its knowledge in the immediacy of a given situation. "264 As a form of 
knowledge, phronesis includes experience within itself. Unlike techne, we cannot separate 
moral knowledge from the particular situation. "In fact we shall see that this is perhaps 
the fundamental form of experience (ErfahrunO. "265 Phronesis also includes rynesis, the 
sympathetic understanding of the other which is required if we are going to be truly open 
to the other. 266 "Once again we discover that the person who is understanding does not 
know and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with 
the other from the perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were 
affected. "267 
D. Farley and the Practice of Theology 
In a manner which is very similar to Gadamer's criticism of the dominance of the 
method in the humanities and the loss of Bildung, Edward Farley argues that a parallel 
movement has taken place in theology. Before the Enlightenment, theology was a 
262 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 241. 
263 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 312. 
264 Ibid., 322. 
265 Ibid. 
266 This is related to our need for openness to the Other in a dialogue. 
267 Ibid., 323. 
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unified field of study which focused on the knowledge of God, a knowledge which was 
not abstract or impersonal. The medieval church understood theological knowledge to 
be wisdom, or habitus. With the rise of critical principles and methods in the 
Enlightenment, the idea of theology as habitus was replaced by theology as theological 
sciences. The encyclopaedic approach to theology brought about a fracturing of what 
used to be a unified discipline into numerous sciences (biblical studies, systematic 
theology, practical theology, etc., ) which are at best indirectly connected. 268 As a result, 
the various theological disciplines are often related closer to their satellite disciplines than 
they are with other theological disciplines. A clear example of this is how pastoral 
counselling is often more closely aligned with psychology than with biblical studies. 269 
Schleiermacher attempted to solve this problem by organising theology around 
the training of the clergy, much like a medical or law school was organised. "Their unity 
in other words is teleological and practical. "270 However, his proposal divided theology 
and practice into separate disciplines for educational purposes. It reduced practical 
theology to criteria gleaned from theological studies which were applied to church 
leadership. "In sum, theory and practice are related in this post-Schleiermacher solution 
as academic and applied aspects of training for clergy. "271 Farley seeks to address this 
fracturing of theology and the separation between theology and practice. "Our thesis in 
other words is that the very structure of theological studies alienates the whole enterprise 
from praxis. "272 
Farley sees two solutions to this problem. For the past three hundred years the 
church has tried the first solution, to organise theology around the training of the clergy. 
In contrast, Farley suggests that we consider taking a regional approach. The ideal, 
eschatological, and historical presence of the church, or the kingdom of God, is the 
region of theology. 273 Under this approach, theology as habitus must be restored. "I 
268 Edward Farley, "Theology and Practice Outside the Clerical Paradigm, " in Practical 
Theology: The Emerging Field in Theology, Church, and Worla ed. Don S. Browning (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), 22-5. A similar argument was made in a lecture 
delivered by John Webster, "Theological Theology, " 6 March 1998, University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham. 
269 Both Capps and Gerkin address this issue in their work. David Capps, Pastoral Care and 
Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 11; Charles V. Gerkin, The Living 
Human Document., Re- Visioning Pastoral Counselling in a Hermeneutical Mode (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1984), 11-22; Farley, 14,33-4. 
270 Farley, 28. 
271 Ibid., 28. 
272 Ibid., 29. 
273 See Pannenberg's argument that theology needs to take a history of religions approach in 
chapters 4-6 of Theology and the Philosophy of Science. 
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would submit that theological understanding is the telos, the aim of any course of 
theological study, whenever it occurs. "274 The unity of theology would be restored. And 
it must also include social and political praxis. 275 This would protect theology from 
becoming an institution which merely supports the status quo and also recognise the 
world transforming nature of this ecclesial presence. "Perhaps the central and perennial 
problem of grasping ecclesial presence lies here, how it can be redemptively persuasive of 
any and all social, political, and cultural spaces without itself becoming identical with any 
of them and developing official and timeless ecclesial-political institutions. "276 
Theology as habitus raises the question of how do we decide which cognitive 
interest is most appropriate for the phenomena at hand. It introduces the question of 
judgement as a controlling principle. As such, judgement demonstrates a type of moral 
knowledge that is not known in advance like techne because you cannot know the right 
means to an end in advance. 277 Thus, habitus is very similar to Gadamer's conception of 
phronesis which involves the development of the theologian rather than the teaching of 
technical methods, techne. It is, as Gadamer would say, dependent on Bildungor 
cultivation, not professional training. The biblical interpreter's habitus must be formed 
by serious dialogue with the Christian tradition which takes place through the fusion of 
horizons in the process of biblical interpretation and results in the enlarging of his/her 
horizon 
- 
not just individually but collectively as we11.278 Farley's idea of theology as 
habitus both demonstrates the relevance of Gadamer's hermeneutic not only for Biblical 
interpretation but also for theological education. 
SUMMARY 
Now that we have looked at Gadamer, we can see that there are points of 
resonance with Heidegger but at the same time he goes beyond his teacher. Gadamer's 
thought resolves the tension which Heidegger had between tradition and truth or 
knowledge. In his defence of tradition, Gadamer provides an epistemological basis for 
the importance which tradition plays in our understanding of the world, and in 
274 Farley, 37. 
275 Ibid., 36-38. 
276 Ibid., 39. Farley's proposal is supported by the works of Gerkin and Capps who try to 
restore the relationship of pastoral counselling to the other theological disciplines by 
appropriating a hermeneutical rather than a psychoanalytical model. 
277 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 321-2. 
278 The relation of habitus to pastoral counseling is one example of this. Both Capps and 
Gerkin realise that the prejudices and self-understanding of the pastoral counsellor is a 
crucial aspect of counseling. Gerkin, 57, Capps, 31-3,50. 
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particular for texts. He wants to raise to consciousness not just the fact that tradition 
plays a role in historical research but also explore its productive role in hermeneutical 
understanding. Hegel's concept of sublation, Collingwood's logic of question and 
answer, and the model of Socratic dialogue are all used by Gadamer to illustrate how we 
should approach tradition and the texts handed down through it to us. Sublation and 
the logic of question and answer explain how there can be both continuity and 
discontinuity within a tradition of interpretation. Through sublation he showed that 
each interpretation sublates the previous ones to which it is related and in the process 
transforms how we understand the text. Not only is our understanding of the text 
reconfigured but our view of previous interpretations have changed as well. The logic of 
question and answer demonstrates that the manner in which we interpret a text is tied to 
the horizon in which our questions arise and also to the subject-matter of the text. 
Therefore, on the one hand, we should not expect the history of a text's interpretation to 
exemplify a gradual linear accumulation of knowledge about that text. Rather, we should 
expect it to takes a twisted route, with unexpected twists and turns, new starts, and 
possible backtracking at points. On the other hand, since the subject-matter of the text 
is one of the partners in his double hermeneutic, the history of a text's interpretation will 
be characterised by elements of both convolution and continuity. 
Perhaps one of the more significant points in the chapter, is that what we learn 
through our encounter with tradition is greater than our individuality. When someone 
interprets a text, what is gained is not just an incremental increase in his or her personal 
knowledge. Rather, the interpreter has participated in a process of tradition. This can 
best characterised under the concept of Bildung. This is not a solipsistic form of 
knowledge but through his encounter with the text, he has been educated or formed 
(gebildete). At the same time the sensus communis of that tradition or community is 
reshaped and developed because of his encounter with the text. In other words, for 
Gadamer the biblical interpreter is a corporately rational being who cannot be separated 
from humanity's past or future. 
The knowledge which is passed down in tradition is not cumulative, as Hegel 
thought. Instead it is dynamic and constantly on the move. Through the processes of 
sublation, question and answer, and the movement of application the elements of 
tradition and our knowledge of texts such as the Bible are ceaselessly being translated, 
transformed, and expanded. This is not to say, as Rorty does, that philosophy (and other 
disciplines) boils down to an endless conversation. "Still, if others have used the insight 
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into historicity to jettison the idea of reason itself, Gadamer does not. Our historical 
situatedness does not only limit what we can know with certainty; it can also teach us 
how to remember and integrate what we must not forget. "288 Gadamer argues, by means 
of his double hermeneutic, that we are truly concerned with understanding die Sache, the 
subject-matter of the text, from within the horizon in which we stand. The possibility 
for diversity in understanding through time and across cultures is not evidence that we 
are never arriving at better understandings of the subject-matter, or that our 
interpretations are not appropriate or right interpretations. Instead, Gadamer's point is 
that when we understand, we will always understand differently and this new 
understanding will contribute to the formation of future horizons of understanding. In 
this manner, Gadamer is able to find a middle position which explains the diversity in 
interpretations which can be true to the text and stand in a relationship to each other (in 
their tradition) without being reduced to an anarchy of competing views. 
288 Warnke, Gadamer, 174. 
PART I: GADAMER'S HERMENEUTIC: 
CHAPTER 2: PLAY, PERFORMANCE, AND PROVOCATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I examined what could be considered the epistemological 
side to Gadamer's hermeneutic. What role does experience play in understanding, the 
logic of question and answer, and what type of knowledge best characterises 
hermeneutical understanding? In this chapter, I would like to shift to a different, yet 
complementary, aspect of his hermeneutic: the eventful character of understanding. In 
this respect, I will look at two metaphors which play a central role in Gadamer's 
hermeneutic: play and performance. Play is perhaps second only to the concept of the 
fusion of horizons in Truth and Method Gadamer uses this concept not only to 
overcome some of the conceptual weaknesses in other hermeneutical theories but also as 
an apologetic for the universality of hermeneutics and to keep the role of method in its 
proper place. 
I. THE ENLIGHTENMENT: 
PUSHING PLAY TO ONE SIDE OF THE PLAYING FIELD 
Gadamer rejects the idea of an individual reading an isolated text alone in a room 
as an illusion which originated in the Enlightenment. 
At once Gadamer is involved in an argument against a view of aesthetic 
experience which has haunted us for nearly two hundred years: the isolated self 
reading the isolated text: the isolated self looking at the isolated painting. But 
there is no such thing as the text apart from its interpretation, and no reading or 
seeing self which does not bring its interpretative schematism to the text or 
painting. I 
In order to achieve this, Gadamer retraces the development of several aesthetic concepts 
in order to reveal the conceptual opposition which he faces. One of the most important 
metaphors which he employs in his investigation and argumentation is ` play'. In Part I 
of Truth and Method, Gadamer devotes much of his effort in an attempt to develop a 
concept of play which is beyond subjectivity but at the same time recognises the finitude 
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Contexts of Interpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth 
and Method, " Boston UniversityJournaL 27 (1,1976), 43. 
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of human existence in order to explain the mode of being of a work of art. 2 In Part II, he 
shows how play is the "in-between" or middle ground between the text and the 
interpreter which is the locus of hermeneutics 3 And in the final Part he argues that 
language is characterised by play. 4 
In order to understand the relevance of Gadamer's concept of play we need to see 
it in light of the history of this concept. This is not just an exercise in historical 
background, but the form of my argument follows one of the central themes of 
Gadamer's hermeneutic: our understanding is conditioned by what has been handed 
down to us in our tradition. Therefore, it is essential that we raise to consciousness, as 
much as possible, those elements of our tradition which have shaped our present 
understanding. This is why Gadamer retraces the conceptual development of play in 
philosophical thought. Not only does he want to show how this concept developed but 
also to reveal the points of resistance to his conception of play. 
A. Kant's Determinative and Reflective Judgement 
The person whom Gadamer views as leading us astray in regard to a subjectivity 
of play is Kant. 5 The fork in the road, in respect to the concept of play, occurred when 
Kant differentiated determinate judgement from reflective judgement. Determinate 
judgement concerns those instances in which we can subsume a particular under a 
universal. If we already possess the universal then such a judgement is considered 
determinate. If we have a particular but the universal must be found, then that 
2 Gadamer, 101-29. 
3 Ibid., 295. 
4 "The question, then, is how the playing of the language-game, which is for each person also 
the playing of the world-game, goes together with playing the artwork-game. " Idem, 
"Reflections on my Philosophical Journey, " trans. Richard E. Palmer, in The Philosophy 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Library of Living Philosophers, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilipp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, vol. 24 (Chicago and London: Open Court, 
1997), 43. 
5 The background to Kant's thought is found in Rousseau who argued that human existence 
was characterised by a "disenchantment of the world. " The starting point for human 
development was located in the state of nature. Property, government, division of 
labour, and tradition have "alienated mankind in the modern from its true nature. " He 
developed three means of reform in Emile the Social Contract, and Nouvell Heloise, but 
his views were inconsistent and only raised more questions. It was not until Kant 
"thought Rousseau's thoughts through to their end" in the dialectical opposition of 
nature and civilisation, reason and feeling that a more systematic solution was offered. 
Hans Robert Jauss, "The Literary Process of Modernism from Rousseau to Adorno, " 
Cultural Critique, trans. Lisa C. Roetzel (Winter 1988-1989), 39-41. 
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judgement is reflective. 6 Determinate judgements involve empirical phenomena, while 
reflective judgements do not. "Determinate judgement possesses its concept and faces 
the difficulty of applying it properly to the multiplicity of spatio-tcmporal appearances, 
while reflective judgement is in search of its concept through its multiplicity. It obeys a 
peculiar principle 
- 
related to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure 
... 
"7 The result of 
this distinction and separation in forms of judgement is that real knowledge is restricted 
to those areas in which we can exercise rational and empirical thought (determinate 
judgement) and the sensuous and aesthetic (reflective judgement) became autonomous. 8 
"The taste of the observer can no more be comprehended as the application of concepts, 
norms, or rules than the genius of the artist can 
... 
What we experience in beauty 
- 
in 
nature as well as in art 
- 
is the total animation and free interplay of all our spiritual 
powers. The judgment of taste is not knowledge, yet it is not arbitrary. "9 
If we now examine the importance of Kant's Critique ofJudgement for the history 
of the human species, we must say that his giving aesthetics a transcendental 
philosophical basis had major consequences and constituted a turning point. It 
was the end of a tradition but also the beginning of a new development. It 
restricted the idea of taste to an area in which, as a special principle of judgement, 
it could claim independent validity 
- 
and, by so doing, limited the concept of 
knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason. The limited 
phenomenon of judgement, restricted to the beautiful (and sublime), was 
sufficient for his transcendental purpose; but it shifted the more general concept 
of the experience of taste, and the activity of aesthetic judgement in law and 
morality, out of the center of philosophy. 10 
Knowledge which results from aesthetic judgement is different from that which comes 
through empirical studies or from the exercise of practical reason and at the same time it 
is characterised by its ability to make universal claims that are able to be communicated 
to others. An example of this is when someone says, "Psalm 23 is not only very moving 
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgmenA trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), 4 IV. 
7 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, in The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), s. v. "Aesthetic, " 54. See also: Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and 
Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of fudgment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 3. 
8 "In der `Kritik der reinen Vernunft' unterstreicht Kant die Unzulänglichkeit des bloßen Spiel mit 
Vorstellungen im Gegensatz zur Erkenntnis: Das `Spiel der Einbildung ist ohne die mindeste 
Beziehung auf Wahrheit. ' Ohne die `data der möglichen Erfahrung'sind die Begriffe fair 
Kant ein bloße Spiel sei es der Einbildungskraft oder des Verstandes. `Joachim Ritter and 
Karifried Gründer eds., Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 
1995), s. v. "Spiel, " A. Corbineau-Hoffmann, 9.1384. 
9 Gadamer, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley. University 
of California Press, 1976), 219. 
10 Idem, Truth and Method 40-41. 
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but it speaks to the needs of the human soul. " This is a claim with universal scope and is 
clearly communicable, but it does not arise from determinate judgement. 
When we say that something is beautiful we employ a form of taste which is non- 
conceptual. We do not appeal to an ideal form of art or literature in our judgement of a 
particular work of art. How then are we able to make a judgement concerning the value 
of a work of art or a text? Kant's answer is that the work of art facilitates the free play of 
imagination and understanding. "Kant claims that this free play of cognitive faculties, 
this animation of our feeling for life occasioned by the sight of the beautiful, implies no 
conceptual grasp of an objective content and intends no ideal of an object. "11 While 
reflective judgement is not rule-governed, it does possess an intersubjective dimension. 12 
Or as Richard Bernstein says, "Taste is communal, not idiosyncratic. " 13 
This presents a dilemma for Gadamer. On the one hand, he argues that we 
cannot approach history or texts as instances of a universal but must see them as 
particulars, "to understand this man, this people, or this state. ""4 We must use a reflective 
form of judgement in which the particular is not subsumed under a universal. On the 
other hand, if we accept Kant's reduction of reflective or aesthetic judgement as the mode 
for hermeneutical knowledge we run into the problem that there are no objective rules 
for determining what is beautiful. For Kant, the feeling of the subject, not the concept of 
the object, was what was important. As a result, historical knowledge based on Kant's 
idea of reflective judgement reduces to solipsistic preferences. 15 For Kant, this pleasure is 
best experienced in the detached spectator. When the Germans observed the French 
Revolution, it was their feelings as spectators, their reflective judgements, which were 
11 Idem, "Art and Imitation, " in The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas 
Walker (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), 96. 
12 "This state of free play of the cognitive faculties in representation by which an object is given 
must be universally communicable. " Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgement, trans. J. H. 
Bernard (N. Y.: Hafner Press, 1951), 52. "The judgment of taste itself does not postulate 
the agreement of everyone (for it is only competent for a logically universal judgment to 
do this, in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes the agreement to 
everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks for confirmation, not 
from concepts, but from the concurrences of others. " Hans Robert Jauss, Aesthetic 
Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw, Theory and History of 
Literature, ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1982), xxxix. See also ibid., 115-16. 
13 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivsm and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 119. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1991), 48. 
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significant for Kant. As spectators, the Germans had a speculative sympathy with the 
French, a sentimental attitude of "well-wishing participation. " 16 
Kant's ideas in this area resulted in a paradigm shift for the humanities. On the 
one hand, the humanities were now subjected to the method of the natural sciences in 
order to exercise determinate forms of judgement in their field so that they could lay 
claim to some degree or form of theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, the 
autonomy and free play of reflective judgement justified the use of empathy, genius, and 
feeling as "subsidiary elements" to the humanities. 17 
The French Revolution also demonstrates a major difference between Kant and 
Hegel. The French Revolution, with its concept of freedom for all, was an underlying 
theme in Hegel's work. 18 Because the Spirit was objectified in social institutions 
according to Hegel, he argued that we cannot hold to a form of inner morality which was 
detached from the "objective structures of life that hold human beings together. " 19 In 
contrast to Kant, who claimed that morality was independent from contextual 
conditions, Hegel asserted that there was a "common and normative reality that surpasses 
the awareness of the individual" that was the basis for our social reality. 20 Therefore, the 
significance of the French Revolution did not lie in the sympathetic feelings of the 
observers, but in the fact that the Spirit was objectified in and through human 
institutions in history. In this way, Hegel was able to reconcile the two forms of 
knowledge which Kant had separated. For Hegel, the Geisteswissenschaften possess a form 
of knowledge that is similar to that found in the natural sciences. "That in history a 
reasonableness hould perdue and make itself manifest similar to that in nature was the 
bold thesis. "21 
16 Immanuel Kant, Conflict of Faculties, trans. M. Gregor and Robert E. Anchor (N. Y.: Abaris 
Press, 1979), 153. This sympathetic response which the French Revolution evoked in 
the German observers revealed the hope for moral progress according to Kant. It 
demonstrated a vicarious participation in the Good which points to moral inclinations 
which can inspire revolutions. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, 148- 
51. 
17 Ibid., 41; Robert H. Paslick, "The Ontological Context of Gadamer's `Fusion': Bochme, 
Heidegger, and Non-Duality, " Man and World, 18 (1985), 406-8. 
18 See the section "I/Thou and Slave/Master" in chapter 1. 
19 Gadamer, "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects, " in Reason in the Age of Science, trans. 
Frederick G. Lawrence, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, ed. Thomas 
McCarthy, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1981), 30. 
20 Ibid., 31. 
21 Ibid., 36. 
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B. Schiller: Free-Play and Aesthetic Differentiation 
Schiller embraced Kant's dichotomy between determinative and reflective 
judgement and widened the gap between them. 22 In doing so, he separated art from the 
realm of reality to that of beautiful appearances. At the same time, he changed Kant's 
concepts of taste and morality to an aesthetic imperative. For Kant, taste was the 
transitional bridge from sensual pleasure to moral feelings. But for Schiller, the 
autonomy of reflective judgement and taste was the basis for the freedom of play. 23 
Schiller grafted Fichte's theory of impulses onto this concept of play with the result that 
"the play impulse was to harmonize the form impulse and matter impulse. Cultivating 
the play impulse is the end of aesthetic education. "24 Play was not only an instinct or 
impulse which characterised human nature, but it was also what educated and enhanced 
our humanity. The goal of the play impulse, according to Schiller, was the formation of 
"a cultured society (Bildungsgesellschaft) that takes an interest in art. "25 
Under this concept of play, art is now understood in terms of its contrast and 
separation from the real world. Nature is no longer a comprehensive domain because art 
constitutes an autonomous realm above or beyond nature. The implications of this are 
two fold. First, determinate knowledge and the universality of the scientific method of 
approaching the thing-in-itself is undermined. And second, the experience of an artwork 
takes place in the free play of an aesthetic state which possesses no direct relation to 
22 Schiller's work was also partially a response to the French Revolution. Only instead of 
viewing it positively as Hegel did, Schiffer saw the French Revolution as a failure and 
posited a turn to aesthetics as a corrective to the French Revolution. Picking up on 
Rousseu's split between nature and civilisation, Schiller tried to find a solution in the 
aesthetic realm 
- 
to look for the lost naivete of the natural perfection in the classics. 
Ibid., 30; Jauss, "The Literary Processes of Modernism, " 42-45; Corbineau-Hoffmann, 
"Spiel, " 9.1385. 
23 "Da das Spiel weder unterworfen ist, gilt es als frei: `Die Erkenntnißkrditt, die durch diese 
Vorstellung ins Spiel gesetzt werden, sind herbei in einem freien Spiele, weil kein bestimmter 
Begriff sie auf besondere Erkenntniffregel einschränkt. - Corbineau-Hoffmann, 1385. 
24 Gadamer, Truth and Method 82. The material and formal impulses correspond to Kant's 
determinative and reflective judgments. The aesthetic impulse mediated between them 
and reconciled them. "The play impulse avoids these extremes of explaining the world 
exclusively in terms of sense or reason, not by addressing itself to an extrinsic reality by 
which we are wholly determined but by taking as its object a semblance (Schein) of 
reality which we freely construct ourselves. " Paul Edward, ed., The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (N. Y. and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), s. v. "Schiller, Friedrich, " by 
Julius Elias, 7.313. 
25 Ibid., 83; Richard Detsch, "A Non-Subjectivist Concept of Play 
- 
Gadamer and Heidegger 
Versus Rilke and Nietzsche, " Philosophy Today 29 (2 1985), 157; Paul de Man, 
"Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist's Über das Marionettentheater, " in The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1984), 264,270. 
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reality. 26 Play is understood now only in terms of subjective categories. 27 The play 
involved in understanding an artwork or text consists in the double abstraction of both 
the individual and the text or artwork from their world or any contextual relationships 
outside of them. 28 
What we call a work of art and experience (erleben) aesthetically depends on a 
process of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted (its 
original context of life, and the religious or secular function that gave it 
significance), it becomes visible as the "pure work of art. " In performing this 
abstraction, aesthetic consciousness performs a task that is positive in itself. It 
shows what a pure work of art is, and allows it to exist in its own right. 29 
What is considered aesthetic is differentiated from everything outside of the aesthetic 
realm. There are two consequences to this line of thought. First, aesthetic consciousness 
attains the level of universality since it is capable of viewing everything aesthetically. And 
second, there is a simultaneity to aesthetic consciousness in that works from the past are 
cut free from their contextual relationships and are able to be experienced directly by a 
contemporary viewer. 30 Nietzsche's categories of `unhistorical' and `supra-historical' 
exemplify this point. He rejected a purely historical interest in the past because that was 
like a gravedigger or mad collector digging through the rubbish heaps. 31 What was 
significant for Nietzsche was how the past was experienced contemporaneously through 
the categories of the unhistorical and the supra-historical. 
The impact of aesthetic differentiation can also be seen in the manner in which 
museums changed during this period. Before Schiller, museums reflected a particular 
taste or school. However, the impact of aesthetic simultaneity and universality resulted 
in museums attempting to expand or rearrange their exhibitions in order to appear as 
comprehensive as possible. 32 
26 This conclusion was reached by Schiller towards the end of his career in what is termed the 
fourth stage of the development of his thought (see the last 11 of his "Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man). Elias, "Schiller, Friedrich, " 7.313. 
27 Gadamer, "Man and Language, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 66. 
28 Idem, Truth and Method, 82-85. 
29 Ibid., 85. 
30 This simultaneity is not based on a monolithic concept of aesthetic taste but recognises that 
taste differs so that there can be "a hundred different treatments of the same subject, to 
find a thousand different forms of expression for the thoughts and feelings common to 
all men. " Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters ed. 
and trans. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967), cxxxi. 
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins, 2nd rev. ed. ed., 
Library of Liberal Arts (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1985), 20,51. 
32 Gadamer, Truth and Method 87. 
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Schiller is mistaken according to Gadamer, because aesthetic judgement and taste 
depend on what is preferred by a society at any point in time; it is part of our social 
fabric. "Even its artistic interests are not arbitrary or in principle universal, but what 
artists create and what the society values belong together in the unity of a style of life and 
an ideal of taste. "33 Thus, play is never unbounded and free as Schiller claims. If 
Gadamer is correct, then the concept of play, which determines how we perceive art, and 
more importantly, how we approach a text, needs to be reworked. 
C. Nietzsche and the Play of an Absurd World 
While Gadamer does not discuss Nietzsche's concept of play, he is significant to 
my discussion for three reasons. First, Nietzsche applied the concept of play to tradition 
and history. Second, he is often used by Heidegger as the foil to his ideas. And third, 
Nietzsche reflects the logical conclusion to Kant and Schiller's arguments and as such he 
plays an important role in the development of modern literary theory and hermeneutics. 
Nietzsche, however, did not approach this position from the avenue of aesthetics, 
as Schiller did, but from history. In The Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche attacked the 
nineteenth century's historical-critical approach to history. Instead of proposing an 
alternative model of history he pushed their conclusions to their logical end. "History 
must solve the problem of history, science must turn its sting against itself. "34 In doing 
so he reduced the world and all that can be known to history, but not a Hegelian form of 
history which possesses a higher order of Spirit or rationality behind it. For Nietzsche, 
the reason why things were the way they were was because of sheer chance and the 
principle of correlation. 35 "Even after suprahistorical essences or necessities are 
forgotten, things cohere, q follows p and is as it is partly because p was as it was. `History' 
is simply this temporal coherence, this connectedness of things from one moment to the 
33 Ibid., 84-85. 
34 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 50. 
35 The principle of correlation is not unique to Nietzsche, but is a widely recognised principle 
of historiography. It emphasises the continuous web of cause and effect which governs 
the natural world. "Since we discern 
... 
the various historical cycles of human life 
influencing and intersecting one another, we gain at length the idea of continuity. " 
James Hastings ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1913; 
reprint 1953), s. v. "Historiography, " by Ernst Troeltsch, 6.718. Almost two hundred 
years before Nietzsche and Troeltsch, Spinoza had argued that the world was governed 
by the correlation of cause and effect evidenced by the natural laws and that "nothing 
comes to pass in nature in contravention to her universal laws 
... 
she keeps a fixed and 
immutable order. " Benedict De Spinoza, Tractatus Theologica-Politicus, in The Chief 
Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (London: George Bell & Sons, 
1883; reprint N. Y.: Dover Publications, 1951), 1.83. 
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next. "36 While his argument denies the possibility for metaphysics (based on what 
occurs in history), it also asserts the continuity of history. 37 This connectedness is both a 
curse and a blessing. History and tradition are the unbearable weight of an unwilled past 
pressing down us. 38 In The Gay Science, he describes this as the `Greatest Weight': 39 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: "This life as you live it and have lived it, you will have 
to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in 
it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequence 
- 
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, 
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned 
upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! "40 
Eternal Recurrence precludes any form of freedom or variation from what has happened 
or will happen again 41 Once we come to terms with the idea of Eternal Recurrence we 
realise that history is a closed system in which each moment affects those that follow it. 
History has no goal or God. Human beings are forever confined to the particular 
horizon of world history in which they find themselves. Redemption from this burden 
comes from how we embrace this unwilled past. "Or have you once experienced a 
tremendous moment when you would have answered him [the demon of Eternal 
Recurrence]: `You arc a god and never have I heard anything more divine. ' If this 
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush 
you. "42 
36 David D. Roberts, Nothing but History: Reconstruction and Extremity after Metaphysics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 65. 
37 Peter Heller, "Multiplicity and Unity in Nietzsche's Works and Thoughts on Thought, " The 
German Quarterly, 52 (1978), 322. 
38 Nietzsche, 5-6. 
39 The title for this section in the German is Das grösste Schwergewicht, which conveys not only 
the idea of the main emphasis but in the context of his discussion of eternal recurrence 
can also be translated as `the greatest heavy weight'. The ambiguity in the German is 
seen in Nietzsche's idea that eternal recurrence is a weight which presses down and 
threatens to crush us unless we embrace it, in which case it is a liberating idea. 
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (N. Y.: Random House, 1974), § 341, p. 273. 
41 Copleston believes that Nietzsche developed the concept of Eternal Recurrence on his own 
whereas Kaufmann appears to have proof that Nietzsche first encountered this idea in the 
works of Heine. However, in contrast to Nietzsche, Heine allowed for a certain degree 
of human freedom and variation in his view of Eternal Recurrence. Frederick Copleston, 
Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture, 2nd ed. (London: Search Press, 1975), 16; 
Walter Kaufmann, "Translator's Introduction, " in The Gay Science, 17; Heller, 325. 
42 Nietzsche, § 341, p. 273-74. Corbineau-Hoffmann, 1386. This raises a possible conceptual 
inconsistency in Nietzsche's thought. How is it possible to hold to both the closed 
continuum of Eternal Recurrence and the creative freedom of the Will to Power? I do 
not think Nietzsche successfully resolved this tension. 
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This is a large topic and I need to restrict the discussion to Nietzsche's ideas 
regarding Eternal Recurrence and play which are relevant to Gadamer's hermeneutic and 
reception theory. Play enters Nietzsche's philosophical system in two ways. First, 
Eternal Recurrence suggests that there is no purpose to history. Therefore, all human 
actions must not be seen as purposive but as innocent play. Once we realise this the 
values we inherit from the past arc no longer real but are only the trace or symptom of 
someone else's exercise of the Will to Power. This brings us to an extreme form of 
nihilism. Second, his program of deconstruction "frees human creativity by showing the 
historical contingency of what had to come to seem suprahistorical and natural. "43 We 
are able, through our exercise of the Will to Power, to deconstruct and reassemble the 
past because the past is absurd and there is a freedom to the will once we embrace Eternal 
Recurrence. "The will to power operates in a vacuum, so to speak. It creates its own 
values and sustains them in a world without a logical basis. "44 In this way, play functions 
as a hermeneutical tool to undermine and destabilise cultural ideologies and morality 
which Nietzsche opposed. "Play as transgressive unreason and absurdity serves to correct 
the imbalance in culture and thought, and art, like play, standing apart from privileged 
modes of reason in culture, works to promote the spirit of unrest and misrule, 
challenging and directing its audience to new conceptions of reality. "45 Play arises from 
the conflict between the meaningless visible world and the "absolute subject who grants 
value to the meaningless by his affirmation. "`w 
The split which Kant opened between determinative and reflective judgement not 
only reaches its zenith in Nietzsche, but is completely reversed. 47 The objective world of 
history is utterly meaningless and oblivious to human agency. We are ignorant of the 
play of the world and history until we grasp the true nature and significance of the world 
through Eternal Recurrence and by an act of the will enter into play with it. "Human 
nature stands, in other words, outside the totality of the world and must seek admittance 
43 Roberts, 69. 
44 Detsch, 165; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "A Lamp in the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of 
`Aesthetic' Theology, " Trinity fournaL 8 (1987): 40. 
45 Irena R. Mayaryk, ed. Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory. - Approaches, Scholars, 
Terms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), s. v. "Play/freeplay, theories of, " by 
Gordon E. Slethaug, 146. 
46 Detsch, "A Non-Subjectivist Concept of Play, " 169. 
47 Heller, 330-31; Corbineau-Hoffmann, 1386. "If Kant and Schiller redefined play in such a 
way as to make it a useful concept for moderns, it was Friedrich Nietzsche who freed it 
from the constraints of reason. " Slethaug, 145. 
79 
to it. "48 In this way his concepts of the Superman and Eternal Recurrence are brought 
together. "Man must practice a heroic yea-saying to life, must live so that he will desire 
and affirm the eternal repetition of his actions. "49 On both sides, the concept of play is 
central to understanding Nietzsche's arguments. The absurdity of the world is compared 
to a child who endlessly builds and demolishes sand piles on a deserted, desolate beach. 50 
When we enter the play of history we are not creating any transcendental values, we are 
merely entering into the unending play of the world. 51 Detsch comments, "human play 
corresponding to the play of the world in which all standards and distinctions are 
meaningless. "52 In this way, Nietzsche carried the Romantic tradition's concept of play 
through to its most extreme conclusion. 
D. Heidegger: the Play of Truth 
Heidegger views Nietzsche as the conclusion to the western philosophical 
tradition. The distinction and separation between the visible and the invisible is one of 
the main trajectories in which this tradition has developed according to Heidegger. In 
the development of this tradition, those things which were visible and transitory lost their 
value and were reduced to the status of mere objects. Until finally, the visible world was 
viewed as totally senseless and absurd by Nietzsche. Heidegger's concepts of truth as 
disclosure, thrownness, and play reverse many of the trajectories of thought concerning 
the topic of play which started with Kant. While `play' is not a central idea in 
Heidegger's thought, it and his conception of truth form the background to Gadamer's 
hermeneutic in this area. 
Heidegger's clearest discussion of play is found in The Principle of Reason. 
Because human beings have a desire to control, we attempt to find a reason for 
everything. This desire is reflected in scientific methods which attempt (through 
objectivity) to detach from the movement of play. However, this is an impossible ideal 
48 Ibid., 168 
49 Copleston, 19. "It is the `final, cheerfullist, exuberantly mad-and-merriest Yea to life. " Ibid., 
61. 
50 Heller, 321. Nietzsche derived this from 52 fragment of Heracleitus. "Wie das Kind im Spiel 
bald das Spielzeug fortwirft, bald aber die Ordnungen des Spiel wieder aufgreift, schaue der 
ästhetische Mensch die Welt an" Corbineau-Hoffmann, 1386-87. 
51 
"The Will to Power is expressed in temporal terms in the theorem of Eternal Recurrence 
which posits the endlessly self-creative, self-destructive play that is the cosmos, as one 
which must repeat itself endlessly throughout eternity. " Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 
324-5; also, 336. See Camus' work for a similar treatment concerning the meaning of 
the human condition. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus trans. Justin O'Brien 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975). 
52 Dctsch, 167. 
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to achieve because there is an opposing movement of play which impoverishes our ability 
for "building and dwelling in the realm of what is essential. There is an enigmatic 
interconnection [Wiederspiel counter-play] between the demand to render reasons 
[Grund] and the withdrawal of roots [Boden. foundation, footing]. It is important to see 
the form of the movement occurring in this lofty play [Spieles] between rendering and 
withdraw. "53 Play occupies the place between the opposing movements of giving or 
delivering reasons and the pulling back or withdrawing of the foundational answers of 
what is essential. 
This concept of play can also be seen in Heidegger's concept of truth. According 
to Heidegger, äßi OE= means `unconcealment' or `disclosure'. Truth as disclosure is 
related to its opposite: concealment or hiddenness. 54 Truth is an event of disclosure that 
takes place within the referential contexts in which we live. 55 Because truth as disclosure 
takes place in finite, temporal human existence, it is never final, closed, or determinate. 
There is always a degree of concealment in every event of disclosure. 56 "The conflict 
between revealment and concealment is not the truth of the work of art alone, but the 
truth of every being, for as unhiddenness, truth is always such an opposition of 
revealment and concealment. The two necessarily belong together. "57 Truth is 
53 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly, Studies in Continental 
Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 31; idem, Der 
Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 60. Alternate translations are mine. While I 
agree with Lilly's translation most of the time, I feel that the metaphorical use of 
Heidegger's terms is often missed in his translation, so I have tried to incorporate that 
into the text. 
54 Ernst Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth, " trans. Christopher Macann, in Hermeneutics 
and Truth, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1994), 88 if. 
55 "Being-true as Being-uncovering, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being- 
in-the-world. " Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, reprint 1992]), 261; Tugendhat, 91; James 
DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heideger, 
Gadamer, and Riewur, in Studies in Religion and Culture, ed. Nathan A. Scott Jr. 
(Charlottesville, VA.: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 62. One of the most 
important existential categories associated with the play of concealment and disclosure is 
Being-towards-death. Death presents us with a tension between Being and non-Being 
which is part of the play structure of the cosmos. Death presents being qua abyss (Ab- 
Grund), "which as the most radical possibility of existence is capable of bringing what is 
most elevated to the clearing and lightening of being and its truth. " Heidegger, "The 
Origin of the Work of Art, " 112. 
56 Ibid., 265. "Truth, in its nature, is un-truth. " Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 
in Poetry, Language, Thought trans. Albert Hofstadter, Martin Heidegger Works, ed. J. 
Glenn Gray (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1971), 54. 
57 Gadamer, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 226. Hiddenness is 
not error or ignorance but belongs to being itself. In fact, it is hiddenness which makes 
the disclosure possible. 223-26. 
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characterised by the play between concealment and unconcealment which means that 
truth is never definitive but will always remain continual and provisional. 58 
Thanks to this clearing [between disclosure and concealment], beings are 
unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet a being can be concealed, too, 
only within the sphere of what is lighted. Each being we encounter and which 
encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presence in that it always 
withholds itself at the same time in a concealedness. 59 
We can never fully grasp something in the totality of its being because this would mean 
that no further perspectives or referential contexts would remain which could evoke new 
possibilities of disclosure which are concealed from us in our interpretive horizon. 60 
However, this does not allow one to conclude that all disclosures are equally true 
or valid. False understanding or interpretations are not a disclosure but a covering up 
according to Heidegger. This takes place when we uncover the entity in a way that is not 
itself. 61 "To say that an assertion "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is 
itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, `lets' the entity `be seen' (6700 evanS) in its 
uncoveredness. The Being true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being 
uncovering. " To say that something is true means there is some degree of conformity of 
our knowledge with the facts which have been disclosed in the event of understanding. 62 
In this respect, Heidegger takes a middle position concerning the meaning of a text. 
If we return to Der Satz vom Grund we find that play is simply part of the fabric 
of existence and, as such, it is has no explanation. "The `because' withers away in play. 
The play is without `why. ' It plays since it plays. It simply remains a play: the most 
elevated and the most profound. "63 Play is a to-and-fro movement without aim or 
purpose that constantly renews itself in repetition. On the one hand, the nature of play is 
58 "Truth, in Heidegger's understanding, will never establish itself irrevocably and definitively, 
with a plenitude of reality. It is a process which can never be completed because the 
hidden will never relinquish its hold on that which emerges from it" Detsch, 169; 
DiCenso 64. 
59 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 53. 
60 Ibid., 53. See the following for a very clear discussion of referential contexts in Heidegger: 
Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, in Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks, ed. 
Tim Crane and Jonathan Wolff (London and N. Y.: Routledge, 1996), 99-104. 
61 Tugendhat's article has an excellent critique of Heidegger's concept of truth as disclosure. He 
demonstrates how Heidegger adopts a very narrow definition of uncovering or disclosure 
as `pointing out'. This raises two problems: (1) how do we differentiate truth from 
pointing out, and (2) false assertions are disclosive also (there is an element of 
unconcealment in their concealment). While Heidegger does not address these 
problems, they raise questions about how we are to judge between falsehood and truth in 
his system. "Heidegger's Idea of Truth, " 86-92. 
62 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 51-55. 
63 Idem, The Principle of Reason, 113; Satz, 188. 
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determined by the thrownness of Being. As such, play has a playing field with 
boundaries, "of rules, of rules of play, of calculus. "64 On the other hand, play is 
characterised by freedom. Rules may restrict play but at the same time play is erratic and 
open to new possibilities of disclosure 65 Therefore, the transmission of a tradition will 
not be a smooth process but will often appear broken or erratic because of the playful 
manner in which the new or unexpected break into a tradition. " Kisiel sums up 
Heidegger's position when he states that Heidegger "insists that there is a final leap 
through the normal conversation with the tradition to the creative event, which does not 
abide by previously established laws, but creates its own norms that bestow a unique 
bearing on the original thinker and changes the normal course of history 
fundamentally. "67 
Heidegger's notion of play, and the playful structure of truth as disclosure 
reverses many of the ideas found in the trajectory from Kant to Nietzsche. Play is not 
separated from or differentiated from other forms of knowledge. All truth, whether it is 
scientific or aesthetic, is characterised by the play of concealment and disclosure. Truth, 
as an original occurrence, takes place in the space created in the play between disclosure 
and concealing and, in this sense, is a historical happening. Truth occurs in many 
different manners: from that found in a work of art, to the founding of a political state, a 
religious ceremony, or the questioning of a thinker. 68 This means that we cannot 
differentiate the aesthetic from everyday life because all disclosures of truth are 
64 Ibid., 112/186. 
65 Kisiel, "Happening of Tradition, " 372. For Heidegger, the danger of taking a conservative 
approach to tradition is that it erects restrictive rules which stifle play. 
66 Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, 90-91; Satz, 154. In this way, Heidegger's concept of 
play shares a common thread with Nietzsche's. Like Nietzsche, he cites the Heraclietus' 
52nd Fragment to demonstrate the playful nature of the cosmos. "A'tt5v itctIc l; a'tt 
hott/ wv, aoEVU)v tj 1tott6bS tj (iaßtXil"t1i. " The dptcil that governs the nature of 
being is that of a "child that plays. " Ibid., 113/188. 
67 Theodore Kisiel, "The Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and 
Heidegger, " Man and Work 2 (3,1969): 377. Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? 
(Tübingen, Neimeyer, 1954) 39. 
68 Ibid., 62. It is worth noting that "science is not an original happening of truth, but always 
the cultivation of a domain of truth already open, specifically by apprehending and 
confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that 
field. " This helps to explain Thomas Kuhn's theory of the history of science as paradigm 
shifts. The creative thought required to conceptualise the field of research in a new 
paradigm would be an original event of truth. The period of normal science that would 
follow once the new paradigm is adopted would not fall under the category of truth as 
play but would be the "cultivation of the domain of truth already opened up. " See: 
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enlarged ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970); idem, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in 
Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977). 
83 
constituted by Dasein's thrownness. 69 In this way, Heidegger overcomes the subjectivity 
inherent in the previous conceptions of play. 
II. GADAMER'S CONCEPT OF PLAY 
As I mentioned in the introduction to part I of this chapter, play is one of the 
fundamental concepts in Truth and Method Gadamer criticises both historicism and 
aesthetic consciousness for the same reason; they are both alienated forms of true 
historical being and, as a result, we cannot truly experience art or history through them. 
It is through his development of the concept of Spiel, (play or game) that he seeks to solve 
the problems located in historicism and aesthetic consciousness. However, he must first 
correct the subjectivity inherent in previous conceptions of play. 7° 
Gadamer does not want to evacuate subjectivity from the concept of play but to 
transcend it. "Play is more than the consciousness of the player, and so it is more than a 
subjective act. "71 The truth claim of a work of art raises a hermeneutical question which 
reveals the limits of method. We cannot provide an adequate explanation of art from a 
methodological perspective. In order to answer the question of how we understand an 
artwork Gadamer insists we must look at the "mode of being of the work of art itse72 
Play does not refer to the subjective state of mind of the observer or creator but, 
play refers to the mode of Being itself, and especially to the "mode of being of art 
itself. "73 Play is best understood as the medium through which understanding takes 
place and not in terms of subject/object, player/game, or psychological categories. Play is 
a primordial mode of Being characterised by a "to-and-fro movement" that is not 
oriented towards a telos, but renews itself with each and every movement. 74 Human 
existence is characterised by and experiences the playful nature of Being. Play exists 
independently of the consciousness of the players and, as such, play takes primacy "over 
the consciousness of the player. "75 Richard Detsch points out how both Heidegger and 
69 "To Dasein's state belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive for Dasein's disclosedness. " 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 264. 
70 Gadamer, "Reflections, " 27. 
71 Idem, "Forward to the Second Edition, " in Truth and Method, xxxvi. 
72 Ibid., 100. Gadamer's argument parallels the central thrust of Heidegger's essay, "The 
Origin of the Work of Art. " 
73 Gadamer, 101. 
74 Ibid., 101-4. Gadamer follows Heidegger's definition of play at this and many other points. 
See: Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, 112-13; Satz, 186-88. 
75 Gadamer, 102. In German, the term play, spielen, carries a semantic range of meaning which 
is not as clearly seen in the English. Gadamer cites this semantic range to show how one 
can play (spielt) a game, or to refer to that fact that something is happening (sich abspielt 
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Gadamer share the same paradoxical assumption when it comes to play. "The both posit 
a dimension which, unlike modern existential philosophy, transcends human subjectivity; 
but unlike the older metaphysical-theological speculation, they both hold fast to human 
finiteness. "76 
There is one fundamental point at which Gadamer and Heidegger's concept of 
play differ. For Heidegger, tradition restricted the room for play and, as a result, he 
argued that we needed to include the freedom of poetic release in the concept of play. 
Gadamer, in contrast, takes. a much more positive approach toward tradition. The 
playing field is the temporal room of tradition?? The playful event of understanding is 
possible only because of what is handed down to us in our tradition (in Part III of Truth 
and Method, he makes the same argument in reference to language), and how what is 
handed down addresses and strikes us. In this way, tradition is constantly playing itself 
out in new possibilities. 78 This point becomes very clear if we contrast Gadamer's idea of 
play with Nietzsche's. For Nietzsche, because we dwell in an absurd world, play knows 
no bounds. Whereas for Gadamer, tradition is not absurd nor an oppressive weight 
pressing down on us but it is the soil from which productive understanding arises. It is 
the playing field in which we play out every act of understanding. 79 
While play is not teleological, it is purposeful. "Play fulfills its purpose only if the 
player loses himself in play. °80 By this, Gadamer means that there is a seriousness to play 
which gives it a purpose. This can be seen in the way we call a person who holds himself 
back and does not enter into the spirit of the game a spoil sport. 81 The player must 
approach play seriously. Not by approaching play in an objective manner (as if it were an 
object to by studied) but by becoming involved in the play of a game. 82 This is a 
significant aspect to play for Gadamer. To be seriously involved in play means that we 
are part of the game which is taking place. The distinction between subject and object 
(player and game) is not appropriate since there would be no game without the players. 
or im Spiele isi). His point is that in German the seme spielen, 'play, ' is not primarily 
something someone does, but conveys the idea that the subject of play is play itself. Ibid., 
104; "Man and Language, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 66. 
76 Detsch, "A Non-Subjectivist Concept of Play, " 160. 
77 Kisiel, "Happening of Tradition, " 371-72. 
78 Detsch, 162. 
79 Gadamer " establishes a reciprocity between the human being and tradition by which each 
continually conditions the other irrespective of any specific awareness of or desire for 
such conditioning. " Ibid., 168. 
80 Gadamer, Truth and Methoa 102. 
81 David Linge, "Editor's Introduction, " in Philosophical Hmneneutics, xxiii. 
82 Gadamer, Truth and Method 102. 
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When a player distances herself from the play she was involved in (in order to critically 
reflect on it), play breaks down and she is no longer in the game. 83 When applied to 
textual interpretation, play as the hermeneutical medium for understanding reveals the 
weaknesses of approaching a text from the perspective of the subjectivity of the author 
(Schleiermacher) or the interpreter (Schiller). 
Play as a fundamental hermeneutical category allows Gadamer to go beyond the 
dominance of method in the humanities, while at the same time not denying the validity 
of method at different points (the performing of the tasks in the game). 
The real subject of playing is the game itself. This observation does not contradict 
the fact that one must know the rules of the game and stick to them, or by the 
fact that the players undergo training and excel in the requisite physical methods 
of the game. All these things are valuable and `come into play' only for the one 
who enters the game and gives herself to it. 84 
As such, method falls under, or into, the medium of play. Play, as part of the primordial 
nature of being, is the medium in which understanding takes place. The application of 
method in interpretation is a derivative form of understanding. In our quest for 
objectivity we employ methods so that we may obtain a degree of certitude in our 
interpretations. However, the concept of play reveals that this is not only a false ideal, 
but the concept of play also stands in active opposition to this. One of the significant 
aspects of art is that this is the area in which we experience this opposition to method 
most clearly. How does one objectively approach Van Gogh's painting of the peasant's 
shoes in a manner which does justice to it as a work of art? 
A. Play as the Being of Artwork 
While play, as a fundamental aspect of Being, is non-teleological, it can open the 
possibility for other forms of activity which do have structures and purposes such as 
games, artworks, and musical performances. For Gadamer, the highest form by which 
play can be experienced is that of art. "My thesis, then, is that the being of art 
.... 
is part 
of the event of being that occurs in presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play. "85 
The fact that play requires someone to play seems obvious. But in Gadamer's 
phenomenological examination of play, the players and that which is played are essential. 
It is only when a player is seriously involved in play that what is being played presents 
itself; it comes into being. An artwork does not exist in and of itself, as a self-sufficient 
83 Ibid., 117. 
84 Linge, xxiii; Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxix. 
85 Ibid., 116. 
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object. Rather, the artwork comes into being only in the playful interaction between it 
and the viewer. This concept of art is based on Heidegger's analysis of art found in his 
essay "The Origin of the Work of Art. " 
In order to illustrate the nature of what an artwork is, Heidegger considers Van 
Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant shoes. As one looks at this picture he or she notices 
all sorts of things: "the toilsome tread of the worker 
... 
the dampness and richness of the 
soil 
... 
the quiet gift of grain 
... 
This equipment belongs to the earth, and is protected in 
the world of the peasant woman. "86 -But how does one discover such things in a work of 
art? Certainly not by the application of a method, "but only by bringing ourselves before 
Van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke. "87 In the event of experiencing the picture a 
disclosure of truth takes place concerning this pair of peasant shoes. An unconcealment 
takes place. "If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what 
and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work. "88 The term 
`art-work' is illustrative of the being of art for Heidegger. For in the interaction with the 
viewer a `work' happens in the disclosure of the truth of the painting. 
Gadamer describes this as the consummation of play. In viewing the painting, we 
are caught up into the play of understanding in which a world is projected by the work of 
art. Play as presentation is realised in the re-presentation which we experience in viewing 
the painting. There is a unity of truth (the subject/object split is transcended) which we 
experience in the work of art. To step back and ask questions about the origin or 
technical aspects of the painting severs us from the true experience of the work of art. 
We are no longer caught up in play, and cannot grasp the truth claim of the work of art 
which comes into existence when we are involved in the play of the artwork. This type of 
reflection also implies a form of aesthetic differentiation between "the work itself from its 
representation" for Gadamer. At the same time, he does not wish to "deny that here 
. 
there is a starting point for aesthetic reflection. "89 The various presentations of a work 
are not free but are restrained by the structure and contingencies that are part of the 
world of the artwork. The presentation of a work is subject to criteria so that it is a 
correctness to representation. The danger, which Gadamer takes great pains to avoid, in 
this type of reflection, is that we might fall back into Kant's two forms of judgement and 
an aesthetic concept of play. Therefore, Gadamer is highly critical of all attempts to 
86 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 34. 
87 Ibid., 35. 
88 Ibid., 36. 
89 Gadamer, Truth and Method 118. 
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reintroduce critical reflection back into hermeneutics. This is one of the major points 
over which Gadamer disagrees with Jauss. However, we shall have to wait until the next 
chapter to see if Jauss is successful in his attempt to include some form of reflection and 
methodology in his hermeneutic. 
B. Presentation and the Transformation into Structure 
The fact that play involves players reveals that human play always plays 
something. First, the player chooses to play this rather than that. This means that 
human play is not characterised by an unrestricted freedom but it takes place in a space 
specifically marked out and reserved for the play in which we have chosen to engage. 
"Human play requires a playing field. "90 Second, play involves performing tasks (i. e., a 
child's game may involve the task of playing with a ball). Human involvement in play is 
possible only because it involves tasks. However, it is important to note that the purpose 
of play is not accomplished in the performance of the tasks involved in the game but in 
"the ordering and shaping of the movement of the game itself. "91 
An essential trait of art as play is that "all play is potentially a representation for 
someone. "92 In performing the tasks of a game, presentation takes place. As the players 
perform the tasks of the game, they are also involved in a self-presentation 93 On the one 
hand, there is a difference between a child playing and that of a musical performance. 
On the other hand, all forms of play are characterised by an openness toward a potential 
audience which moves play beyond self-presentation to "representing for someone. " The 
Schauspiel, or theatrical performance, is a clear illustration of this principle. As the actors 
(players) perform the play, a presentation occurs. This involves their self-presentation as 
they play themselves out in the tasks they perform. "Only because play is presentation, is 
human play able to make representation the task of a game. "94 The Schauspiel takes its 
mode of existence in its performance in that this form of play (the drama) is written by 
an author for its performance by players to an audience. The potential nature of 
presentation is completed by the audience, spectators, viewer, or reader 95 Play is realised 
not just in the players but also those who watch the play. "In fact, it is experienced 
properly by and presents itself (as it is `meant') to, one who is not acting in the play but 
90 Ibid., 107. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 108. 
93 "Play is really limited to presenting itself. Thus its mode of being is self-presentation. " Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 108-9, 
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watching it. In him the game is raised, as it were, to its ideality. "96 Therefore, play is 
best defined as the "process that takes place `in between' the player and the game. 97 
Just as we saw above, play in this sense, cannot be approached objectively, by 
means of a neutral subject who employs methods in his reflecting on the origin of the 
play or its presentation. Critical reflection creates a distance between the player and play 
which drops the player out of play. Most of us are familiar with this type of experience 
when a critic's comment breaks the `spell' of the play (I have a drama or movie in mind) 
in which we are involved. 
In this `world' of the film, we have been lowered into a lifeboat, and are battered 
by the roaring wind. Our stomachs turn as the boat rises high, then drops- twenty 
feet into a trough between the waves. We hear the sound of the spray, and as 
lightning breaks across the sky we catch a glimpse of the ship we have just left 
... An awestruck voice whispers besides us "No one would ever think that the 
Director had used a two-foot model in a six-foot tank. " The spell has been 
broken by the comment of a critic, who necessarily speaks on the basis of a critical 
approach. 98 
Nor can it be apprehended through the free-play of the viewers' aesthetic consciousness. 
Rather, play is the `in between' which involves the participation of the players and 
audience in the presentation of the play. 99 
Because artistic presentation, as play, exists for an audience, play is transformed 
into structure. While play is without purpose or intention, it can lead to activities which 
possess purpose and structure. By transformation into structure, Gadamer "means that 
something is suddenly and as a whole something else, that this other transformed thing 
that it has become is its true being, in comparison with which its earlier being is nil. "100 
The author of the drama, the script, and the players no longer exist in themselves. 
Instead, what they are playing comes to appearance. "Thus transformation into structure 
means that what existed previously exists no longer. But also that what now exists, what 
represents itself in the play of art, is the lasting and true. "101 Play transforms the author's 
script and the player's performance into what they are playing. 102 This same 
transformation takes place in reading literature. Just as the being of the work of art is 
play and must be viewed by the spectator in order for it to be actualised "so also it is 
96 Ibid., 109. 
97 Ibid., 109,117. 
98 Thiselton, New Horizons, 315-6. 
99 Gadamer, 117. 
100 Ibid., 111. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 112. 
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universally true of texts that only in the process of understanding them is the dead trace 
of meaning transformed back into living meaning. " 103 
In respect to the audience, play transforms into a world (structure) in which the 
audience dwells Gadamer's argument at this point rests on Heidegger's idea that the 
work of art projects a'world. ' In his explanation of what one experiences in Van Gogh's 
painting of the peasant shoes, Heidegger talks about how we experience the world present 
in the artwork. This does not occur through description or explanation "but only by 
bringing ourselves before Van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke. In the vicinity of 
the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be. "104 This 
projected `world' exists in a playful relationship through conflict with the `earth'. Earth 
refers not only to the physical and historical environment in which we live, but it also 
consists in our thrownncss. As such, earth is the intersubjective life-world from which all 
human understanding takes place and from which we are able to project a world. The 
truth of the work of art, is that the work of art opens up a world. Or to put it another 
way, "its world is present in it. " 105 In the artwork a world arises and as a result, there is a 
disclosure of truth. In our experience of Van Gogh's painting of the peasant's shoes 
something new is revealed or disclosed which "is not simply the manifestation of a truth, 
it is itself an event. "106 The viewer actively participates in this disclosure of the world of 
the work of art by "opening of oneself to the event of encounter and standing in it in 
such a way that the being of the work of art shows itself, steps forth, appears" 107 In this 
way, Gadanner writes that play is a transformation into truth, "it produces and brings to 
light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn. "108 Play reconciles the subject 
and the object since both participate in the `in-between' of play. It also holds the 
intersubjective horizon of `earth' in tension with the projected understanding of the work 
of art, its `world. ' 
What does this mean in relation to the history of a text's interpretation? When 
we apply Gadamer's concept of the transformation of play into structure to history of a 
103 Ibid., 164. 
104 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 35. 
105 Gadamer, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 222. "Towering 
up within itself, the work opens up a world and keeps it abidingly in force. " Heidegger, 
44. 
106 Ibid., 224. 
107 The experience of art is not something that we do, but is something we are absorbed into, it 
is the `work' of art. Richard E. Palmer, "Ritual, Rightness, and Truth in Two Later 
Works of Hans-Georg Gadamer, " in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 540. 
108 Gadamer, Truth and method, 112. 
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text's reception we realise that there can be no `single meaning' for the text. Meaning can 
never be the identical. While the task of interpreting a text can be repeated (we are 
performing the same text), it cannot be re-enacted in exactly the same manner because 
the conditions under which the performance is performed cannot be identical. In order 
to understand this phenomena, Gadamer examines what takes place in the celebration of 
a ritual or festival. A religious festival, such as Easter, displays affinities with textual 
interpretation because it only exists in its celebration (or performance) just as the 
meaning of a text only exists in its reading. 109 
The celebration of a festival possesses two distinct but related forms of 
temporality. First, a festival is historically temporal. Originally it was celebrated in one 
manner but with the passing of time it comes to be celebrated differently, and our present 
observance will be slightly different yet. The festival changes from one year, or 
celebration, to the next. I 10 A festival is not one and the same, but it is historical in that 
"it exists by always being something different. 111 Like a text, it displays this curious 
temporality of celebration, disappearance, and then returning in the next celebration. No 
two celebrations are replicated in the same manner, but the festival is open to unlimited 
re-enactments. At the same time, a ritual's celebration must be appropriate to what is 
being observed. The `rightness' of the celebration is related to both the festival being 
observed (similar to the manner in which a musical performance is related to the score 
being performed) and to the customs and tradition of those who are observing it. 112 
The second aspect of a festival's temporality is that it is contemporaneous. This 
occurs in the same manner that a musical piece only exists in its performance and 
involves the participation of the audience. 113. "`Contemporaneity' means that in its 
presentation this particular thing that presents itself to us achieves full presence, however, 
remote its origin may be. " 114 When we celebrate Christ's resurrection on Easter we do 
not compare this celebration with the original one, or past celebrations, but we fully 
109 While textual interpretation and the celebration of a festival are similar it is important to 
note that they are not identical for Gadamer. Palmer, - 534. 
110 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 123. 
111 Ibid., 123-4 note 225 Gadamer is arguing against the Platonic idea that a festival could be 
an `ideal' which remains unchanged while its manifestation in history will always be 
different. For Gadamer, there is no Platonic ideal behind the festival, just as there is not 
ideal `meaning' behind the text. 
112 Palmer, "Ritual, Rightness, and Truth, " 531-33. 
113 "A festival only exists in being celebrated. " Gadamer, Truth and Method, 124. 
114 Ibid., 127. Gadamer learned of contemporaneity from Kierkegaard who claimed that in the 
preaching of the word a mediation between our present and the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus took place so that we experience the later as a present reality. 
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participate in this celebration, "all mediation [of historical distance] is superseded by total 
presence 
... 
"115 This is not the same thing as simultaneity, which sees every point in 
time as equally present and is based on the free-play of aesthetic consciousness by which 
texts, or festivals, from the past are cut off from their contextual relationships so that we 
are able to experience them directly. 116 Contemporaneity, by contrast, involves the 
recognition that there is a historical distance between what is being celebrated and the 
present celebration: between Easter morning and this Easter celebration. The distance 
between the past horizon and the present is not ignored but is what makes participation 
in the festival possible. We recognise the alterity of what is being celebrated and in doing 
so we return to the present. This is a hermeneutical movement which must be 
performed. "The past must be made manifest to the present because its presence and 
immediacy are not given. " 117 
C. Presentation, Imitation, and Recognition 
Whereas Heidegger speaks of the conflict between world and earth, or disclosure 
and concealment to explain the event of truth in the work of art, Gadamer employs the 
concepts of imitation (or mimesis) and recognition. 118 Once again, Gadamer is 
attempting to defend concepts which have fallen into disrepute. Mimesis, or imitation, 
use to serve as one of the underlying hermeneutical and literary concepts. However, since 
the early 1960's, it has come under increasing criticism, especially from French theorists 
such as Barthes, Genette, Derrida, and Foucault. 119 If mimesis, or imitation, is denied 
then understanding texts falls into the unending play of signs to be interpreted; this is an 
untenable point as we saw in the first half of this chapter. Robert Alter claims that good 
literature presupposes and makes use of the vehicle of mimesis in order to present to us 
"lives that might seem like our lives, minds like our minds, and desires like our own 
desires. "120 
Imitation plays an important cognitive role in that it is related to 
preunderstanding. When we imitate someone we are not trying to hide ourselves behind 
115 Ibid., 128. 
116 See above, "Schiller. Free-Play and Aesthetic Differentiation. " 
117 Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of "Truth and Method"(New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 115. 
118 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 46-50,63. 
119 See the following article for an excellent discussion of concerning the fall of mimesis: Robert 
Alter, "Mimesis and the Motive for Fiction, " Tri Quarterly, 42 (Spring 1978): 228-32. 
120 Ibid., 248. 
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a disguise but to represent that person. 121 This imitation is related to our knowledge of 
the person and our audience's knowledge of them also. Heidegger wrote about the 
mimetic quality of a sculpture of a Greek god in a temple. "It is not a portrait whose 
purpose is to make it easier to realise how the god looks; rather, it is a work that lets the 
god himself be present and thus is the god himself. "122 For Gadamer, this is an example 
of how play is transformed into structure. In the mimetic presentation of the Greek god 
in the statue, a figure or shape of that god is projected in the world of that work of art. 123 
This is not some form of an atemporal truth which is realised but it is an event which 
occurs when we bring ourselves before that sculpture. It is a historical happening in that 
it is an event which happens and arises in a historical situation. 124 
The correctness of the presentation of a work of art is realised through the 
cognitive function of recognition. Umberto Eco employs a similar notion of recognition 
in his semiotic theory. "Recognition occurs when a given object or event 
... 
comes to be 
viewed by an addressee as the expression of a given content, either through a pre-existing 
and coded correlation or through the positing of a possible correlation by its addressee. "125 
There must be some form of agreement or conformity between what we already know of 
the thing and what is presented in the artwork. 126 This is what allows us to say, "Yes, 
that's the way it really is. "127 The cognitive value of recognition does not end with 
realising this conformity or agreement for Gadamer. "The joy of recognition is rather the 
joy of knowing more than is already familiar. "128 In representation there is a `bringing 
forth' of the thing represented. This may involve isolating the subject-matter of the 
artwork from its original context, or highlighting certain facets of it while passing over 
121 Gadamer, 113. This concept is difficult to grasp in English because of our use of two 
related hermeneutical terms: imitation and mimesis. While both convey the idea of 
correspondence and resemblance, imitation denotes the idea that it is a static or exact 
copy whereas mimesis leans more to the side that there is a dynamic and active 
relationship between the representation and the thing represented. Gadamer's concepts 
at this point are much more in line with the term mimesis. Irena R. Mayaryk, ed. 
Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), s. v. "Mimesis, " by John Baxter. 
122 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 43. 
123 Ibid., 64,66. 
124 Ibid., 61. 
125 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 221. 
126 Ibid., 51-52. 
127 For Gadamer, the expression, "It is so, " is related to the experience of "it comes forth. " "`So 
ist es' 
- 
so ist es `richtig [It is so 
- 
it is ` right' so! ]" The way we sense the rightness of 
something is related to disclosure. Palmer, "Ritual, Rightness, and Truth, " 108. 
128 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 114; Alter, "Mimesis and the Motive for Fiction, " 245-46. 
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others. 129 "All true imitation is a transformation that does not simply present again 
something that is already there. It is a kind of transformed reality in which the 
transformation points back to what has been transformed in and through it. It is a 
transformed reality because it brings before us intensified possibilities never seen 
before. " 130 There will never be any `last word' about the meaning of a work of art or a 
text. Every encounter with an artwork is part of the still unfinished happening of the 
work itself because. of the way we recognise `more' than we knew previously. 131 
Imitation and recognition are not restricted to the mere copying of the subject-matter but 
also involve a disclosure of its essence. 132 
The interpretation of Jesus' parables are illustrative of the functions of mimesis 
and recognition. The characters and narrative situation found in the parables would have 
been easily recognised by Jesus' audience in relation to the people and situations of their 
daily lives and the themes contained in the parable would have been recognised in 
relation to their theology and overall understanding of the scriptures. 133 The 
intersubjective world which the audience shares with the parable draws them into the 
parable's projected narrative world and allows them to make judgements concerning its 
correctness. 134 At the same time, by the time the parable has reached its conclusion it 
has questioned, challenged, or reversed the preunderstanding of the hearer's theological 
framework. 135 While hearers are caught up in the play of the presentation of the parable 
129 The four gospels illustrate this idea. Each one is a mimetic representation of the life of Jesus 
which differs from the other three by the way they emphasise certain aspects of his 
ministry and teaching, and ignore other elements. 
130 Gadamer, "The Festive Character of the Theater, " in The Relevance of the Beautiful, 64. 
131 Detsch, "Gadamer, Heidegger, Rilke, Nietzsche on Play, " 159. 
132 Gadamer, 114. "The work, therefore, is not the reproduction of some particular entity that 
happens to be present at any given time; it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the 
thing's general essence. " Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " 37. 
133 Baird presents a very strong case that Jesus actually adapted his parables to match the 
particular background of the specific audience he was addressing at that time. J. Arthur 
Baird, Audience Criticism and the Historical Jesus (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), 103. 
Via extends the shared world of the parables beyond the original audience to generations 
of future readers, including the present one. For example, the parable of the Prodigal 
Son would relate to anyone who has experienced family life. Dan Otto Via, The 
Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 
126. 
134 Robert W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutics and Word of God The Problem of Language in the 
New Testament and Contemporary Theology (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1966), 138-40,179; 
Alter, "Mimesis and the Motive for Fiction, " 234-35. 
135 Thiselton, "The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs' Hermeneutics in 
the Light of Linguistic Philosophy, " Scottish Journal of Theology, 23 (1970), 440-2; Eta 
Linnemann, Parables of fesus: Introduction and Exposition, trans. John Sturdy (London: 
SPCK, 1966), 18-23. 
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they are confronted by its truth claim. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, the hearer 
is challenged to reconsider her definition not only of who her neighbour is but also what 
it means to obey the greatest commandment. The intersubjective world shared by the 
hearer and the parable evoke the hearer's expectations which are then revised or expanded 
in relation to the truth claim presented in the parable. This is not a one time revision. If 
this were so, then once the parable was understood for the first time we would end up 
with a fixed or determinate meaning. But one of the generally accepted traits of parables 
is that we recognise `more' than we previously recognised in successive readings of the 
parables. The possibility of there being any static or determinate meaning is 
undermined. 
Jauss develops Gadamer's idea of mimesis farther by showing how it is one aspect 
of what allows a tradition of interpretation to form. With the recognition of `more', 
which mimesis allows, a tradition begins to take shape. In the first reading of a text, 
recognition is based on the relation of the text to the intersubjective world of the readers. 
However, future readers will incorporate what previous readers recognised in the text. 
Thus, the `more' which is recognised contributes to the expansion and transformation of 
successive horizons or reader's expectations. "Only as the horizon changes and expands 
with each subsequent historical materialization, do responses to the work legitimize 
particular possibilities of understanding, imitation, transformation, and continuation 
-- 
in short, structures of exemplary character that condition the process of the formation of 
literary tradition. " 136 
Let me attempt to illustrate the role of recognition in the formation of the 
tradition of biblical interpretation. John 11: 33 records that when Jesus came to the tomb 
of Lazarus he was "ivepptpf (; a-rd' in his spirit. The German and English 
commentators follow two different historical trajectories of thought on how this verb 
should be interpreted. The English commentators prefer to translate this verb as 
referring to Jesus being "deeply moved" or. "groaning" in his spirit, while the Germans 
prefer the more active meaning of Jesus becoming "angry". On the English side, this 
tradition of interpretation dates back to the King James translation and is reflected in 
136 Hans Robert Jauss, "Art History as Pragmatic History, " in Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, 
trans. Timothy Bahti, Theory and History of Literature, ed. Wad Godzich and Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 64. See also 
Paul de Man's comments on mimesis. "Introduction, " in Towards an Aesthetic of 
Reception, xxii. 
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many of the most recent translations. 137 Beasley-Murray mentions these traditions of 
interpretation in his commentary on john. 
This understanding of E 43ptuäteat has controlled the expositions of Bernard, 
Temple, Strachan, Sanders, Morris, Marsh, Lindars, Bruce, as also of Lagrange 
and F. M. Braun. By contrast Luther's rendering, "Er ergrimmte im Geist und 
empörte sich, " i. e., "He was angry in the spirit and distressed, " has controlled 
German interpretations to the present day, which generally departs from it only 
by way of stronger expression 
.... 
Such is the interpretation followed by 
Bultmann, Büchsel, Strathmann, Schnackenburg, Schulz, Haenchen, and Becker 
in their commentaries. 138 
This example illustrates the manner in which what previous readers or interpreters 
recognise in the text contributes to the horizon of expectations of future readers. In this 
way, the correctness of what is recognised as being represented in the text is partially 
determined by what the previous readers recognised. 
D. Internal and External Representation 
Alasdair MacIntyre offers a helpful clarification of Gadamer's concept of 
representation and recognition. Maclntyre makes a differentiation between external and 
internal representations. 139 An external representation is what we would classify as 
occurring in a copy. It is the type of representation which occurs in a passport 
photograph of a person. You can inspect the picture and the person independently and 
inquire about the degree of resemblance. In contrast, internal representation discloses or 
reveals features which can only be grasped in the representation. Rembrandt's portraits 
reveal to us aspects or features of the human face which we did not recognise before. 140 
The key features of the person represented can only be found in the representation and it 
137 The following are just two examples. The recently revised (1995) New American Standard 
Bible translates this passage as, "he was deeply moved in spirit, " and the New Revised 
Standard version has, "he was greatly disturbed in spirit. " 
138 George R. Beasley-Murray, John, in Word Biblical Commentary, ed. David Hubbard and 
Glenn W. Barker, vol. 36 (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 192. There are a few 
exceptions, in the English, Westcott, Hoskyns, Barrett, Brown interpret this verb as 
being angry. Ibid., 193. 
139 Alter makes a parallel argument when he claims that we can categorise literature along the 
following two poles. At one end are the more poetical and literary texts which 
systematically project "the illusion of reality and shatters it. " At the other end is "the 
realist novel" which tries to maintain a close affinity with reality. Alter, "Mimesis and 
the Motive for Fiction, " 238-39. 
140 "It turns out that we are not, in asserting truth or falsity, asserting or denying some 
relationship between part of language and a non-linguistic feature of the world; we are 
always comparing one linguistic characterisation with another. Truth is a property of 
internal as much or more than of external representation, elsewhere just as in art. " 
Maclnryre, "Contexts of Interpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth 
and Merhod, " 44-45. 
96 
is through the representation that "we learn to see what is represented. " It is not a copy 
of the thing in the world, but it is a disclosure of its heightened being. 141 Therefore, all 
art is not equal. The playful nature of understanding will be more fully realised in art 
forms and texts which are more externally representative. This is a point which I believe 
that Gadamer is in agreement with when he writes that in the work of art, play is raised 
to its ideality. 142 
If we apply this idea of internal and external representation to texts then we can 
see that there is a spectrum of different types of texts. Eco realises that there is a wide 
spectrum to the nature of texts. At the one end of the spectrum are closed texts which are 
designed to arouse "a precise response on the part" of the reader. At the other end are 
open texts which function primarily by generating meaning through the play which the 
reader enters into with the text, or as Roland Barthes writes, the ` jouissance du texte. " 143 
Paul's request for Timothy to bring him his cloak, books ((3tßafa) and parchments 
({1Eu(3päva5-) in II Timothy 4: 13 is an example of a closed text while Jesus' parables are 
good examples of open texts designed to project a world in which the reader enters. 144 
"Different genres within scripture will call forth different kinds of correlation, because of 
their different types of mimesis. " 145 
However, there is no such thing as a pure closed or open text. Even the most 
closed texts "are in fact open to any possible `aberrant' decoding" when readers from 
different horizons read the text. 146 The most open text is also not open to any 
141 Ibid., 44. 
142 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 109. Also see his discussion of a scale of translatability 
between lyrical poetry at one end and novels at the other. Idem, "The Eminent Text and 
Its Truth, " Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association, trans. Geoffrey Waite, 
13 (1980), 8. 
143 Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texte in Advances in 
Semiotics, ed. Thomas Sebeok (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 3-10. 
Eco appears to have developed these concepts from Lotman's theory of grammar- 
oriented and text-oriented cultures. Idem, A Theory of Semiotics, 136-38. 
144 However, even the parables are characterised by a high degree of external representation, or 
as Via would term, `low mimetic. ' While the parables are fictional they remind of 
everyday people and situation, there is nothing mythical or romantic about them. Dan 
Otto Via Jr., The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1967), 96-100. 
145 Frances Young, The Art of Performance Towards a Theology of Holy Scripture (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990), 154. Italics hers. 
146 Searle shows that even a simple statement such as "the cat is on the mat" is open to 
numerous interpretations. These depend on the kinds of assumptions we make about 
the presence of gravity, the possibility of there being wires suspending the cat over the 
mat, or that the mat is stiffened and propped up at an angle. John R. Searle, 
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 121-124. 
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interpretation. In writing an open text, the author has structured it in such a manner 
that it is not open to accidental interpretations, but it outlines or projects a `closed 
project' for the reader to realise. 147 "A text can succeed in being more or less open or 
closed. "148 Therefore, play will characterise, to a certain extent, the act of understanding 
a closed text. At the same time, the playing field opened up by a particular text will vary 
according to the nature of that text. 149 
In the application of Gadamer and Jauss' hermeneutics to biblical studies this 
point must be kept in mind because Gadamer uses literary texts as an example of the 
ideal form of play in a text and Jauss is primarily interested in the study of literary texts 
which we would classify as being more eternally representative. 150 However, the Bible 
contains a wide range of literary genres with a wide diversity when it comes to whether 
they are internally or externally representative. The danger lies in thinking that we can 
apply one concept of representation to all texts. This is especially true if we were to 
follow Gadamer and Jauss in adopting literary texts as the primary example since some 
the biblical texts, such as the Gospels are characterised by a higher degree of internal 
representation. "The implied reader of these texts understands them not as an enclosed 
fictional world but as an imaginative rendering of prior reality. "151 
In summary, Gadamer's ideas on play, imitation, and recognition overcome the 
problems associated with play which date back to Kant's separation of determinate from 
reflective judgement which eliminated the classical role mimesis played and attributed 
genuine knowledge to the sciences only. In recognising what is already known, but in a 
deeper or more authentic manner, the representation of play reinstates the position of 
cognitive knowledge in the arts. 152 It also presents a resolution to the problems which 
147 Eco, Role of the Reader, 8-9. Gadamer takes a parallel argument when he argues that "The 
aesthetic object is not constituted by the aesthetic experience of grasping it, but the work 
of art itself is experienced in its aesthetic quality through the process of its concretization 
and creation. " Gadamer, Truth and Method, 118 note 219. 
148 Ibid., 5. 
149 Thiselton points out the danger of not making this distinction between different types of 
texts and the space for play which they open up. If all texts are subsumed under the 
model of the open text, then texts can no longer function as a basis for rational action. 
We cannot limit interpretation to one single model, to do so we get trapped in a 
philosophical tradition. Biblical texts transcend one category of texts and must have a 
theory broad enough to encompass the variety of functions which they perform. 
Thiselton, New Horizons, 129-32. 
150 See Gadamer's "The Eminent Text and Its Truth, " 3-10 for his view of literary, and 
especially poetical, texts. 
151 Francis Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
199704. 
152 Gadamer, Truth and Methorh 115. 
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we have inherited from Kant. On the one hand, there are those who argue for the 
determinate meaning of a text. E. D. Hirsch is perhaps the best known contemporary 
literary theorist who claims that through the application of method one can "achieve 
`true' or `highly probable' interpretations. " 153 In order to accomplish this, Hirsch bases 
his hermeneutic on a concept of meaning which is distinct from significance and relies on 
a split between the subject and the object. 154 The result of taking such a positivistic 
approach toward textual interpretation is that the productive possibilities for play are 
restricted from the start. On the opposing side are those that would agree with Schiller 
and Nietzsche's concept of the unending and total freedom of play. Derrida argues that 
deconstruction is a never ending mode of play of the text. The idea that there is a fixed 
textual meaning is only an illusion. "Every meaning which is presumed to stand by the 
commentator is shown to be no more than a play between simulation and dissimulation. 
The true nature of every text therefore is to be in a state of flux as long as it is engaged by 
the reader and is reduced to a mere trace when the engagement is over because the text 
has no determinate essence. "155 
Weinsheimer warns us of the danger of both of these opposing views. "What 
philosophical hermeneutics reminds us, however, is that both extremes, homogeneity and 
heterogeneity alike, deaden mental activity. For understanding lives in the play of 
equivalence and difference. "156 Gadamer's concept of play avoids the problems of the 
anarchy of unrestricted heterogeneous interpretations and the intellectual confinement of 
determinate meaning which kills the possibility for play. However, if the truth of a work 
of art arises or is instantiated in its performance or representation, then how do we 
differentiate between the different truth claims realised in different performances? 
E. Playful Truth 
What is truth in relation to the play of interpretation? This is a difficult question 
to answer because Gadamer does not explicate his theory of truth at any one point, but 
153 Christopher E. Arthur, "Gadamer and Hirsch: The Canonical Work and the Interpreter's 
Intention, " Cultural Hermeneutics, 4 (1977), 183. 
154 Ibid., 184,194. See James DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth, 85-90, for 
an incisive analysis of Hirsch's hermeneutic on this point. 
155 Mario J. Valdes, "Conclusion: Concepts of Fixed and Variable Identity, " in Identity of the 
Literary Text, Mario J. Valdes and Owen Miller, eds. (Toronto: University iToronto 
Press, 1985), 303; 
156 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, xiii, emphasis mine. 
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rather it is one of the main themes which he weaves throughout Truth and Method 157 
However, I believe it is possible to pull together several of the strands which Gadamer 
uses in weaving his tapestry so that we can arrive at a fairly clear picture of what truth 
involves in regard to play and interpretation. 
First, truth occurs in the meaningful happening of play, it is something in which 
we participate, like a player in a game. The truth of an artwork is something which 
strikes us as meaningful. "What we encounter in the experience of the beautiful and in 
understanding the meaning. of tradition really has something of the truth of play about it. 
In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we 
want to know what we are supposed to believe. " 158 For Heidegger, this happening of 
truth takes place in the disclosure of Being. Gadamer, makes his mentor's concept more 
historical in that he is primarily concerned with showing how the event of truth occurs in 
our conversation with tradition; through the works of art and texts which are handed 
down to us in it. 159 The disclosive character to the happening of truth means that truth 
will always be provisional. There will always be some degree of un-truth with the truth. 
Or to put it negatively, our finitude and historical thrownness means "that there are 
many things that are true that we are not capable of recognising because we are, without 
being cognizant of it, limited by prejudices. " 60 
Secondly, truth is related to the subject matter of the text. It involves our ability 
to recognise some degree of conformity or correctness between what is represented and 
the representation. This is not based on a correspondence theory of truth, in which the 
work of art or the text are mainly descriptive of the subject matter they are portraying. 
But is more in line with a coherence model in which our interpretive context and 
preunderstanding inform our experience of the text or work of art. As such, to ask 
questions about the truth involves asking questions "about the structures that inform our 
modes of being-in-the-world. " 161 Perhaps the most important element which comes 
157 Or as Bernstein says, truth is "one of the most elusive concepts in Gadamer. " Bernstein, 
"From Hermeneutics to Praxis, " 96; Riser, "The Remembrance of Truth, " 123; 
Groundin, "Hermeneutic Truth, " 50. 
158 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 490. "It is worth emphasizing that for Gadamer truth 
appears neither at the beginning nor at the end but in the interim, in the process of 
representation. " Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 119. 
159 Gadamer, "What is Truth?, " trans. Brice R. Wachterhauser, in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. 
Brice R. Wachterhauser (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 36,45- 
46; Walter Lammi, "Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'Correction' of Heidegger, " Journal of 
History of Ideas, 52 (3,1991), 496. 
160 Gadamer, "What is Truth? " 40. 
161 DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth, 147. 
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into play here is the language which we inherit from our tradition. For Gadamer, "a 
judgment is true when it lets something be presented together that is presented together 
in the thing [die Sache]; a judgment is false when it lets something be presented together 
that is not presented together in the thing [die Sache]. The truth of speech is determined 
by the adequation of speech to the thing. " Or as the formula states "adaequatio intellectus 
ad rem. " 162 
But truth in interpretation does not stop there. Truth also includes the disclosive 
potential involved in mimesis and play. Truth is not limited to repeating what is already 
known; it also includes the possibility for aspects of the subject matter to be understood 
in ways never seen before. "The joy of recognition is rather the joy of knowing more 
than is already familiar. "163 Once again, this brings out the provisional aspect of truth. 
Future horizons of understanding will always contain the possibility for the "joy of 
knowing more" Truth is provisional because the conditions from which it arises 
- 
language, history, and tradition 
- 
are never a universal whole which will allow for all 
that is possible in the text to be recognised. Because there will never be any last word 
concerning the meaning of a text each and every generation has the responsibility to 
interpret the text for themselves. 
Finally, truth is not only characterised by its eventfulness, but it is also a process 
which takes place over time in our dialogue with tradition. There are two aspects to this 
which I discussed in the previous chapter which should be kept in mind. The manner in 
which we enter into dialogue with our tradition is by means of the logic of question and 
answer which involves a double hermeneutic. Not only does the interpreter need to ask 
questions which are appropriate for the text but at the same time he or she is questioned 
by the text. 164 This dialogue with tradition is also characterised by the I/Thou 
relationship. We must allow tradition to truly say something to us, to exercise its truth 
claim on our lives. We must be open to tradition in such a way that it can say something 
to us. 165 Truth is realised through dialogue. In the process of a conversation our ideas 
are questioned and tested which results in the revision and correction of our previous 
understanding. 166 "Gadamer seeks to show that there is a truth that is revealed in the 
process of experience (Erfahrung) and that emerges in the dialogical encounter with the 
162 Gadamer, "What is Truth? ", 36. 
163 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 116. 
164 Idem, "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey, " 43. 
165 Idem, Truth and Method, 452-53; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics 205. 
166 Grondin, 56. 
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very tradition that has shaped us. " 167 The question now becomes, how does this actually 
take place in respect to the practice of interpreting texts? 
III. PERFORMANCE AND TRADITION FORMATION 
Gadamer's conception of play and performance explains three problems related to 
any tradition of interpretation. The concept of play provides a basis for the fact that 
there can be multiple interpretations for a text. Not only that, but it also provides a 
philosophical explanation for the possibility that there can be more than one right, or 
correct interpretation. "The work can be multiply interpreted, multiply true, without 
disintegrating into fragments or denigrating into empty form. "168 This takes place not 
only synchronically, but even more significant for Gadamer, diachronically in the 
formation of a tradition. 
Certain forms of play are capable of repetition. A game, such as England vs. 
Germany in the last Eurocup semifinal was a one time form of play; it can never be 
repeated. However, other forms of play, such as music, drama, literature, and artworks, 
are all repeatable forms of play. This is part of what transformation into structure 
(Gebilde) involves. A dramatic play (Schauspiel) is characterised by the fact that it is a 
form of play that has been transformed into structure which is capable of being presented 
more than one time. In successive performances of a play, such as Hamlet, a tradition of 
performances or interpretations begins to take shape. 169 Structure allows play to be 
repeated and its significance to be understood; yet play is transformed into structure only 
when it is played. t 70 
Gadamer illustrates this with the idea of a musical performance. Every 
performance of a musical composition is the same because of the structure of the score, 
yet the music's full being is realised only in the presentation. This is related to his 
concept of the double hermeneutic which we examined in the last chapter. We are truly 
concerned with understanding die Sache, the subject matter, from within the horizon in 
which we stand. Since play is structure, there must be a "meaningful whole" to that form 
or instance of play which allows for repeated presentations of the work. The score of the 
167 Bernstein, "From Hermeneutics to Praxis, " 97. 
168 Weinsheimer, 100. 
169 "For instance, whether we are familiar with the literature on Shakespeare's work or not we 
approach his work in a way influenced by a tradition of Shakespeare interpretation so 
that we assume its excellence, importance and so on. " Georgia Warnke, Gadamer, 
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 96. 
170 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 117. 
102 
music, the text of a book, or the painting by Van Gogh are examples of structure. At the 
same time, the play's full being, and structure, are only realised in each presentation. 
The playing field which mimesis opens up creates the potential for an endless 
possibility of performances but at the same time it is not an unbounded, endless playing 
field. While a musical score or text may have more than one right interpretation, it does 
not mean that there arc no wrong interpretations. 171 This is a point which Jauss, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, is in full agreement with, "the text itself is thus able to limit 
the arbitrariness of interpretation, guaranteeing the continuity of its experience beyond 
the present act of reception. "172 A performance must be faithful to the structure, or 
score, just as a reading must be faithful to the subject matter of the text. 173 
This constitutes the obligation of every presentation: that it contain a relation to 
the structure itself and submit itself to the criterion of correctness that derives 
from it. Even the extreme of a completely distortive presentation confirms this. 
It is known as a distortion inasmuch as the presentation is intended and judged to 
be the presentation of the structure. 174 
The interpretation of texts shares this same structure of play and presentation. "Just as 
we were able to show that the being of the work of art is play and that it must be 
perceived by the spectator in order to be actualised (vollendet), so also it is universally 
true of texts that only in the process of understanding them is the dead trace of meaning 
transformed back into living meaning. "175 Differences in the historical horizon in which 
the music is performed or the text read will bring out different aspects in their respective 
presentation. "Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its 
author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive 
activity as well. " X76 
The performance of a play, the presentation of an artwork, the interpretation of a 
text are not secondary additions to the work of art or text. They are part of the being of 
171 For Gadamer, "the mimetic field, although endless by its practical performances, is not a 
house of mirrors without referent, an endless play of copy copying a copy. Rather, to be 
caught with the mimetic field is to be caught in a play of truth. " This is one of the 
differences between Gadamer and Derrida. Riser, "The Remembrance of Truth, " 131. 
172 Hans Robert Jauss, "The Theory of Reception: A Retrospective of its Unrecognized 
Prehistory, " in Literary Theory Toda» ed. Peter Collier and Helge Geyer-Ryan (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1990), 60. 
173 "The important point about effective-historical consciousness, then, is not only that inquiry 
is always oriented by our concerns; although Gadamer makes this point, his argument is 
also that inquiry is always inquiry into a subject-matter and that the consensus reached 
about this subject-matter can reveal something `true' about it. " Warnke, Gadamer, 146. 
174 Gadamer, Truth and Method 122. 
175 Ibid., 164. 
176 Ibid., 296. 
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the work, "as possibilities that flow from it and are included in it as facets of its own 
disclosure. "177 The dependence of Ulrich Luz's wirkungsgeschichtliche approach to the 
New Testament on Gadamer's hermeneutic is clearly seen at this point. 
A biblical text is not a reservoir or cistern, with a fixed amount of water in it that 
can be clearly measured. Rather it resembles a source, where new water emerges 
from the same place. This means that the history of interpretation and effects 
that a text creates is nothing alien to the text itself, as if the text with its meaning 
existed at the beginning and then only afterward and secondarily had 
consequences and created a history of interpretation. 178 
The ontological nature of play is not an either-or situation but a both-and involving 
identification and difference. As a result, with each presentation there is an overflow or 
emanation of being. 179 Anthony Thiselton clearly conveys the relationship between the 
poles of continuity and variability in interpretations which the metaphor of musical 
performance helps us to reconcile in relationship to biblical interpretation. 
The Bible may be compared to a musical score. What `controls' or sets limits to 
the scope of, the present performance is the notation of this composition as it was 
composed at some time in the past. If it is not based on the score, the present 
performance is not a performance of this composition. Nevertheless, what the 
current audience experiences in the present is the actual performance, and no two 
performances will be quite the same. Wooden repetition may turn out to be less 
faithful to the score than the use of creative imagination. Yet the creativity of the 
performer still takes place within clear limits. For without faithfulness to the 
score, the performance would not be a faithful interpretation of that work. 180 
Ebeling reiterates Thiselton's point when he argues that the process of interpretation 
involves saying the same thing differently. "If, by way of pure repetition, we were to say 
today the same thing that was said 2,000 years ago, we would only be imagining that we 
177 Linge, xxvi. 
178 While I have already quoted Luz in the introduction, it is worth restating it here. Ulrich 
Luz, Matthew: A Continental Commentary, trans. Wilhelm C. Linss, Evangelisch- 
Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Joachim Gnilka, Norbert Brox, Ulrich 
Luz, and Jürgen Roloff eds. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), 1.19. 
179 Ibid., 117,126,140,148. "This occurrence means the coming into play, the playing out, 
of the content of tradition in its constantly widening possibilities of significance and 
resonance, extended by the different people receiving it. Inasmuch as the tradition is 
newly expressed in language, something comes into being that had not existed before, 
and that exists from now on. We can illustrate this with any historical example. 
Whether a given traditionary text is a poem or tells us of a great event, in each case what 
is transmitted re-emerges into existence just as it presents itself. There is no being-in- 
itself that is increasingly revealed when Homer's Iliad or Alexander's Indian Campaign 
speaks to us in the new appropriations of tradition; but, as in genuine dialogue, 
something emerges that is contained in neither of the partners by himself. " Ibid., 462. 
180 Anthony C. Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory, " in Believing in the 
Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church 
of England (London: SPCK, 1981), 74. 
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were saying the same thing, while actually we would be saying something quite 
different. "181 
Successive performances form a tradition with which later performances must 
come to terms. Both the audience and the performers will be affected by past 
performances which will serve as either conscious models to be followed or constitute 
part of the audience's background understanding. 182 This is tied in with the cognitive 
importance of recognition. Classic performances or interpretations are incorporated into 
the history of the text's influence and become part of the future readers' horizons of 
expectations. In this way, previous interpretations serve as markers which determine the 
field of play by which future readers will judge the correctness of their readings. Thus, 
we have two regulative norms to determine the validity of any interpretation according to 
Gadamer: the subject matter of the text and those interpretations which are recognised by 
tradition (consciously and/or part of our pre-understanding) as authoritative. 
The text that is handed down to us is a fusion of previous opinions about it, a 
harmony of voices, as Gadamer often puts it, to which we add our own. But this 
means that object of hermeneutic understanding is already afitsion of the 
interpretations of a tradition and our encounter with it is an encounter with the 
tradition. 183 
While some performances and interpretations arc more influential than others, none 
should reach the level where they are recognised as being definitive or canonical. Past 
performances are not something which are to be blindly imitated. As part of our 
tradition they make up the playing field for our understanding the musical piece, drama, 
or text. "Although the tradition created by a great actor, director, or musician remains 
effective as a model, it is not a brake on free creation, but has become so fused with the 
work that concern with this model stimulates an artist's creative interpretative powers no 
less than does concern with the work itself. "184 Instead of the two poles usually 
associated with interpretation, the interpreter and the text, we now have three poles: the 
text, its Wirkungsgeschichte or tradition of interpretation, and the interpreter located 
within his historical horizon. 
181 Gerhard Ebeling, The Problem of Historicity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 26. 
Francis Young observes that an authentic and faithful performance of a classical piece of 
music does not involve going back to the earliest version of the score, playing it on 
medieval musical instruments, or making use of obsolete techniques. Young, The Art of 
Perfo' rmance, 24. 
182 Ibid., 61. 
183 Warnke, Gadamer, 90, emphasis mine. 
184 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 119; Warnke, 90. 
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N. PUTTING OUR PREJUDICES AT RISK: THE PLAY OF INTERPRETATION 
A. Familiar and Foreign 
The claims of the text primarily strike us in two ways. The first involves the 
hermeneutical circle of part to whole. We begin every act of reading for understanding 
by projecting an anticipation of completeness (Vorgrif der Vollkommenheii by which we 
try to grasp the unity of the text's meaning. 185 In the process of reading, our projected 
meaning is open to correction; it is constantly placed at risk while we read the text. This 
gives the reading process direction and is constantly revised as we move through the parts 
of the text. 186 The second is the presupposition that what the author says in the text is 
true, which is based on a hermeneutic of charity 
- 
that the author knows the subject 
matter better than we do. 187 Hermeneutically, this requires that we are conscious of the 
otherness of the text and be responsive to the truth claims which it makes against our 
fore-conceptions. 188 
The hermencutical principle of the anticipation of completeness and the openness 
to the truth claims of the text rest on the assumption that we are related to the subject 
matter of the text in some manner. 189 "Just as the recipient of a letter understands the 
news that it contains and first sees things with the eyes of the person who wrote the letter 
- 
i. e., considers what he writes as true, and is not trying to understand the writer's 
peculiar opinions as such 
- 
so also do we understand traditionary texts on the basis of 
expectations of meaning drawn from our own prior relation to the subject matter. "190 A 
text which is totally foreign to us would never be comprehensible. 191 At the same time, 
our relationship with a text or tradition is never complete or universal. There is always 
185 Gadamer, " Vom Zirkel des Verstehens, " in Martin Heidegger zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag 
(Tübingen: Günther Neske Pfullingen, 1959), 28. 
186 Ibid., 31. 
187 This point is identical to his epistemological defence of tradition. We must realise that our 
knowledge is finite and others know more than we do about some topics. Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 280. 
188 See chapter 1 for my discussion of the I/Thou relationship; Gadamer, "Vom Zirkel des 
Verstehens, " 29. 
189 Idem, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " 147; Truth and Method 295. 
190 Idem, Truth and Method, 294. "Die Hermeneutik muß davon ausgehen, dafßwer verstehen 
wi/h mit der Sache, die mit der Überlieferung zur Sprache kommt, verbunden ist und an die 
Tradition Anschluß hat oder Anschluß gewinnt, aus der die Überlieferung spricht. " Idem, 
"Vom Zirkel des Verstehens, " 31-2. 
191 Wittgenstein makes a parallel point in his aphorism, "If a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him. " Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe, 3rd cd. (N. Y.: Macmillian, 1958), 223e. 
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an element of brokenness in the transmission of a tradition. 192 There is a polarity 
between the familiarity we have with a text and its foreignness which is not psychological 
in nature, but is part of the ontological nature of tradition. 193 
One of the explanations for this is found in the idea of forgetfulness which 
Nietzsche and Heidegger employed in their views of history and tradition. Forgetfulness 
is part of the human condition, we have finite minds which are capable of only retaining 
so much. 194 It is also linked to the manner in which we selectively appropriate the past. 
For Nietzsche, the monumental approach to history selectively looks back over the 
significant achievements of the past not as something to be repeated but as testimony to 
human creativity. As such, the achievements of the past form a bond of opportunity with 
the present and reveal possibilities for our lives. 195 Because we selectively appropriate the 
past, most of what is handed down to us in tradition is forgotten. The interpreter is 
interested in those achievements or failures in the past which will provide a model or an 
example which he can apply to his present situation. Most of the past is passed over and 
forgotten in Nietzsche's monumental approach to history. 
Forgetfulness plays a more complex role in Heidegger. Historical existence is 
characterised by an element of forgetfulness in which the truths we currently possess are 
levelled down and covered over by tradition. 196 This is one of the reasons why he 
pursues his etymological studies; he wants to recover a fresher, more original meaning of 
the word by pealing away the layers of meaning by which these concepts had been 
192 This concept is not new, but played a central role in Petrarch's rhetorical theories. For him, 
"what tradition preserves or rather entails, is not a deposit of familiar meanings but 
something strange and refractory to interpretation, resistant to the present, 
uncontainable in the given world in which we find ourselves at home. " Gerald L. Bruns, 
"What is Tradition? " New Literary History, 22 (1991), 8. 
193 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295. 
194 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 6-7, idem, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral 
Sense, " in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufman (N. Y.: Penguin, 1968), 45-47. 
195 Ibid., 12-17. 
196 One of the central problems which Heidegger addresses in Being and Time concerns this 
very problem. "This question [of Being] has today been forgotten" Being and Time, 21, 
46-48. The central question of philosophy was shifted from the question of Being (das 
Sein) to beings (das Seiende) by Plato and Aristotle. The result is that western philosophy 
is dominated by a technical objectifying use of language and has lost its understanding of 
Being. "Its beginnings reach back to Plato and Aristotle. For them, thought is of value 
because it is a Texvn, a reflective process in the service of doing and making. " 
Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism, " trans. Edgar Lohner, in Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century, William Barrett and Henry Aiken eds. (N. Y., 1962) 271-2. For a fuller 
discussion see: Heidegger, "Die Zelt des Weltbildes" in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1963); 69-105. 
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levelled down through the transmission of a tradition. 197 Perhaps the most important 
issue for Heidegger, is how the western philosophical tradition has forgotten the question 
of Being. 198 
Gadamer thinks that this reveals an important dimension to our historical reality; 
the past is not part of our present horizon because we remember it but also because it has 
been forgotten. In fact, one of the reasons why understanding is possible at all is because 
tradition and language are forgetful. "The transitory sinks into a forgetting and it is this 
forgetting which makes it possible to hold fast and to preserve those things which have 
faded and fallen into forgottenness. "199 The past would present itself to us as a complete 
totality with which we would be totally familiar if we didn't forget 
. 
200 Since tradition is 
forgetful it allows certain ideas, events, and texts to stand out as more significant or 
meaningful. This also implies that tradition is not a homogeneous whole, but is 
characterised by diverse and possibly conflicting ideas. As such, tradition is subversive of 
any form of totalisation. This idea is not new to Gadamer, but was a point raised by 
Petrarch also 201 
Alongside forgetting, Gadamer places remembering or recollection. Recollection 
is different from the forgetting or levelling down power of tradition. In recollection, 
there is a halting of the passing away and being covered over processes by which ideas 
become part of our pre-understanding. 
Recollection is always what comes to one, and comes over one, so that something 
that is again made present to us offers, for the space of a moment, a halt to all 
passing away and forgetting. But recollection of being is not a recollection of 
something previously known and now present once again; rather, it is recollection 
of something previously asked, the reclaiming of a lost question. And a question 
197 "Because language was the vehicle for coming to be, Heidegger's deconstructive inquiry was 
heavily etymological in thrust. He sought to peel away the subsequent encrustations to 
recover what he took to be the original meaning of such key terms as aletheia, logo.; and 
physic, then to show how that original meaning, embodying a fresher, more desirable 
experience, had gradually been forgotten as changes in their meaning entailed a certain 
loss of resonance or connotation. " Roberts, Nothing but Hisrot 129. 
198 Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical journey, " 34. 
199 Idem, "The Continuity of History, " 239-40. 
200 The example Danto uses to illustrate this point is a supercomputer which can record every 
event as it occurs. This computer would only be able to chronicle the past, it would not 
be able to bring out its significance or meaning of the past events. Arthur C. Danto, 
Analytic Philosophy of History (Cambridge: CUP, 1965), 112-42. See also Nietzsche, The 
Use and Abuse of History 6-7. 
201 For Petrarch tradition was by nature diverse, "what tradition preserves or rather entails, is 
not a deposit of familiar meanings but something strange and refractory to 
interpretation, resistant to the present, uncontainable in the given world in which we 
find ourselves at home. " Bruns, "What is Tradition? " 8. 
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which is asked again is no longer recollected; it becomes a question again and is 
now asked anew. It is no longer a recollection of something that was once asked 
- 
it is posed anew. In this way, questioning reconceptualizes [aufhebt to destroy 
but also to preserve in a higher form] the historicity of our thinking and 
knowing. 202 
By remembering our history, we do not turn the past into a historical object, but re-collect 
it so that it becomes a living reality for us. As such, recollection is built on the ideas of 
the logic of question and answer, sublation, and recognition. The forgetting side of 
tradition means that much of what we know becomes transitory, it is levelled down, 
while memory serves to preserve something in the midst of this sinking away. This 
means that tradition is not a passive process but is something which must continually be 
reappropriated and renewed. This reveals one of the differences between Heidegger and 
Gadamer; "where Heidegger seeks direct insight into the truth of Being (of Being of 
truth), Gadamer looks for help in conversation with the tradition. " Therefore the task of 
hermeneutics is concerned with "the art of bringing what is said or written to speech 
again. 203 
B. The Productive Function of Temporal Distance 
This brings temporal distance into the centre of hermeneutics. Historicism 
conceived of temporal distance as a hurdle to understanding which must be overcome 
because it creates a separation between the historian and her object. By contrast, for 
Gadamer, understanding is grounded in temporal distance. Temporal distance stands at 
the centre of contemporary hermeneutical theories because of the manner in which it 
functions as the medium through which understanding takes place. 204 Temporal 
distance plays a productive and positive role in understanding. This is because temporal 
distance is not an empty chasm between us and the text, but it is filled with the 
conventions of tradition. It is a living continuity of elements. "Our historical 
consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is 
202 Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey, " 35. 
203 Ami, "Gadamer's Correction of Heidegger, " 506,501; Gadamer, Reason in the Age of 
Science, 119 
204 "Aus dieserZwischenstellung in der sie ihren Stand nimmt, folgt daßihr Zentrum bildet, was 
in der bisherigen Hermeneutik ganz am Rande blieb: der Zeitenabstand und seine Bedeutung 
für das Verstehen. Die Zeit ist nicht primdr ein Abgrund der überbrückt werden muß, weil 
er trennt und fernhält, sondern sie ist in Wahrheit der tragende Grund des Geschehens, in 
dem das gegenwärtige Verstehen wurzelt. Der Zeitenabstand ist daher nicht etwas, was 
überwunden werden muß. " Gadamer, "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens, " 32. Idem, Truth and 
Method 297. 
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heard. It is present only in the multifariousness of such voices: this constitutes the nature 
of tradition in which we want to share and have a part. "205 
Not only does temporal distance play a productive role in understanding but it 
also serves a critical purpose. As a tradition progresses we are constantly remembering 
and forgetting various elements of our tradition. Not everything that we possess at any 
point in time is productive, helpful, or beneficial. Therefore, the prejudices which we 
inherit from our tradition are not a nice neat package but they contain elements which 
have been forgotten or levelled down but still operate in our background network of 
beliefs. A tradition is constituted with prejudices which have the potential to distort 
communication and prejudices which have the possibility to allow for a better 
understanding of the text or subject at hand. 
Gadamer affirms the need to distinguish true prejudices, which lead to 
understanding, from false prejudices, which produce misunderstanding. In order to 
make this distinction our prejudices must be raised to consciousness. However, as long as 
our prejudices continue to operate unnoticed we cannot foreground (abheben) or make 
ourselves aware of them. This would be easy to accomplish if prejudices were something 
of which we were consciously aware. The problem is that most of our tradition is 
invisible to us, it operates prereflectively as the background, Vorhabe, which enables 
understanding. 206 "It is precisely our experience of history that we are located so 
completely within it that we can in a certain sense always say, We don't know what is 
happening to us. "207 
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and the state in which we live. The 
focuses of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual 
is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the 
prejudices of the individual far more than his judgments, constitute the historical 
reality of his being. 208 
As long as a prejudice functions in the play of understanding in an unnoticed or 
invisible manner it will not be open to any form of judgement or confirmation. Once we 
bring a prejudice up to reflection it loses its hold on us. "Reflection on a given 
205 Gadamer, Truth and Method 284. 
206 "History is always invisible to the participants in it; and for this reason methodological 
prophylactics, however, necessary, always ultimately fail. " Weinsheimer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics 38. 
207 Gadamer, "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects, " in Reason in the Age of Science, 36. 
208 Idem, Truth and Method, 276-77. Weinsheimer, 170. 
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preunderstanding brings before me something that otherwise happens behind my 
back"209 In order for this to happen, something about this particular element of 
tradition must strike us as odd, out of place, or foreign; or as Gadamer says, "it must be 
provoked. "210 Gadamer's idea is grounded in Heidegger's thought on what happens 
when a tool is misplaced or broken. We do not take much notice of a tool as long as it is 
working properly and is in the proper place 
. 
But when this referential context is 
violated, we not only take greater notice of the tool but also what it was related to and the 
purposes it served. "The more urgently (Je dringlicher] we need what is missing, and the 
more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand" the more it stands 
out. 211 For Gadamer, temporal distance, or the Otherness of that element of tradition, 
violates the pre-reflective referential contexts of our prejudices and causes us to not only 
take notice about that object but also to ask questions about it. The distance between the 
past and present creates a tension which is needed for that element of our tradition to be 
raised to consciousness and for us to be able to critically reflect on it. 212 
There are two primary ways in which our prejudices are placed at risk when we 
are interpreting a text. The first involves the manner in which we always construct an 
anticipated completeness or unity for the text we are reading. We project this off our 
preunderstanding of what the text is about, or if we know very little about the text, from 
our experience of other texts which may be related to it by genre, historical period, or 
subject matter. Hirsch illuminates the significance of this point when he argues that even 
if a person does not read the classical texts of their tradition they will still meet them 
through second or third hand sources. The foundational texts of our tradition and the 
literary canon are not self contained books sitting on the self, but help shape and form 
the tradition to which we belong. 213 Therefore, we are familiar with these texts before 
209 Gadamer, "Scope and Function of Reflection, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 38. 
210 Idem, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " 157. 
211 Heidegger, Being and Time, 103-5. A parallel concept developed in literary theory, 
particularly Russian Formalism; the power of literature to break our habituated, 
referential contexts by presenting things in new and unexpected ways is known as 
`defamiliarization. ' Robert C. Holub, "Reception Theory and Russian Formalism, " 
Germano-Slavica, 3 (4,1980), 277-78. This is a concept which Jauss will integrate into 
Gadamer's hermeneutic. 
212 "The point is that rational judgments develop and function within pre-disclosed interpretive 
frameworks derived from cultural-historical existence. Judgments have been ` anticipated' 
by a series of cultural developments that are not of a purely rational order, and in this 
sense judgments have a secondary quality. " DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of 
Truth, 97. 
213 E. D. Hirsch, Cultural Literary: What Every American Needs to Know (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987), xiv. 
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we read them. This is one reason why we can approach a classical text with an 
"assumption of familiarity. 11214 When the text violates this familiarity, our prejudices are 
provoked. This negative experience opens our prejudices to questioning. Weinsheimer 
describes this movement in understanding as implying "that we are willing to integrate 
the meaning of the text with our previous preconceptions by making them conscious, 
bringing them into view, and assimilating them to what the text reveals. "215 In this 
sense, reading the classic biblical commentaries and theological works introduces us to 
what we already have with us, our pie-understanding. It brings our prejudices and 
preunderstanding to the forefront and makes them explicit. 216 
The second way in which our prejudices are provoked is through the logic of 
question and answer and keeping ourselves open to the truth claims of the text. Because 
we do not hold to all things at all times, the truth claims of historically distant text will 
confront us as being partially or blatantly untrue. "We also realise that sometimes a work 
that grips us when it confronts us in historical distance would seem untruthful to us if it 
were a contemporary creation. "217 The classic example of someone who wrestled with 
this tension which historical distance raises is Rudolf Bultmann. 
All of our thinking today is shaped, irrevocably, by modern science. Blind 
acceptance of the New Testament mythology would be arbitrary 
... 
Man's 
knowledge and mastery of the world have advanced to such an extent through 
science and technology, that it is no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold 
to the New Testament view of the world. In fact, there is no one who does. The 
miracles of the New Testament have ceased to be miraculous, and to defend their 
historicity by recourse to nervous disorders or hypnotic effects only serves to 
underline the fact. It is impossible to use an electric light and the radio, to avail 
ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time believe in 
the New Testament world of spirits and miracles 218 
However, if we read the Bible, or any other text, in a manner in which we try to find 
answers which agree with our assumptions then we are not truly engaging in dialogue 
with that text and genuine understanding is foreclosed according to Gadamer. We must 
214 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 166. 
215 Ibid., 167. 
216 "In either case, teaching the classics functions to acquaint students for the first time with 
what they have always known, to bring that foreknowledge to explicit consciousness and 
thus make it available for denial and affirmation. " Weinsheimer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics 142. 
217 Gadamer, "The Eminent Text and Its Truth, " 9. 
218 Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology, " in Ke ygma and Myth: A Debate, vol. 
1., trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SPCK, 1953), 5, emphasis mine. 
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approach the text with questions which are appropriate and at the same time remain 
open to the questions which the text may ask us. 219 
The essence of the question is to open up possibilities and keep them open. If a 
prejudice becomes questionable in view of what another person or text says to us, 
this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the text or the other person 
accepted as valid in its place.... In fact our own prejudice is properly brought into 
play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the 
other's claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself. 220 
In both instances, temporal distance is what creates the space or tension for the otherness 
of the text to provoke our prejudices. 
C. Time is the Best Teacher 
Because meaning arises in the play of dialogue between a reader and a text, the 
meaning of a text will always exceed what the author intended. "Not just occasionally 
but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is 
not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well. "221 This is not based 
on a psychological subjectivism of the reader nor in the relativism which arises from 
historicism, but is grounded in Gadamer's ontological concept of play as the `in-between' 
that involves both text and reader, game and player, in the event of understanding. 
Therefore, the meaning of a text is not limited to the horizon in which it first appeared, 
but involves the successive performances of the text which involve various readers in 
different horizons. In fact, if we follow Gadamer's argument fully, then the 
concretizations of meaning which occur in successive interpretations are part of the text, 
they are not extrinsic to the text but are ontologically part of it in the play of 
understanding. 222 
Contrary to what may seem like common sense, the original horizon, or the 
original audience, is not the best position from which to fully appreciate the meaning of a 
text. This is a common problem which we experience with contemporary works of art 
219 Gadamer, " Yom Zirkel des Verstehens, " 30. 
220 Idem, Truth and Method 299. 
221 Ibid., 296. This point is backed up by Paul Ricceur: "The text's career escapes the finite 
horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more that what the author 
meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a 
meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author. " Paul Ricceur, 
"The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, " in Interpretive Social 
Research: A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), 78. 
222 Weinsheimer, Gadamers Hermeneutik 121-24,135; Luz, Matthew, 1.19,117,126,140, 
148. 
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and sometimes with recently published books. We experience a "curious impotence of 
our judgment" because our prejudices and cultural background are too closely aligned 
with the work of art or the book. Our comprehension is constrained because our 
prejudices continue to operate unnoticed. 
We recall the ancient principle that the true value of a work of art cannot be 
understood before the deaths of the author and the generation whom he 
addressed. The initial audience, then, is no more the criterion of correct 
understanding than the author, because that audience is disposed toward or 
against a work by special prejudices of which it is not aware and over which it has 
no control. 223 
As a result, our projected pre-understanding may not be negated and the questions the 
text places to us may be the same ones we are asking. In both cases, we are not struck by 
the text and our prejudices are not provoked. On the other side. of the same coin, the 
text may resonate with our prejudices because the two are so closely aligned. In both 
instances, what the contemporary readers experience "does not conform to their [the art 
works'] true content and significance. Only when all their relations to the present time 
have faded away can their real nature appear, so that the understanding of what is said in 
them can claim to be authoritative and universal. "224 As a result, we enthusiastically 
receive this text as a significant work. But then, once our horizon has shifted and our 
tastes and prejudices are reconfigured, we question what it was about that text that 
excited us so much in the first place. 225 
We should see two processes operating in relation to each other as a tradition 
moves forward and temporal distance between the text and the reader opens up. The 
first is that as the readers' horizons shift, new possibilities of meaning will be disclosed. 
At the same time, temporal distance will filter our prejudices and by doing so will exclude 
different sources of error from this tradition of interpretation. 226 "Moreover he [the 
reader] needs the text in order to place his own prejudices at risk and to point out the 
dubiousness of what he himself takes for granted, thus disclosing new possibilities for 
questioning and extending his own horizon by fusing it with that of the text. "227 If we 
223 Ibid., 179. 
224 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 297. See also, Palmer, Hermeneutics, 184-85, Watson, Text 
and Truth, 51-2. 
225 See the section on Jauss' third thesis in chapter 3 for Jauss' development of this idea. 
226 Gadamer, 298-99. Thus, temporal distance is essential to understanding an event's true 
meaning and significance which will emerge "through subsequent events and in the 
manifold discourse in which various interrelated social groupings negotiate a range if 
interpretative options which structure the ways in which that significance comes to 
speech. " Watson, Text and Truth, 52. 
227 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 211. 
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adopt Gadamer's view, then we should wait and allow the meaning and significance of a 
work to emerge slowly, over time. But in our instantaneous age (where computer speeds 
are measured in nanoseconds) this appears to be an almost unrealistic goal. Reviews are 
published before a commentary or theological book arrives at the bookstore. 
Hegel expressed this in the preface to his Philosophy of Right when he stated, 
"What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. "228 For Hegel, an idea or 
concept enters human history "with an infinite wealth of forms, shapes, and 
appearances. " Some of these are transient and irrational, while others are eternal and 
rational. In the dialectical process of history, this "motley covering" is penetrated so that 
as we progress through the movements of thesis, antithesis, and sublation into a synthesis 
of what is actual or real (wirklich) becomes rationally embedded in the tradition. 229 
Gadamer concurs with Hegel's argument "that in the long run the irrational is not 
capable of really lasting. "230 Rational, appropriate interpretations will prove themselves 
in history. 
This is why temporal distance is filled with a "variety of voices. "231 In the 
process of realising new possibilities of meaning our prejudices are also filtered. Some 
interpretations will prove themselves stable and productive and will receive a certain 
normative status until the questions we ask are no longer those answered by that 
interpretation. "In this respect the history of biblical interpretation is the history of both 
false trails to be avoided and of insights to be developed further. "232 
In relationship to biblical interpretation, we need to expand our definition of 
what the historicalness of the text refers. It does not refer exclusively to the immediate 
horizon in which the text was written. Nor does Gadamer's hermeneutic raise a division 
between the original horizon and successive horizons of interpretation. "The two poles of 
the past `givenness' of the Bible and its present interpretation do not (or at least should 
228 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), 10. Lawrence translates this as "What is rational is real 
and what-is real is rational, " in "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects, " 36. The 
difference between them is based on Knox's desire to reflect the difference Hegel makes 
between wirklich (actual) and real (real) in Philosophy of Right even though there is a 
high degree of semantic overlap in how these terms can be translated into English. 
Knox, "Translator's Foreword, " vi. 
229 Hegel, 10-12. 
230 Gadamer, "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects, " 36. 
231 Ibid., 284. 
232 Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory, " 73. "What understanding 
produces is knowledge, and temporal difference assists knowledge in ways that are 
negative and positive. " Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic 179. 
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not) stand in opposition to each other. "233 On the one hand, Gadamer would claim that 
the original horizon does not possess the temporal distance to grasp the meaning of the 
text. On the other hand, we have tradition which has explored "the false trails" and has 
confirmed the insights or trajectories which have proven fruitful. "What distinguishes 
the true from the false interpretation is not a principle but a process, for to historical 
beings truth is disclosed in the historical process of interpreting. Insight, in brief, is not 
fundamentally the subject's doing, but an effect of history on those who belong to and 
participate in it. "234 
This should not give one the impression that we are only passive participants in 
our tradition. On the contrary, Gadamer argues that this should call us to an active 
engagement with our tradition. "Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own 
way, for the text belongs to the whole tradition whose content interests that age and in 
which it seeks to understand itself. "235 When Gadamer says that we "belong" to a 
tradition he is making use of the semantic range of the German word "gehören (to 
belong to) and its root word "hören" (to hear). Not only do we belong, gehören, to a 
tradition, but we must engage in genuine open conversation and listen, hören, to the 
claims of the text and the meanings passed down in the tradition to which we belong so 
that we can gain insights about the text's subject matter which would not have been 
visible from our horizon alone. 236 Thus, we are both passively belong to and must 
actively listen to our tradition and what it hands down to us. 
Gadamer's work provides the hermeneutical justification for Ebeling and 
Froehlich's challenge that we must incorporate Wirkungsgeschichte into biblical studies. 
Not only do we belong (gehören) to this history of interpretations and influences but we 
also need to learn how to listen (hören) to the `variety of voices' of past commentators 
who fill the temporal distance between us and the biblical texts. 
233 Thiselton, 73. "The object of history, then, is not what once was, but rather what once was 
in relation to what now is. " Weinsheimer, Gadamer i Hermeneutic, 173 
234 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 40. As such, understanding is not primarily 
conceived as the result of method, but "as participating in an event of tradition, a process 
of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated. " Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, 290. 
235 Gainer, 296, emphasis mine. 
236 Weinsheimer and Marshall, "Translator's Preface, " xvi. This is related to Gadamer's 
comment on what it means to be slavish. "Similarly, `to hear and obey someone' (auf 
jemanden hören) does not mean simply that we do blindly what the other desires. We 
call such a person slavish (hörig). " Ibid., 361. 
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D. Historically Effective Consciousness 
Our belonging to and conversing with tradition is what Gadamer terms 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein Marshall and Weinsheimer translate this as 
"historically effected consciousness" in order to try and capture the ambiguity and double 
relation to tradition which Gadamer wants us to understand in his use of this phrase. 237 
On the one hand, this term expresses the idea that our consciousness is effected by and 
brought into being by our tradition. 238 On the other hand, our being consciousness of 
belonging to and being conditioned by history is also contained in the term. "This 
ambiguity is that it is used to mean at once the consciousness effected in the course of 
history and determined by history, and the very consciousness of being thus effected and 
determined. "239 The recognition and adoption of historically effected consciousness as a 
universal element in understanding that should be elevated to the centre of our 
hermeneutic is the main thrust of Gadamer's argument in Truth and Method. 240 
Historically effected consciousness is characterised by the hermeneutical elements 
which I have developed in this and the previous chapter. The structure of historically 
effected consciousness is that of "experience that experiences reality and is real itself. "241 
It functions in a manner similar to self-understanding by which we come to understand 
ourselves when we recognise ourselves in the other. This involves a reconciliation 
between the outward and returning movements of the hermeneutical circle. In studying 
a text from our tradition, such as the Bible, we learn how to make ourselves at home in 
the historically distant world of the text. But then we must reconcile this alienated self in 
a returning movement when we make the questions of the Bible our questions and apply 
it to our horizon; allowing the Bible to say something to us. 242 The hermeneutical 
experience of tradition is also characterised by the negation of our expectations which 
237 Marshall and Weinsheimer, "Translator's Preface, " in Truth and Method, xv. 
238 For Gadamer this involves the realisation of the limits of our self-understanding in relation 
to the thrownness and finitude of our existence, "that is, as the `historically affected 
consciousness' which is 'more being than consciousness' 
- 
mehr Sein als Bewußtsein. "
Idem, "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey, " 27. This can be seen in Gadamer's 
choice of the words to express the idea. Sein is part of consiousness, Bewufftrein. "The 
emphasis should be on the 'sein'that contains historically conditioned structures and not 
on an empty, flickering awareness. " Ibid., 60 note 30, see also Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
38. 
239 He continues, "Obviously the burden of my argument is that effective history still 
determines modern historical and scientific consciousness; and it does so beyond any 
possible knowledge of this domination. " Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxxiv. 
240 Ibid., mociii. 
241 Ibid., 346. 
242 Ibid., 346,361. 
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then leads to a more appropriate understanding of the subject matter. As opposed to the 
certainty which a methodological approach toward the Bible may promise us, the 
negative nature of experience does not destroy this security so much as it develops and 
cultivates our openness to the other and our ability to learn from experience. "The 
hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in methodological sureness of itself, but in 
the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man from the man 
captivated by dogma. "243 
The biblical interpreter who is experienced in this sense has gained not only 
objectifiable knowledge but, even more significantly, they have undergone a development 
(gebildet) which has enabled them to grow in phronesis. 244 Bildungor phronesis gives the 
interpreter the ability to not only apply the text to his situation but also enables him to 
perceive his bond to tradition. It not only raises the interpreter's mind to an awareness of 
his tradition but enables the "educated man (Gebildete)" to move in it, not just to develop 
his own virtues but also the ability to acquire new ones. 245 This overcomes the division 
between reason and authority which the Enlightenment raised. 246 Through historically 
effected consciousness, Gadamer is able to present a reconciliation between the study of 
history and its effects (Wirkungen) in such a manner that there is a unity between them. 
This is not a new element which Gadamer thinks should be included in hermeneutical 
theory, but as I pointed out above, it is something that has always been the part of the 
nature of our historical existence and which needs to be elevated to the centre of our 
hermeneutic. 247 
Tradition, and the texts that it passes down, is not a closed book. The playful 
nature of understanding and the disclosive character of imitation/mimesis which allows 
us to recognise more than we knew before means that tradition is an open book which is 
still being written. The history of the interpretation of the Bible also presents us with a 
partially constructed historical map of abuses of the text which should be avoided and 
legitimate insights and responses which disclose new possibilities for the life of the 
church. 248 "What hermeneutical reflection dictates is that we be aware of this self- 
critical moment present in all such criticism, for only in such awareness will we be able to 
243 Ibid., 362. 
24 4 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 193. 
245 Gadamer, Truth and Method 14, Warnke, Gadamer, 174. 
246 Warnke, 166, Thiselton, New Horizons, 327, Brown, Boundaries of Our Habitation, 34. 
247 Gadamer, 282-83. 
248 Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth, and Corporate Memory, " 73; Jauss, Toward; 59. 
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recognise those moments of the past that we wish to creatively move beyond. "249 It is 
also a transformative form of learning in that our prejudices are brought into play when 
we enter into dialogue with our tradition. Thus, Gadamer's hermeneutic, and 
wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewußtsein in particular, not only presents the philosophical 
hermeneutical grounds and rational for a Wirkungsgeschichte approach to biblical 
interpretation, it also provides it an apologetic for this approach. 
CONCLUSION: Two PROBLEMS WHICH PUSH US BEYOND GADAMER 
There are two points at which Gadamer's hermeneutic receives most of its 
criticism. These same two points I think open the door for us to move beyond 
Gadamer's argument. They arc: (A) the question of the legitimacy of our prejudices and 
(B) the problem of how does one apply his hermeneutic in practice. 
A. The Legitimacy of Prejudices 
1. Reflection on Prejudices: Habermas 
Habermas' main criticism of Gadamer is that he denies the power of 
reflection. 250 Habermas argues that our `thrownness' in a tradition is not as binding as 
Gadamer and Heidegger claim. According to Habermas, there must be an element of 
brokenness or non-obligation in our relation to tradition in order for us to be able to 
interpret and mediate our tradition and other cultures. 251 This allows the interpreter to 
perform a controlled distanciation in the interpretative act and raise our prejudices and 
prcundcrstanding to reflected procedure. 252 
One of the problems with Habermas' criticism is that his concept of distanciation 
is very different from Gadamer's. Tradition, prejudice, and language cannot be subjected 
to reflection or critique since they operate at a pre-cognitive level of human existence. 
They are part of our being, or thrownness, and as such, they lie below or behind our 
conscious reflection. 253 In order for us to become aware of an element of our tradition, 
one of our prejudices must be made to stand out for us to take notice of it. The manner 
249 Jeff Mitscherling, "The Historical Consciousness of Man, " History of European Ideas, 11 
(1989), 738. 
250 Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, " in Understanding and Social 
Inquiry, eds. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy (Notre Dame and London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 358. 
251 Ibid., 353. 
252 Ibid., 356. 
253 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 276-77. 
119 
in which this occurs is through the realisation of the historical distance between the 
horizon of the interpreter and the text's from which one's prejudices are provoked. 
Reflection on a given preunderstanding brings before me something that 
otherwise happens behind my back. Something 
- 
but not everything, for what I 
have called the wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein is inescapably more being than 
consciousness and being is never fully manifest. Certainly I do not mean that 
such reflection could escape from ideological ossification if it does not engage in 
constant self-reflection and attempts at self-awareness. Thus only through 
hermeneutical reflection am I no longer unfree over against myself but rather can 
deem freely what in my preunderstanding may be justified and what 
unjustified. 254 
By contrast, Habermas claims that we need to be able to distance ourselves from our 
current horizon of understanding as well, a claim which Gadamer rejects. 
Habermas' argument centres around his claim that Gadamer is naive in his 
approach to prejudices. 255 Tradition is not neutral but needs to be socially critiqued for 
distortions in communication. Reflection is by nature retrospective and looks back on 
the prejudices of a tradition and makes them transparent. As such, reflection has the 
power to confirm or break up our prejudices. "In this process the element of authority 
that was simple domination can be stripped away and dissolved into the less coercive 
constraint of insight and rational decision. "256 But in order for reflection to operate in 
this manner it needs a reference system outside of tradition, or language, which is the 
ontological ground of tradition. 257 As such, tradition is not an all encompassing reality 
but is related to other aspects of life. In particular, tradition is relative to the systems of 
labour and domination, which in turn give us a reference point outside of tradition for 
reflection. 258 
254 Idem, "Scope and Function of Reflection, " in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 38. 
255 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 186; Graeme Nicholson, "Answers to 
Critical Theory, " in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (N. Y. and 
London: Roudedge, 1991), 155-56. 
256 Habermas, 358. However, the conceptual form of Habermas' frame of reference, universal 
history, is a point of agreement between himself and Pannenberg. For Habermas, this 
frame of universal history is hypothetically created from the fragments of emancipatory 
and utopian interests in a tradition. This anticipated whole can then be used in 
. 
reflection to expose and eliminate distortions in communication so that truth can 
emerge. But Habermas' concepts of the hermeneutical whole (which is provisional) and 
the dialectical totality (which is marked by precision) are not always easily distinguished 
in his thought. The dialectical totality of universal history runs into the same problem 
we saw above, by constructing a category of universal history which complements and is 
distinct from the hermeneutical whole, Habermas has gone outside of the bounds of 
tradition once again. 
257 Ibid., Pannenberg, 186. 
258 Habermas tries to prove this point in relation to language which he sees as being shaped by 
the forces of social labour and changes in production. In contrast to Gadamer who 
120 
Pannenberg comes to Gadamer's defence when he criticises Habermas in his 
attempt to ground reflection in a frame of reference outside of tradition. 259 The problem 
with Habermas' critique is that it presupposes ideological contents and instinctual 
energies which shape a nation's identity and goals prior to tradition. These prior 
instinctual interests serve as the foundation for the basic orientation which people express 
in work, interaction, and thought. 260 These interests are transcendental in nature and 
serve as the basis for Habermas' concepts of reflection and objective knowledge. The 
result is that "epistemology can be elaborated only as a social theory. "261 Contrary to 
Habermas, Pannenberg contends that you cannot derive transcendental concepts such as 
these from material or empirical research. Secondly, it is not legitimate to claim that 
cultural systems are reflections of these instinctual energies262 And finally, even 
Habermas admits that such reflection is not outside the scope of tradition but is still 
conditioned by it. Thus, Gadamer's approach to tradition is not as naive or conservative 
in its approach as Habermas claims it is. 
Gadamer does not think we should give in to the power of tradition and just 
accept what it hands down to us as Habermas implies. Gadamer does not defend a 
particular set of historical values, but argues for the power of tradition itself. 
His concern, in short, is not to demonstrate that ours is the best of all possible 
traditions, but that all traditions, all `histories, ' are possessed of a force that 
cannot simply be denied.... In sum, he has attempted to lay the groundwork for 
a philosophical critique of society - not a mere critique of ideology, which itself 
remains bound to values that are inherited from a particular tradition, but a 
critique of such critiques itself, a thoroughly self-conscious critique, pursued 
through dialogue, of those intersubjectively-constituted values in which the 
conversation of our tradition so greatly consists.... It is a call to recognize our 
responsibility, as individuals, to enter into that creative dialogue by means of 
which alone can the `conversation, ' the tradition, of the present be preserved, 
altered, and passed on. 263 
argues that language determines our world, Habermas claims that language is constrained 
outwardly by labour and inwardly by social power relationships. Habermas, 360-61, c. f. 
Gadamer, Truth and Method 450. 
259 Pannenberg, 186. 
260 Ibid., 90-91. 
261 Ibid., 92. 
262 Ibid., 93. 
263 Jeff Mitscherling, "Resuming the Dialogue, " in Anti-Foundationalism and Practical 
Reasoning. 
- 
Conversations between Hermeneutics and Analysis ed. Evan Simpson 
(Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987), 132. See also, Jean Grondin, 
"Gadamer on Humanism, " in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 157-70. 
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Thus, Gadamer does not claim that we should approach tradition from a conservative 
perspective but that tradition is open to revision and criticism. 264 
2. The Legitimisation of Prejudices: Warnke 
While Habermas criticises Gadamer from outside his system, Warnke presents a 
more balanced reading and critique of Gadamer from within his hermeneutic. Warnke 
asks whether Gadamer is too optimistic in regard to the capacity for our prejudices to be 
legitimated or corrected in Gadamer's hermeneutic. 265 In particular, she asks if 
Gadamer's idea of the anticipation of completeness is an adequate hermeneutical concept 
to. determine if our prejudices are legitimate or not. Arising from illegitimate prejudices, 
is it possible to project a unity to a text which is capable of yielding an interpretation that 
can explain the relationships between the parts and the whole but at the same time is an 
inappropriate unity for the text? Hypothetically, we would have to answer yes. Warnke 
asks us to imagine a situation in which a man propositions a woman for sex. The 
problem is that the man enters this situation with the prejudice that when a woman says, 
"No, " she really means, "Yes. " If she resists, then he will reads her actions as "a 
recognition of the customs under which women pretend not to want sex in order to make 
their ultimate surrender more romantic. "266 Even though the man misinterprets the 
entire situation, his prejudices continue to operate unprovoked. In fact, they are 
confirmed by the situation, because the projected anticipation of completeness is 
reinforced by each step in this encounter. Therefore, Warnke is correct when she argues 
that what counts as a legitimate prejudice cannot simply be determined by what allows 
for the unity of the parts and whole to emerge. 
The weakness in Warnke's argument comes in the example which she has chosen. 
Instead, of supporting her argument, I think it confirms Gadamer's position concerning 
the filtering process of historically effective consciousness. It is hard to imagine an 
educated (not in the sense of possessing a university education but in Gadamer's concept 
of Bildung) person today who would defend the man's prejudices or interpretation of this 
hypothetical situation. It would seem that, in this instance, tradition has served a 
filtering process in which that which is real has been shown to be historical. Also, 
Warnke does not adequately take into consideration the need for our being open to the 
264 Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel" 51 
265 "Gadarner seems to place his hopes for reason in this sort of mutual learning and 
accommodation. " Georgia Warnke, "Legitimate Prejudices, " Laval thfologique et 
philosophique, 53 (1,1997), 101. 
266 Ibid., 92. 
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claims of the other according to the third type of the I/Thou relationship. The man was 
never open to the claims of the woman in this situation and we would have to say that he 
never understood what she was saying but reduced her to the level of a thing to achieve 
his ends. And finally, her example is based on two individuals in isolation. But neither 
our prejudices, nor our interpretations are solipsistic for Gadamer. We are always linked 
to others through tradition, language, and dialogue. Thus, while this individual may 
have read the situation the way he did, if it were brought into public dialogue then the 
possibility of his prejudices remaining unprovoked would be greatly diminished. 267 
B. Does Method Still Play a Role? 
Having arrived at the conclusion to my discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutic, the 
question remains, "How, do we put this into practice? " The absence of any form of 
methodological direction or guidance is one of the most frequent criticisms levelled at 
Gadamer. 268 However, we must remember that Gadamer's project was descriptive not 
prescriptive as he stated in his introduction to Truth and Method "My real concern was 
and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over 
and above our wanting and doing. "269 In one sense then, it would not be appropriate to 
criticise him for failing to answer a question which he never intended to answer, one 
which he felt was not only outside the bounds of his hermeneutic but was also 
antithetical to it in his opinion. 
Gadamer's reluctance to even hint at some form of method or criteria is based on 
his criticism of the historical-critical method which we inherited from the nineteenth 
267 Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics, 184-86. I believe Sullivan raises a better example than 
Warnke's when he discusses Gadamer's refusal to become involved in Nazism during 
World War II because of the manner in which Gadamer saw the communicative 
situation was being distorted by the government. Ibid., 178-81. 
268 For one of the most incisive critiques of Gadamer's hermeneutic concerning the question of 
criteria for determining legitimate interpretations see: Lawrence M. Hinman, "Quid 
Facti or Quid Juris? The Fundamental Ambiguity of Gadamer's Understanding of 
Hermeneutics, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 40 (1980), 512-535. His 
criticism of Gadamer centres around what he perceives as internal contradiction 
concerning truth in Gadamer's thought. If truth is identified as part of the 
hermeneutical process itself then we are reduced to a position in which we cannot 
critique the truthfulness of any interpretation. If on the other hand, we can make some 
form of judgment concerning the truth of an interpretation then truth cannot be 
identified as part of the hermeneutical process. Hinman thinks that Gadamer never 
succeeds in solving the apparent contradiction in his work. However, I think that 
Hinman misses several of the points which Gadamer raises concerning the rightness of 
the question, phronesis, and intersubjective elements that are involved in hermeneutical 
understanding and allow us to make judgments concerning the truth of an 
interpretation. 
269 Gadamer, Truth and Method xxviii. 
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century and the imposition of the methodology of the natural sciences into the human 
sciences. Behind this lays his argument that method is something which someone throws 
over an object in order to determine a specified result. 270 This restricts the disclosive 
possibilities which one could learn from the text. In the humanities, this restriction is 
even more severe for it reduces the possible communication between the interpreter and 
tradition to a one way dialogue. The subject ends up asserting him or herself as a master 
over his or her tradition. As a result, history becomes facts and tradition is no longer our 
conversation partner and teacher. 
However, Apel claims that Gadamer's negation of the role of method in 
hermeneutics is based on an outmoded and mistaken view of method. In Apel's opinion, 
"Gadamer remains guilty of the `scientistic fallacy': like those he attacks, he supposes that 
the natural sciences possess a monopoly on the meaning of `science' and `objectivity, ' and 
that social scientific or historical understanding must therefore, dispense with both the 
claim to science and the search for objectivity. "271 Apel agrees with Gadamer that the 
methodological approach of the natural sciences cannot be hermeneutically defended 
because it misses the intersubjective dimension of human knowledge and the role which 
language plays in understanding. However, he also argues that rules and methods play an 
important role in hermencutical understanding. It is not an `either or' but a `both and' 
situation according to Apel. 272 His position is very similar to the argument which I 
made in regard to the relationship between techne and phronesis. One form of knowledge 
does not exclude the other, but actually requires it for its proper functioning. 273 In the 
same manner, method can play an important role in understanding. 
At the same time, Gadamer does give some partial recognition to the role and 
need for methods in the humanities274 However, the only point at which I have found 
Gadamer advocating the use of method concerns the need to employ genetic research 
270 Robert Holub, Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction (London and N. Y.: Methuen, 
1984), 36. 
271 Georgia Warnke, "Translator's Introduction, " in Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and 
Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, trans. Georgia Warnke, Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought, cd. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, MA and 
London: MIT Press, 1984), xvi. 
272 Karl-Otto Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities, " 
Man and World 5 (1,1972), 3-37; idem, "Types of Rationality: the Continuum of 
Reason between Science and Ethics, " International Symposium on "Rationality To-day, " 
ed. Theodore F. Geraets, vol. 13 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), 307-50; 
and idem, Understanding and Explanation 50-68. 
273 See the section entitled "Hermeneutical Knowledge and Tradition, " in chapter 1. 
274 "Therefore I did not remotely intend to deny the necessity of methodical work within the 
human science (Geisteswissenschaften). " Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxix. 
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when substantial understanding is not possible. 275 More than this is needed if we are 
going to successively apply Gadamer's hermeneutic to biblical interpretation. We really 
need some form of methodological framework to incorporate all the different approaches 
to the Bible which have developed over the years and are in practice today. 
Pannenberg argues in Theology and the Philosophy of Science that some form of 
criteria is needed if theology is not going to be reduced to mere emotive statements. 276 
Methods and theories do not operate primarily by describing reality (a Cartesian form of 
positivism which Gadamer correctly opposes) but are provisional explanatory devices 
which are revised in light of the object to which they are applied. They are often 
retrospective by nature which is why the lessons learned from tradition point forward to 
new insights and discoveries. 277 The question becomes, is it possible to find some model 
which can fit within or complement Gadamer's hermeneutic that we can apply to the 
practice of biblical interpretation? In order to answer this, I would like to turn to one of 
the most logical places to look for an answer, Gadamer's student; Hans Robert Jauss. 
275 See the section entitled "Substantive and Genetic Understanding" in chapter 1. Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, 180-8 1; idem, "On the Problem of Self-Understanding, " in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 45-46. 
276 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 34-35. Thiselton, New Horizons, 334- 
35. 
277 Pannenberg, 138-39,156-57. 
PART II: JAUSS' RECEPTION THEORY 
CHAPTER 3: THE CHALLENGE OF LITERARY HISTORY 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1967, when Hans Robert Jauss delivered his lecture "Literary History as a 
Challenge to Literary Theory" at Konstanz, Germany, he has been the leading figure in 
what has come to be known as reception theory. However, reception theory is not as 
widely known in the Anglo-American culture as it is in Germany. As Jauss has noted, 
"to the foreign ear questions of `reception' may seem more appropriate to hotel 
management than to literature. "1 
Why has reception theory and Jauss' work not been more widely read and 
studied in the Anglo-American tradition? Robert Holub thinks that the primary reason 
for this is that we have tended to be more heavily influenced by the French tradition than 
the German. The work of Roland Barthes, Paul de Man, and Paul Ricceur have been 
very influential in our hermeneutics. Among the many German scholars who work in 
reception theory, only Wolfgang Iser's works are widely read in English. 2 However, 
Iser's work does not serve as an adequate introduction to reception theory for the Anglo- 
American reader for two reasons. First, Iser makes very few references to Jauss in his 
work, thus giving the false impression that these two colleagues at Konstanz University 
do not work that closely together 3 And secondly, he does not fully develop the role of 
history as Jauss does 4 As a result, his work is often associated with reader response 
theorists, such as Stanley Fish, in hermeneutical discussions. 5 
1 Robert Holub, Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction, New Accents Series, ed. Terence 
Hawkes (London and N. Y.: Methuen, 1984), ix. 
2 In particular Wolfgang Iser's two books: The Implied Readers: Patterns of Communication in 
Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 
and The Act of Reading. A Theory ofAesthetic Response (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1980). 
3 For example, in The Act of Reading, Iser only mentions Jauss briefly in a few footnotes. 
4 In his book Die Appellstruktur der Texte: Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer 
Prosa (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1970), Iser developed a preliminary idea of literary 
history. He followed this concept in The Implied Reader, but by the time he wrote The 
Act ofReadingthe history of reading had almost been entirely replaced by an ahistorical 
phenomenology of reading. Robert C. Holub, "Trends in Literary Theory: The 
American Reception of Reception Theory, " German Quarterly, 55 (1 1982), 89. 
5 Holub, 80-96. 
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This situation improved slightly in the late 1980's with the publication of three 
of Jauss' books by the University of Minnesota Press and the journal New Literary History 
printing several articles on reception theory. However, while his work is now more 
familiar to the English reader, it is still viewed as a peripheral hermeneutical or literary 
theory. "Although most major theorists and many coming into the field are now familiar 
with the general precepts of reception theory, to my knowledge there are no endeavours 
to extend or refine a position based on these precepts; nor are there any major studies in 
English 
-- 
again outside of American Germanistik 
-- 
which put this theory into 
practice. "6 
It is hoped that this thesis can help to resolve this deficiency, at least in the field 
of biblical hermeneutics. The goal of the next two chapters can briefly be outlined along 
the following lines. In the first half of the present chapter, I plan to critically examine 
the basic hermeneutic which Jauss develops for reception theory. There are two reasons 
for this: first, to introduce the English reader to Jauss' work, and second, to critically 
examine those points which are significant for biblical studies. The second half of this 
chapter will explore some of the wider hermeneutical concepts which both Jauss and 
Gadamer share. Is Jauss' hermeneutic a deviation from or a logical extension and 
development of Gadamer's hermeneutic? The following chapter shall be devoted to 
exploring several of the more significant points of reception theory for this thesis, such as 
the role of the classic text and the question of plurality and continuity in a tradition of 
interpretation. 
One final point needs to be mentioned before I discuss Jauss' work, and that 
concerns the fact that the use of the title `reception theory' immediately runs into 
problems because of a complex of German terms and concepts which are related to this 
idea. These concepts include Wirkungsgeschichte (the history of the impact of a text), " 
Rezeptionsgeschichte (the history of reception), Wirkungsästhetik (the aesthetics of effect or 
response), and Rezeptionsästhetik (aesthetics of reception). Robert Holub offers the 
following strategy in order to help us navigate amongst this complex of German 
hermeneutical terms. "I have adopted the following policy: `reception theory' refers 
throughout to a general shift in concern from the author and the work to the text and the 
reader. It is used, therefore, as an umbrella term and encompasses both Jauss' and Iser's 
projects as well as empirical research and the traditional occupation with influences. "7 
6 Idem, Crossing Borders: Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 22-23. 
7 Idem, Reception Theory, xi-xii. 
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Reception theory differs from the history of interpretation in that the later is primarily 
concerned with examining commentaries and other theological works while the former 
covers a much wider territory. In respect to biblical studies, not only is reception theory 
concerned with commentaries but it is also interested in sermons, canonical law, hymns, 
artworks, and in the practices of the church8 
I BACKGROUND TO JAUSS' THOUGHT 
There were several major shifts that took place in Germany prior to and during 
the 1960's which help to explain the rise of reception'theory, and in particular Jauss' 
theories. Alongside a public discontent with economic problems, there was a growing 
discontentment in the academic realm. The "Memorandum for the Reform of the Study 
of Linguistics and Literature" which Jauss, Wolfgang Iser, and others wrote arguing for 
methodological and institutional change in the universities is a good example of this. 
Specifically, there were growing doubts within the German academic community about 
the methods and values for teaching literary studies at that time. 9 German literary 
studies had come to a point of crisis within the current paradigms by which it was being 
practised. '° The problem with the historical-critical and the aesthetic formalist 
approaches was that they suppressed and concealed the role of the reader. While the 
reader is an indispensable element to any act of interpretation, the function of the reader 
was rarely discussed. It is only through the experiences of those who read, interpret, and 
apply the message of the texts that literary traditions are formed. As a result, Jauss sought 
to find theory which did justice to the "dynamic process of production and reception 
from author, work, and public" that would hopefully "lead the study of literature out of 
the dead ends of literary history which were bogged down in positivism. " 11 The revival 
in the interest in literary hermeneutics during the 1960's and his studies under Gadamer 
raised one particular question to the forefront for Jauss. "The concept in question is that 
of the horizon insofar as it - as historical marker and, at the same time, the necessary 
Gerhard Ebeling, The Word of God and Tradition, (London: Collins, 1968), 28; Ulrich Luz, 
Matthew 1-7: A Continental Commentary, trans. Wilhelm C. Linss, Evangelisch- 
Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen TestamenA Joachim Gnilka, Norbert Brox, Ulrich 
Luz, and Jürgen Roloff eds. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), 1.95. 
9 Ibid., 7-12; Raman Selden and Peter Widowson, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary 
Theory, 3rd ed. (London and N. Y.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 52,54; Rien T. 
Segers, "An Interview with Hans Robert Jauss, " New Literary History, 11.1 (1979), 90- 
95. 
10 This idea shall be discussed in greater depth in later in the section on Jauss' adoption of 
Kuhn's concept of paradigm shifts. 
11 Hans Robert Jauss, "Der Leser als Instanz einer neuen Geschichte der Literatur, " Poetica (7, 
1975), 325-6. 
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condition for the possibility of experiential knowledge 
- 
constitutes all structures of 
meaning related to human action and primary modes of comprehending the world. " 12 
On the practical side, Jauss' interest in these issues arose from his study of 
medieval literature. His study of these texts raised questions for him concerning the 
possibility of direct aesthetic understanding through the text alone, the role which the 
original horizon of the text first played in understanding, and the possibility of historical 
mediation through background information. 13 In an effort to address what he saw as the 
weaknesses of the prevailing literary theories and to introduce the conclusions he had 
reached, he delivered "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory. " 
I'tried to imagine a new literary history, one that opened the closed circuit of 
author and work in the direction of the receiver, and was meant to make of this 
receiver, whether a reader or the public, the intermediary between the past and 
the present, the work and its effects. Such a history would have to stand up 
against the ideal of objectivity espoused by the old, discredited literary history, 
and also the demands for exactness laid down by those sociologists and 
structuralists who scoffed at historical understanding. 14 
A. The Fall of Literary History 
Jauss' main area of concern is the relationship between literature and history. 
One of the greatest challenges he faced was to reformulate and revive the concept of 
literary history since literary history had fallen from the position it once enjoyed 150 
years ago. During the crisis in literary studies in the 1960's, literary history was seen as 
an outdated form of knowledge that was too historically oriented and did not approach 
literature aesthetically. This was a valid criticism that had to be overcome if reception 
theory was going to succeed. 
This crisis in literary history had its roots in nineteenth century positivistic 
history. Positivistic history's appropriation of scientific methodology removed a unique 
framework from literary history. The result was that literary history was swallowed up by 
general history. This approach did not do justice to the history of literature in two ways. 
First, it did not consider the categorical distinction between literary effects and 
positivistic history. In literature, there is a connection between the author who creates 
the meaning and readers who realise it over and over. Positivistic history misses this 
12 Idem, Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding, vol. 68, trans. Michael Hays. 
Theory and History of Literature, eds. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 197. 
13 Ibid., 218; idem, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature, " New Literary Historg 
10 (1979), 184 if. 
14 Idem, Question and Answer, 224. 
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connection because it compares works with other works and authors with other authors. 
And second, it severed the communication process between author, text, and receiver. 15 
This follows the same criticism which Gadamer made concerning a positivistic approach 
to history: by objectifying what ought to confront you, the text, you have emasculated 
it. 16 As a result, the text is detached from the creative act and you are only left with the 
traces or relics of the creative mind. "The individual text has no value in itself but only 
serves as a source 
- 
i. e., only as material conveying knowledge of the past historical 
context, just like other silent relicsof the past. " 17 
The two traditional solutions which were put forward to meet the invasion of 
positivistic history in literary studies were either to study literary history by (1) genres or 
(2) according to the "life and works" of authors. The first solution approaches literary 
history by arranging the material according to general patterns, such as genre, in order to 
consider the individual works within the framework of a chronological series. The 
significance of the author, or the interpretation of his or her work is reduced to an 
occasional aside. In the end, literary history is swallowed up by a history of culture. The 
second approach arranged literary history according to the history of great authors and 
evaluated different literary texts according to a rubric of "life and work" essays. In this 
approach, the less known authors and works are ignored and the development of 
elements such as literary genres is overlooked. Both, also, suffer the loss of the aesthetic 
dimension of qualitative judgements and the results of such studies are "put aside as mere 
antiquarian knowledge. " 18 There is a good reason for hesitancy to include any form of 
judgement about the quality and significance of past works within literary theory. "For 
the quality and rank of a literary work result neither from the biographical or historical 
conditions of its origin [Entstehung], nor from its place in the sequence of the 
development of a genre alone, but rather from the criteria of influence, reception, and 
posthumous fame, criteria that are more difficult to grasp" 19 
15 Jauss, "History of Art and Pragmatic History, " in Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, vol. 2, 
trans. Timothy Bahti, Theory and History of Literature ed. Wad Godzich and Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 51-52. 
16 See the section on "The Rehabilitation of Prejudice and Tradition" in chapter 1. 
17 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
Second, revised ed. (N. Y.: Crossroad, 1989), 198, italics mine, also 275 
18 Jauss, "Literary History as Challenge to Literary Theory, " in Towards an Aesthetic of 
Reception, 4; Holub, Reception Theory, 55-6. 
19 Ibid., 5, emphasis mine. 
130 
B. Marxism 
In Jauss' mind, the two most promising schools of thought to offer solutions to 
this crisis in literary history in this century are Marxism and Formalism. The strength of 
Marxism is its emphasis on the idea that art and literature are not independent activities 
but are part of the life-processes, and only when this is considered does history cease to 
be a collection of lifeless facts. Marxism sees literature as part of the human 
appropriation of the world. 20 A second strength of Marxism is that it does not have a 
relativistic or an uncritical attitude towards tradition as many theories do. 21 
Jauss' critique of Marxism focuses primarily on East German Marxist literary 
theory. The reason for this arises from their criticism of reception theory during the 
1970's. 22 Robert Holub summarises their criticisms under three points. First, they saw 
the turn to reception theory as a sign of the emptiness of formalism and other bourgeois 
methods. As such, Jauss' theory was seen as an example of a consumer oriented society 
with the emphasis on reception and not production. This reflects Marx and Engels' 
thinking that "production is the `starting-point of realisation' and therefore, the 
`predominating factor' in the entire process. "23 Thus, effect and reception, while 
important, remain secondary in most Marxist forms of literary theory. Second, they 
thought that Jauss' theory makes literary phenomena relative since his work "does not 
include any mechanism for evaluating past judgements and hence for excluding them as 
valid for consideration of the work. "24 And finally, they thought Jauss' work lacked the 
proper sociological grounding. Jauss and Iser's response to these criticisms was not to 
defend their reception theory, but to reply in kind with a criticism of Marxist theory. 
However, I think that Jauss benefited from their criticisms by clarifying his position on 
these points in his later work. 
There are several areas of Marxist thought which are unacceptable to Jauss. The 
main point of contention between Jauss and Marxist critical theorists concerns the role 
which production plays. 25 As we saw above, the Marxists criticised Jauss for not giving 
20 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 11. 
21 Holub, Reception Theory, 123. 
22 Ibid., 121-34; Rien T. Segers, "An Interview with Hans Robert Jauss, " New Literary History 
11.1 (1979), 88. For an example of a Marxist critic who appropriates reception theory, 
mutatis mutandis, see Manfred Naumann, "Literary Production and Reception, " New 
Literary History, 8.1 (1976), 107-26; idem, "Das Dilemma der `Rezeptionstlsthetik"' 
Poetica, 8.3-4 (1976), 451-66. 
23 Holub, Reception Theory, 126. 
24 Ibid., 128. 
25 Ibid., 126; Jauss, "The Idealist Embarrassment: Observations on Marxist Aesthetics, " New 
Literary History, 7 (1975), 202; Segers, 88; see also Naumann, 107-115. 
131 
more weight to the productive side of the study of literature. Jauss, on the other hand, 
berates them for making literary effects and reception secondary to issues concerning the 
production of texts. 26 And even then, literary production is secondary and always in 
harmony with the given economic processes; it gives a `coherent expression' to the 
objective social structures in which the text is produced. Literature is reduced to 
mankind's appropriation of nature and the control of economic processes. This reveals a 
Platonic unity of idea and form, essences and appearance, in Marxist theory. Marxism 
replaced the concept of the ideal with economic factors. "This has the consequence that 
the social dimension of literature and art with respect to their reception is likewise 
limited to the secondary function of only allowing an already previously known (or 
ostensibly known) reality to be once again recognized. "27 The play of interpretation is 
restricted to what is already known and mimesis is likewise restricted, you cannot 
recognise more in the text or work of art. 28 Jauss questions how literature can serve a 
revolutionary function then if one can only recognise what is already known, "the 
stabilized images and prejudices of their historical situation, " and not allow for the 
disclosure of more which can create new perspectives on the world 29 
In order to overcome the weaknesses inherent in Marxist literary theory, one 
must recognise the double character of literature, it not only expresses reality but it also 
creates reality. 30 The influence of Heidegger's concept of the work of art, through 
Gadamer, on Jauss is seen here. In the act of reading a text, a disclosure of truth takes 
place, much like Heidegger's illustration concerning Van Gogh's painting of the 
26 At another point, Jauss accuses Marx of reversing Aristotle's relation between praxis and 
poiesis by making poiesis the primary factor. Marx placed objective doing before and 
above communicative action. In contrast to all the other animals, it is the human 
capacity of labour, not consciousness, which separates humanity from the lower animals. 
Thus, the concept of imagination and reflection were replaced by man's "appropriation 
of Nature. " Jauss, "The Idealist Embarrassment, " 195-7. 
27 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 14. In particular, Jauss is 
attacking Georg Lukäcs, Probleme des Realismus (Berlin, 1955), 13 if. This is related to 
the question of how the idea of `beauty' can reside in the concept of production. Marx 
admitted that Greek classical art can give enjoyment to modern viewers independent of 
the material conditions of its production. Marcuse felt that art provided enjoyment 
because "it appeals to repressed qualities of human sensibility through its aesthetic form. 
It appeals to the liberation which the utopian future gives. " Idem, "The Idealist 
Embarrassment, " 193. Both Marx and Marcuse are examples of how Marxist literary 
theory relies on idealistic categories such as beauty, but also deny that such categories 
exist. Jauss' conclusion is that Marxist theories cannot escape idealism if they want to 
explain the effects of past works of art on present viewers or how art can transcend class 
and social conditions. Ibid., 206-7. 
28 See "Play as the Being of Artwork, " in Chapter 2. 
29 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 14. 
30 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 14-15. 
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peasant's shoes. This disclosure is not prior to, or alongside the text, but occurs in the 
reader's interaction with the text. There is an essential unity to the text between its 
expression of reality and the reality that it forms. 31 Literature not only is a product of 
social influences and serves as a repository of culture, it also performs a socially formative 
function. Literature in Marxist theory "is a product of social forces, and not an agent of 
social change. "32 Jauss wants to go beyond Marxist theory to also include the effect and 
reception of the literary work. "Put another way: literature and art only obtain a history 
that has the character of a process when the succession of works is mediated not only 
through the producing subject but also through the consuming subject 
- 
through the 
interaction of author and public. "33 
The norm-building function of literature is very significant for the history of 
biblical interpretation. There are many instances in church history where the 
interpretation of a biblical passage has resulted in practices which one would not be 
proud to embrace today. In the next chapter, I shall examine how the interpretation of 
Matthew 22: 1-14 has resulted in consequential practices and doctrines which cover a 
wide moral spectrum. Ulrich Luz argues that because texts possess a socially formative 
power, and in particular theological texts in relation to the church, we must have a 
`hermeneutic of consequences. ' "For this kind of hermeneutic, the study of the history of 
effects is essential, because it shows what the consequences of biblical texts in history 
wcrc. "34 
C. Formalism 
In New Horizons in Hermeneutics, Anthony C. Thisclton sees the turn toward 
literary theory in biblical studies as one of the most significant developments in biblical 
hermeneutics in the past 25 years. However, many of the different movements which 
literary studies experienced in this century have only been appropriated by biblical 
studies within the past 25 years. Formalism was a phase which both biblical and literary 
studies passed through, but the time lag in biblical studies has been much greater than in 
literary studies. As a movement, Formalism was primarily a Russian linguistic and 
31 See the' "Playas the Being of Artwork, " in Chapter 2. 
32 Holub, 122. 
33 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 16. "The work lives to the extent 
that it has influence. Included within the influence of a work is that which is 
accomplished in the consumption of the work as well as in the work itself. " Ibid., 15. 
3 Ulrich Luz, Matthew in History: Interpretation, Influence, and Effects (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994), 92-3; Heikki Räisänen, "The Effective 'History' of the Bible: A Challenge 
to Biblical Scholarship?, " Scottish Journal of Theology, 45 (1992), 309. 
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literary movement which originated with Roman Jakobson's work Sborniki po teorii 
poeticheskogo iazyka [Studies on the Theory of Poetic Language] which was published 
between 1916 and 1919. As a school, it died out by the end of the 1920's when many of 
the formalists were forced to abandon their views due to constant criticism from Marxist 
critics. Formalism's influence was much longer lived though. It exercised a considerable 
impact on the Prague School, largely due to the fact that Roman Jakobson moved there 
in 1921. In the West, Formalism had little direct impact except on French structuralism, 
particularly in the works of Roland Barthes and Gerard Genette. It was not until the 
publication of Viktor Eirich's book, Russian Formalism: History and Doctrinein 1955 and 
the republication and translation of some of the original Formalist works that it became 
widely known in German and Anglo-American literary and biblical studies. 35 It is 
through the structuralist approaches of Barthes, Dan Otto Via, and Daniel Patte that 
Formalism was indirectly appropriated in biblical studies. 36 One of Jauss' objectives is to 
retrieve the useful concepts of Formalism, which were lost when literary studies rejected 
Formalism, and reincorporate them into literary theory. In this sense, Jauss' use of 
Formalism and his moving beyond it presents a promising avenue of research for biblical 
hermeneutics. 
Dissatisfaction in literary studies which were dominated by the historical- 
positivistic approach of the 19th century was the seedbed from which Formalism arose. 
Jakobson criticised the tendency he saw in literary studies to exchange the study of 
literature for something else, namely the examination of the historical conditions external 
to the text in order to gain an understanding of the intentions of the author and aid in 
the interpretation of the text which the historical-positivist paradigm practised. The two 
strands which bound the various Formalists together was: (1) their attempt to redefine 
the study of literature and place it on equal footing with other `scientific' methods, and 
(2) the idea that a text was an aesthetic entity which reflected reality through its own 
internal structures. Formalists employed the following tools to achieve these goals: the 
difference between poetic and practical language in texts, defamiliarization, the 
relationship between story and plot, and literary evolution. 37 The shift to an 
35 Erlich Viktor, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1955); Irena R. 
Makaryk, ed. Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), s. v. "Formalism, Russian, " by Nina 
Kolesnikoff, 53-60. 
36 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of 
Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 486-94. 
37 Yuri N. Tynianov, The Problem of Verse Language, trans. Michael Sosa and Brent Harvey (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1981; from Problems stikhotvornogo iazyka [Lenningrad, 1924]); and 
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autonomous text, stylistics, and the immanent effect of the aesthetics of the text represent 
a move away from the historical-positivist paradigm of the 19th century. "Der 
Protestcharakter der neuen Methodik ist charakterisierbar durch ihre herausfordernde 
Prämisse, daßdie historische Erklärung eines Werkes nicht mehr, sondern weniger beibringen 
könne, als aus dem Werk selbst als einem Ausdruckssystem von Sprache, Stil und Komposition 
zu erkennen die. "38 As such, Formalism represents a turning from the external conditions 
of historical and causal explanation for studying texts to the strategic priority of the 
internal organisation of the literary text. 39 This is both the strength and weakness of 
Formalism. Its focus on aesthetic perception and the relationships between the text and 
its recipients are its strong points. However, its focus on the sum total of literary devices 
in the text to the exclusion of historical and social factors is its weakness. 40 
Jauss agrees with the assessment by Formalisms of the ability of literature to 
break open everyday language and understanding through the devices of 
defamiliarization and the difference between poetic and practical (or everyday) language. 
Practical language was concerned with clear communication through reference to objects 
or accepted concepts while the goal of poetical language was the experience of the sounds 
or textures of the text. 41 Paul Ricceur agrees with this assessment of the distinction 
between poetical and practical language. "What binds poetic discourse, then, is the need 
to bring to language modes of being that ordinary vision obscures or even represses. "42 
idem, "On Literary Evolution, " in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist 
Views, eds. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic 
Publications, 1978), 68-78. 
38 Jauss, "Paradigmawechsel in der Literaturwissenschaft, " Linguistische Berichte, 3 (1969), 50. 
39 For more on this shift in literary paradigms see the next chapter. Jauss, "Paradigmawechseh" 
50; Holub, 2; Thiselton, New Horizons, 58-9. 
40 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 16; Holub, Reception Theory 
30-31, Nina Kolesnikoff, "Formalism, Russian, " 58-59. Jauss mainly considers the 
works of Roman Ingarden, Jan Mukarovsky, and Felix Vodicka. 
41 Practical language uses sound to communicate ideas, while the goal of poetic language is the 
experience of the sounds themselves. Since Jakobson and some of his early colleagues 
were linguists, it is easy to understand why they were attracted to the question of the 
difference between poetical and practical language use. Nina Kolesnikoff, "Formalism, 
Russian, " 53-54. This distinction appears to have been inherited from positivism which 
viewed the explicit meaning of a text as cognitive and the implicit meaning as a form of 
emotive language. Practical language would be cognitive, of the semantic order, because 
it refers to the actual world. Poetical would be extra-semantic in that it consists of the 
weaving together of emotive evocations, which lack cognitive value. Cf. Ricoeur, 
Interpretation Theory, 46. Vanhoozer is mistaken in his argument that Jauss picked up 
this dualism between poetic and practical language from Romanticism, and misses the 
more direct and significant influence of Formalism. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "A Lamp in 
the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of 'Aesthetic' Theology, " Trinity fournaL 8 (1978), 
34. 
42 Ricceur, Interpretation Theory, 60. 
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Literary texts achieve this by `defamiliarizing' objects by presenting them in new and 
unexpected ways. This opposition between the world presented in the text (poetical 
language) and reality (practical language) gives the reader a basis for comparing the 
claims or perspectives of the text with their horizon of expectations 43 According to 
Formalism, one of the primary goals of literature is to present something in an 
unexpected or novel manner and thus, disrupt our habitual patterns of recognition 44 
While they viewed defamiliarization primarily as a characteristic of literature or 
art, it is similar to Heidegger's point about the power of everyday language and 
conventional norms to conceal our understanding of things. For example, as long as a 
hammer is in its proper contextual relationships, the manner in which we understand the 
hammer as a hammer and its significance is "inconspicuous" to us because it lies hidden 
in the common language we share 45 But when the contextual relationships which 
govern our use and expectations of the hammer are disrupted, our understanding of the 
hammer becomes explicit. It is when the hammer is missing, or broken, that we realise 
what the hammer was "ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. "46 Both 
Heidegger and Gadamer develop this line of thought to show that the power or effect of 
art involves a push (Stofii which disrupts or breaks "complacent meaning expectations. "47 
Reading always involves how the text strikes the reader and how the meaning of the text 
is then related back to the reader's preunderstanding. 48 For Jauss, the processes of 
defamiliarization and the tension between poetical and practical language allow the text 
43 Jan Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language, " trans. Paul L. Garvin, in 
Critical Theory Since Plato, cd. Adam Hazard (N. Y. and London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Publishers, 1971), 1050-57. Robert C. Holub, Crossing Borders: Reception 
Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1992), 16. 
44 Defamiliarization takes place at three levels. At the linguistic level, it makes language 
difficult through the use of difficult sounds and words. It disrupts at the content level 
by challenging accepted ideas. And at the literary level, it deviates from the accepted 
literary norms and genres. Viktor Shklovskii, "Art as Device, " in Russian Formalism: 
Four EssayA eds. L. Lemon and M. J. Reis (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1965). 
45 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, 1992 
reprinted. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 199. 
46 Ibid., 105. 
47 Fred R. Dallmayr, "Prelude: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in 
Dialogue, " in Deconstruktion and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, 
Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter: 
Texts and Comments, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1988), 85. 
48 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey, " trans. Richard E. Palmer, 
in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Library of Living 
Philosophers, ed. Paul Arthur Schilipp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, vol. 24 (Chicago and 
London: Open Court, 1997), 55. 
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to disclose new perspectives for the reader to view the world by disrupting the reader's 
expectations and everyday understanding. 
While the opposition between poetical and practical language may serve as a 
helpful tool for the study of particular genres, poetical or literary texts, its applicability to 
other forms of literature is limited. For instance, in the Bible, this opposition may prove 
fruitful in the investigation of poetical texts such as Psalms or Ecclesiastes but its value 
for a text which is more historical is questionable. Gadamer questions Jauss' hermeneutic 
over this very issue. We cannot restrict the manner in which we experience art or texts to 
reflective aesthetic pleasure, which is built upon the differentiation between poetic and 
practical language. 49 By contrast, Gadamer's concepts of play, presentation, and the 
transformation into structure, which I examined in the last chapter, present a much 
broader hermeneutical model which is able to incorporate all the different genres and 
literary devices employed in such a diverse book as the Bible. I think it is possible to 
retain the concept of poetical versus practical language, and especially its use of 
defamiliarization, as long as it is seen within a larger hermeneutical framework of play 
which allows for a much wider range of literature than poetical or literary texts. 
The Formalists brought out the relationship between texts, both synchronically 
in the tension between poetic and practical language, and diachronically in the tension 
between work, genres, and past works. 50 Jauss thinks that the introduction of the 
diachronic perspective into literary studies through the concept of the evolution of 
literary forms, functions, and genres is one of the most significant contributions of 
Formalism. This corrects the positivistic view of seeing the study of literary works as a 
closed system that is connected at best by a general sketch of history, the works of an 
author, a style, or a particular genre. Formalism seeks to relate one text to others in order 
to discover their evolutionary relationships. An author has a certain amount of genres 
and linguistic styles from which to select in composing her text. It is through the 
creativity of the author, and her use of the literary conventions that genres are modified 
or new ones are created through her works. However, once a text is written it becomes a 
literary fact and is incorporated into the literary tradition which then shapes the 
possibilities for future authors. 51 The elements of defamiliarization which were new and 
unexpected for the original audience have been ` levelled down' and become part of the 
horizon of expectations for successive generations of readers and no longer function to 
49 Gadamer, "Forward to the Second Edition, " in Truth and Method, xxxi. 
50 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 16-17. 
51 Tynianov, "On Literary Evolution, " in Readings in Russian Poetics, 68-78. 
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disrupt their expectations. 52 The decisive feature of a work's evolutionary significance is 
its innovative character which is perceived against the background of other works of 
literature. "The works that thereby stand out from, correspond to, or replace one 
another would appear as moments of a process that no longer needs to be construed as 
tending toward some end point, since as the dialectical self-production of new forms it 
requires no teleology. "53 Literary evolution is not a linear process, like Darwinianism, 
but is punctuated by struggle and breaks. 54 This is perhaps the most important feature of 
Formalism that Jauss appropriates, the idea of change and development in literature with its 
focus on innovation that allows for a combination of history and artistic significance. 
If Marxism failed because it did not consider the aesthetic dimension of 
reception, Formalism suffered from a lack of historical and social perspective. 55 Jauss 
criticises Formalism for viewing the text as autonomous and only examining that which 
is internal to the text and intertextual systems. 56 Formalism's program of explaining a 
work's place in history by examining its change in literary forms is not an adequate basis 
from which to construct literary history. According to Jauss, Formalism must be opened 
up so that the relation of the text to the questions left by preceding works, (the text as an 
answer to those questions), and the questions that the text in turn leaves behind must be 
considered. 57 Thus, like Marxism, Formalism misses how literature informs culture and 
the progress of history. 58 In order to solve this shortcoming, Jauss proposes that 
Formalism should be modified to include an aesthetics of reception which involves 
examining the original horizon of expectations in which the text first appeared, the 
horizon of the reader, as well as those elements which are internal to the text. 
Jauss' solution to the crisis in literary history is to combine Marxism's demand 
for historical mediation and Formalism's advances in the realm of aesthetic perception 
with his concept of the horizon of expectation of the reader to construct a new model of 
52 Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language, " 1052-3. 
53 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 33. The sole criterion of this 
evolution, according to Formalism, is the appearance of new literary forms and "not the 
self-reproduction of worn-out forms, artistic devices, and genres, which pass into the 
background until at a moment in the evolution they are made 'perceptible: once again. " 
Ibid., 16-17. 
54 Jam, Towards, 105. 
55 Nina Kolesnikoff, "Formalism, Russian, " 58-59. 
56 Holub, 30-31. 
57 Ibid., 64. - 
58 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 40. 
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literary history. 59 One of the main issues that must be corrected in both Marxism and 
Formalism is the limited role they assign to the reader. 
Reader, listener, and spectator 
- 
in short, the factor of the audience 
- 
play and 
extremely limited role in both literary theories. Orthodox Marxist aesthetics 
treats the reader 
- 
if at all 
- 
no differently from the author; it inquires about 
his social position or seeks to recognize him in the structure of a represented 
society. The Formalist school needs the reader only as a perceiving subject who 
follows the directions in the text in order to distinguish the [literary] form or 
discover the [literary] procedure. 6° 
Because the reader is not just a passive agent but also plays a formative role in shaping 
literary history, the reader must play an active role in literary theory. 
The historical life of a literary work is unthinkable without the active 
participation of its addressees. For it is only through the process of its mediation 
that the work enters into the changing horizon-of-experience of a continuity in 
which the perpetual inversion occurs from simple reception to critical 
understanding, from passive to active reception, from recognized aesthetic norms 
to a new production that surpasses them. 6' 
II. JAUSS' PROVOCATION: 
"LITERARY HISTORY AS A CHALLENGE TO LITERARY THEORY" 
The most logical point to start any discussion of Jauss' works is with his essay, 
"Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory" for which he is best known and has 
been the most widely discussed paper on literary theory in Germany in the past twenty to 
thirty years. 62 
This essay is provocative by nature and presents not only a challenge to the 
inadequacy of the literary theories at that time but also offers a solution in the form of a 
proposal for a new paradigm in literary studies. His appeal to Friedrich Schiller's 
inaugural lecture of 1789, "What Is and Toward What End Does One Study Universal 
History, " is a clear indication of this. Schiller called for a new approach to history and 
literature because the answers to the questions which the classical-humanist paradigm 
asked were no longer satisfactory. This paradigm developed during the Renaissance and 
formulated guidelines from classical texts which served as norms to evaluate all other 
literature. 63 Schiller realised that, with the rise of historicism, classical literature could no 
59 "The task for a new literary history, therefore, becomes to merge successfully the best 
qualities of Marxism and Formalism. " Holub, 57. 
60 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 18-19. 
61 Ibid., 19. 
62 Holub, 69. 
63 See the section on "Paradigm Shifts" in the next chapter for a discussion of how the concept 
of paradigms functions heuristically and apologetically in Jauss' work. 
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longer be held as embodying atemporal norms and thus, this approach was in crisis. Not 
only did Schiller explain why they were facing a crisis in literary studies at that time but 
he also established the expectations of nineteenth century literary history. 64 Jauss 
prepares the reader to receive his work in a similar manner by referring to Schiller's essay 
in the introduction to his lecture. 
Jauss' essay is divided into two sections. In the first section, he discusses much of 
the background material I discussed in the previous section in order to set the stage for 
his proposal. This proposal is laid out in seven theses that constitute the second half of 
his essay. Since this is such a significant work to understand Jauss' thought I will devote 
a large portion of this chapter in order to summarise each of these theses. 
Thesis 1. Literary history must move from historical objectivism which is based on the 
aesthetics of production and representation to an aesthetics of reception and 
influence. 
Collingwood's axiom that "History is nothing but the reenactment of past 
thought in the historian's mind" is even more significant for the history of literature. 65 
Literary history is not based on facts but on the experience of texts by readers. In this 
respect, Jauss develops Gadamer's metaphor of a musical score and repeated 
performances to define literary history. "A literary work is not an object that stands by 
itself and offers the same view to each reader in each period.... It is much more like an 
orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text 
from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence. "66 Therefore, 
literary history is a continual process of aesthetic reception. The endless collection of 
objective facts which some literary histories produce misses the eventful character of the 
text as well as the manner in which the concretization of the meaning of the text can play 
a historically constitutive role. Texts are not like historical events. On the one hand, 
they only become an event with a reader who reads them in light of other works which in 
turn shapes his reception of future works. On the other hand, they lack effect or 
influence if they are not appropriated by a reader. 67 It is only through reception, 
through the interrelationship between the literary work and the reading public, that a 
work of literature reveals its structure and meaning in an open series of historical 
events. 68 
64 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 6. 
65 R G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (N. Y. and Oxford, 1956), 228; Jauss, 21. 
66 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 21. 
67 Ibid., 20-22. 
68 Idem, Towards, 73. 
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Thesis 2. The aesthetic of reception can avoid psychologising by looking at the influence 
of work in the period of its appearance, from pre-understanding of genres, and 
from themes already familiar in other works. 
A text does not appear in a vacuum but makes use of signals, genres, and other 
familiar characteristics. This means that the event of aesthetic experience is not an 
arbitrary subjective experience, "but rather the carrying out of specific instructions in a 
process of directed perception, which can be comprehended according to its constitutive 
motivations and triggering signals, and which can also be described by a textual 
linguistics. "69 There is an intersubjective horizon that determines the effects or 
influences of a text. Because texts employ conventions, which the reader inherits from 
other texts and which become part of the forms of life or the reader's language game(s), 
the effect of the text is not an event that is purely private, but it has an intersubjective 
character. 70 Jauss' point is not to reduce literary history to a sociology of knowledge but 
he is arguing that there is historical data available to the literary historian in this area. 71 
In order for a reader to comprehend a text it requires that he possess the 
foreknowledge to make that text understandable. The expectations that the reader brings 
to the text are inherited from his tradition and rules which he has learned from reading 
other texts. These expectations are "then varied, corrected, altered, or even just 
reproduced" as he/she reads the text 72 This results in a semiotic expansion and 
correction of the reader's system. The various horizon of expectations (in which the 
work first appeared and the successive horizons in which it is read) are by nature 
intersubjective and are therefore open to investigation. One could determine if the 
author was writing in a manner with which the readers would have been familiar or if the 
69 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 23. 
70 I realise that the concept of `language-games' is interpreted in a variety of manners by 
different authors. George Pitcher and Norman Malcom employ this concept in a 
manner which is much less pluralistic than D. Z. Phillips and Peter Winch. While 
Richard Rorry is even more pluralistic, verging on the notion of language-games being 
quasi-autonomous `free-floating islands. ' Jauss' argument is closest to that of Pitcher and 
Malcom. 
Jauss' thought offers parallels with the later Wittgenstein here, in as far as, an 
utterance or text gains its currency from the intersubjective world of shared co-operation 
and training. For Wittgenstein, this intersubjective world is primarily discussed in terms 
of training, while Jauss prefers to discuss it in terms of tradition. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1958), § 240- 
44, and esp. 293. 
71 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 22-24. 
72 Ibid., 23. 
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author was being innovative in the manner she was structuring the text by studying the 
genres familiar to the author and the original readers. 
The intersubjective dimension for studying the horizon of expectations also 
includes the intertextual relationships between texts. The work of Umberto Eco and 
Jonathan Culler help us to understand the concept of intertextuality and the role which it 
plays in hermeneutics. According to Eco, the process by which the characters on a page 
becomes a `sign-function' involves the production of the sign (word or meaning) which 
arises in the act of recognition. 73 A code must pre-exist to enable the person to see the 
relation between the action and the content in order for a human action to be recognised 
as an expression of some content. 74 Culler develops these ideas in relation to the practice 
of reading texts and the inter-subjectivity of understanding. In a statement very similar 
to Eco, Culler affirms, "When a speaker of a language hears a phonetic sequence, he is 
able to give it meaning because he brings to the act of communication an amazing 
repertoire of conscious and unconscious knowledge. " Reading is no exception to this 
rule. "To read a text as literature is not to make one's mind a tabula rasa and approach it 
without preconceptions; one must bring to it an implicit understanding of the operations 
of literary discourse which tells one what to look for. "75 
Anyone who lacks this knowledge will be baffled when presented with a text such 
as a parable. "He would be unable to read it as literature 
.., 
because he lacks the complex 
`literary competence' which enables him and others to proceed. He has not internalised the 
`grammar' of literature which would permit him to convert linguistic sequences into 
literary structures and meanings. "76 In a manner similar to Wittgenstein, Culler argues 
that we need training in the rules, conventions, and forms of literature in order to 
understand literature. A general experience of the world and society is not enough to 
make a reader competent to understand literary works. 77 
73 "Recognition occurs when a given object or event, produced by nature or human action 
(intentionally or unintentionally), and existing in a world of facts among facts, comes to 
be viewed by an addressee as the expression of a given content, either through a pre- 
existing and coded correlation or through the positing of a possible correlation by its 
addressee. " Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1976), 221. 
74 "I am speaking to you; you understand me because my messages are emitted following rules 
of a communally shared code. " Umberto Eco, "Social Life as a Sign System, " in 
Structuralism: An Introduction, cd. David Robey (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 61. 
75 Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature 
(London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 113-14. 
76 Ibid., 114, emphasis mine. 
77 Culler, 114-20. 
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But it is clear that the study of one poem or novel facilitates the study of the next: 
one gains not only points of comparison but a sense of how to read. One 
develops a set of questions which experience shows to be appropriate and 
productive and criteria for determining whether they are in a given case, 
production; one acquires a sense of the possibilities of literature and how these 
possibilities may be distinguished. We may speak, if we like, of extrapolating 
from one work to another, so long as we do not thereby obscure the fact that the 
process of extrapolation is precisely what requires explanation. 78 
In the interpretive or reading process, Culler is interested in how conventions and 
intertextuality enable, but also limit, the possible readings of a text. He is not concerned 
with, nor does he believe, that there is one correct interpretation for a text. Just as langue 
and parole are dialectically related to each other, so are texts and intertextual systems. 
Culler defines intertextuality as: 
`Intertextuality' thus has a double focus. On the one hand, it calls our attention to 
the importance of prior texts, insisting that the autonomy of texts is a misleading 
notion and that a work has the meaning it does only because certain things have 
previously been written. Yet in so far as it focuses on intelligibility, on meaning, 
intertextuality' leach us to consider prior texts as contributions to a code which makes 
possible the various effects of signification. Intertextuality thus becomes less a name 
for a work's relation to particular prior texts than a designation of its 
participation in the discursive space of a culture: the relationship between a text 
and the various languages or signifying practices of a culture and its relation to 
those texts which articulate for it the possibilities of that culture. The study of 
intertextuality is thus not the investigation of sources and influences as 
traditionally conceived; it casts its net wider to include anonymous discursive 
practices, codes whose origins are lost, that make possible the signifying practices 
of later texts. 79 
Jauss emphasises both the diachronic and synchronic aspects to intertextuality. 
For example, when we read a detective story we understand it in a synchronic 
relationship to other detective stories we have read. At the same time, a detective story 
may be a reworking of a previous novel, or it may be picking up themes and ideas from 
classical literature. The reader's pleasure and interest in the text arises from the manner 
in which our expectations are generated between works. Intertextuality functions like a 
"well-known game with familiar rules but unknown surprises. "80 
And finally, the intersubjective dimension to the horizon of expectations may be 
seen in the opposition between poetic and practical functions of language. What may 
have been a new and innovative literary style or manner of communicating an idea when 
78 Ibid., 121, emphasis mine. 
79 Ibid., 104. 
80 Jauss, "Theses on the Transition from the Aesthetics of Literary Works to a Theory of 
Aesthetics of Experience, " in Interpretation of Narrative, eds. Mario Valdes and Owen 
Miller (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 144. 
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the text was first written becomes part of the literary competence of successive 
generations of readers. As a result, later readers do not experience the same tension or the 
disruptive power of the text which the original readers would have. 81 
The relevance of this for biblical studies can seen in the history of parable studies. 
Christian Bugge and Paul Fiebig criticised Adolf Julicher's work, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu, 
for interpreting Jesus' parables from the perspective of classical Greek literature and 
ignoring the Jewish and rabbinical genre of mashal which serves as a better model for 
understanding the form and content of Jesus' parables. The result is that Jülicher 
perceived Jesus as a 19th century German who was versed in the Greek classics 82 The 
meaning of a parable was reduced to expressing one clear moral point which should be 
explicated by the exegete in as general a term as possible. 
Thesis 3. The artistic character of a work can be determined by the influence or effect of 
a text on its audience. The change in horizons that the text brings about 
through the negation of the familiar or opening up of new perspectives is a 
result of the aesthetic distance between the text and its audience, which can be 
objecti, f ed through the audiences' reactions and the critics' judgements. 
If a work is closely aligned with the audience's horizon of expectations then no 
horizontal change is produced. Jauss classifies this as `culinary art'. 83 For Gadamer, the 
point Jauss is making concerning `culinary art' is vitally important. If we experience no 
provocation, negation, or push (Stoff from the work of art, then we have not had an 
experience, Erfahrung. Without this provocation, we will never learn to recognise what 
81 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 16, -24; idem, "Thesis on the 
Transition, " 141. 
82 Warren S. Kissinger, The Parables ofJesus: A History of Interpretation and Bibliograph} ATLA 
Bibliography Series, ed. Kenneth E. Rowe (Metuchen, N. J. and London: Scarecrow 
Press, 1979), 72-74,77-83; Adolf Jülicher, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 52-115; Christian A. Bugge, Die Haupt- 
Parabin Jesu (Giessen: J. Rickerische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903); 15-35; Paul Fiebig, 
Die Gleichnisreden Jesu im Lichte der rabbinischen Gleichnisse des neutestamentlichen 
Zeitalters (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1912), 6-118. 
83 He appears to have adopted this term from Heidegger who complained that art had been 
reduced to a "matter for pastry cooks. " Art is deprived of its ability to make a truth 
disclosure if it is either relegated to the lower realm of material objects or elevated to 
aesthetic consciousness. The threat to modern art which Heidegger saw was that such a 
reduction had already taken place, "the beautiful is what reposes and relaxes; it is 
intended for enjoyment and art is a matter for pastry cooks. " Martin Heidegger, An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959), 131-32. Heidegger makes this point in his argument against the reduction of 
thinking to calculation, language being pressed into the service of trivia, and art to 
aesthetics. Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and 
Philosophical Description (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 330-35. 
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we do not know, learn to ask questions, or mature and develop (Bildung) as individuals, 
communities, and traditions. 84 
At the same time, tradition has a levelling, or homogenising power on even the 
most innovative works; the aesthetic distance between the text and the original audience 
diminishes for later readers "to the extent that the original negativity of the work has 
become self evident and has itself entered into the horizon of future aesthetic experience, 
as a henceforth familiar-expectation. "85 Classical texts and masterworks suffer from this 
form of horizontal change. To protect and/or rescue great literary works from being 
reduced to culinary art "requires a special effort to read them `against the grain' of the 
accustomed experience to catch sight of their artistic character once again. "86 In biblical 
hermeneutics, the classical example of this is the removal of the negation or subversive 
character of the parables. The negation in the parable of the Good Samaritan is no 
longer recognised in our horizon of expectations. Even the title we apply to this parable 
(the "good" Samaritan) betrays this fact. The shock which the original audience 
experienced as the parable reversed their expectations of who the good person was is 
almost the exact opposite of our horizon of expectations. 87 
There is a dialectical relationship between texts and horizons of expectations. 
Some works violate or break the audiences' expectations to such an extent that the 
audience is only able to gradually appreciate the text with the passage of time. This takes 
place as the horizon of expectations develops or alters so that the aspects of the literary 
work in question can be appreciated. The reception of the novels Fanny and Madame 
Bovary in the nineteenth century illustrates this. Both books were written at the same 
time, on a similar subject matter, adultery, and to the same audience. Fanny was 
immediately received and enjoyed several reprintings while Madame Bovary which 
84 See my discussion of these topics in Chapter 2; Gadamer, Truth and Method 354-56; Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, "Translator's Preface, " in Truth and Method xiii; 
Theodore Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology: The Current Debate in 
German Philosophy, " Philosophy Today, 14 (1970), 159. 
85 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 25; Idem, Question and Answer, 
16. 
86 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 26. Umberto Eco makes an 
important contribution to this discussion by showing that even classical or provocative 
texts can be consumed by the naive reader in a manner which is equivalent to Jauss' 
argument about 'culinary art. ' A naive reader will not appreciate or enjoy the text in the 
manner that a critical reader will. This is not just the result of being a poor reader but 
involves the relationship between the structures or strategies in the text and the 
competence of the reader. Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the 
Semiotics of Texts, Thomas Sebeok (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 
9-10,204-16. 
87 Jauss, 25-28. 
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violated many of the literary expectations and norms of the original audience, gained 
acceptance gradually. As the horizon of expectations shifted the fortune of the two books 
was reversed. "As Madame Bovary, however, became a world-wide success, when at first 
it was understood and appreciated as a turning-point in the history of the novel by only a 
small circle of connoisseurs, the audience of novel-readers that was formed by it came to 
sanction the new cannon of expectations; this canon made Feydeau's weaknesses 
- 
his 
flowery style, his modish effects, his lyrical-confessional cliches 
- 
unbearable, and 
allowed Fanny to fade into yesterday's bestseller. "88 The reception of a particular text, in 
turn, shapes and alters the aesthetic norms of that tradition and, as a result, those works 
which were formerly accepted as successful books are now seen as outmoded; our 
appreciation of them has been withdrawn. 
This same phenomena occurs in biblical studies. A prime example of this is, once 
again, Jülicher's, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu. While the historical-critical method was 
recognised for determining the original meaning of the gospels during the nineteenth 
century it was not until the publication of Jülicher's book that this method was accepted 
as being applicable to the parables. Geraint Jones sees Jülicher's work as so significant 
that he organises the history of parable research according to the scheme of pre- and post- 
Jülicher. 89 Until Jülicher, the parables were still interpreted allegorically and classified as 
allegories. Jülicher's work dispelled both of these ideas: the parables are not allegories nor 
should they be interpreted allegorically despite the fact that this had been the accepted 
88 Ibid., 28. The reception of Moby Dick is another excellent example of this phenomena. 
"Moby Dick received mixed reviews when it was published, and proved to be a popular 
disaster. Not until Raymond Weaver began reviving Melville some seventy years later 
did the book attract much attention. For a few years, critics debated its value and 
eventually advocates won, and the great ungainly book was enshrined in the hall of fame: 
it was tacitly deemed canonical by something approaching a general consensus. Since 
then, it has been treated as scripture by most people working in American literature: that 
is to say, its genre has been examined like the biblical midrashim; numerous hypotheses 
of its overall meaning have been constructed; exegeses of individual chapters or symbols 
have been performed; the book has become required reading in thousands of schools; 
most educated people claim to be conversant with it. Only rarely does one see a negative 
evaluation of it any more; it has passed beyond that stage. " Christopher E. Arthur, 
"Gadamer and Hirsch: The Canonical Work and the Interpreter's Intention, " Cultural 
Hermeneutics, 4 (1977), 186. 
89 See chapter 1 of Geraint Vaughan Jones, The Art and Truth of the Parables: A Study in Their 
Literary Form and Modern Interpretation (London: SPCK, 1964). Little acknowledges 
the significance of Jülicher's work but prefers to see Jeremias as the figure around whom 
the past century of parable research has revolved. James C. Little, "Parable Research in 
the Twentieth Century I. The Predecessors of J. Jeremias, " Expository Times, 87 (1976) 
356-60; "Parable Research in the Twentieth Century II. The Contribution of J. 
Jeremias, " 88 (1977): 40-43; and "Parable Research in the Twentieth Century III. 
Developments since J. Jeremias, " 88 (1977): 71-75. 
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practice since the earliest days of the church. The impact of Jülicher's work is such that 
if a modern scholar wishes to introduce an allegorical dimension into his reading of the 
parables he must fight against what has been accepted as exegetical conventions since 
Jülicher. 90 It is interesting to note that Jülicher credits Alexander Bruce as the person 
who broke the allegorical method of interpretation. However, Bruce's use of the 
historical-critical method to the parables resulted in his being severely criticised, almost a 
formal censure, by the Free Church of Scotland. 91 In this sense, while Bruce's work was 
not received it helped to alter the horizon of expectations which prepared the way for the 
reception of Jülicher's work. 92 
In Jauss' earlier work, the most important criteria for determining the influence 
of a text concerned the manner by which the text negated the preunderstanding of its 
audience. This was based on Adorno's hermeneutic principle of negativity. In his later 
work, Jauss softened this position dramatically. 93 No longer does he consider negation 
the primary means by which a work provokes its reader, nor does he limit the reception 
value of a text to its provocation. The reception of a text may take a wide spectrum of 
reactions from the different horizons of readers, including the manner in which a text 
may affirm the accepted norms and conventions of the readers. This is one area in which 
Jauss corrects Gadamer's thought. For Gadamer, the provocation of our prejudices by a 
text is achieved primarily through the concept of negation 94 Jauss gives two primary 
reasons for this modification in his hermeneutic. First, if tradition levels-down the 
provocative power of a text, then how do we explain a text's continued reception and 
significance within a tradition? The exemplary and normative character of classic texts 
clearly demonstrates the limited role which negation can play in the transmission of a 
tradition of literature. 95 Second, you cannot reduce the historical reception of a text to 
one factor such as negation. Rather we must also include other communicative 
functions 
90 Blomberg's attempt to recapture allegory is a recent illustration of the continuing influence 
of Jülicher's work. Craig L. Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables (Leicester: Apollos, 
1990), 30-38. See also: James Barr, Old and New In Interpretation: A Study on the Two 
Testaments (London: SCM Press, 1966), 103-4; Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: 
An essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 96-7. 
91 A. M. Hunter, Interpreting the Parables (London: SCM Press, 1960), 37-38. 
92 Jülicher at the same time criticised Bruce's work for developing a three-story model of 
parables which weakened his ability to define what a parable was. Jülicher, Die 
Gleichnisreden Jesu, 1.300. 
93 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, 12-15; idem, "Der Leser " 331. 
94 For one example of this see: Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness, " trans. 
Jeff L. Close, in Interpretive Social Research: A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. 
Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 156. 
95 Jauss, Towards, 64. 
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of literature such as role identification, the extension of ideas, and literature's socially 
formative and affirming function 96 Literature fufils both an anticipatory and 
archaeological function. In the latter, texts do not merely negate existing norms and 
prejudices but mediate norms and values from the past by allowing the reader to 
rediscover them, and as such, literature serves the purpose of mediating such norms with 
various spheres of life within the present horizon. 97 This dual function is theologically 
significant. Not only does the Bible speak to us most sharply when it "addresses us as 
adversary, to correct and to change our prior wishes and expectations, " as Calvin and 
Luther claimed 98 But it also fulfils an archaeological role in that through the reading of 
the Bible we are called upon to remember and preserve what has been handed down to 
us. There is a third reason why this shift is important in relation to this thesis. If the 
concept of negation stands at the centre of reception theory, then we will end up with a 
view of tradition which is characterised by novelty, rupture, and discontinuity. If 
reception theory is broadened to include other elements, along with negation, then we 
return to a middle position which includes both continuity and plurality within a 
tradition. 
If we return to the example of the parable of the Good Samaritan, the widening 
of reception theory to other communicative functions beside negation become obvious. 
While we may not experience the negation of the parable that the original Jewish 
audience would have identified with the Samaritan, the socially-formative function of the 
parable is still experienced to this day. We are to show mercy and compassion as the 
Samaritan did. 
Thesis 4. The reconstruction of the original horizon of expectations allows us to compare 
past and present understanding and forces us to become aware of the text's 
history of reception which mediates the two horizons. 
There is no `timelessly true' meaning for a text that is available to the reader. 
This would require that the reader could step outside history and the errors of his 
predecessors. Instead, Jauss adopts Gadamer's conception of the fusion of horizons 
96 This is especially true if we consider the role which question and answer plays in Jauss' 
thought. "The coherence of question and answer in this history of an interpretation is 
primarily determined by categories of the enrichment of understanding (be they 
supplementation or development, a reaccenting or a new elucidation), and only 
secondarily by the logic of falsifiability. " Idem, Towards, 185; idem, Aesthetic Experience, 
15; idem, Question and Answer, 148,224-5; Holub, Reception Theory, 79. 
97 John Neubauer, "Trends in Literary Reception: Die neuen Leiden der Wertherwirkung, " 
German Quarterly, 52.1 (January, 1979), 74-5. 
98 Thiselton, New Horizons, 9. 
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which takes place through dialogue. Once again Jauss and Gadamer follow 
Collingwood's philosophy of history, "We can understand a text only when we have 
understood the question to which it is an answer. "99 But the reconstructed question is 
never identical with the original question the text sought to answer because any 
reconstruction of a past horizon is always enveloped in the present horizon of the 
interpreter. 
The reconstruction of the horizon of expectations, in the face of which a work 
was created and received in the past, enables one on the other hand to pose 
questions that the text gave an answer to, and thereby to discover how the 
contemporary reader could have viewed and understood the work.... It brings to 
view the hermeneutic difference between the former and the current 
understanding of a work; it raises to consciousness the history of its reception 
100 
This means that the history of a text's reception results from the 'unfolding of the 
potential meaning of the text. Meaning does not solely reside in the original horizon but to 
an `equal degree' comes from the interpreter's horizon. '0' One of the traits of a text is that, 
in the words of Paul Ricceur, it possess a `surplus of meaning'. 102 For Jauss, this surplus 
of meaning opens the possibility for new interpretations to bring to light perspectives or 
elements of the text which previous ones did not. This is based on Heidegger and 
Gadamer's argument that the meaning or truth claims of a text will never be fully realised 
in any single act of understanding. 103 Meaning does not solely reside in the original 
horizon but arises from the text's interaction with successive generations of readers. 
Since such folds [possible meaning unnoticed by author or original audience] can 
first be discovered only through the interpreter's later horizon, and can be 
expounded on only by assimilating them in a new interpretation, this horizon 
ought not simply be erased by aligning it with the earlier horizon when an 
anticipatory assumption proves unfounded. Instead, the content of the horizon 
of one's own expectation must be brought into play, and mediated through the 
alien horizon in order to arrive at the new horizon of another interpretation. 104 
The two horizons must be brought into play which results in an ongoing process of 
constituting the meaning of a text. In order for the fusion of horizons to take place, the 
99 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 370; Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary 
Theory, " 29. 
100 Ibid., 28. 
101 Idem, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature, " 184. 
102 Paul Ricceur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning(Fort Worth, TX: 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 29-36. 
103 See "Heidegger. the Play of Truth, " and "Performance and Tradition Formation, " in the 
previous chapter. 
104 Jauss, Question and Answer, 206-7. 
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interpreter must pose the question that draws the text "back out of its seclusion" so that 
the text can answer and "say something". "This also means that `while a right elucidation 
never understands the text better than the author understood it, ' it does surely 
understand differently. Yet this difference must be of such a kind as to touch upon the 
Same toward which the elucidated text is thinking. "'105 The `surplus of meaning' which 
unfolds in the history of texts interpretation does nor imply that any subjective 
interpretation is a valid unfolding of that meaning. The idea that there may be more 
than one right interpretation does not, in this case, imply that there arc no wrong 
interpretations. The `score' of the text, the tradition of the text's interpretation, and the 
reconstruction of the horizon in which the text appeared are all intersubjective elements 
which separate Jauss' hermeneutic from the more subjective approaches of Richard Rorry 
or Stanley Fish. 106 As a result, it follows that our interpretations of classical texts, such as 
the Bible, are always provisional by nature and open to review while at the same time 
faithfully addressing the text and its subject matter. If we slide off to one side or the 
other of this position, the writing of new commentaries is a futile exercise. 
Thesis 5. A text must be seen in its position in its `literary series' in order for someone to 
recognise its historical significance. 
"Put in another way, the next work can solve formal and moral problems left 
behind by the last work, and present new problems in turn. "107 Formalism's concept of 
literary evolution was a step in this direction. However, its criterion of innovation in the 
process of literary evolution is one-sided and cannot adequately explain the growth and 
development of literature. One must also consider the horizon of the reader and the 
aesthetics of reception. Literary history is not just concerned with a chronological series 
of literary facts. It must seek the questions left behind by the text and the solutions the 
text offered to the questions that were posed to the author. In order to recognise these 
questions, the interpreter must bring their experiences into play, "since the past horizon 
of old and new forms, problems and solutions is only recognizable in its further 
mediation, within the present horizon of the received work. "los 
105 Ibid., 207, quoting Martin Heidegger, The Question concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 
William Lovitt trans. (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1977), 58. 
106 Paul de Man notes that Jauss has always viewed such subjective hermeneutical models "with 
a measure of suspicion. " "Introduction, " in Towards, xix. 
107 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 32. 
108 Ibid., 34. "Its [historical knowledge] object is therefore not a mere object, something 
outside the mind which knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can be known only 
in so far as the knowing mind re-enacts it and knows itself as so doing. To the historian, 
the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but 
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Every literary work is seen as offering possible solutions to the questions that were 
posed by previous texts and also presenting new questions. This means that the `new' is 
not merely literary innovation but is a historical category. This takes place when an 
author wilfully reappropriates the past in his work or provides an unexpected or new 
perspective on past literature, "allowing something to be found that one previously could 
not have sought in it. " 109 
The new also becomes a historical category when the diachronic analysis of 
literature is pushed further to ask which historical moments are really the ones 
that first make new that which is new in a literary phenomenon; to what degree 
this new element is already perceptible in the historical instant of its emergence; 
which distance, path, or detour of understanding were required for its realization 
in content' and whether the moment of its full actualization was so influential 
that it could alter the perspective on the old, and thereby the canonization of the 
literary past. I10 
The implications for this thesis upon biblical studies are immediately apparent. 
In New Testament studies, the area where this fifth thesis has been practised the most 
concerns the question of the historical and intertextual relationships between the 
synoptic gospels. Which gospel came first, how did the subsequent authors edit or 
expand upon the previous text's rendition of one of the events in Jesus' life, and so on? 1 tt 
At the same time, we need to also consider the position which different commentaries 
hold within the `literary series' of biblical interpretation. Commentaries and 
interpretations are not just answers to questions about the meaning of the text, but also 
present questions for future commentators. This means that the history of biblical 
interpretation should be seen as a tradition constituted by question and answer in which 
the meaning of the biblical texts unfold. "The two poles of the past `givenness' of the 
Bible and its present interpretation do not (or at least should not) stand in opposition to 
each other. In this respect, the history of biblical interpretation presents us with a history 
of legitimate responses to the text which shape the formation of the Christian tradition 
experiences to be lived through in his mind; they are objective, or known to him, only 
because they are also subjective, or activities of his own. " Collingwood, The Idea of 
History, 218. 
109 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 35. This is one of the main 
theses in his essay, Hans Robert Jauss, "The Dialogical and the Dialectical Neveu de 
Rameau How Diderot Adopted Socrates and Hegel Adopted Diderot, " trans. Sara 
Brewer Berlowitz, Protocol of the Colloquy of the Center far Hermeneutical Studies in 
Hellenistic and Modern Culture, ed. William R. Herzog II (Berkeley: The Graduate 
Theological Union and the University of California, 1983). 
110 Idem., "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 35. 
111 The most significant text in this field, even though it is now dated, is: Rudolf Bultmann, 
The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1963). 
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because of their exemplary character and illegitimate responses which hopefully will be 
avoided by future interpreters. 112 The Holy Spirit guides the Church by clarifying the 
truth, "the on-going communal life of the Church yields ever new and richer insight into 
the significance of the life, death and destiny of Jesus of Nazareth. "113 If this corporate 
and tradition constituted form of knowledge constitutes our understanding of the Bible 
in such a dynamic fashion, then Jauss' hermeneutic offers a very important resource to 
not only interpret the Bible but also to cultivate and correct this corporate form of 
knowledge. 
Thesis 6. Advances in the field of linguistics allow us to overcome the dominance of diachronic methods in literary history. 
One of the effects of Hegel's philosophy was the acceptance of a diachronic view 
of history. This view presupposed that every event that occurred at a similar point in 
time was equally informed by the significance of that moment. However, different 
contemporaneous events cannot be understood this way. Different events are 
conditioned by their own particular history or time curves. Any moment in history is 
therefore a mixture of these historically heterogeneous events. The significance of this for 
literary history is that texts that appear contemporaneously are, in reality, a 
heterogeneous collection of texts, each shaped and informed by different time curves. 
Therefore, the literary historian needs to incorporate synchronic, `cross-section, ' studies 
into her work in order to be able to grasp the differences between texts which appear 
close to the same time period, especially if there is a cultural proximity between the texts. 
This is especially important when one considers works which are written during epochal 
changes, or what Kuhn would call `paradigm shifts. ' Synchronic studies allow us to see 
how the competing values and structures are realised in different texts which appear 
contemporary with each other during such changes. This enables us to formulate some 
form of heuristic framework to examine and explain the questions which are being asked, 
the answers which were received, and the significance of the changes in the "system of 
relationships in the literature of a historical moment. "1 14 "The history of literature 
comes to light at the intersection of diachrony and synchrony. "t 15 
112 Anthony C. Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory, " in Believing in the 
Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the 
Church of England (London: SPCK, 1981), 73; Jauss, Toward, 59. 
113 Michael J. Himes, "The Ecclesiological Significance of the Reception of Doctrine, " 
HeythropJournaL 33 (1992), 152. 
114 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 36. Jauss' work corrects Hegel's 
idea that differences between beliefs and ideas occurred between different historical 
152 
If we expand Jauss' argument at this point, we could say that different texts that 
appear contemporaneously are answering different questions. If this is the case, then it is 
not a big step to incorporate Maclntyre into Jauss' program. Jauss' `time curves' are a 
simplified form of rival traditions found in Maclntyre's tradition-constituted form of 
epistemology and the two systems appear to complement each other well: Jauss on the 
aesthetic and literary side and Maclntyre on the tradition and epistemological side. 116 
The heterogeneous mixture of texts in a tradition or literary horizon is also 
subject to the levelling power of tradition just as masterworks are. "This multiplicity of 
literary phenomena nonetheless, when seen from the point of view of an aesthetics of 
reception, coalesces again for the audience that perceives them and relates them to one 
another as works of its present, in the unity of a common horizon of literary 
expectations, memories, and anticipations that establishes their significance. " 117 If this is 
so, then literary history is not relegated to following either a program of great books or 
the sum total of all texts, but the synchronic perspective helps us determine which texts 
are significant in shaping our literary tradition. Literary evolution can be established 
through the changes in the different horizons of expectation. Successive synchronic cross 
sections should produce points of intersection with diachronic studies. As the literary 
scholar finds these points of intersection, they will reveal the "literary evolution in its 
moments formative of history as well as its caesurae between periods. "118 
This raises an interesting question concerning the plurality and continuity in 
biblical interpretation. On the one hand, it affirms the possibility of different 
interpretations of a passage based on the idea of different `time curves' which shape those 
interpretations or approaches to the Bible. On the other hand, it would seem to indicate 
that the continuity we see in the history of biblical interpretation is the result of the 
epochs, not within them. An idea which is still found in the work of Gadamer. Charles 
Larmore, "Tradition, Objectivity, and Hermeneutics, " in Hermeneutics and Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (Albany. SUNY Press, 1986), 154. Jauss, 
Aesthetic Experience, 269-70. 
115 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 37. 
116 The clearest explication of Maclntyre's position is found in: Alasdair Maclntyre, After 
Virtue A Study in Moral Theory 2nd cd. (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1984). 
117 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 38. The levelling power of 
tradition is also seen in Kuhn's work. After a scientific revolution has taken place, the 
texts books which are written level out scientific history by presenting it as the steady 
accumulation of facts and gradual development of theories until the reader arrives at 
current research program. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 136-43. 
118 Jam, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 36-39. 
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levelling power of tradition. What were considered heterogeneous understandings of the 
biblical text when they appeared are now considered homogeneous elements of our 
tradition. A tradition does not preserve all the questions which contributed to its 
formation, some are forgotten, some erased by a definitive answer, and others 
renewed. 119 The levelling power of tradition is both a selective process filtering which 
literary expectations will constitute future expectations and, at the same time, it is a 
forgetful process. As Heidegger claimed, tradition enables us not only to recover the past 
by making the foreign familiar, but it also "blocks our access to those primordial sources" 
by "making us forget" the significance of the sources. 120 Forgetting is as much a part of 
historically effective consciousness as is remembering. 
One of the critical contributions which this sixth thesis makes to biblical studies 
is that it provides us with a method to recover some of the questions and answers which 
have been forgotten within our tradition. We gain invaluable resources which provide us 
with a wider field of play to approach a text as we recover the questions and answers 
which constitute our tradition of interpretation 
. 
At the same time, this mode of study 
should contribute to the development of our phronetic knowledge, what Gadamer would 
term Bildung. We should become more sensitive to wider perspectives on a text's 
possible interpretations and wiser in determining which of these are most appropriate for 
the present horizon. 121 From an ecumenical perspective, the recovery of lost questions 
and answers reveal the diversity of questions that our tradition has homogenised and 
allows us to not only see the validity of other traditions of interpretation but also enables 
us to better engage them in dialogue. "Reception entails the respectful hearing of the 
other's statement of faith and the discernment that the statement is coherent with the 
apostolic tradition and perhaps further illuminates one's own experience of the Christian 
life. "122 
119 Ideen, Question and Answer, 70; 219. 
120 Heidegger, Being and Time, 43. Heidegger's philosophy served as a corrective to Hegel's 
program of absolute knowledge of history and at the same time the cumulative or 
evolutionary approach to historical knowledge. There is always an element of 
concealment or forgetfulness in every act of disclosure or remembering. Thus, the truth 
(aletheia) of something is always characterised by some degree of concealment. 
Gadamer, "Hegel and Heidegger, " 107; idem, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy, " in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 226-27. 
121 See the section "Hermeneutical Knowledge and Tradition, " in Chapter 1. 
122 Himes, "The Ecclesiological Significance of the Reception of Doctrine, " 155. 
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Thesis 7. Literary history is a special history with a unique relationship to general 
history. 
Marxism, Formalism, and Structuralism failed to see how literature informed 
society and shaped history. The social function of literature occurs when "the literary 
experience of the reader enters into the horizon of expectations of his lived praxis, 
performs his understanding of the world, and thereby also has an effect on his social 
behavior. " 123 Jauss expands the role of negative experience found in Gadamer's 
hermeneutic by incorporating Karl Popper's thought on the productive role of negative 
experience in the sciences. 124 Each hypothesis and observation presupposes a horizon of 
expectations. The disappointment or falsification of these expectations are what enables 
the researcher to make contact with reality. While Jauss does not fully agree with 
Popper's theory, it does illustrate the "productive meaning of negative experience. "125 
However, unlike real life, the reader does not bump into reality when his or her 
expectations are negated. The experience of reading creates a freedom from the 
constraints of daily life and has the possibility to disclose new perspectives to the reader. 
"Thus a literary work with an unfamiliar aesthetic form can break through the 
expectations of its readers and at the same time confront them with a question, the 
solution to which remains lacking for them in the religiously or officially sanctioned 
morals. "126 
At this point, Jauss integrates literary-historical and sociological research into the 
horizon of expectations. Synchronic studies reveal the horizon of expectations at a 
certain period which arise from the audience's experience with other works of art and the 
sociological background of everyday life. 127 Literary history must study the social 
conditions and background that affect the author's and audience's expectations. These 
"entanglements are indispensable. " However, this is not to reduce literary hermeneutics 
to a theory of production like Marxism, for once a text is formed it achieves a life of its 
own which extends beyond the original horizon and plays a socially formative function 
for succeeding horizons of expectations-128 
123 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 39. 
124 For my discussion of Gadamer on this topic see Chapter 1, "Hegel's Dialectic: Experience 
and Sublation. "
125 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 41. 
126 Ibid., 44. 
127 Ibid., 41. 
128 Idem, Hans Robert Jauss, "Der Leser, " 338-39; idem, Towards 91. See also: Paul Ricceur, 
Interpretation Theory, 25-44. 
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The gap between literature and history, between aesthetic and historical 
knowledge, can be bridged if literary history does not simply describe the process 
of general history in the reflection of its works one more time, but rather when it discovers in the course of `literary evolution' that properly socially formative function that belongs to literature as it competes with other arts and social forces 
in the emancipation of mankind from its natural, religious, and social bonds. 129 
Jauss is concerned with the relationship between literary history and general history in 
this essay. In particular, he wants to overcome the model in which the interpretation of a 
text is accomplished by placing the text in its proper historical context. This misses the 
fact that the history of a text's interpretation is an essential element for our ability to 
understand it. Therefore, he had to rethink the relationship between literary and general 
history. His conclusion is that literary history had to include the "eventful (ereignischafte) 
nature of the literary work as well as its constitutive historical role. "130 The historyof 
literature is a historical process which occurs in the experiences and interpretations of 
those who "absorb their message, enjoy or judge them, acknowledge or refute them, 
select and forget them, and to such an extent form traditions, and those who finally 
assume an active role by answering a tradition and producing new works. "131 
This last thesis parallels and reinforces the argument Ebeling and Froehlich make 
concerning the need to integrate biblical exegesis and church history. According to Jauss, 
the reception history of a biblical text is related to church history through the socially 
formative function which literature performs. In particular, Jauss emphasises in this 
thesis the way in which the reception of a text can disclose new perspectives and 
possibilities for living in the world and thus, emancipate the church from traditional, 
cultural, or religious bonds. Martin Luther's interpretation of Romans 1: 17 is the 
paradigmatic example of this in the Protestant tradition. However, Luz stresses that the 
socially formative function is not always emancipatory. The history the interpretation of 
Matthew 27: 25, "His blood be on us and our children, " demonstrates the manner in 
which a text may be abused or misinterpreted. The interpretation verse has often been 
used to support the persecution of the Jews. "The history of effects shows that texts have 
power and therefore cannot be separated from their consequences. Interpreting a text is 
not simply playing with words but an act with historical consequences. "132 While both 
Jauss and Gadamer would agree that this is not a genuine example of dialogue with the 
129 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 45. 
130 Holub, "German Theory in the United States, " in Colloquy, 43. 
131 Jauss, "Dtr Leser, " 325. 
132 Luz, Matthew in History, 33. 
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text, it is nevertheless an effect produced by the reception of the text which has shaped 
the history of the Christian tradition and needs to be included in its Wirkungsgeschichte. 
III. HERMENEUTICS OF RECEPTION 
The influence of Gadamer on the field of hermeneutics cannot be overstated, and 
this is particularly true for Jauss who was a student of Gadamer's. While Jauss builds on 
Gadamer's thought he also makes distinctive contributions of his own. These include 
the horizon of expectations, the three levels of reading, and aesthetic experience. What I 
propose to accomplish in the second half of this chapter is to consider several of the 
broader hermeneutical aspects of Jauss' work in which he builds upon and modifies or 
extends Gadamer's hermeneutic in these areas. 
A. The Horizon of Expectations 
The concept of the horizon of expectations stands at the centre of Jauss' 
theory. 133 The positivistic-historical model recognised that every interpreter is bound to 
his historical horizon but at the same time it tried to overcome this restriction by 
bracketing the interpreter's horizon. Influenced by science, nineteenth century history 
ignored Kant's question concerning intersubjective validity in knowledge. 134 Instead, it 
followed a one-sided approach from Kant which adopted his restriction of science to the 
"scope and constitution of objects of experience. "135 What positivistic history lost in this 
process was Kant's concept that we study phenomena to answer questions which our 
reason determines. 136 The only a priori which this view recognised was logic and facts, 
or empirical data, which exist independent of observation and could be objectively and 
intersubjectively validated. 137 The positivists thought were able to stand above the 
influence of their historical situation by objectively observing the facts of history, like a 
biologist objectively observing the specimen under the microscope. 138 
133 Idem, Question and Answer, 224. 
134 Karl-Otto Apel, "The Communication Community as the Transcendental Presupposition 
for the Social Sciences, " in Towards a Transformation of Philosophy (London and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 43,47. 
135 Ibid., 32. 
136 Ibid., 50,55. 
137 This corresponds to Leibnils two principles: the truths of reason and the truths of facts. 
Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities, " Man 
and World 5 (1 1972), 5. 
138 Jam, "The Identity of the Poetic Text in the Changing Horizon of Understanding, " in 
Identity of the Literary Text, ed. Mario J. Valdes and Owen Miller (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985), 146-7. 
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The result was that in their attempt to objectively reconstruct the past, they were 
still unwitting captives of their own horizon. "Whoever believes that it is possible to 
arrive at the other horizon, that of some prior time, by simply disregarding one's own 
inevitably introduces subjective criteria concerning selection, perspective, and evaluation 
into his supposedly objective reconstruction of the past. "139 Albert Schweitzer is famous 
for his comment about the results of such a naive historical practice in the quest for the 
historical Jesus. This quest only succeeded in producing "a figure designed by 
rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in an 
historical garb. "140 It is naive to think that it is possible to understand another horizon 
by disregarding one's own horizon. The pervasiveness of the ideal of historical objectivity 
is still felt today in biblical studies. Some of the most highly respected commentary series 
continue to approach the Bible as an ancient text, a relic from the past which is subjected 
to objective technical analysis. 141 
As a response to this paradigm of historiography, Gadamer developed Heidegger 
and Husserl's concept of the horizon which moves with the interpreter as they move and 
live. 
Every experience has its horizon of expectation: all consciousness exists as a 
consciousness of something, and thus, always also exists within the horizon of 
already formulated and still forthcoming experiences 
... 
Experience is formed in 
the functional swing from anticipation (preconception) to the fulfillment or 
disappointment of the anticipation. Even the new that is unexpected is "new in 
the context of a certain knowledge"; within the horizon of disappointed 
expectation, it becomes something that can be experienced, something that opens 
a new horizon, and thus demonstrates that "every actual horizon 
... 
[has] within 
it a system of potential horizons. "142 
The implication of this concept for hermeneutics involves a shift from understanding as 
the interpretation of a text as some "professed or revealed truth on the one hand, and 
understanding as the search for or investigation into possible meaning on the other. "143 
Understanding was taken for granted by historical-positivism, historical distance did not 
alienate. What was required for an interpreter to understand a text was historical, 
grammatical, and philological interpretation. Thus, understanding was reduced to 
,a 
form of translation. 
139 Jam, Question and Answer, 198. 
140 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 1950), 62,398. 
141 Markus Bockmuehl, "A Commentator's Approach to the `Effective History' of Philippians, " 
Journal for the Study of the New Testament, 60 (1995), 57. 
142 Jauss, Question and Answer, 203-4. 
143 Ibid., 200. 
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Understanding is no longer guaranteed for Gadamer or Jauss. Historical distance 
between the horizons alienates the reader from the text and creates a need for reflective 
mediation between the horizons of the text and the reader. In opposition to the 
historical-positivist school which sought to overcome or bracket historical distance 
between the two horizons, Gadamer bases the fusion of horizons on the need for 
historical distance. 1' The possibility for productive understanding lies in the temporal 
distance between the horizons which is not to be overcome, but allows the interpreter to 
see the foreignness of the text before the two horizons are fused. This allows the 
otherness of the text to appraise the interpreter's prejudices and for interpretation to be 
an experience which changes the interpreter. 145 
One of the essential characteristics of the concept of horizon for Jauss is the 
relationship between experience and expectation. "Whereas experience can organize the 
past into spatial and perspectival whole, expectation is directed at the open horizon of 
individual, not yet realised possibilities, and is thus open to the incursion of unexpected 
events that break through the closed horizon of earlier experience and found new 
expectations that will themselves be corrected through experience and are themselves able 
to engender new perspectives. " Jauss is building on Heidegger's hermeneutical circle 
between the projection of "Being-towards-possibilities" and "potential-for-Being" which 
is disclosed in the projective act and Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel's dialectic of 
experience, negation, and sublation. 1` 6 According to Jauss, "If `experience and 
expectation' are so entwined in one another as a conceptual pair - both in the 
apprehension of history and in the horizon of aesthetic experience - that `no 
expectation [can exist] without experience, and no experience without expectation. '"147 
Everything, even the innovative, and that which negates the past, is understood from the 
perspective of what we inherit from the past. 
History and aesthetics arc integrated in the concept of Erwartungshorizont, or 
horizon of expectations by Jauss. As I mentioned previously, Jauss adopts this notion 
from Gadamer's concept of the horizon (Horizont) which refers primarily to the 
14 4 The naivete of the historicism consists in its trust in methodology which it mistakenly 
believed allowed it to escape the need for reflection and forget its own historical 
relevance. Gadamer, "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens, " in Martin Heidegger zum Siebzigsten 
Geburtstag (Tübingen: Günther Neske Pfullingen, 1959), 34. 
145 Ibid.; idem, Truth and Method, 300-7; Jauss, Question and Answer, 205; see Chapter 2, 
"Time is the Best Teacher. " 
146 See "The Rehabilitation of Tradition, " and "Hegel's Dialectic: Experience and Sublation, " 
in chapter 1. Jauss, Question and Answer, 203-5. 
147 Jam, Question and Answer, 202-3. 
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historical world in which we live and is constituted by the prejudices which we inherit 
from our tradition. What is surprising to note is that Jauss does not rely primarily on 
Gadamer for the definition of this concept but rather turned to the art historian, E. H. 
Gombrich. For Gombrich, the "horizon of expectations" is the "mental set, which 
registers deviations and modifications with exaggerated sensitivity" which allow the 
viewer to decipher a work of art. 148 Robert Holub provides a helpful definition for Jauss' 
use of this term. "`Horizon of expectations' would appear to refer to an intersubjective 
system or structure of expectations, a `system of references' or a mind-set that a 
hypothetical individual might bring to any text. "149 Erwartungshorizont refers primarily, 
but not exclusively, to the expectations which a reader brings to a text, or as Gombrich 
would say, "We come to their work with our receivers already attuned. "150 One example 
of this is the manner by which our (direct or indirect) exposure to a certain type of genre 
will shape how we approach other texts which we would consider to be part of that 
genre. 
Jauss' interest in the productive role which the original horizon of expectations 
plays in understanding arose while he was working on medieval texts. 151 His work in 
this area revealed to him the problems inherent in direct aesthetic understanding through 
the text alone or historical mediation through background information. In order to 
remedy the shortcomings of other literary methods, he argued that it is possible to 
partially reconstruct the original horizon of expectations of the original audience through 
historical study. The goal of this reconstruction is not an empathetic understanding of 
the original readers' experience but to examine the preconceptions of the original 
addressees-152 This allows the critic to gain some degree of appreciation for how the text 
either appealed to, affirmed, or negated the expectations of the reader. There are two 
benefits from this type of study. First, it allows the critic to determine the literary merit 
of the work as it appeared in its first horizon based on how the text negated or affirmed 
the norms of that horizon, and how the reception of the text shifted over time. Second, 
148 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation 
(London: Phaidon Press, 1959), 53. See also: Eco, Theory of Semiotics, 204-8. 
149 Holub, Reception Theory, 59. 
150 Gombrich, 53. 
151 Jauss, Question and Answer, 218. 
152 Ibid., 222. 
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it also allows the reader to experience the `alterity' of the text, its historical distance from 
their horizon of expectations. 153 
1. Gadamer and the Passive Fusion of Horizons? 
Some have criticised Gadamer because his concept of the fusion of horizons is 
perceived as a metaphor which refers to the passive merging of two image fields into one 
field of vision. 154 Jauss feels that this negates Gadamer's thrust, which is to discover the 
historical difference and alienation created by temporal distance and bring the text into 
the present through conversation. 155 The tension between the two horizons not only 
allows us to recognise what is foreign in the text, it also challenges or questions our 
prejudices. We are struck or provoked by the text which results in either an affirmation 
or denial of our prejudices. 156 For this reason, Jauss prefers to speak of a mediation of 
horizons, which implies a more active and reflective participation on the reader's part, 
than Gadamer's fusion of horizons, which connotes a more passive stance in that 
"Gadamcr sometimes does not give an active role to interpreters. " 157 
For me, it is an active synthesis, which maintains the tension between the text of 
the past and my present experience. All hermeneutical reflection must 
consciously develop this tension.... Only in this mediating of two different 
horizons, you arrive at a new experience, which changes the interpreter 
him/herself. 158 
According to Jauss, the mediation between the horizons of expectations takes 
place in two different movements which are interrelated. It must mediate between (1) 
the original inception and the public reception of the text and (2) between past and 
present experiences or understandings of the text. At the same time, it must also mediate 
153 'Alterity is defined as "the recognition of the contrast with modern experience". Jauss, "The 
Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature, " 187. 
154 Dietrich Böhler, "Philosophische Hermeneutik und hermeneutische Methode, " in Poetik und 
Hermeneutik IX (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1981), 500-10. 
155 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363-77 for his discussion on conversation and the logic of 
question and answer. 
156 Jauss, "Der Leser, " 339; idem, Question and Answer, 202-3. The background for these ideas 
can be found in Heidegger's work. "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 
`signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value 
on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in 
question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the 
world and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. " Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 190-1. 
157 Jam, "Minutes of the Colloquy, " summarised by Brigid Merriman, in Colloquy, 60. 
158 Jauss' opening statements in "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 52-53. 
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between "the horizon of expectations, which a work of art evokes, confirms or even 
transcends, and the horizon of experience which the recipient brings to bear. " 159 
Reception theory, as developed by Jauss, does an excellent job explaining and 
examining these two movements involved in the mediation of horizons. Since he is 
concerned primarily with literary texts these two movement appear to be fairly 
comprehensive. However, for some biblical texts there appears to be a third horizon 
which must be brought into play. The third horizon which needs to be considered is 
that of the audience which is implicit in the text. J. Arthur Baird has demonstrated the 
significance the audience which Jesus addressed plays in the gospel accounts. In contrast 
to Jeremias, who claims that the narrated audience is one of the least stable elements in 
the gospels, Baird's careful analysis shows that it is one of the most consistent elements, 
especially when the evangelists are narrating Jesus' parables. 160 
It would seem highly probable that the audience was of great importance to those 
who recorded the tradition because they believed the message of the logia was 
audience-centered. They believed the Jesus of the logia taught selectively, 
accommodating his message to his audience to such a degree that the nature of 
the audience became an important part of the message of the logion itself. This 
was then preserved with unique fidelity, for anyone knowing about Jesus would 
have realized that the audience was needed for correct and meaningful 
reproduction of his teaching. This means to us that the audience has become a 
hermeneutic factor of first importance. 161 
It would seem, then, that for certain biblical texts we need to incorporate a third 
movement into the mediation of the horizon of expectations. That is, between the 
horizon of the audience addressed within the text and our present horizon of 
expectations. 
2. Jauss and an Authoritarian Mediation of Horizons? 
If Gadamer has been criticised for presenting a passive fusion of horizons, others 
have attacked Jauss for introducing a new form of authoritarianism to hermeneutics. 
Instead of claiming that there is only one correct meaning for a text, Jauss has introduced 
"a grain of relativism by making `correct interpretation' - dialogically depend on the 
159 Ibid., 52. In his essay, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " Jauss focused 
primarily on the first form of this mediation of horizons. In his later work, the second 
movement came to play an equal role. Idem, "Der Leser, " 338. 
160 J. Arthur Baird, Audience Criticism and the Historical Jesus (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1969), 16-18,61-2. 
161 Ibid., 134. 
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relation between the text and the reader's changing situations. "162 They perceive the 
language which Jauss uses when he describes his efforts to historically reconstruct the 
original questions which the text sought to answer as being too exact. They think that he 
claims to have uncovered `the' question to which the literary work was a response. 163 
When asked if he thought that there are `true' questions which need to be asked or if 
there is a true meaning to the text, Jauss responded. "Your question poses, in my sense a 
false alternative: it is just the new question which permits me to uncover something 
which, till now, had not yet been seen in the text. Were it not as an implied meaning in 
the text, my question would not find a new answer and would have to be abandoned. "164 
Jauss' answer illustrates his adoption of Collingwood's position concerning the `rightness' 
of the question. 165 New questions uncover something new in the text only when they 
are answered by the text; they must be appropriate to the text. Question and answer 
stand in a dialogical relationship to each other which cannot be divided or set in 
opposition to each other. Thus, even our understanding of past horizons and genres are 
the result of questions which we ask within our horizon and will be different from the 
questions asked in other horizons of interpretation. 
These criticisms appear to flow primarily from the manner in which they perceive 
Jauss' appropriation of history to reconstruct the horizons of expectations. Jauss' attempt 
to introduce the reconstruction of the original horizon of expectations is seen as a return 
to either a positivistic approach to literary history based on objective facts or as an 
essentialist view of the text. However, these criticisms do not give due weight to Jauss' 
agreement with Gadamer on this point. All understanding, even historical 
reconstruction, takes place within a horizon of expectations. Even the reconstruction of 
the original audiences horizon will be perceived differently at different times. Jauss' 
hermeneutic is historical, not in the sense that it refers to the employment of the 
historical-critical methods to determine the original meaning of the text, but rather in the 
much wider sense of the term. His hermeneutic is historical, wirkungsgeschichtlich, in 
that it includes not only the original horizon in which the text appeared, but also the 
162 Ulrich Gumbrecht, "Dialectics, or Authoritative Monologue in Dialogue Disguise, " in 
Colloquy, 35; John H. Smith, "Response, " in Colloquy, 46. 
163 Robert Wicks, "Review of Question and Answer, " Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, 
49.3 (Summer, 1991), 276-77; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, "Dialectics, or Authoritative 
Monologue in Dialogue Disguise, " in Colloquy, 34-35. 
164 Jauss "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 55. 
165 See the section on this in chapter 1. 
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tradition of interpretation of the text from that time till the present, and the present 
readers' horizon of expectations. 
While Jauss holds to the possibility of reconstructing the original horizon of 
expectations from historical data and literary genres, he does not hold to an essentialist 
view of the text or its meaning. There is no timeless, correct interpretation for a text. 
Rather, he follows Heidegger's concept of the work of art and Gadamer's play as 
presentation and the transformation into structure. 166 In this way, Jauss follows 
Gadamer's middle road between the unlimited play of meaning and an authoritarian, or 
essentialist, view of meaning. In every act of interpretation there is some degree of 
identity which arises from what is given in the text and at the same time "the non- 
identity which is arrived at by interpretation. " 167 It is similar to the manner in which 
each performance of a musical score is different (non-identical), but at the same time it is 
a performance of the same score (element of identity). The act of interpretation involves 
the mediation of the different horizons which results in the meaning of the text being 
concretized. 
Interpretation and literary history must be performed by each and every 
generation since every act of understanding takes place in a historical horizon. "This is 
not a defect of the theory but its most liberating feature, for it ensures that no fixed view 
ever prevails and that each generation must read the texts anew and interrogate them 
from its own perspective and find itself concerned, in its own fashion, by the work's 
question. "168 A decade before Jauss wrote his inaugural address, Bullmann realised 
almost the same conclusion in this area. "Since the exegete exists historically and must 
hear the word of Scripture as spoken in his special historical situation, he will always 
understand the old word anew. "169 
B. Three Levels of Reading and the Logic of Question and Answer 
The goal of Gadamer's hermeneutic is for the interpreter to consciously enter 
into the living process of transmitting a tradition. The basic thrust of his hermeneutic is 
166 See the previous chapter, "Play as the Being of Artwork. " 
167 Jauss, "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 60; Heidegger, Holzwege, 197. 
168 Wlad Godzich, "Introduction, " in Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, xii-xiii. 
169 Rudolf Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions possible?, " trans. Schubert M. 
Ogden, in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. Schubert M. 
Ogden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), 296. Ebeling also commented on this, 
"This peculiarity of historical interpretation enables us to understand the essential 
unfinished nature of historical research and the necessity of constant renewal ... " 
Ebeling, The Word of God and Tradition, 18. 
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the historical and dialogical nature of understanding which takes place through the 
alienation created by temporal distance and then entering into a conversation with this 
text through the logic of question and answer. However, Jauss asks if there is not an 
internal conceptual contradiction in Gadamer's hermeneutic. While he agrees with most 
of Gadamer's thought, he questions whether Gadamer's concepts of historical 
distanciation and the fusion of horizons implies a contradiction between active and 
passive forms of understanding. 170 This is why Jauss prefers to speak of `mediation' 
rather than `fusion' since it implies that understanding is an active process in both 
movements of understanding. 
The area of Gadamer's hermeneutic in which Jauss attempts to move from 
`fusion' to `mediation' pertains primarily to the logic of question and answer. Following 
Collingwood and Gadamer, Jauss bases the dialogical interaction between text and reader 
in the dialogue of question and answer. For Gadamer, the capacity of the question "to 
open up and hold open possibilities" serves as the grounds for the hermeneutic priority of 
the question. 171 "To understand something therefore means to understand something as 
an answer, and more precisely, to test one's own view against that of the other, through 
question and answer. "172 
Jauss tries to be more specific than Gadamer in his use of the metaphor of a 
`conversation' with the text through question and answer. In order for the fusion of 
horizons to take place, the interpreter must pose the question that draws the text "back 
out of its seclusion" so that the text can answer and "say something". This is very similar 
to Pannenberg's criticism of Gadamer's metaphor of a conversation. Pannenberg argues 
that the text cannot protect itself from premature agreement (misunderstanding) as a 
conversation partner can and a text must be empowered by the interpreter to assert 
itself. 173 The priority which Gadamer gives to the question, which strikes the reader, 
must be balanced to include the role of assertions, or answers. 174 Not only does Jauss 
agree with Pannenberg's critique but he also thinks that Gadamer's mediation of the past 
170 Jauss, Question and Answer, 205. 
171 See: Robert R. Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989); Gadamer, "The Model 
of Platonic Dialectic, " in Truth and Method 362-68. 
172 Jauss, Question and Answer, 213. 
173 Jauss, "Limits and Tasks, " 108; Wolfsart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal 
History, " in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. I, cd. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1970), 177,121. 
174 Idem, "Limits and Tasks, " 108; Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History, " 122- 
24; see "Gadamer's Dialogical Question and Answer, " in chapter 1. 
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and the present in a tradition sells understanding short since it does not include a critique 
of the tradition as well. 175 
Gadamer's idea that "to understand meaning is to understand it as the answer to 
a question"176 is also limited in its application according to Jauss. Poetical texts 
exemplify this limitation. A poem yields a mode of perception that stands in contrast to 
everyday perceptions and which creates the possibility to discern new perspectives on the 
world. The logic of question and answer is temporarily suspended during this primary 
perceptual understanding or aesthetic experience in which the reader experiences the 
linguistic power or artistry of the text, and "thereby, the world in its fullness of 
significance. " 177 Question and answer enters in the secondary act of interpretive 
understanding. When we read a poem our first reading of the poem becomes the 
horizon for our second reading, "what the reader received in the progressive horizon of 
aesthetic perception can be articulated as a theme in the retrospective horizon of 
interpretation. " 
This shifting of question and answer to the second level of reading resulted from 
the criticism he received from his inaugural essay "Literaturgeschichte als Provokation". 
Marxist literary critics in East Germany considered his essay a defence of the traditional 
status quo, while in West Germany it was seen as subverting the literary tradition. Jauss' 
work which followed this essay can be seen in large part as a response to these criticisms, 
especially in regards to the important role which negativity played in his earlier 
hermeneutical theory. In his second book, Aesthetic Experience, Jauss clarified and 
corrected his position in response to these criticisms. 178 He attempts to achieve this by 
modifying his position in three different ways. First, as we saw in the discussion of his 
third thesis, he reduces the role which negativity plays in his hermeneutic. Second, in its 
place he elevates the role of aesthetic experience. And third, he develops the three 
different levels of reading as a heuristic device to explain the overall structure of his 
hermeneutic. The first reading is an aesthetically perceptive reading, the second is an 
exegetical reading, and the third is a historical reading. The three successive readings of a 
text are compared with the movements of comprehension, interpretation and 
application. "The steps might be described phenomenologically as three successive 
175 Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 28-32; Idem, Question and 
Answer, 66,226. 
176 Gadamer, Truth and Method 375. 
177 Jauss, Towards, 142. 
178 Godzich, "Introduction, " in Aesthetic Experience, xiv-xv. See also the discussion on Jauss' 
third thesis above. 
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readings. "179 While these three movements cannot be separated from each other in 
practise, we can make distinctions between them that help us to examine them. 
1. First Reading 
- 
Aesthetic Perception 
In his essay "The Poetic Text within the Changes of Horizons of Reading, " Jauss 
examines the viability of Gadamer's assertion that understanding, interpretation, and 
application form a unity which is to be realised in practice. Jauss agrees with Gadamer 
that these three movements form a triadic unity and that any division between them is 
artificial to a certain degree. At the same time, he maintains that we can, and should, 
examine and explicate each of these movements. It is by examining each of the three 
movements that Jauss attempts to "demonstrate what kind of understanding, 
interpretation, and application might be proper to a text of aesthetic character. "180 
In Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics Jauss explains the difference 
between understanding and interpretation according to pre-reflective and reflective 
aesthetic experience. Pre-reflective aesthetic experience is directed toward something 
which is constituted by the reader in the process of performing the text, it points beyond 
everyday experience. In reflective aesthetic experience, the reader adopts the role of an 
observer. However, this does not mean that he/she ceases to enjoy the text but rather 
that they recognise the real-life situations that concern them in the aesthetic object. For 
Thiselton the relationship between "pre-critical" reading and interpretation is analogous 
to the relation between the reader and the critic. "As readers we allow ourselves to be 
mastered by the text. The text has its way with us. Our expectations are aroused and 
even at times manipulated. We feel what we are meant to feel; we live out the story. But 
the role of the critic reverses the relationship. The critic scrutinises the text as his or her 
object of enquiry. "tsp. Jauss' first level of reading is very similar to what Gadamer claims 
should be the experience of the audience (or anyone who participates in play). Our 
attention does not extend beyond the boundary of what is presented in the play, poem or 
performance. To reflect upon what is being presented results in our dropping out of the 
presentation of play. 182 According to Jauss, this occurs in the first level of reading in 
which understanding takes place through the reader's aesthetic perception or experience 
179 Jauss, Toward., 140. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Thiselton, New Horizons, 316 
182 See "Play as the Being of Artwork, " in chapter 2. 
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of the text. Aesthetic perception occurs through the process of reading in which the text 
"like a `score' indicates for the reader" its significance. 183 
Murray Krieger's metaphor of window 
- 
mirror 
- 
window helps to explain 
the manner in which the reader's aesthetic perception of the text is related to the real 
world and how this aesthetic perception serves as the basis for reflective interpretation, or 
the second level of reading. First, the text is like a window through which we see the 
world. This window then becomes a set of mirrors which reflect internally, within the 
various elements and relationships in the narrative world of the text. At this level, the 
familiar and the previously unrecognised are organised into new patterns of relationships 
which create new existential possibilities for understanding. Finally, the mirrors 
transform back into a window once again which discloses new perspectives on the 
world. 184 Thus, reflective aesthetic experience permits the reader to see anew, to explore 
other worlds of the imagination, and realise possible future actions. 185 
This first perceptual reading can also be described as an experience of collecting 
evidence about the text. As the reader moves through the text in the first reading he/she 
builds up a comprehension of the text's whole from the parts. This then serves as the 
presupposed horizon for the second step, an interpretive reading. "The interpretation of 
a poetic text always presupposes aesthetic perception as its pre-understanding; it may 
only concretize significances that appeared or could have appeared possible to the 
interpreter within the horizon of his preceding reading. " 186 As such, it both "opens up 
and delimits the space for possible concretization. "187 The differentiation between the 
first and second levels of reading is not an artificial distinction. It is analogous to 
rereading a poem. The first reading forms the horizon for the second reading. 
2. Second Reading 
-Interpretation and the Logic of Question and Answer 
Each reading becomes the horizon for the preliminary understanding of the next 
reading. What the reader grasps in the first aesthetically perceptive reading is reflected 
upon in the second reading. In this way, he moves Gadamer's logic of question and 
answer from the first reading to the second and grounds the primary or logically first 
183 Ibid., 141. 
184 Murray Krieger, A Window to Criticism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964), 30-6, 
59-65 
185 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, 5-10. 
186 Idem, Towards, 142-43. 
187 Gadamer's axiom "To understand means to understand something as an answer" is 
restricted by Jauss to this secondary act of interpretation and not to the primary act of 
perceptual understanding which produces the aesthetic experience. Jauss, Towards, 145. 
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form of understanding on aesthetic pleasure, not on question and answer. 188 Thus, 
Gadamer's idea that to understand is to understand something as an answer is limited to 
the second, interpretative, reading. "It can here apply only to the secondary act of 
interpretative comprehension, in so far as the latter concretizes a definite meaning as an 
answer to a question, and not the primary act of perceptive comprehension, which alone 
can introduce and constitute the aesthetical experience of a poetical teat. " 189 In the 
second reading, this conversation with a text must consciously mediate between the two 
horizons in order to avoid the dominance of the interpreter's horizon in this process. It 
is through the hermeneutics of question and answer that allows the interpreter to go 
"beyond his own horizon in order to examine the horizon of the other, and reengage in 
the dialogue with the text, a text that can only answer when it has been asked again. ""90 
To put it another way, in the first reading a `fusion' of horizons takes place through the 
reader's aesthetic experience of the text. In the second reading, a `mediation' of the 
horizons of the text and the interpreter occurs through the logic of question and answer. 
The second reading is a movement from the whole, which is inherited from the 
first reading, to an examination of the parts. 191 Perceptual understanding becomes the 
horizon for reflective interpretation, which becomes the horizon for application. 
The explicit interpretation in the second and in each further reading also remains 
related to the horizon of expectation of the first, i. e., perceptual reading 
- 
as 
long as the interpreter claims to make concrete a specific coherence of 
significance from out of the horizon of meaning of this text, and would not for 
example, exercise the license of allegories to translate the meaning of the text into 
a foreign context, that is to give it a significance transcending the horizon of 
meaning and thereby the intentionality of the text. 192 
Therefore, the meaning of a text is not a pre-given timeless commodity. Instead, 
the meaning of a text is defined according to the performance of the text by a reader. 
The reader concretizes one among many possibilities of significance in the second 
interpretative reading. 
When one recognizes the hermeneutical premise that the whole meaning of a 
lyrical work must be. understood not as a substance, as a timeless predetermined 
188 If we extend Jauss' metaphor of the three successive readings to Gadamer's hermeneutic we 
see that the logic of question and answer would fall within the first reading. "Thus the 
dialectic of question and answer always precedes the dialectic of interpretation. It is 
what determines understanding as an event. ' Gadamer, Truth and Method, 472. 
189 Jauss, "Limits and Tasks, " 112-3. 
190 Idem, Aesthetic Experience, 217. 
191 In this way, the hermeneutical circle of part/whole is incorporated in Jauss' theory. Idem, 
"Limits and Tasks, " 115-6. 
192 Idem, Towards, 142. 
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meaning, but as a proposal of a meaning, one can expect from the reader enough discernment to see that in the act of interpretive comprehension he can 
concretize only one of the poem's meanings, and that its pertinence for himself 
must not exclude its debatability for others. 193 
It is a fundamental hermeneutical principle that the questions which are asked 
arise from the horizon of the interpreter and, as a result, not every question can be posed 
in each horizon. Rather, the text under investigation should correct and determine 
which questions are to be asked and in what order. 194 But this does not mean that the 
relevance of other concretizations of the meaning of the text are excluded from 
consideration in the process of interpretation. Every interpretation falls under the 
hermeneutic of partiality since understanding and interpretation are not achieved 
through objective means of description but are characterised by the selective taking of 
perspectives from within an interpreter's horizon of expectations. 
3a. Third Reading 
- 
Historical Distance, "What did the Text Say? "
The third level is the one most familiar to traditional historical-grammatical 
hermeneutics, but is usually practised as the first level. 195 This is because the historical 
method overlooks the fact that aesthetic perceptual understanding is what takes place 
first. 196 This third level of reading involves the historical-reconstructive reading of the 
text. 197 Just as the second interpretive reading is dialectically related to the first 
aesthetically perceptive reading so also is the third historical reading related to the other 
two levels. The aesthetic character of a text serves as the means to bridge the historical 
distance between the text and the present. But aesthetic comprehension is also 
dependent on the reconstruction of history which "prevents the text of the past from 
being naively identified with the prejudices of the present and its expectations and 
therefore renders possible through the definite separation of the past and present 
horizons, the demonstration of the text's otherness. "198 Historical research is required to 
locate or protect the `otherness' of the text. This reconstructive investigation enables us 
193 Idem, "Limits and Tasks, " 115-6. 
194 Idem, Towards, 113,139. 
195 Idem, "Limits and Tasks, " 116. 
196 "Literary hermeneutics has remained for the longest time under the influence of the 
paradigms of history and of the interpretation immanent in the text; and that explains its 
present laggardness. The scholars limited their work to exegesis, left their concept of 
comprehension inarticulate, and neglected the problem of application so completely that 
the turn to reception aesthetics, which in the sixties began to close the development gap, 
reached an unexpected success as a 'change of paradigms'. " Ibid., 96. 
197 Idem, Towards, 146. 
198 Idem, "Limits and Tasks, " 116-7; "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 53. 
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to seek "out the questions (most often unexplicit ones) to which the text was the response 
in its time. "199 Every bit of detail that can be found should be questioned as a possible 
source. There are two things such a quest should look for: (1) the text's response to 
expectations of a formal kind, such as those raised by its literary tradition, and (2) the 
text's response to questions concerning meaning raised in the life-world horizon in which 
the text was produced. 
One of the hermeneutical implications of question and answer is that the 
recipient of a text is now actively involved as a mediator of the text. This places the text 
and the reader on almost equal footing The reader must adopt a posture which is open 
and oriented to the concerns of the text and address the question which the text 
originally sought to answer and the questions which the text left behind. The historical- 
reconstructive methods serve a controlling function by protecting the temporal distance 
of the text from the reader's horizon and thereby allowing the text to be seen in its 
alterity. The questions we ask must lead to a knowledge of the author's questions as 
he/she sought to answer them in their horizon. But this does not mean that reflection 
over this issue should deny the "horizon of contemporary interests that continually co- 
conditions the kind and manner of questioning. " "Conversation allows question and 
answer to confirm for themselves whether the other has understood in the same way, has 
understood differently, or has misunderstood altogether. "200 
Historical investigation is also required because literary transmission does not 
always unfold freely. What is passed down in a tradition may have been restrained 
through domination or distortion. Jauss considers "the ideological-critical suspicion that 
literary transmission may not unfold in absolute freedom; it may be 
pseudocommunicatively constrained" a critical insight which requires vigilance on the 
part of the interpreter. In this case, literary communication between the horizons is not 
transparent but must be retrieved from the power of tradition to incorporate what is 
heterogeneous into it. 201 In this way, Jauss is able to overcome one of the major 
199 Idem, Towards, 146. 
200 Idem, Question and Answer, 62. Stephen Fowl strongly opposes this approach, the literary 
approach to the scriptures does not require historical research. Stephen Fowl, Engaging 
Scripture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 1-61. However, in the last two chapters of his book 
Fowl seems to negate the argument in the first half of the book when he engages in 
historical and philological studies in the book of Ephesians. 
201 Jauss, Question and Answer, 226; Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profilee trans. 
Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 190; Theodore 
Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology: The Current Debate in German 
Philosophy, " Philosophy Tod* 14 (1970), 155-8; Deicer Misgeld, "Modernity and 
Hermeneutics: A Critical-Theoretical Rejoinder, " in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. 
171 
criticisms which have been persistently made against Gadamer by Habermas, the need for 
some form of critique of ideology within hermeneutics. 202 The inclusion of a 
`hermeneutics of consequences' is extremely important aspect of reception theory's 
possible contribution to the fields of biblical interpretation and church history. "Biblical 
texts whose consequences have been hatred, exclusiveness, and injustice call for critical 
questioning, even if they correspond superficially to the history of Jesus or even if they 
are his own words. "203 
3b. Third Reading 
- 
Application, "What does the Text Say to Me? " 
This transforms the questioning stance of the reader from "What did the text 
say? " to "What does the text say to me, and what do I say to it? "204 The interpreter must 
"allow the self to be cross-examined by the text while examining it, listen to the claims its 
makes. "205 The move from understanding through interpretation to application is 
needed lest the attempt to reconstruct the original question the text sought to answer 
slides back into the lifeless facts of historicism. "To determine this [function], that is, to 
recognize the problem left behind to which the new work in the historical series is the 
answer, the interpreter must bring his own experience into play, since the past horizon 
of old and new forms, problems and solutions, is only recognisable in its further 
mediation within the present horizon of the received work. "206 
The transformation of the question "What does the text say? " to "What does the 
text say to me, and what do I say to it? " demonstrates that hermeneutics is concerned 
with the entire process, from understanding, through interpretation, to application 207 
This is not to say that application is limited to some form of practical action, but that it 
Hugh J. Silverman (N. Y. and London: Routledge, 1991), 164-75; Graeme Nicholson, 
"Answers to Critical Theory, " in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 51. 
202 See the section "Reflection on Prejudices: Habermas, " in chapter 2. 
203 Luz, Matthew in History, 92. 
204 Jauss, Towards, 146. 
205 Idem, Question and Answer, 65. 
206 Idem, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 34. 
207 Jauss does not see the unity of these three movements as something new to him or 
Gadamer, but rather has always been an integral part of every hermencutical theory 
(whether this was recognised or not). "I only wish to emphasize the fact that an implicit 
understanding of the unity of comprehension, interpretation and application has formed 
the basis of hermeneutics now only since the period of the Enlightenment, but since the 
very ancient practice of the ars incerpreran4 and that the new pattern of various 
methods of interpretation did not simply substitute the old paradigm of various 
meanings of the text, but refined and developed its forms. " Ibid., 97-8. 
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is equally, if not more so, the broadening "of the horizon of one's own experience vis-ä- 
vis the experience of the other. "208 
In his interview with Rien Segers, Jauss summarised these three movements and 
their relationship to each other as the following: 
Interpretation as the concretization of a specific significance (among other 
possible significances which earlier interpreters have concretized or later 
interpreters can still concretize) always remains bound to the horizon of the first 
reading, perceiving aesthetically and understanding with pleasure; it next has the 
task of illuminating the verbal and poetic conditions which, from the 
construction of the text, orient the primary act of understanding. Application 
includes both acts of understanding and interpretation insofar as it represents the 
interest in transporting the text out of its past or foreignness and into the 
interpreter's present, in finding the question to which the text has an answer 
ready for the interpreter, in forming the aesthetic judgement of the text which 
could also persuade other interpreters209 
These three movements are rooted in the priority of the horizon of the first 
aesthetic reading. This is part of Jauss' desire to make the aesthetic reading, the aesthetic 
character of the text the "definite and provable premise of its interpretation. "210 
However, this is not a temporal priority, nor are these three steps always performed in 
the same order. "The priority of aesthetic perception in the triad of literary hermeneutics 
requires the horizon, but not the temporary priority of the first reading; this horizon of 
perceptive comprehension can also only be acquired by repeated reading or by means of a 
historical comprehension. "211 An example of this is Jauss' case study on the "Myth of 
the. Fall" (Genesis 3). In this study, his first step is to examine the horizon of the first 
reading, then the original horizon, and finally he turns to the history of reception. 212 
Thus, while it is possible to speak of the distinctions between understanding, 
interpretation, and application one must keep in mind the fundamental unity of these 
three movements. 
C. The Hermeneutic Validity of Aesthetic Experience 
Gadamcr is very suspicious of Jauss' attempt to introduce aesthetic experience as 
one of the foLindations for hermeneutics, and for good reason. Aesthetic experience 
involves a double differentiation according to Gadamer. 213 It involves an abstraction of 
208 Idem, Towards, 147. 
209 Segers, "An Interview with Hans Robert Jauss, " 85 
210 Jauss, "Limits and Tasks, "112. 
211 Ibid., 119. 
212 Idem, Question and Answer, 95-100. 
213 Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneatic, 93. 
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the text from the world in which it originated and the reader from his horizon. As a 
result, aesthetic experience does not allow for knowledge or for the text's truth claims. It 
is strictly aesthetic pleasure. "Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that 
artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning. "214 This criticism is 
related also to the problems inherent in the concepts of unlimited play and poetical 
versus practical language which I have already discussed. If Gadamer had been directing 
his criticism toward Jan Mukarovsky or Paul VaMry, then his criticism would have been 
exactly on target. For Mukarovsky, the question of truthfulness does not apply to the 
enjoyment of poetic texts. Paul Valery provides a clear illustration of aesthetic 
differentiation of which Gadamer is critical. 
Walking, like prose has a definite aim. It is an act directed at something we wish 
to reach. 
... 
The dance is another matter. It is of course a system of actions; but 
of actions whose end is in themselves. It goes nowhere. If it pursues an object, it 
is only an ideal object, a state, an enchantment, the phantom of a flower, an 
extreme life, a smile 
- 
which forms on the face of the one who summoned it 
from empty space. 215 
If aesthetic experience is pure perception, as Mukarovsky, Valiry, and others claim, then 
each reading of a text is a new creation. There is no correct reading, meaning, or criteria 
to determine what would count as a correct reading. This leads to a form of 
hermeneutical nihilism. 216 We end up with a radical discontinuity, a collection of 
unrelated, individual experiences which shatters any possible identity for the text or the 
possibility for a tradition of a text's transmission to form. 217 
Gadamer correctly argues, in my opinion, that our experience of any text must 
allow for knowledge and truth claims. Every aesthetic perception involves relationships. 
We understand something assomething. 218 It is only when we understand these 
relationships that we can appreciate the artistic qualities of the text. 219 This experience 
of a text is best understood if we compare it with the phenomena of self-understanding. 
In order to understand ourselves we must experience others. Continuity among all our 
214 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 92. 
215 Paul Valiry, "Poetry and Abstract Thought, " trans. Denise Folliot, in Critical Theory Since 
Plato, ed. Adam Hazard (N. Y. and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 
1971), 921-2. 
216 Gadamer, Truth and Method: 94-5. 
217 Ibid.; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutic, 97. Or as Gombrich noted, "If art were only, 
or mainly, an expression of personal vision, there could be no history of art. " Gombrich, 
Art and Illusion, 3. 
218 Heidegger, Being and Time, 19. 
219 "Only if we `recognize' what is represented are we able to `read' a picture; in fact, that is 
what ultimately makes it a picture. Seeing means articulating. " Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 91. 
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different experiences comes from the manner in which we sublate what appear to be a 
discontinuity of experiences into the continuity and identity of our self-understanding. 
In the same manner, Gadamer argues, we sublate these experiences of art and literature 
into our human existence, and this corresponds to the historical nature of human life. 220 
A tradition of interpretation comes into being in this way; through the continual 
encounters with the text, which by nature never exhaust the potential of the text but are 
unfinished events, which are sublated into the prejudices, phronesis, and communal 
knowledge within that tradition. 
Jauss is aware of Gadamer's criticism, but is still adamant that "The primary 
experience of a work of art takes place in the orientation to its aesthetic effect, in an 
understanding that is pleasure, and a pleasure that is cognitive. "221 He agrees with 
Gadamer's criticism, but only to the degree that aesthetic experience is related to abstract 
aesthetic pleasure. The problem with Gadamer's criticism, while valid, is that it is 
directed at the abstraction of aesthetic consciousness that emerged in the nineteenth 
century. 222 By contrast, Jauss has attempted to reformulate the hermeneutic role of 
aesthetic experience. 223 
There are three classical functions or modes of aesthetic experience which Jauss 
considers important for understanding the nature of aesthetic experience. Poiesis involves 
the active participation of the reader in constructing the aesthetic object, or as Heidegger 
would say, the world projected by the text. Aesthesis is the pleasure which comes from 
seeing and recognising. It is the knowledge we learn from the possibilities which we 
realise in reading the text. In this way, aesthesis is similar to the recognition of mimesis. 
The way in which the disclosure and the recognition of these possibilities transforms the 
reader's self-understanding, changes her beliefs, and liberates her mind to consider new 
perspectives on the world is the function of catharsis. These three functions are not 
arranged hierarchically, but form "a nexus of independent functions. "224 
220 Ibid., 96-100. 
221 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, xxiv. 
222 Ibid., 26-8,91-2. 
223 Jauss attempts this rehabilitation in order to overcome the problems which he saw in the 
role which negativity played in his (and Gadamer's) hermeneutic. Roland Barthes also 
attempted a similar rehabilitation of aesthetic pleasure. However, he still falls prey to 
Gadamer's criticism since he denies the possibilities of any form of dialogue between the 
reader and the text. Reading is a passive act of experiencing the pleasure of the language 
in the text. Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text trans. Richard Miller (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990). 
224 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, 35; 46-95. 
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Aesthetic experience is pre-reflective in that it is directed at the reference, or 
world projected by the text and extends beyond everyday experience. At the same time, 
aesthetic experience is reflective since the reader is able to adopt the role of an observer 
who recognises the relationships between the elements in the text and his situation. 225 
As such, aesthetic experience is not pure perception or abstracted pleasure, but it requires 
that the reader understand the original horizon of the text in order to protect the 
otherness of the text from being naively assimilated into his horizon. 226 It also requires a 
certain level of literary competence on the part of the reader which comes from his 
familiarity with the genre of the text and previous interpretations or understandings of 
the text. Instead of a discontinuity of individual experiences which results from 
abstracted aesthetic pleasure, Jauss' model of aesthetic experience contributes to, and 
takes place, within the continuity of a tradition of interpretation227 
Aesthetic experience includes cognitive knowledge and the truth claims of the 
text as Gadamer argues. One of the strengths of Jauss' position is that the interpretation 
of a text is not restricted to experts but is open to the average, educated reader. 
Reception theory is not based on an ideal form of reader, but rather a contemporary 
reader who has an average level of education. Alongside the average reader, Jauss places 
the "commentator with scholarly competence, who deepens the aesthetic impressions of 
the reader" through historical, philological, literary and other forms of research and 
criticism. 228 Reception theory protects a text such as the Bible from being taken captive 
by the trained scholars and opens its interpretation and the history of its effects to a 
much wider community than a theory such as the historical-critical method does. 
Interpretation that bypasses this primary aesthetic experience is the arrogance of a 
philologist who subscribes to the error that the text was not created for readers but for 
him, to be interpreted by such as he. "229 
225 Ibid., 5-10. 
226 Idem, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature, " 185. 
227 "Significance which is unlocked through aesthetic experience, arises from the convergence of 
effect [Wirkung] and reception. It is not an atemporal, basic element which is already 
given; rather, it is the never-completed result of a process of progressive and enriching 
interpretation, which concretizes 
-- 
in an ever new and different manner 
-- 
the textually 
immanent potential for meaning in the change of horizons of historical life-worlds. " 
Ibid., 183. 
228 Jauss, Towards, 144. For an article which explains how to apply this to the teaching 
situation see: Michael Ecken, "Hermeneutics in the Classroom: An Application of 
Reception Theory, " College English Association Critic, 46 (3-4,1984), 5-16. 
229 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, xxix. 
PART II: JAUSS' RECEPTION THEORY 
CHAPTER 4: PARADIGMS AND CLASSICS 
I. INTRODUCTION: RECEPTION THEORY 
AND THE HISTORY OF RECEPTION 
One of the problems confronting contemporary hermeneutics is the tension 
between plurality and continuity of interpretations. Under the historical-critical model, 
the truth or meaning of a text is sought through the historical reconstruction, 
philological, grammatical, and sociological studies and is grounded in the relationship 
between the author and the text. Thus, the nature of the text guarantees that there 
should be continuity in interpretation since the goal is to move closer to the original 
meaning intended by the author. Plurality then becomes a matter of misunderstanding 
or the application of the wrong method. ' Or it can be explained by making a distinction 
between the meaning of the text as intended by the author and the significance of the 
text as it realised in history. 2 There are two problems with this view. First, 
understanding becomes a subjective process which takes place between the creative mind 
of the author and reproductive mind of the interpreter. And second, the distinction 
between meaning and significance is not that straightforward. 
The distinction between meaning and significance is at best difficult to apply to 
the history of interpretation, for it is indisputably the case that interpreters of 
Plato, Aristotle, or Scripture in different historical eras differed in what they 
thought they saw in the text and not just in their views of the significance of the 
`same' textual meaning for themselves. Interpreters of Paul, for instance, have 
E. D. Hirsch is associated with the attempt to ground the meaning of a text in the author's 
intention. The possibility for determining a definitive interpretation is based on a 
methodological approach toward the text. Just as we can repeat a scientific experiment 
to achieve the same results, so we can discover the author's meaning through the correct 
procedures of interpretation. Hirsch's argument is more nuanced than many of his critics 
recognise, he is not arguing that we will always arrive at the author's intentions but that 
there is nothing to prohibit a valid understanding of the text. E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity 
in Interpretation (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1967), 17,31. 
"Meaningis that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a 
particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other hand, 
names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, 
or indeed anything imaginable. " Hirsch, 8; 49-57. 
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not been arguing all these centuries only over what Paul ` means' pro nobis, but 
also over the claim Paul makes regarding the subject matter. 3 
If Gadamer and Jauss are correct in arguing that this approach is no longer valid since it 
overlooks or downplays the significance of the horizon of the interpreter and the 
alienation created by historical distance then correct understanding can no longer be 
guaranteed and the challenge of historical distance presents the need for some other form 
of mediation. 
For Jauss, the truth of the meaning of a text can "be recovered only when it is 
sought in the change in the horizon of historical experience 
- 
and comprehended as an 
on moving, and always partial concretization of meaning. "4 Each and every act of 
understanding involves a fusion of horizons which results in a concretization of the 
meaning of the text. The meaning of a historically distant text does not solely reside in 
its original horizon, but arises in the fusion between the two horizons. The meaning of a 
text is performed in the "unfolding" of its meaning through the concretization of possible 
meanings in history. "The meaning of a work of art as well is extracted only during the 
progressive process of its reception; it is not a mystic whole that can reveal itself totally on 
its first showing. "5 This event or experience of something past, as recognisable in the 
present, is one manner in which tradition is transmitted, "a movement that begins with 
the recipient, takes up and brings along what is past, and translates or `transmits' it into 
the present, thus setting it in the new light of present meaning. "6 Subsequent 
concretization of the text change and expand the horizon of expectations as history 
progresses. In this process, "responses to the work legitimize particular possibilities of 
understanding imitation, transformation, and continuation 
- 
in short, structures of 
exemplary character that condition the process of the formation of literary tradition. "7 
3 Linge, "Editor's Introduction, " in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), xxiv. 
4 Hans Robert Jauss, Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding, trans. Michael 
Hays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 201. 
5 Jauss, "History of Art and Pragmatic History, " in Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. 
Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 59. 
6 Ibid., 63. 
7 Ibid., 64, emphasis mine; idem, Question and Answer, 201-4. Even the interpretation of the 
most open-structured fictional or lyrical text, which is designed to stimulate the 
imagination of the reader, displays a continuity which shows how new responses to a text 
are related to the reader's expectations. The second Poetic und Hermeutik colloquium 
examined different interpretations of Apollinaire's poem L Arbre,. While they 
recognised the validity of different interpretations of this work by the people who 
attended the colloquium they also realised that these different interpretations did not 
contradict each other. The conclusion they reached was that even with a highly poetic 
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The transmission of a literary tradition cannot be reduced to the sum total of the 
prejudices which a tradition passes on, it requires a receiving consciousness without 
whose participation this process would not take place. This receiving mind is required to 
ask a question of the text so that it may answer. The questions which the reader asks of 
the text are "decided first and foremost by an interest that arises out of the present 
situation, critically opposes it, or maintains it. "8 The fulfilment or disappointment of 
these questions set up the change in horizon for the next reader. Evidence of the change 
that takes place from one horizon to the next is seen in the fact that the understanding of 
the text that satisfied the expectations of one horizon are no longer seen as acceptable in a 
succeeding horizon. "The open, indeterminate structure [of the text] makes a new 
interpretation possible, whereas on the other hand the historical communication of 
question and answer limits the mere arbitrariness of interpretation. "9 In the process of a 
literary tradition, there is a continual testing and evaluating of questions and answers. to 
Continuity and plurality are not opposing poles in Jauss' theory but are related to 
each other. Perhaps the clearest indication of this comes in the way these two elements 
interact with each other in the history of a tradition. The history of art consists of both 
tradition and innovation, archaeology and anticipation, and we need to preserve both 
sides of this coin. Literature which follows the norms of past works is only imitative. 
While works that attempt to express only what is new are merely an expression of 
"dilettantism (or the tedium of science fiction). " i In order to understand the 
phenomena of literature and the history of its reception we need both tradition and 
innovation, continuity and plurality. "In the realm of the arts tradition realizes itself 
neither in epic continuity nor in a creatio perpettua but in a process of mutual production 
and reception, determining and redetermining canons, selecting the old and integrating 
the new. "12 
text the first reading can give a "unifying aesthetical orientation. " Idem, "Limits and 
Tasks of Literary Hermeneutics, " Diogenes, 109 (1980), 118-19. 
$ Ibid., 65. 
9 Idem, Towards, 69. 
10 "In the historical tradition of art, a past work survives not through eternal questions, nor 
through permanent answers, but through the more or less dynamic interrelationship 
between question and answer, between problem and solution, which can stimulate new 
understanding and can allow the resumption of the dialogue between the past and 
present. " Ibid., 70. 
11 Ideen, "Tradition, Innovation and Aesthetic Experience, " Journal ofAesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 46.3 (1988), 376. 
12 Ibid. 
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In this chapter, I intend to consider two aspects of reception theory which 
address the issues of continuity and plurality within a tradition of interpretation. The 
first is Jauss' adoption of Thomas Kuhn's model of paradigm shifts. The second element 
concerns the questions of what constitutes a classic text and what role the classic performs 
within a tradition. These two aspects, paradigms and classic texts, touch on several of the 
most important questions about plurality and continuity within a tradition of 
interpretation in reception theory. 
II. PARADIGM SHIFTS 
Thomas Kuhn's model for the history of science serves two purposes in Jauss' 
hermeneutic. First, Kuhn's work serves as a complement to the concept of punctuated 
evolution which Jauss borrowed from Formalism 
. 
And second, Jauss argues that literary 
studies are in a state of crisis requiring a paradigm shift to resolve this crisis, namely to a 
literary theory which incorporates the history of the text's reception. Thus, Kuhn's 
concept of paradigm shifts serves an apologetic function in Jauss' hermeneutic. In the 
first half of this chapter, I propose to explore the role and implications of paradigm shifts 
within reception theory. The goal of this exploration is hopefully to understand better 
some of the issues surrounding continuity and plurality within the transmission of a 
text's interpretation. 13 As such, Kuhn's concept of `paradigm shifts' provides a useful 
heuristic device which for reception theory. 
The shift from an evolutionary or cumulative models to explain the history and 
development of knowledge to a model which incorporates paradigm shifts and/or 
revolutions in thought is one of the most important conceptual shifts in historical 
methodology in the past fifty years. Until recently, the evolutionary or cumulative model 
was the dominant model used to explain the history and development of knowledge. 
This model viewed the development of knowledge as being a more or less linear 
accumulation of knowledge, discoveries and insights. This was widely accepted either 
implicitly or explicitly in theology as well as the other disciplines. Nicholas Lash 
comments, "Almost all theories of doctrinal development tend to assume that the history 
of Christian doctrine is a more or less unified process of continual, if erratic, growth and 
expansion. "14 
13 Because Thomas Kuhn's works are so well known and influential and because his concepts 
are explicitly appropriated by Jauss, I shall attempt to limit my discussion to Kuhn's 
works. 
14 Nicolas Lash, Change in Focus: A Study of Doctrinal Change and Continuity (London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1973), 145. To cite another example, John Baker speaks of doctrinal 
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With the shift to theories of history which take the situatedness of the historian 
and their subject more into account, questions concerning historical discontinuity have 
come to the foreground. The foregrounding of change and discontinuity in the 
revolutionary or paradigm-shift model enables us to pay greater attention to the historical 
situatedness of the historian, his/her subject, and to examine problems of historical 
discontinuity in thought. However, this in turn raises a whole new set of questions and 
problems. "The immediate difficulty facing someone who decides to write on the 
problem of change and continuity is that there is no aspect of Christian belief, doctrine 
and activity which does not form part of, and is not increasingly felt to form part of, the 
problem. "15 
The text most cited for discrediting the evolutionary model of historical 
knowledge is Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. '6 "This important 
book is a sustained attack on the prevailing image of scientific change as a linear process 
development taking place according to two principles. The first is an organic growth or 
unfolding of what is logically implicit in the origins of the Christian faith accompanied 
by a second principle of rational correction and criticism. "In short, doctrinal 
development may be described as the community working out a fuller understanding of 
its inheritance of faith and submitting this to the test of time, that is, of the life and 
thought of the Christian people in future generations. " John Baker, "Carried about by 
Every Wind?: The Development of Doctrine, " in Believing in the Church: The Corporate 
Nature of Faith, report by The Doctrine Commission of the Church of England 
(London: SPCK, 1981), 265-6. 
15 Lash, vii. 
16 In his obituary in the New York Times, Kuhn's work is described being a "profoundly 
influential landmark of 20-century intellectual history. " Lawrence Van Gelder, "Thomas 
Kuhn, 73; Devised Science of Paradigm, " The New York Times (June 19,1996), B7. The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions was translated into over 16 languages and sold over 1 
million copies. Gary Gutting makes the very bold claim that Kuhn's book "has had a 
wider academic influence than any other single book of the last twenty years. " "Preface" 
in Gary Gutting, ed. Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas 
Kuhns Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), v. It 
is not that the ideas that Kuhn exposed were radically new, for even he admits that the 
idea that the development of knowledge in science "as a succession of tradition-bound 
periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks" was borrowed from other fields. Art, 
literary, and political history have long employed similar concepts to describe their fields. 
Rather it was the way in which he employed these concepts on the history of science, the 
strongest domain for logical, positivistic approaches to the history of the development of 
knowledge, and his liberal use of examples to illustrate his concepts of the relation 
between tradition and innovation which attracted so much attention to his work. This 
is rather ironic since The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published as part of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, "the summa of logical positivism, the 
movement that viewed the nature of science as the most strictly synonymous with its 
logic. " David Hollinger, "T. S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and its Implications for 
History, " in Paradigms and Revolutions 214,195-9. While others such as Karl Popper 
also denied the view that science progressed by a steady accumulation of knowledge it is 
Kuhn's work which appears to be cited more widely in regard to this area. Karl R. 
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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of ever-increasing knowledge, and an attempt to make us see that process of change in a 
different and, Kuhn suggests, more enlightening way. "17 While Kuhn accepted that the 
cumulative model could explain the growth of knowledge during certain periods of 
history, it was not appropriate for explaining long term development of knowledge, 
changes in theories, or shifts in research paradigms. 18 
While Kuhn attempted to distance his concepts for the history of science from 
the humanities, his-work is important for two reasons. First, similar twists, turns, and 
changes in the direction of research and the world view of the community occur in 
biblical studies as well. However, Kuhn is right in arguing that these shifts are not as 
clearly defined as they are in the sciences. Second, if the paradigms are as significant for 
the sciences as Kuhn argues, then the questions he raises present an exaggerated form of 
what we could expect to see in the humanities. Thus, if the problems that arise in 
relation to paradigm shifts in the sciences can be resolved, we are in a stronger position to 
claim that they can be resolved in biblical studies as well. 
A. Incommensurability and Discontinuity in Paradigm Shifts 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has generated a great deal of discussion and 
debate over the manner in which knowledge is accumulated and passed down within a 
tradition of inquiry. Some, such as Richard Rorty and Israel Scheffler read Kuhn as 
supporting the view that the shift from an old paradigm to a new one preserves very little 
if any continuity between the two paradigms. Communication between researchers 
operating in the two different paradigms is incommensurable and for a researcher to 
switch paradigms amounts to an irrational act of conversion. 19 Others, including Kuhn 
himself, claim that Kuhn's earlier work suffered from rhetorical exaggeration which 
Kuhn softened and corrected in his later works. According to this view, Kuhn's use of 
incommensurability involves a matter of degree, it is not total incommensurability. 20 In 
17 Dudley Shapere, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 27. 
18 Kuhn defines normal science in the following manner, "In this essay, `normal science' means 
research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that 
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice. " Kuhn, Scientific Revolution., 10. 
19 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989); Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); also 
Ian Barbour, "Paradigms in Science and Religion, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 223- 
45. 
20 Mark Blaug, "Kuhn versus Lakatos, or Paradigms versus research Programmes in the History 
of Economics" in Paradigms and Revolutions, 141-2; Gerald Doppelt, "Kuhn's 
Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense, " Inquiry, 21 (1978), 34-6. 
Kuhn's corrections of his earlier views can be seen in the revisions which he made to the 
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order for paradigm s to serve a legitimate function in reception theory then we must 
resolve the question of whether Kuhn's view supports a strong or weak view of 
incommensurability. 
Kuhn's view of the history of science is based on two concepts: normal science 
and paradigm shifts or revolutions. During periods of normal science, research takes 
place within a paradigm which is shared by the members of a research community or 
scientific field. 21 A paradigm provides a communally shared body of "intertwined 
theoretical and methodological belief' which allows for selection and evaluation in 
scientific research. 22 If paradigms are primarily understood in terms of the theories, it is 
hard to explain, the dominance of a paradigm on a research community. Paradigms 
represent much more than theories, they also include the constellation of a group's 
commitments and beliefs according to Kuhn. This involves symbolic generalisations 
which are employed by the group (such as f= ma), models which are appealed to provide 
metaphors and analogies for explanations, and exemplars of concrete problems and 
solutions which are often used to teach students. 23 The role of shared examples cannot 
be understated for they often provide the context in which researchers learn the rules of 
their discipline and how to apply them. 24 
1962 edition of The Structure of Scientif c Revolutions the "Postscript" he included in the 
second edition, and his essays in The Essential Tension. In this respect, it is worth noting 
that Richard Rorty seems to cite primarily from the 1962 edition of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions and does not engage with Kuhn's second edition or his later works. 
21 One of the sources for conceptual confusion and misunderstanding in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions is the wide manner of ways in which he used the term "paradigm. " 
In the "Postscript" Kuhn attempted to address the potential for misunderstanding in his 
use of this term. He claims that he primarily uses the term "paradigm" in two ways. 
"On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and 
so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort 
of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining 
puzzles of normal science. " The first use is sociological understanding of the term 
"paradigm, " the second is to understand it in terms of exemplary past achievements 
which govern present research. Kuhn,. Scientific Revolutions, 175; idem "Second 
Thoughts on Paradigms, " in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Tradition and 
Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977), 294. Margret Masterman lists twenty- 
one different ways in which Kuhn uses this term in his book. "The Nature of a 
Paradigm, " in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 59-89. Shapere argues that Kuhn's lack of clarification and qualification of 
`paradigm' results in a theory that is too vague and ambiguous to be useful. Shapere, 
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, " 38. 
22 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 10-17. 
23 Alan E. Musgrave, "Kuhn's Second Thoughts, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 39. 
24 Exemplars provide ways of seeing problems and solutions which form the basis for `tacit 
knowledge' which does not follow rules or techniques. Rather it is an educational 
process by which the members of a research community learn to see things in a certain 
way `naturally. ' This is very close to Gadamer and Maclntyre's conception of phronesis. 
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At the same time, a paradigm restricts the questions that can be asked and the 
range of solutions or results to research problems that the community will accept. 25 This 
is an essential dimension to any form of knowledge, "in order for us to perceive or talk or 
communicate, we have to ignore. In order for us to understand anything, we have to fail 
to perceive a great deal that is there. Knowledge is always purchased at the expense of 
what might have been seen and learned but was not. "26 The range and scope of the 
questions which can be asked within a paradigm will "always be very small compared 
with the range that imagination can conceive. "27 
It is at this point that parallel ideas in Heidegger's conception of 
preunderstanding can help us to explicate some aspects of Kuhn's notion of paradigms. 
Heidegger uses three terms to explain how preunderstanding operates. Vorhabe is what 
we possess in advance, the network of our cultural background which makes us who we 
are and is translated as fore-having. Vorsicht is something we see in advance, our 
conceptual vocabulary and schemes, or fore-sight. And Vorgrif is something we grasp in 
advance or the fore-conception of the object. Heidegger's "point is that even before I 
begin consciously to interpret a text or grasp the meaning of an object, I have already 
placed it within a certain context (Vorhabe), approached it from a certain perspective 
(Vorsicht) and conceived of it in a certain way (Vorgrif ).... The meaning of any object, 
then, is co-determined by one's own circumstances or `life-relations' (Dilthey) and 
expectations. "28 These fore-structures or fore-projections are absolutely necessary for our 
being able to understand anything. This takes place by the way in which they enable us 
to place the text, event, person, or thing within a familiar context. Even the `pure' 
science of mathematics is grounded in the fore-structure of preunderstanding. 
What is decisive for its development does not lie in its rather high esteem for the 
observation of `facts', nor in its `application' of mathematics in determining the 
character of the natural processes; it lies rather in the way in which Nature herself 
"One of the fundamental techniques by which the members of a group 
... 
learn to see 
the same things when confronted with the same stimuli is by being shown examples of 
situations that their predecessors in the group have already learned to see as like each 
other and as different from other sorts of situations. " Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 193-4; 
4348,181-91. 
25 "Paradigm procedures and applications are as necessary to science as paradigm laws and 
theories, and they have the same effects. Inevitably they restrict the phenomenological 
field accessible for scientific investigation at any given time. " Kuhn, 60. 
26 Robert Oppenheimer, "Tradition and Discovery, " American Council of Learned Societies 
(Rochester, NY: American Council of Learned Societies, 1959), 15. 
27 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 35. 
28 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1987), 77. 
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is mathematically projected In this projection something constantly present-at- 
hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one 
may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are 
quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time). Only `in the 
light' of a Nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like a 
`fact' be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited in terms of 
this projection. 29 
Kuhn's concept of paradigms is related to all three aspects of preunderstanding. 30 
The way in which we look at science is determined by our world 
- 
what we count as 
science. Vorhabe corresponds to Kuhn's sociological use of the term paradigm, the 
disciplinary matrix-skill and tacit knowledge which a scientist or interpreter acquires in 
order to enable them to perform their research. Vorsicht parallels Kuhn's use of 
exemplars and past achievements to define what counts as a problem and a solution and 
in particular how they `project' their research. And Heidegger's concept of Vorgriff, 
corresponds to the anticipations, hypotheses and theories which can be confirmed 31 
'The activity of forming and confirming interpretations makes use of assumptions and a 
"background of practices (Vorhabe) which need not - and indeed cannot - be included 
as specific presuppositions of the theory, yet already define what could count as 
confirmation. "32 
Those who see Kuhn's text presenting a strong case for the incommensurability 
between paradigms and as an argument for the relativity between paradigms claim that 
there is no data in itself, since all data is theory laden. "In verifying a theory we move in a 
circle from hypothesis to data, and data to hypothesis, without ever encountering any 
bare facts which could call our whole theory into question. "33 In literary theory, Stanley 
Fish is perhaps one of the better known exponents of this view. According to him, there 
are no determinate components in literary theory, every component is the product of 
interpretation, nothing is independent for the interpretive process. Thus, there can be. no 
"given' [in reference to the text] if by given one means what is there before 
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, 413-14. 
30 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 10,41-42; Shapere, "Scientific Revolutions, " 29. This reading 
of Kuhn can also be backed up by noticing the similarities between his thought and 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Anthony C. Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth and 
Corporate Memory, " in Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith, A Report 
by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1981), 58. 
31 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics, " (Review ofMetaphysics 34 1980), 8-10. 
32 Ibid., 10. "But the important point for the natural sciences is that natural science is successful 
precisely to the extent that these background practices which make science possible can be 
taken for granted and ignored by the science. " Ibid., 16. 
33 Ibid., 4,11. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Barbour, "Paradigms in Science and 
Religion, " 223-45; Schefer, Science and Subjectivity, 84. 
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interpretation begins. "34 If Fish, Rorty, Feyerabend and others are right in pressing 
Kuhn for incommensurability and relativism, then all we are left with is a plurality of 
interpretative communities or strategies. 35 As a result, communication between 
paradigms is achieved only through the rhetoric of persuasion, not through rational 
argumentation. However, if Kuhn's views are not this strong, then we can learn from 
other views, there is the possibility for continuity in the midst of diversity, and progress 
in what we learn from the past. 
The manner in which anomalies function in paradigm shifts demonstrates that 
Kuhn does not support a strong form of relativism and incommensurability. For 
Heidegger, when something violates our preunderstanding, an anomaly, it opens the 
possibility for a new disclosure of understanding for that object 36 This same idea is 
picked up by Kuhn, but employed at the level of a system or paradigm. 37 The 
domination of a paradigm is weakened or questioned only when a paradigm enters into a 
period of epistemological crisis. This occurs when a persistent anomaly becomes 
generally recognised and is given more attention because it is seen to be in explicit 
conflict with some core beliefs of the scientific community. During this phase, the 
solutions proposed for the anomaly will move from those which are closely aligned with 
the presuppositions of the research community to those which diverge from, or even 
challenge, the accepted conceptual scheme. In this process, the rules for normal science 
begin to get blurred. Copernicus provided a good illustration of this when he 
complained about the blurring of rules which resulted in astronomers being so 
"inconsistent in these [astronomical] investigations 
... 
that they cannot even explain or 
observe the constant length of the seasonal year. "38 
34 Stanley Fish, "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser, " Diacritics 11 (March, 1981), 7-8. 
35 Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London and N. Y.: Verso, 1987), 34,69; Wolfgang 
Stegmuller, "Accidental Theory of Change, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 86-7. 
36 Because we exist with others we share conventions and norms about the appropriate use of 
hammers and which hammers are appropriate for which uses. The way in which we 
understand a hammer as a hammer and its significance is "inconspicuous" to us because 
it lies hidden in our Vorhabe, Vorsich* and Vorgrif. It is only when the contextual 
relationship of these conventional norms are disrupted that our understanding of 
something, such as the hammer, becomes explicit. It is when the hammer is missing, or 
broken, that we realise what the hammer was "ready-to-hand wit4 and what it was 
ready-to-hand for. " Heidegger, Being and Time, 105; 195,199-200,411-412. 
37 The result of trying to resolve the questions which an anomaly raises is that "it 
conceptualizes its phenomena in ways that automatically bring new and previously 
unnoticed (or uninteresting) dimensions of these phenomena into the center of scientific 
attention and inquiry. " Doppelt, 45-6. 
38 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1957), 138. 
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There are three ways to resolve such a crisis in Kuhn's opinion. In some 
instances, the paradigm may eventually be able to provide a solution. The anomaly may 
be labelled as unsolvable and set aside with the hope that later developments may provide 
a solution to it. Or in the final instance, a new paradigm which proposes a solution may 
emerge from the crisis. 39 In any case a paradigm is not rejected just because it has 
bumped into nature in some way that challenges its views. The rejection of a theory 
always involves more than just comparison of a theory with nature. A paradigm is only 
rejected when there is a rival to take its place. 40 When adjudicating between competing 
theories, scientists place the highest value on the ability to raise and solve puzzles. In this 
way, Newton's mechanics surpassed Aristotle's, and Einstein's improved upon Newton's 
"as instruments of puzzle-solving. "41 This seems to imply that in Kuhn's system there 
are theory independent values and standards by which to judge the progress of a new 
theory over an older one. "The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously 
the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the 
comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other. "42 "Thus Kuhn is far 
from relativism. "43 
If this reading of Kuhn in terms of Heidegger's concepts of Vorhabe, Vorsicht, 
and Vorgriff is correct, it explains why Kuhn's work is read by some as an argument for 
incommensurability and not by others, depending on which level the interpreter sees 
paradigms operating. It also allows us to try and remain faithful to Kuhn's claims to 
incommensurability, but understanding it as a weak form of incommensurability. While 
Kuhn is denying that long-term progress in science proceeds by a steady linear 
39 Idem, Scientific Revolutions, 84. 
40 Kuhn, "The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research, " in The 
Essential Tension, 234. Kuhn is not arguing that the sudden emergence or recognition of 
an anomaly invalidates a paradigm. While Kuhn is in fundamental agreement with 
much of Popper's work, he disagrees with Popper's criteria of "falsification by direct 
comparison with nature. " Kuhn claims that it is possible for anomalies to exist for some 
time without challenging a paradigm's theories because they could be considered either 
solved by ad hoc hypotheses or they could be considered irrelevant. Idem, Scientific 
Revolutions, 67-78,77. Kuhn criticised Popper for overlooking periods of normal science 
and focusing on paradigm shifts and also for applying the standards of evaluation found 
in logic to science and as a result ignoring the social dimension to science. Idem, "Logic 
of Discovery or Psychology of Research, " in Essential Tension, 266-92. To be fair, Kuhn 
overlooked what Popper terms the "principle of tenacity, " or the way in which scientists 
protect a theory with ad hoc secondary hypotheses. Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, 50,82-3; Blaug, "Kuhn versus Lakatos, " 139. 
41 Ibid., 205-6. 
42 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 77, emphasis mine. To reject a paradigm while not embracing a 
competing one is tantamount to rejecting science itself in Kuhn's view. Ibid., 79. 
43 Musgrave, "Kuhn's Second Thoughts, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 48. 
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accumulation of facts and revision of theories, he is not advocating the position that 
opponents like Scheffler attribute to him, that the acceptance or switching of paradigms 
is an irrational process. "In fact, however, Kuhn is trying to express a third alternative: 
an account of scientific authority in terms of the informed judgment of the community of 
trained scientists. "44 
The two movements of normal science and paradigm shifts which Kuhn employs 
to characterise science produce what he calls an `essential tension' in the researcher. 
Normal science is characterised by what he calls "convergent" thinking, while periods of 
paradigm shifts are characterised by "divergent" thinking. Paul Ricteur uses the terms 
"sedimentation" and "innovation" to describe these two poles which constitute a 
tradition. 45 The ability to support a tension between these two forms of thought is a 
"prime requisite" for scientific research. "Very often the successful scientist must 
simultaneously display the characteristics of the traditionalist and of the iconoclast. "46 
Or to use our terms, during periods of normal science we would expect to see continuity 
in a discipline's research and paradigm shifts would produce a plurality of results and 
methods until a new paradigm was accepted which would be discontinuous from the 
previous paradigm to varying degrees. However, this does not mean that iconoclastic 
research or interpretations are supported during periods of paradigm shifts, and definitely 
not during periods of normal research. During periods of normal research, there will be 
large number of areas of possible research for which the paradigm will not be asking 
questions. To wander off and research them from an open-minded perspective would be 
counter-productive and, in Kuhn's opinion, would be a move back to a pre-consensus 
stage of research. At the same time, during periods of crisis and paradigm shifts, the new 
theories or novel discoveries which emerge always do so from the context of old theories 
and beliefs which determine what "the world does and does not contain. "47 Kuhn's 
theory presents a model by which we can see a balance and role for both plurality and 
continuity, tradition and innovation. "I hope to have made meaningful the view that the 
productive scientist must be a traditionalist who enjoys playing intricate games by 
preestablished rules in order to be a successful innovator who discovers new rules and 
new pieces with which to play them. "48 
44 Gutting, "Introduction" in Paradigms and Revolutions 8. 
45 Paul Ricaur, "The Text as Dynamic Identity, " in Mario J. Valdes and Owen Miller, eds., 
Identity of the Literary Text(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 181-2. 
46 Kuhn, The Essential Tension, " 227. 
47 Ibid., 232-37, especially 234. 
48 Ibid., 237. 
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B. Paradigms in Reception Theory 
1. Literary History and Paradigms 
Jauss employs Kuhn's concept of paradigm shifts to outline the modern history of 
literature under the rubric of four paradigm shifts. The first paradigm, the classical- 
humanist, developed during the Renaissance. This paradigm formulated rules and 
guidelines from classical texts which served as norms to evaluate other works of literature. 
During this period, history as a modern discipline was developing. Initially, history was 
seen as a method which could help raise the standards of appreciation but it also 
introduced ideas on the historicity of the author and the text. The classical-humanist 
paradigm collapsed when classical literature was no longer seen to be unique or 
incomparable, embodying atemporal norms by which to judge other works. This 
situation arose because historical studies had shown how these works were products of 
their own time. This brought about the shift to the historical-positivist paradigm which 
dominated literary studies in the 19th century. During this period, philological and 
source studies, critical editions, and the reconstruction of the pre-history of the text took 
centre stage. To give their research a sense of direction, they often made use of national 
ideology. The highest aspirations of a nation were embodied in its classical works which 
brought to speech what was latent in the nation's culture and history. During the first 
half of the twentieth century (1900 to the 1950's), the aesthetic-formalist paradigm rose, 
in large part, as a reaction against the historical-positivist paradigm because its attempt to 
explain literature solely on the basis of historical conditions was no longer seen as 
adequate. Russian Formalism, New Criticism. in America, and the work of Oscar 
Walzels in Germany are all examples of this paradigm shift. One of the dominant traits 
of the third paradigm was the elevating of the literary work to an autonomous, 
independent object of research. 49 
Jauss believes that we are in the midst of a fourth paradigm shift. During the 
1960's, the inadequacies of the different methods which attempted to reconstruct the 
past or to approach the text in-itself resulted in the suppression of the question 
49 Jauss, "Paradigmawechsel in der Literaturwissenschaft" Linguistische Berichte 3 (1969), 47-51; 
idem, "The Literary Process of Modernism from Rousseau to Adorno, " Cultural 
Critique, Lisa C. Roetzel trans. (Winter, 1988-89), 27-32,54-57; Rien T. Segers, 
"Readers, Text and Author. Some Implications of Rezeptionsidsthetik, " Yearbook of 
Comparative and General Literature 24 (1975), 16; Holub 1-3. Eagleton follows almost 
the same taxonomy as Jauss for these paradigm shifts. Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: 
An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 74. 
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concerning application, which was "the real content of the turn toward aesthetics of 
reception which occurs in the mid-sixties and which evidently, was successful. "50 The 
renewed interest in hermeneutics, the rise of alternative methods, and problems 
concerning the teaching and content of the literary canon in a society permeated by mass 
media are all evidence for the need of a new paradigm. While the shape of the new 
paradigm has not been fixed yet, it must integrate the three movements of 
understanding, interpretation, and application if it is to succeed. Thus, Jauss' adoption 
of Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts in his literary theory also serves the apologetical 
function for the relevance of his ideas. 51 
2. Parables and Paradigms 
As I mentioned in the "Introduction, " the need for a new paradigm which 
includes the effective history of the Bible is also felt by some in biblical studies. Whereas 
Jauss organises the history of literary theory under four paradigms, the same type of 
generalisation cannot be made in biblical studies. Instead one must speak of paradigm 
shifts in very localised terms. Even within New Testament studies different shifts have 
occurred at different times. The study of parables is a good illustration of this. If the 
shift to the historical quest for Jesus took place between 1774, with Lessing's anonymous 
publication of Reimarus' Fragments, to Strauss' Life ofJesus in 1835, then we can see how 
the application of the historical-critical method to the parables lagged behind the study 
of other aspects Jesus' life. It was not until 1886, when Adolf Jülicher published Die 
Gleichnisreden Jesu, that parable studies shifted from the age old allegorical approach to a 
non-allegorical, historical paradigm. 52 "So thoroughly did Jülicher do his work that for a 
time it almost seemed that as if he had spoken the last word on the parables. "53 This is 
perhaps the most significant paradigm shift in the history of parable studies54 
50 Segers, "An Interview with Hans Robert Jauss, " 84. 
51 Holub, 12,154. Others are sympathetic to Jauss' call for a new paradigm in literary studies. 
Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Whirl without End: Audience-Oriented Criticism, " in 
Contemporary Literary Theory, cd. G. Douglas Atkins and Laura Morrow (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 81-95, especially 82 
52 While A. B. Bruce's work preceded Jalicher's, it was not widely received and therefore did 
not serve as the stimulus for the paradigm shift as Jiilicher's did. See my discussion of 
this point in the discussion of Jauss' third thesis in chapter 3. Alexander B. Bruce, The 
Parabolic Teaching of Christ: A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of Our Lord 
3rd revised ed. (N. Y.: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1908). 
53 A. M. Hunter, Interpreting the Parables (London: SCM Press, 1960), 38; Adolf Julicher, Die 
Gleichnissreden Jesu (Freiburg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1886). 
54 James C. Little, "Parable Research in the Twentieth Century I. The Predecessors of J. 
Jeremias, " Expository Times, 87 (1976), 356-7. "It was, however, Adolf Jülicher who 
imparted a definitively new direction in their study... " Geraint Vaughan Jones, The Art 
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The second paradigm shift followed and was based on Bultmann's form-critical 
approach. 55 C. H. Dodd tried to show that we must examine the parables in relation to 
how Jesus understood his ministry and the Old Testament motifs which Jesus employed 
in the parables. 56 Dodd and Jeremias' work was based on a form-critical analysis of the 
parables. Using this approach they differentiated the different Sitz im Leben in which the 
parable operated. Jeremias' contribution came from the manner in which he attempted 
to find the earliest form and context of each parable by examining ten different means by 
which the parables were transmitted in the primitive church. When the parables were 
recontextualised to these different Sitz im Leben they were seen to generate new and 
different meanings. 57 Both Jeremias' and Dodd's work represents one of the definitive 
turning points in the study of the parables. "There can be no going back from this work 
of Jeremias. It is perhaps the greatest single contribution to the historical understanding 
of the parables. "58 
What separates the present paradigm from the second paradigm involves the 
manner in which one understands the message of the parable. For both Dodd and 
Jeremias understanding is primarily a reflective, conscious operation on the part of the 
interpreter. With the shift to the present paradigm, the reader's understanding is 
transformed at a deeper or pre-reflective level. This is partially based on concepts such as 
Heidegger's idea that a parable `projects a world' or Riceeur's work on how symbols and 
parables `give rise to thought-159 The shift to this paradigm was instigated by the New 
Hermeneutic's view that understanding was an existential event or process. Ernst Fuchs 
and Truth of the Parables: A Study in Their Literary Form and Moder Interpretation 
(London: SPCK, 1964), 3. Jones organises the history of parable interpretation 
according to pre- and post-Jülicher. Ibid., 3-40. 
55 For a discussion of Bultmann's contribution in this area see: Jones, The Art and Truth, 42- 
51. 
56 Cadoux's work, while it preceded and prepared the way for Dodd and Jeremias, was not as 
influential as their work. James C. Little, "Parable Research in the Twentieth Century I. 
The Predecessors of J. Jeremias, " Expository Times, 87 (1976), 360. 
57 According to Dodd, Jesus uttered the parables in the midst of a period of intense 
eschatological crisis. By the time the gospels were written the church had experienced a 
prolonged period of growth and the eschatological crisis was now understood to be 
distant future event. This led to the church reinterpreting Jesus' parables in light of their 
situation. C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (London: Nisbet and Co., 1935), 
34-5,102-5. These multiple meanings are not the result of a theory of meaning but 
arise from a theory of multiple settings. 
58 Norman Perrin, "The Parables of Jesus, as Metaphors, and as Aesthetic Objects: A Review 
Article, " Journal of Religion, 47 (1967), 340. However, Hunter thinks that all Jeremias 
did was "to dot the i's and stroke the is of Dodd's exposition. " Hunter, 39. 
59 Thiselton, "Reader Response Hermeneutics, " in The Responsibility of Hermeneutics (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 98-102. 
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claims that the parables are language-events in which Jesus communicated his self- 
understanding of the world and his relationship to God. The parables, as language- 
events, offer the possibility for the reader to share in this understanding. The readers are 
not observers who reflect on the parable but are active participants in the parable and 
find themselves being questioned in it. 60 Eta Linnemann is another example of the 
existential approach in this paradigm. The role of the parable is to get the hearer to make 
a decision which is in line with Jesus' view of the world, this brings the hearer into a new 
understanding of their situation. In order for the reader to make this decision, she must 
understand the ideas and images in the parable so that she can make a correspondence 
between the narrated world projected in the parable, Jesus historical situation, and her 
historical situation. 61 The stronger the opposition between the hearer and the narrator, 
or the narrated story world in the parable, the more significant will be the hearer's 
decision. 
As this paradigm progressed, the manner by which the reader experienced the 
parable shifted from existential theories of language to literary theories of reading. 
Parables were now seen as aesthetic objects which possess an existential-theological 
dimension. 62 Geraint V. Jones, Dan Otto Via, and John Dominic Crossan are some of 
the more prominent members of this paradigm 63 This fourth paradigm was more 
heavily influenced by literary theories, in particular reader-response theories, than by 
other fields of thought in biblical studies. As such, it represents a unique turn or 
paradigm shift in relation to the rest of New Testament or biblical studies. The primary 
point that I want to bring out in this discussion is that when we speak of paradigm shifts 
in biblical interpretation, we must qualify that by specifying which particular aspect or 
area of biblical interpretation to which we are referring. 
60 Idem, "The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs' Hermeneutics in the 
Light of Linguistic Philosophy, " Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (1970), 440-2; 
Kissinger, Parables, 182-4. 
61 Eta Linnemann, Parables ofJesus. Introduction and Exposition, trans. John Sturdy (London: 
SPCK, 1966), 18-23. 
62 Dan Otto Via Jr., The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1967), 70-1. 
63 This paradigm overlaps with many of the concerns of the existential paradigm, especially in 
the work of Via and Crossan. However, their approach is marked by a distinctive turn 
to literary and hermeneutical theories. Jones, The Art and Truth John Dominic 
Crossan, In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1973); 
idem, "Parables as Religious and Poetic Experience, " Journal of Religion, 53 (1973); 
idem, The Dark Interval Towards a Theology of Story (Allen, TX: Argus 
Communications, 1975); Via, Parables Thiselton, "Reader-Response Hermeneutics, " 
101-6. 
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C. Paradigms and the Logic of Question and Answer 
While Kuhn's concept of paradigm shifts serve a fruitful function in Jauss' 
thought, Jauss does not appropriate them with modifying Kuhn's ideas. An important 
modification Jauss makes in Kuhn's theory concerns what raises a paradigm shift in 
literary theory. According to Kuhn, a research community is open to change when an 
anomaly persists and penetrates deeply into its research paradigm. 64 Jauss asks what 
makes an anomaly become more significant at a certain time if it is there all along? For 
example, what led to the scientific breakthrough in the double helix structure of DNA? 
This did not take place because of X-ray photography but it came about by asking the 
question, "what atoms like to lie next to each other? " Because Kuhn overlooked the logic 
of question and answer he missed the continuity this can bring to paradigm shifts. 65 
The criteria by which a new paradigm is judged to be successful and the degree to 
which it replaces the old paradigm is based on its ability to answer questions which the 
old paradigm could not. A new paradigm "can only be accepted and developed in 
significance to the degree that it is able to solve, or promise to solve, a problem that is 
acutely felt in, or first intrudes on, the synchronic system of canonized questions and 
answers of a given life-world. "66 Questions from previous paradigms' are part of the new 
paradigm's content and the new paradigm must show how it answers those questions. 
To do this it must "occupy all the positions, and all the `empty spaces' in the former 
model. "67 In this way Jauss synthesises Collingwood's logic of question and answer with 
the concept of paradigm shifts. "The paradigm of a history of problems replaces the old 
history of events, and, at the same time, deessentializes the so-called history of reception, 
making it possible to reconstruct the historical processes involved in terms of the relation 
between question and answer. "68 
This is one of the crucial areas in which Maclntyre's and Jauss' theories overlap 
and one in which Maclntyre is able to offer a more constructive and useful model for 
64 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 67; 52-76. 
65 Jauss, Question and Answer, 69-70. Jauss does not take this example from Kuhn's work but 
from James D. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the 
Structure of DNA, Gunther Stent ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 34. 
66 Idem, Question and Answer, 70. 
67 Ibid. The challenge of mass-media is an example of a question which Jauss feels needs to be 
addressed in order for a new paradigm to be successful. The influence of mass media 
which has not been addressed in previous paradigms but because of its pervasiveness in 
contemporary society it must be included in any new literary theories. Idem, 
"Paradigmawechsel, " 55. 
68 Idem, Question and Answer, 70. 
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reception theory than Kuhn. Like Jauss, Maclntyre emphasises continuity between 
paradigm shifts in a tradition, not everything is thrown into question at one time. 
Maclntyre also develops the role of question and answer within paradigm shifts. This is 
seen in his concept that what helps to define a particular tradition is its `core 
problematic. ' When a tradition is no longer able to address the questions in its core 
problematic in a manner that satisfies its members that tradition is said to enter into an 
epistemological crisis. 
Each tradition, to some significant degree, stands or falls as a mode of enquiry 
and has within itself at each stage a more or less well-defined problematic, that set 
of issues, difficulties, and problems which have emerged from its previous 
achievements in enquiry. Characteristically, therefore, such traditions possess 
measures to evaluate their own progress or lack of it, even if such measures 
necessarily are framed in terms of and presuppose the truth of those central theses 
to which the tradition gives it allegiance. 69 
This is one area in which we see a difference between paradigm shifts as Kuhn 
envisioned them taking place in the natural sciences and how they occur in literary 
studies according to Jauss. The impulse for literary paradigm shifts is found in the demand 
that faces every paradigm of literary studies, the challenge of snatching a work out of the past 
through new interpretations and translating them into the present which makes the text's 
experience available again. A literary paradigm falls into crisis when it is no longer able to 
engage texts in a manner that allows them to speak to the present through new 
interpretations or translations. "Or to say it another way, each generation places new 
questions to the work of art from the past which is made to speak and to give us answers 
again. "70 Paradigms do not shift in literary studies because of anomalies since there is no 
comparable field of empirical observations like there are in the natural sciences, as Kuhn 
argued. Rather, these shifts take place because the previous paradigm had Fallen into 
crisis because it could not bring the text to speech again in that horizon. The ability for 
any literary or biblical hermeneutical theory to rescue a text from the past and enable it 
to address the contemporary reader is an essential element of what Maclntyre would 
define as part of the core problematic for any hermeneutical theory. 
I will briefly mention three areas in which Maclntyre's work complements and 
advances Jauss' ideas. First, Maclnryre's use of epistemological crisis allows one to 
determine if a tradition is progressing, is static, or is deteriorating. This is seen in the 
69 Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 
1985), 166. 
70 Jauss, "Paradigmawechsel, " 55. 
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success or failure a tradition has in overcoming an epistemological crisis. This would 
provide a meta-critical standard for evaluating the proposals of various different, and 
often competing, literary theories in their attempts to resolve the current crisis in literary 
studies. Second, a successful resolution to an epistemological crisis will result in a new 
paradigm which will not only answer the question they were confronted with, but it 
should also be able to explain why the old paradigm could not solve it. It will possess 
retrospective justification by providing an answer which the previous paradigm could not 
provide. Third, truth is defined as unsurpassability. Or to put it negatively, members at 
one stage in a tradition are able to look back on their predecessor's rational inadequacies 
and claim that these inadequacies or incoherencies "will never appear in any possible 
future situation, no matter how searching the enquiry, no matter how much evidence is 
provided, no matter what developments in rational enquiry may occur. "71 
There is one final area in which MacIntyre's work can serve as a correction or 
expansion of Jauss' theory. This concerns Jauss' appropriation of Kuhn's theory as a 
whole. Kuhn does not see his theory of paradigm shifts applying to disciplines other 
than science. There are several reasons for this. These involve how Kuhn defines the 
concept of `progress' in research (which he limits to the natural sciences), the concern 
that other disciplines have with wider the lay audiences' reception of their work, the 
isolation of the scientific community from society, and the manner in which textbooks 
portray the history of science and the role they play in the education (or indoctrination) 
or the student into the scientific community. In contrast to the sciences, Kuhn sees even 
the "most abstract of theologians" as far more concerned with a wider audience than the 
theological guild, actively involved in social issues, and exposed to the history of different 
problems and solutions which theologians have wrestled with as part of his/her 
education. 72 Since Maclntyrc addresses paradigm shifts and epistemological questions 
specifically within the humanities (philosophy and ethics) his approach is to be more 
amenable to Jauss' literary hermeneutic than Kuhn's work. 
71 MacIntyre, 358. "At this point we can see the wisdom of Maclntyre's definition of truth. 
The criterion (unsurpassed so far) provides the best possible evidence for truth (will 
remain unsurpassed), and, furthermore, the criterion has a reasonable (conceptual) 
connection with the meaning of truth. The criterion falls short of a necessary and 
sufficient condition for truth-truth claims are fallible, as are all other claims. " Nancey 
Murphy, unpublished manuscript, "Philosophical Resources for Postmodern Evangelical 
Theology, " 25. 
72 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 160-8. 
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D. Paradigms and Semiotic Shifts 
If normal science represents a cumulative growth in knowledge, paradigm shifts, 
in large part, do not. In the change from one paradigm to the next, not only are theories 
replaced but so are the shared rules and standards of research. At an even more 
fundamental level, these changes involve semiotic transformations in the use and 
definition of concepts. This is why Copernicus was ridiculed when he claimed the earth 
moved. 
Part of what they [Copernicus' Ptolemaic critics] meant by `earth' was fixed 
position. Their earth, at least, could not be moved. Correspondingly, 
Copernicus' innovation was not simply to move the earth. Rather, it was a whole 
new way of regarding the problems of physics and astronomy, once that 
necessarily changed the meaning of both `earth' and `motion. ' Without those 
changes the concept of a moving earth was mad. 73 
Copernicus did not simply say the earth moved, but introduced a whole new set of 
problems in physics which required new meanings for `earth' and `motion'. Since new 
paradigms arise from old ones and make use of the previous paradigm's vocabulary, the 
semiotic shifts in one area require other terms and concepts to fall into new relationships 
with each other, a ripple effect of semiotic transformations depending on how closely 
they are related to the primary terms which are transformed. 74 It is on the basis of this 
that Kuhn makes one of his most famous statements, "when paradigms change, the 
73 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 149-50; idem, The Copernican Revolution, 
chapters 3-7. The Ptolemaic theory had as part of their language an `earth' which could 
not be moved, it was a fixed position. Doppelt, 46; Thiselton, Two Horizon., 405. 
Another excellent illustration which Kuhn provides is how when Aristotle and Galileo 
looked at a heavy body swinging back and forth on a string they saw different things. 
Aristotle taught that a body will move from a higher position to a lower position of 
natural rest by its very own nature. Therefore, "the swinging body was simply falling 
with difficulty, " reaching its lower position of rest through the long process of oscillatory 
motions. By contrast Galileo saw new relationships between weight, height and velocity. 
This was made possible by the "late medieval paradigm" theory of impetus in which 
Galileo was trained. "When Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first 
saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum. " Idem, Scientific Revolutions 121. 
74 Ibid., 149. As a result the term 'planet' had to be redefined "so that it could continue to 
make useful distinctions in a world where all celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen 
differently from the way they had been seen before. " Ibid., 128-9. Doppelt points out 
that many of those who claim that paradigms are incommensurable confuse the manner 
in which sense and reference function. They argue that in the shift from Ptolemaic to 
Copernican cosmology the reference of the term `planet' changed, not its sense which 
remained stable. In contrast, Kuhn is claiming that even though the connotation of the 
concept changed there is still a stability of reference which allows for commensurability. 
This is partly based on the. manner in which rival paradigms share `their everyday and 
most of their scientific world and language. " Competing paradigms are not isolated 
floating islands imprisoned by their own languages. Doppelt, 37-8; Kuhn, Scientific 
Revolutions, 201. See Gadamer's discussion of the relationship between language and 
world in: Truth and Methood, 383-491, esp. 447. 
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world itself changes with them. "75 The changes in definitions and concepts from the 
older paradigm to the new one transforms the "reactions, expectations, and beliefs" of 
those who share that paradigm. "The scientist who embraces a new paradigm is like a 
man wearing inverting lenses. Confronting the same constellation of objects as before 
and knowing that he does so, he nevertheless finds them transformed through and 
through in many of their details. "76 
While he does not cite Wittgenstein directly at this point, Kuhn does make use of 
Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit illustration. 77 "What were ducks in the scientist's world 
before the revolution are rabbits afterwards. "78 As we saw above, at the level of Vorsicht, 
the paradigm which a person accepts shapes their beliefs and expectations, or whether 
they see a duck or rabbit when looking at the line drawing. "What a man sees depends 
both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience 
has taught him to see. "79 Wittgenstein's remarks concerning how the language and 
tradition in which we are trained frame the questions we ask and our perceptions provide 
further support for Kuhn's argument. "One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the 
thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through 
which we look at it. A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay 
in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. "80 
The semiotic transformations which occur in paradigm shifts are not restricted to 
the natural sciences. The interpretation of what the child is suffering from in Matthew 
17: 15 ('Lord have mercy on my boy for he is a lunatic, QEXijvtäCaTatt, and is very ill") 
is an example of how our understanding of the Bible is linked with semiotic shifts in 
other domains of our culture. In the original horizon of expectations in which this story 
took place, the rural Palestinian Jewish audience would have understood this child's 
75 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 111. Kuhn qualifies this statement with others to show that 
"though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the-scientist afterward 
works in a different world. " Ibid., 121; Gutting, "Introduction, " 20. Those who hold to 
a strong view of incommensurability love to cite passages like this from Kuhn to show 
that there is no neutral language to which one can appeal. Musgrave does not find this 
argument convincing. For example, a Copernican defines the earth as a planet while the 
Aristotelians did not. Musgrave fails to see why the two sides could not explain their 
respective positions to each other in a manner they could understand, without resorting 
to some form of a "theoretically neutral observation language". Musgrave, "Kuhn's 
Second Thoughts, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 49,52 note 9. 
76 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 121. 
77 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 114-5. 
78 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 111. 
79 Ibid., 113,121. 
80 Wittgenstein, 5 114-15. 
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condition in relation to a complex of ideas including evil influences of the moon and/or 
his parents bringing it on their child because they had intercourse by the light of the 
lamp or in a mirror. 81 The early church perceived QeanvtäýaTat from the wider 
perspective of the Greek and Roman cultures. Along with the evil influences of the 
moon were added demonic possession or the idea that this was possibly a divine disease. 
At the same time, we find a counter-voice to this in the medical writings of Galen and 
Hippocrates who taught that this illness was the result of natural causes and could be 
cured by natural means. 82 Apuleius (second century A. D. ) is perhaps a classic example of 
the varied explanations surrounding epilepsy in the Roman world. At one point he 
seems to prefer a naturalistic view of the disease like Hippocrates and in another instance 
he reverted to the classical Greek view of it as the `divine sickness' 83 Apulcius also 
81 The evil influence of the moon is perhaps reflected in Psalm 121: 6, "The sun will not smite 
you by day, Nor the moon by night, " where the power of the moon to affect one's health 
was compared with that of sunstroke. The notion that the moon beamed harmful 
influences was widespread in ancient near east. Mitchell Dahood, Psalms III: 101-150, 
in The Anchor Bible, eds., William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman, vol. 17a 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1970), 218; Leslie C. Allen, Psalms 101- 
150, in Word Biblical Commentary, ed. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker, vol. 21 
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983), 152. "And do not stand naked in front of a lamp, " for 
it was taught: He who stands naked in front of a lamp will be an epileptic, and he who 
cohabits by the light of a lamp will have epileptic children. Our Rabbis taught: If one 
cohabits in a bed where an infant is sleeping, that infant will be an epileptic. " Tractate 
Pesahim, in Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud trans. H. Freedman, ed. I. 
Epstein (London: Soncino Press, 1990), 112b. In the Babylonian Talmud it appears 
that epilepsy was taken as seriously as leprosy in some instances. "Raba said: Now that it 
has been stated that sisters also establish a presumption, a man should not take a wife 
either from a family of epileptics, or from a family of lepers. " Tractate Yebamoth, 64b. 
82 Hippocrates, Breaths, in Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge, 
MS: Harvard University Press, 1923; reprint, 1952), XIV. 1-64, seqq. passim 248-252; 
IV 118,126,128,130,132; idem, Air, Water, Places, vol. 2, Loeb, 111.22-23. W. H. S. 
Jones, "Introduction to The Sacred Disease, " in Hippocrates, Loeb, vol. 2,133. James 
Collier, "Epilepsy, " in A Short History of Some Common Diseases. ed. W. R. Bett 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 120-121. Galen's Consilium de Puero 
Epileptico, which is extant in tenth-century Arabic. "He followed the Hippocratic 
School of Cos in counseling hygienic measures, careful feeding and occupation in 
treatment, and states that he had often seen the disease arrested by the occurrence of an 
attack of quartan fever. " The effects of epilepsy were weak at half moon and much 
stronger during the full moon. Owsei Temkin, The Falling Sickness: A History of Epilepsy 
from the Greeks to the Beginnings ofModern Neurology, 2d. ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1971), 26. 
83 When Apuleius was charged with placing a boy under a spell he defends himself by arguing 
that the boy was epileptic. He offers the traditional Greco-Roman medical explanation: 
epilepsy is caused by "the overflowing of... pestilential humour into the head" (Ch. 
51). Or again, "When the flesh is so melted by the noxious influence of fire as to form a 
thick and floating humor, this generates a vapor, ' which when 'compressed within the 
body causes a white and eruptive ferment. '" (Ch. 50) Later he seems to be loser in line 
with the classical Greek view of it as the 'divine sickness. ' "It is his `own personal 
opinion that the human soul, especially when it is young and unsophisticated, may by 
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recorded the ostracism of epileptics from society because of the repulsiveness of the fits 
and fear of contamination. 84 
It is against this background that Origen's comments on this passage must be 
situated. In his interpretation, Origen attempts to reverse what he sees as a heretical idea 
embedded in the widely held view that epilepsy was caused by the phases of the moon. 
To attribute the cause of this disease, which was semiotically linked to demonic 
influences in his linguistic world, to the moon's influence on the moist humours in the 
head was equivalent to blasphemy. 85 It slandered the good creation and the Creator. 
Instead, he argued that the impure spirit which caused the seizures observed the cycles of 
the moon in order to make it appear as if this illness was a result of the moon's phases. 86 
By the time of Calvin, Galen's views were widely accepted in medieval medicine which 
attributed epilepsy to the lunar phases. The explanation that this boy's illness was 
influenced by the moon was a fact proven by experience for Calvin. 87 As a result, he 
the allurements of music or the soothing influence of sweet smells be lulled into slumber 
and banished into oblivion of its surroundings so that, as all consciousness of the body 
fades from memory, it returns and is reduced to its primal nature, which is in truth 
immortal and divine; and thus, as it were in a kind of slumber, it may predict the 
future. " He then goes on to say that the boy must be "fair and unblemished in body, 
shrewd of wit and ready of speech, so that a worthy and fair shrine may be provided for 
the divine indwelling power" which will manifest itself in the divination which occurs. 
(Ch. 43) Apuleius, Apologia; Howard Clark Kee, Medicine, Miracle and Magic in New 
Testament Times, Society for New Testament Studies, Monograph Series, ed. G. N. 
Stanton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 98. 
84 Apuleius recorded the treatment Thallus , an epileptic slave, received, "nobody dares to ear 
with him from the same dish or to drink from the same cup, and it is even suspected that 
he has been sent away lest he contaminate the family. " Apuleius, Apologia, 43; Temkin, 
The Falling Sickness, 8-9. 
85 Origen's argument that this is a demonic problem, not an illness influenced by the moon, is 
based on his opposition to Gnostic teachings, especially Celsus, which taught that the 
planets influenced human life on earth and were connected with the soul's ascent in the 
next life. Ideas which originate in Persian and Mithraic sources, not the Christian 
Scriptures. Origen, Contra Celsum VI. 19-23, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: 
C. U. P., 1986), 331-7. 
86 Origen In Mattheium XIII. 6 in Mattbäuserklärung ed. Erich Klostermann, Die griechischen 
christlichen Schrifsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, ed. Ernst Benz, vol. 10 (Leipzig: J. 
C. Hinrichs, 1935), 194-5; Commentary on Matthew, XIII. 6, Ante-Nicene Christian 
Library, additional vol., cd., Alan Menzies (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1897), 2.778. 
Chrysostom followed Origen's teaching in this area. "For the evil spirit, to bring a 
reproach upon nature, both attacks them that are seized, and lets them go, according to 
the courses of the moon; not as though that were the worker of it,, --away with the 
thought; 
--but himself craftily doing this to bring a reproach on nature. And an 
erroneous opinion hach gotten ground among the simple, and by this name do they call 
such evil spirits, being deceived; for this is no means true. " Chrysostom, Homilies on 
Matthew, LVII. 3 in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church (Oxford: John 
Henry Parker, 1844), 2.778. 
87 Vivian Nutton, "From Galen to Alexander, Aspects of Medicine and Medical Practice in 
Late Antiquity, " in Dumbarton Oaks Papers: Symposium on Byzantine Medicine, ed. John 
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explicitly rejects Chrysostom's (and Origen's) argument and bases his interpretation on 
the prevailing medical paradigm of his day. 88 Modern commentators find these 
interpretations superstitious. While they will discuss the historical background behind 
the Greek term which Matthew uses (QEXr1vtäýaTat) as part of their philological study 
or historical reconstruction, their understanding of what the boy is suffering from is 
almost unanimously in favour of our contemporary medical understanding of epilepsy. 89 
Where the early church saw the demonic and the baleful influence of the moon, 
Origen and Chrysostom saw the demonic. By the time of Calvin, medical science had 
attributed the ailment to the influences of the moon on the weakness of the nervous 
system. Today we see a neurological condition which is not related to the lunar phases or 
demonic influence. Language determines, to a large extent, what we will actually see in 
the text. 90 
This demonstrates two benefits from examining the history of a text's reception. 
First, in doing so, the twists and turns in the semiotic code provoke our prejudices (or 
linguistic background) which cause us to question the validity of our present 
understanding and semiotic code. And second, past interpretations present us with 
different perspectives on the text (new ways to look at the picture as Wittgenstein would 
say), they present us with hermeneutical resources which allow us to grasp more 
possibilities for the disclosive potential of the text. To interpret the healing of the boy in 
Matthew 17 from a medical perspective negates many of the nuances in the passage 
Scarborough, vol. 38 (Washington D. C.: Meriden-Stinehour, 1984), 1-14; Owsei 
Temkin, Galenism: Rise and Decline ofMedical Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1973). 
88 "Nor do I accept the imagination of Chrysostom that Satan invented this name (lunaticus or 
comitiali morbo) as a trick to spray (throw) disgrace on the good creation: for we are 
taught by the sureness of experience (docet enim certa experientii) that the course of the 
moon increases or decreases these diseases. " John Calvin, In Harmoniam Matthaeo, 
Marco et Luca Compositam Commentarii, Ad Editionem Amstelodamensem ed. (Berolini: 
Apud Gustavum Eichler, 1833), 2.124; 1.127; Commentary on a Harmony of the 
Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1957), 2.322; 1.245, translation mine. 
89 Perhaps one of the best examples of this is Pringle's translator's notes in Calvin's Harmony. 
He refers to views, such as those held by Calvin, as no longer held except "by the 
unlearned, and countenances of exploded theory, " no more than we hold that the sun 
revolves around the earth. Pringle, Harmony, 1.245, translator's note 1. Others include: 
John Wilkinson, "The Case of the Epileptic Boy" Expository Times 79 (November 
1967), 40-2; Kee, Medicine, Miracle and Magic in New Testament Times, 50; Craig L. 
Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity 
Press, 1987), 88. 
90 This is not to argue as Foucault does that there are no objects prior to discourse. Michel 
Foucault, Madnessand Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. 
Richard Howard (New York. Pantheon, 1965). 
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concerning Jesus' authority, his redeeming a fallen race, and the story's relationship with 
the previous pericope concerning Jesus' transformation. 
The hermeneutical resources which we may uncover from the past by examining 
the reception of a text and the semiotic shifts which are revealed in this process are not 
merely for the sake of history. The resources which are recovered may offer insights or 
possible solutions to the questions we currently face, such as the debate over 
homosexuality. This debate, in particular, demonstrates that paradigm shifts are not 
something relegated to historical study, but demonstrate that they occur in the present 
and require the church to formulate new answers to new questions based on how we 
define and understand a topic such as homosexuality. 91 
III. THE QUESTION AND RELEVANCE OF THE "CLASSIC" 
Classic texts play an important role in reception theory. However, before we can 
discuss that role we must first define what we mean when we label a text as a `classic. ' 
Traditionally this term has been applied in three different ways. First, it is used to 
designate works from a specific period of literary history, most often in reference to the 
classics of Greek and Latin literature. Second, the term `classic' is used to designate the 
greatest works of literature or what is accepted as being the best representative works 
from a particular period. And finally, it refers to those texts which are considered part of 
the reading curriculum in an educational system; texts chosen for their value to teach 
morality, good taste, and the values of a tradition 92 
A. Classic Gadamer 
As a student, Gadamer was educated in the study of the classics and his 
hermeneutic is, to a large extent, concerned with the relevance of classical texts as bearers 
of truth claims. 93 The study and relevance of classic texts betrayed the weakness of the 
91 Even among those who research homosexuality there does not appear to be a consensus yet. 
Michael Ruse, Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988), 265-7; 
D. Cappon, Toward an Understanding of Homosexuality (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1965), vii. 
92 Wolfgang Bernard Fleischmann, "Classicism, " in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics, ed. Frank J. Warnke Alexander Preminger and O. B. Hardison, Jr. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), 136-41; Rene Wellek, "The Term and Concept of 
'Classicism' in Literary History, " in Aspects of the Eighteenth Century: Papers Presented at 
the John Hopkins University Humanities Seminar, 1963, ed. Earl R. Wasserman (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965), 105-28. For an excellent reader on 
the classic see: W. J. Bate, ed. Criticism: The Major Texts (N. Y.: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1970). 
93 Francis Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1997), 45; Robert R. Sullivan, Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-Georg 
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"naive scheme of history-as-research" for Gadamer. Under this scheme, the normative 
and pedagogical value of the classic was destroyed as the historical critical approach 
reduced the classic to a mere `relic' from the past. Nietzsche registered a similar 
complaint. The problem with the historical critical method was not that it raised to 
consciousness the reader's historical distance from the classic text, but that it immobilised 
the classic. 94 We may consider Augustine's works great classics but historical study only 
subjects them to "answer a thousand impertinent questions. "95 
After World War I, various scholars began to recognise the normative value of the 
classic alongside its historicity. 96 One of Gadamer's concerns is that hermeneutics does 
justice to both of the classic's dimensions: its historicity and its normativity. The 
normative element of a classic text is its most important trait according to Gadamer. Its 
authority cannot be exhausted through historical study because it is primarily not a 
statement about the past but it is an address to the present. "The classical represents an 
ideal of excellence that remains compelling to us in spite of critical reflection upon 
certain aspects of it. "97 The traditional definitions of the classic are inadequate because 
they failed to address the manner in which the classic addresses the present. 
How then does Gadamer define the `classic'? "It does not refer to a quality that 
we ascribe to a particular historical phenomena but to a mode of being historical: the 
historical process of preservation (Bewahrung) that, through constantly proving itself 
(Bewährung), allows something true (ein Wahres) to come into being. "98 This appears to 
be a development of Hegel's maxim that "What is rational is real and what is real is 
rational. "99 What is revealed in history is filtered and tested through the rational process 
of thesis, antithesis, and sublation. What is rational, real, or true will prove itself in 
history and become embedded in the tradition. In the case of the classic though, it is not 
Gadamer (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 20 fE 
Frederick G. Lawrence, "Translator's Introduction, " in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in 
the Age of Science (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1981), xiii. 
94 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use acrd Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins, 2nd rev. ed., Library 
of Liberal Ara (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1985), 97. Jauss agrees with Nietzsche's assessment 
and feels that the dominance of the historical method was largely responsible for creating 
the dissatisfaction with literary studies in the 1960's. Jauss, "Limits and Tasks of 
Literary Hermeneutics, " 96. 
95 Watson, Text and Truth, 49. 
96 Sullivan, 18-64; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 286-7. 
97 Georgia Warnke, "Legitimate Prejudices, " Laval theologique et philosophique, 53 (1,1997), 
98. 
98 Gadamer, 287. 
99 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxf)rd: 
Oxford University Press), 10. See my discussion of this topic in "Time is the Best 
Teacher, " in chapter 2. 
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so much the preservation of what is real or actual that is significant but the manner in 
which that enduring element of the classic continues to address successive historical 
horizons. The classic possesses a surplus of meaning which is preserved and constantly 
proves itself by the way it addresses new generations of readers. Classical texts are those 
which retain their normative hold in their interpretation and reinterpretation. "This is 
just what the word `classical' means: that the duration of a work's power to speak directly 
is fundamentally unlimited. "100 
While the classical is historical, it stands above the changes in taste and culture 
that restrict other works to the horizon in which they originated. The truth which the 
classic conveys is accessible to every generation. "When we call something classical, there 
is a consciousness of something enduring, of significance that cannot be lost and that is 
independent of all circumstances of time 
-a kind of timeless present that is 
contemporaneous with every other present. "10 Gadamer attempts to walk a fine line 
here. On the one hand, the classic is more than a text from a certain period or historical 
style. On the other hand, it does not possess ome supra-historical value but is still a 
historically constituted and understood cultural artifact. 102 
This aspect of the classic reveals something significant about the transmission of 
knowledge through tradition. First, the normative value of the classic is based on the 
manner in which it is able to address each horizon with its truth claims. The normative 
claim of a classic text is not monological but is plurivocal. As a result, the meaning of a 
classical text will never be exhausted. Second, the manner by which the classic overcomes 
historical distance and addresses the present directly (not as an artifact from the past that 
requires interpretation) is an ideal case of effective historical consciousness in which the 
past and present horizons are fused. " Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective 
act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past 
and present are constantly mediated. " 03 And third, the classical exemplifies how 
tradition preserves the past. Tradition does not preserve or remember everything. 
Rather it preserves those elements of the past which have relevance for successive 
generations. "Thus the classical epitomizes a general character of historical being: 
preservation amid the ruins of time. "104 The classic's claim to truth are constantly 
100 Gadamer, 290; Georgia Warnke, "Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: A Gadamerian 
Critique of Rorty, " Inquiry, 28 (1985), 355. 
101 Gadamer, 288. 
102 Gadamer, 286-8. 
103 Gadamer, 290. 
104 Gadamer, 289. 
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proven and preserved as they are passed down in the tradition in a manner that not only 
forms connections between the past and present but does so in a way that it addresses the 
present in a relevant and compelling manner. Thus, classical texts operate like threads 
which preserve and give continuity to the tapestry of a tradition's corporate knowledge. 
B. David Tracy: A Classic Gadamerian 
David Tracy has, perhaps more than anyone else, adopted and applied Gadamer's 
concept of the classic in his work, The Analogical Imagination. 105 On the whole, Tracy 
faithfully follows Gadamer's thought and clearly demonstrates the relevance of the classic 
for theological study. In fact, one of the elements which Tracy thinks constitutes a 
theological text's future reception as a classic involves the manner in which it enters into 
conversation with the classics of the Christian tradition. "Barth's retrieval of Calvin; 
Lonergan and Rahner of Aquinas; Reinhold Niebuhr of Augustine; H. Richard Niebuhr 
of Jonathan Edwards; Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann of Luther" are all contemporary 
examples of how theologians have entered into dialogue with the classics of the Christian 
tradition. 106 
There are two aspects to Gadamer's thought which Tracy develops in particular. 
The classic (1) possesses an excess of meaning and (2) possesses a form of timelessness 
that while rooted in its own historicity, it addresses the contemporary reader. 107 The 
excess of meaning which a classic text possesses means that the truth of the classic is open 
for possible disclosure in every reader's horizon. The classic not only possesses an excess 
of meaning, but it actually encourages this through its interpretations. 108 The ability of 
the classic to disclose its truth claims in a relevant manner to each horizon is the basis for 
its timelessness. This is what gives the classic its normative status. "Thus do we name in 
these experiences, and these alone, `classics. ' Thus do we recognise, whether we name it 
so or not, a normative element in our cultural experience, experienced as a realized 
truth. " 109 The experience of readers for the past two thousand years of realising new 
105 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (London: SCM Press, 1981), especially chapter 3, "The Classic, " 99-153. 
106 This is one of the main traits by which Tracy considers them as candidates for being 
recognised in the future as theological classics. Ibid., 104. 
107 Ibid., 102. 
108 Ibid., 113,133. For Stout, the classic is the ideal example of how texts promote a diversity 
of interpretations. "The more interesting the text, the more readings we shall be able to 
give without simply repeating ourselves and our predecessors, and the more readings we 
shall want to give. " Jeffrey Stout, "What is the Meaning of a Text?, " New Literary 
History, 14 (1982), 9. 
109 Ibid., 108, also 113. 
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possibilities for existence which have arisen from their reading of the Bible would, 
according to the criteria of disclosive potential, firmly categorise the Bible as a classic. I 0 
If the timelessness of the classic is grounded in the manner by which it addresses 
successive generations of readers, then the endurance of the classic is dependent upon its 
reception by its readers. l li On the one hand, each generation must enter anew into 
direct dialogue with the classic text. "I can never repeat the classic to understand them. I 
must interpret them. "112 On the other hand, the classic addresses us indirectly through 
our tradition. The classic's disclosure of truth is so compelling that it becomes normative 
the moment it is experienced and as a result, it enters into the memory and prejudices of 
our tradition through its readers. "Its memory enters as a catalyst into all our other 
memories and, now subtly, now compellingly, transforms our perceptions of the real. "113 
The classic is handed down to us directly as a text and indirectly through its effect on our 
tradition. "Every classic text, moreover, comes to any reader through the history of its 
effects (conscious and unconscious, enriching and ambiguous, emancipatory, and 
distorted) upon the present horizon of the reader. " 14 "The classical legacy is a bequest 
the heirs cannot reject, for they have always inherited the classic even before having read 
them. "t 15 In this sense, our encounters with the classic will often be indirect, through 
second and third hand sources or references. They contribute to the formation of our 
prejudices. Classical commentaries and theological works partially constitute our 
preunderstanding of the Bible and will determine to a certain degree what we will 
recognise in the text and, hence, serve as pre-reflective criteria for the `correctness' of an 
interpretation. 116 The normative status of the classic operates at both the reflective level, 
through the reader's experience of the text's truth claim, and at the pre-reflective level, 
through the prejudices of the tradition which have been partially constituted and defined 
by the classic texts. 
110 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "A Lamp in the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of 'Aesthetic' 
Theology, " Trinity Journal, 8 (1987), 50-51. 
111 "The position defended here emphasizes, above all, the reception by the reader of the 
classical text. " Ibid., 118. Stendahl makes a very similar point, "For it is recognition that 
makes a classic a classic, not its inner qualities. " Krister Stendahl, "The Bible as a Classic 
and the Bible as Holy Scripture, " Journal of Biblical Literature, 103 (1984), 4. 
112 Ibid., 103. 
113 Ibid., 115. 
114 Ibid., 105. 
115 E. D. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987), xiv. 
116 See the section on "Performance and Tradition Formation" in chapter 2 for more on this. 
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If Tracy and Gadamer are correct, then the interpretation of a classic will involve 
a dual dialogue. The interpreter must engage the text in an open dialogue and allow the 
truth claims of the classic to exert themselves upon the reader. At the same time, the 
interpreter must expand this dialogue to include the history of the text's reception, its 
Wirkungsgeschichte. 117 There are two reasons why this second aspect of the dialogue is 
hermeneutically valuable. First, at the contemporary or synchronic level it allows the 
reader to check her understanding of the text against the wider perspective of her 
community. Second, at the historical or diachronic level it allows us to verify or correct 
our understanding against those of our tradition. 118 "If one's own experience has been 
verified by other readers, especially by the community of capable readers over the 
centuries, the reflective judgement should prove that much more secure. "119 
This is not an exercise in the kind of historical knowledge which Gadamer and 
Jauss criticise. Rather, the goal is to develop the interpreter's effective-historical 
consciousness, wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein 
. 
The compelling disclosure of truth of 
the classic text occurs at the first, or aesthetic experience, level of reading, according to 
Jauss' three levels of reading. At the second and third levels of reading, the interpreter 
must attempt to bring to consciousness their preunderstanding of the text so that they 
may be brought into play with the text. As the interpreter engages the Wirkungsgeschichte 
of the classic text it opens the possibilities for him to realise his place within the history of 
this text's transmission, for verifying his interpretation, for uncovering ideological and 
theological distortions in the transmission of the classic, and for intersubjective 
`boundaries' to determine what counts as a valid interpretation to be introduced. "This 
application is historically grounded in contemporary conditions of reception 
... 
for it 
binds meaning with significance, suggesting that the texts current meaning is a reorientation 
of its historical significance. "120 
The manner in which this type of study opens the reader to the provocative and 
transformational power of the classic text is an important idea which cannot be 
overlooked. This provocation takes place when we realise the historical distance between 
1 17 Tracy, 131. 
1 18 At the historical level the interpreter should attempt to "render explicit the history of the 
influences, effects, and interpretations as well as the history 
- 
partly traditional, partly 
personal 
- 
of the interpreter's own preunderstanding of the tradition. " Ibid., 120. 
119 Ibid., 116. 
120 Michael Ecken, "Hermeneutics in the Classroom: An Application of Reception Theory, " 
College English Association Critic, 46 (3-4,1984), 15, emphasis mine. 
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the classic and our horizon which raises our prejudices to consciousness and brings them 
into play with the claims of the text. 121 
As a single interpreter, for example, I may recognize the challenge to my present 
preunderstanding of a text of Ignatius of Loyola which Roland Barthes' vitalizing 
reading now allows 
- 
even when I do not accept Barthes' reading of this text as 
the most adequate one. I may recognize as a second example, the challenge to my 
preunderstanding which T. S. Eliot's readings of Shelley, Milton or Vergil 
provide 
- 
even when I do not finally accept his rejection of Shelley, his 
ambivalence towards Milton, his astonishing awe in front of Vergil. 
... 
Yet in 
their interpretations of these texts at once challenge mine and, by that challenge, 
they inevitably transform, however subtly, my own interpretations of the same 
texts. 122 
C. Jauss: When is Classic a Classic? 
Like Gadamer, Jauss' hermeneutical theory arose from his work on classical texts 
and, in a large part, is developed for their interpretation. Gadamer was primarily 
interested in classical Greek texts, especially Aristotle and Plato's work. Jauss, on the 
other hand, tends to have a much wider field of interest, but it was his work on the 
literature of medieval animal epics, the Songs of Roland which raised hermeneutical 
questions for him. In particular, he was concerned with how the modern reader should 
approach medieval texts, which were once widely received but are so distant from the 
modern reader's horizon of expectations that they present the challenge of the "forgotten 
horizon of a closed past. " 123 
The question of `timelessness' is the greatest point of difference between Jauss 
and Gadamer on the subject of the classic. The timelessness of the classic is problematic 
at best according to Jauss. 124 For Gadamer, the classic text continues to speak to each 
horizon "as if it were saying something to me in particular. " 125 The classical tragedies of 
Greece are an example of this. While they were originally performed for certain festivals, 
their power to endure meant they were performed in new and different situations, until 
they are no longer experienced as performances today but are primarily read as texts. The 
reason they have endured as classics is because the original question which they sought to 
121 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutic' and Literary Theory, 142. 
122 Ibid., 120-1. 
123 Jauss, "The Identity of the Poetic Text, " in Identity of the Literary Text 159; 159-65. The 
following illustrate Jauss' concern in this area. Idem, "The Alterity and Modernity of 
Medieval Literature, " New Literary History 10 (Winter, 1979), 181-229; idem, "Thesis 
on the Transition, " 144-7. 
124 Wad Godzich, "Introduction, " in Aesthetic Experience, xxxii; Holub, Reception Theory, 44. 
125 Gadamer, Truth and Method 577. 
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answer possesses a "superiority to and freedom from its origins. " 126 The classic 
overcomes historical distance because the question which the classic sought to answer 
addresses itself to each horizon directly. Tracy adapts this concept to a theological 
framework. Questions concerning human finitude, mortality, estrangement, and 
sinfulness are examples of questions which possess this "superiority" and address 
everyone. 127 While Gadamer denies that this implies any type of `supra-historical' 
character to the classic or to its question, Jauss thinks that Gadamer has not adequately 
defended against this and, as a result, is liable of it. If Tracy's work is a faithful extension 
of Gadamer's, then we can easily see how this view slides into a form of supra- 
historicalism. 128 "It becomes a classic: always retrievable, always in need of appreciative 
appropriation and critical evaluation, always disclosive and transformative with its truth 
of importance, always open to new applications and thereby new interpretations. " 129 
The classic is more historical than Gadamer and Tracy realise according to Jauss. 
Classics come and go with the passing of time. "Jauss refuses to see in the enduring 
character of great works anything other than a temporary stabilization of the dynamic of 
reception. " 130 A good example of this is the reception of Fanny and Madame Bovary 
which I discussed in chapter three. Even though many recognise Madame Bovary as a 
literary classic today, it took years before the reading public could appreciate Flaubert's 
narrative style and the manner in which his novel challenged the morals at that time. 131 
This demonstrates one of the more important features concerning the classic: historical 
distance is required in order to recognise a text as a classic. "If `it is only by hindsight, ' as 
126 Ibid. Jauss claims that the superiority of the question over its origin is based on Gadamer's 
concept of mimesis as `recognition. ' In the classic, we recognise a question which 
resonates with our experience of the world. Jauss, Towards 30-1; Godzich, 
"Introduction, " in Aesthetic Experience, xxxvi. 
127 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 164. 
128 Paul Ricceur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blarney, Kathleen McLaughlin and 
David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University -of Chicago Press, 1988), 3.172. 
Georgia Warnke recognises this problem in Gadamer's work but still attempts to defend 
his view against this charge. Warnke, Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 105. In his latest work, Gadamer. appears to modify 
his view and suggests that historical distance is required for the reception of the classic. 
Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey, " trans. Richard E. Palmer, in The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1997), 45. 
129 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 115. "When we read a classic 
... 
we find that our present 
horizon is alwaysprovoked, sometimes challenged, always transformed by the power 
extended by the classic's claim. " Ibid., 134, emphasis mine in both quotes. 
130 Ricceur, Time and Narrative, 3.172. 
131 See chapter 3, "Thesis 3. " Jauss documents the various reactions of critics when Fanny and 
Madame Bovary were published in: "Die beiden Fassungen von Flauberts Education 
sentimentale, " Heidelberger Jahrbücher, 2 (1958), 96-7. 
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Eliot says, `that a classic can be known as such' 
... 
that is because the classic has not 
distinguishing characteristics that enable one to recognize it in the contemporary. " 132 If 
a work is immediately and widely recognised then it risks being too closely aligned with 
the expectation of the horizon in which it appeared. As time passes, and the horizons of 
expectations shift, such a work may quickly become irrelevant, or being classified as 
`culinary art, ' as was the case with Fanny. 
The passing of time allows the norm forming potential of the text to shape the 
expectations so that of succeeding generations of readers are able to appreciate the text 
more fully, and even recognise it as a classic. In the instance of Madame Bovary, it was 
through a small group of connoisseurs that this novel was first received and the norms of 
how to read this book were introduced and spread to ever wider circles of readers creating 
new literary norms and expectations in the process. 133 "The `verdict of the ages' on a 
literary work is more than merely `the accumulated judgment of other readers, critics, 
viewers, and even professors'; it is the successive unfolding of the potential for meaning 
that is embedded in a work and actualized in the stages of its historical reception as it 
discloses itself to understanding judgment, so long as this faculty achieves in a controlled 
fashion the `fusion of horizons' in the encounter with tradition. "134 The various 
concretizations of meaning of the text present the interpreter with both adequate and 
inappropriate understandings of the text, fruitful questions for further dialogue, or 
deadends to be avoided. "Only as the horizon changes and expands with each 
subsequent historical materialization, do responses to the work legitimize particular 
possibilities of understanding, imitation, transformation, and continuation -- in short, 
structures of exemplary character that condition the process of the formation of literary 
tradition. "135 It is through the reception of a text through history that we recognise the 
normative status of a particular text, confer on it the status of `classic, ' and realise what 
constitutes in appropriate understanding of its meaning as this unfolds in different 
horizons of expectations. 136 
132 Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1991), 135. Tracy also implicitly realises this when he 
discusses which modern theological works are candidates for becoming classics in the 
future. Tracy, 104-5. 
133 Jauss, Towards 28. 
134 Jauss, Towards, 30 quoting, Rent Wellek, Concepts of Criticism (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1963), 17. 
135 Jauss, Toward, 64. 
136 See "Performance and Tradition Formation, " in chapter 2. "This logic manifests itself in 
the formation and transformation of the aesthetical canons and, changing horizons of 
interpretations, renders possible the distinction between the arbitrary and consenting, 
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The passing of time is also a double-edged sword. Not only is it needed to 
recognise and appreciate a classic, but it can also reduce a classic to an obscure corner of a 
tradition's literature. As Heidegger pointed out, tradition possesses a levelling down 
power which can remove the provocative or normative status from any text. 137 
Collingwood also realised this when he wrote that the original question which the classic 
sought to answer can be forgotten over time. 138 One of the goals of reception theory is to 
provide a means by which classic texts which have fallen from their classical status may be 
rescued from the dust of history. Through the historical reconstruction of the original 
horizon of expectations we can grasp to some degree the manner in which the text 
provoked, denied or challenged its original audience's expectations. Also, the recovery of 
the alterity of the classic text raises the `otherness' of the text to consciousness for the 
reader and opens the possibility for the reader to engage in a more meaningful, or 
appropriate aesthetic experience of the text (as opposed to a naive assimilation of the text 
to his horizon or running into the closed horizon of a historically distant text). 
The classical character of the so-called masterworks especially belongs to this 
character of the second horizontal change; their beautiful form that has become 
self-evident, and their seemingly unquestionable "eternal meaning" bring them, 
according to an aesthetics of reception, dangerously close to the irresistibly 
convincing and enjoyable "culinary" art, so that it requires a special effi rt to read 
them "against the grain " ofthe accustomed experience to catch sight of their artistic 
character once again. t39 
D. Classic and Reception Theory 
So far we have examined how Gadamer rescued the classical text from historical 
positivism which was correct in locating the text in its past horizon but missed how the 
classic addresses later horizons of readers. Gadamer attempted to reconcile the historicity 
and its ability to address future horizons directly of the classic in his hermeneutic. David 
Tracy's work, not only demonstrates the strengths of Gadamer's position but also betrays 
its weaknesses, especially in relation to the question of the classic becoming a supra- 
historical category. 
between the merely `original', and the normative interpretations. " Jauss, "Limits and 
Tasks of Literary Hermeneutics, " 118. 
137 Heidegger, Being and Time, 165; Jauss, Aesthetic Experience, 16; Dorothea Frede, "The 
Question of Being: Heidegger's Project, " in The Cambridge Companion of Heideger, 
Charles B. Guignon ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 60. 
138 Collingwood, Autobiography, 39. 
139 Jauss, Toward., 25-6, emphasis mine. Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 142. 
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Hans Robert Jauss' work, I argued, represents a needed correction to Gadamer's 
hermeneutic in this area. In particular, he is able to retain the normative element of the 
classic while at the same time conceiving it as a thoroughly historical concept. Classics 
come, classics go, and sometimes they need to be retrieved from the levelling power of 
tradition. The dialogical relationship between the reader's horizon and the text 
represents a positive contribution to this topic by Jauss and helps to explain how classics 
are recognised, and why they loose their provocative and normative status. What I hope 
to accomplish in following section is to examine the relevance of the classic in relation to 
the practice of reception theory and biblical interpretation. 
1. What is a Classic? 
The question of "What counts as a classic? " needs to be differentiated more than 
we have done so far. On the one hand, I agree with the main traits of what classifies as a 
classic which I have discussed so far. A classic text is one which possesses ome degree of 
normativiry and has proven itself over time. On the other hand, such broad strokes are 
not very useful for the practice of reception theory in relation to biblical interpretation, 
rather we need to consider how different types of classics function within a tradition. 
For example, Stendahl considers the Bible a classic in that it is a work that has 
been "considered worth attention beyond its time,... beyond its space. "t40 I doubt that 
many theologians would disagree with this. However, is this use of the classic 
comparable with classifying Calvin's commentaries as classics? While they have both 
proven themselves through history, the degree of normativity between the two cannot be 
compared. Wittgenstein's question of "What is a game? " provides a helpful direction to 
pursue in relation to the question of "What is a classic? " For Wittgenstein a term such as 
"game" is a blurred concept, there is no one definition for what counts as a game. Rather 
there are similarities which games share that "crop up and disappear" depending on 
which instances of games you are considering. These similarities are best described as 
"family resemblances. "t41 In the same manner, there are many different forms which the 
classic may take and to look for one definition would, by necessity, restrict our 
investigation from the start. Rather we should "look and see" what is recognised as a 
140 Scendahl qualifies this classification of the classic by saying that there is probably no "truly 
global classic" which is valid across of cultures. Krister Stendahl, "The Bible as a Classic 
and the Bible as Holy Scripture, " Journal of Biblical Literature 103 (1984): 4-6. The 
New Testament also qualifies as a classic for Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 259. 
141 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 65-72. 
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classic and then consider why it is a classic, how it functions within its place in the 
tradition, and what it shares in common with other classics. 
If we return to the Bible as a classic, Maclntyre's concept of `foundational texts' 
helps us to grasp this use of the term classic. Traditions (religious as well as national) are 
often founded on authoritative texts and the interpretive debate which partially 
constitutes that tradition will involve an extended argument over the meaning and 
significance of that tradition's authoritative texts. The shape and direction a tradition 
takes will be determined to a certain degree by the critical interpretations and application 
of those foundational texts. 
For such a tradition, if it is to flourish at all, as we have already learned, has to be 
embodied in a set of texts which function as the authoritative point of departure 
for tradition-constituted enquiry and which remain as essential points of 
reference for enquiry and activity, for argument, debate, and conflict within that 
tradition. Those texts to which this canonical status is assigned are treated both 
as having a fixed meaning embodied in them and also as always open to 
rereading, so that every tradition becomes to some degree a tradition of critical 
reinterpretation in which one and the same body of texts, with of course some 
addition and subtraction, is put to the question, and to successively different sets 
of questions, as a tradition unfolds. 142 
A tradition is constituted by the critical reinterpretation of its authoritative body of texts 
which is put to successively different sets of questions as a tradition unfolds. With each 
change in the readers' horizon new questions and debates about the meaning and role of 
the authoritative text will be raised. "Thus a major source of disagreement and debate 
within a tradition will be ` interpretative' in the older, narrow sense of textual 
exposition. " 143 The constant reinterpretation of the tradition's foundational texts and 
the application of these interpretations to the tradition's practices are what constitute the 
ongoing life of the tradition. Powell applies Maclntyre's ideas to the history of the 
interpretation of the American Constitution. While the U. S. Constitution serves as the 
foundational text for what Powell terms the tradition of `Constitutionalism, ' the 
decisions rendered by the courts and the scholarly commentaries on the Constitution also 
serve a normative role. 14In particular, legal interpretations and decisions 
(adjudications) do not serve merely as precedents for the practice of constitutional law in 
142 Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1985), 383. 
143 H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition ofAmerican Constitutionalism: A Theological 
Interpretation (Durham, N. C. and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 28-9; 
Gadamer, Truth and Method 263. 
144 Powell, 29-30,49. 
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the future, but they are related to the internal goods of the tradition. 145 Within this 
tradition, Powell identifies a handful of significant legal decisions which played an 
authoritative role in future decisions or which changed the course of the tradition of 
Constitutional interpretation. 146 It is because these decisions are constantly referred to 
in legal debate, the normative status they serve, and the manner in which they have 
become part of the dramatic narrative which defines the tradition of Constitutionalism, I 
would argue that they serve as classic texts. In this sense, we can label the Bible as the 
foundational text for the Christian tradition and commentaries such as Calvin's or Karl 
Barth's commentary on Romans as classic texts of the interpretive dialogue of the 
tradition. 
If the Bible functions as the foundational classic which serves to shape and define 
the Christian tradition, then how do classic commentaries and theological texts function 
within the tradition? First, as Thomas Kuhn brought out, they are used within the 
educational and professional institutions. Kuhn makes this point in relation to the 
authority which textbooks possess within scientific paradigms. They introduce the 
students and members of a research community to what counts as data, theories, and the 
body of articulated problems, "to which the scientific community is committed at the 
time they are written. " 147 At the same time the educational and technical literature of 
the scientific community equips its members with a vocabulary to express their research 
and thought and provides them with examples of what counts as problems and 
solutions. 148 If this is the case in the sciences, then the role of classic texts within the 
humanities and theology is perhaps even more important. The pedagogical value of the 
classic operates in a manner similar as textbooks do in Kuhn's model in that they are used 
within seminaries and universities to introduce the students to what counts as a 
theological question and what is considered an adequate answer. Classic commentaries 
serve to illustrate the bounds of what is considered appropriate performance of the score 
of the biblical text. Theological classics serve an archaeological function in the way they 
are cmployed within the institutions and educational processes to introduce the history 
145 These internal goods include the respect for past interpretations, logical coherence, and 
adherence to the norms of legal argument. Powell, 117-8. 
146 Such cases include the Dred Scott case in which a slave attempted to sue his master for 
freedom when they moved to the free state of Illinois, Lochner v. N. Y. which examined 
the issue of how long an employer may demand its employees work per week, and 
Brown v. The Board of Education which struck down the segregation laws. Powell, 
120-32,139-43,165-72. 
147 Kuhn, Structures of Scientif c Revolutions, 136; idem, Essential Tension, 230. 
148 Ibid., 177,187. 
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of the Christian tradition and its thought. While the institutional textbooks in the 
sciences are rewritten after a paradigm shift, in the humanities classical texts continue to 
be employed after paradigm shifts. This not only introduces an element of continuity in 
the tradition, but is also familiarises those who read them with alternative "problems 
[and] solutions which he must ultimately evaluate for himself. " 149 If textbooks develop 
the technical reasoning within the scientific community, classics should develop the 
phronesis and historically-effective consciousness in theology and the other humanities. 150 
Second, classics often play a central role in defining and shaping the direction of 
a tradition. They serve as forks in the road, either by inducing a shift in thought or by 
indicating that such a shift has taken place. When a tradition enters a period of 
epistemological crisis, Jauss argues that this is often first experienced and expressed in the 
arts and literature. 151 Perhaps the best known example of how an interpretation sparked 
a theological paradigm shift occurs in Luther's understanding of Romans 1: 17. At the 
personal level, this transformed Luther's entire understanding of the Bible, and at the 
corporate level, its norm forming function is dramatically displayed in the Protestant 
understanding of the Scriptures and doctrine of salvation. 152 
In other instances, the classics follows the horizontal shifts which has already 
occurred. William Carey's "An Enquiry into the Obligation of Christians to Use Means 
for the Conversion of Heathens" is an example of a commentary on Matthew 28: 18-20 
following such a shift, the ramifications of which had not been clearly articulated until 
his work was published. When Carey wrote his essay, the Protestant church as a whole 
had already taken its first steps in various missionary ventures. By contrast, William 
Carey came from a hyper-Calvinistic dissenting Baptist church background which 
believed the command of Matthew 28: 18-20 was no longer binding on the church 
because there were no successors to the aposdes. 153 At a pastors' conference in 1786, 
149 Ibid., 165. 
150 For an extended discussion on the nature and role of phronesissee the section entitled, 
"Hermeneutical Knowledge and Tradition, " in chapter 1. 
151 Jam, "The Literary Process of Modernism from Rousseau to Adorno, " Cultural Critique, 
trans. Lisa C. Roetzel (Winter, 1988-1989), 34-6; idem, "1912: Threshold to an Epoch. 
Apollinaire's Zone and Lundi Rue Christine, " Yak French Stadien trans. Roger Blood, 74 
(1988), 56-8. 
152 Thiselton, New Horizons, 35; Maclntyre, "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and 
the Philosophy of Science, " in Paradigms and Revolutions, 61. 
153 J. Van Den Berg, Constrained By Jesus' Love: An Inquiry into the Motives of the Missionary 
Awakening in Great Britain in the Period Between 1698 and 1815 (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 
1956), 165. This also demonstrates Jauss' point that any synchronic time frame will be 
made up of different `time curves' of literature and its reception. In Carey's instance, his 
particular denominational background represents a `time curve' of the reception of 
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Carey raised the question as to whether the Great Commission may still be binding upon 
the church. The president of the denomination, Dr. Ryland, reacted very strongly to 
Carey's question. "You are a miserable enthusiast, to propose such a question. Nothing 
certainly can come to pass in this matter before a new Pentecost accompanied by a new 
gift of miracles and tongues promises success to the commission of Christ as in the 
beginning. "154 In order to counter the hyper-Calvinistic presuppositions of his particular 
denomination, Carey had to present a very articulate and much stronger argument than 
if he had been addressing the larger Protestant movement rather than his local dissenting 
church community. His argument was not based on new insights but rather involved a 
summary of previous positions concerning the nature of the church and knowledge about 
the various ethnic groups around the world which had come from British colonisation. 
While various Protestant leaders had argued that Matthew 28: 18-20 was a mandate for 
missions and was still binding on the church, it was not until Carey published his essay 
that this interpretation was widely accepted and the debate over the applicability of the 
Great Commission on the contemporary church was ended. 155 Because of the "Enquiry 
in the Obligation" William Carey is known as the father of modern missions. "Since the 
time of William Carey it has been customary to take the closing verses of Matthew's 
Gospel as the fundamental mandate for mission. "156 Both of these aspects of the classic 
interpretation, inducing and indicating a shift in horizons, are what we expect if the 
Matthew 28: 18-20 which was quite different from the larger Christian community. 
Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 36-7; idem, Aesthetic 
Experience, 269-70. 
154 Gustav Warneck, Outline of a History of Protestant Missions from the Reformation to the 
Present Time, 3d cd., trans. George Robson (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 
1901; reprint, New York: Fleming Revell Company, 1906), 75. 
155 "The Moravians' challenge to mission went unheeded, for the Herrnhutters addressed the 
Enlightenment's spiritual coldness. But sixty-five years later, when Carey summoned 
Christians to missionary obedience, he spoke to hearts stirred by the Evangelical 
Awakening. The response that issued then has continued to grow. " William Richey 
Hogg, "The Rise of Protestant Missionary Concern, 1517-1914, " in The Theology of 
Christian Mission, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Nashville: Abingdon, 1961. ), 106-7. 
George Smith, writing in 1885, called it "the first and still the greatest missionary 
treatise in the English language. " This small book reflected his theological and 
geographical insights. Almost one fourth of its 87 pages were charts on the statistics of 
various nations. While his theological argument was not elaborate, he carefully set out a 
Biblical and historical argument for missions. "Introduction to `An Enquiry into the 
Obligation of Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathens, " in 
Perspectives on the World Christian Movement, eds. Ralph D. Winter and Steven C. 
Hawthorne (Pasadena: William Carry Library, 1981), 228. 
156 Leslie Newbigin, "Cross-currents in Ecumenical and Evangelical Understandings of 
Mission, " International Bulletin ofMissionary Research 6 (October, 1982), 146; Donald 
McGaveran, Momentous Decisions in Missions Today (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 20 
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meaning of the text is something that is concretized when the horizon of the text is 
mediated with the horizon of the reader. 
2. Classics and Continuity 
One of the strengths of Gadamer's position concerns the way in which classics are 
proven and preserved as they are passed down through history. The classic creates 
connections between the past and the present in a manner which is relevant and 
compelling for the contemporary reader. In this section, I would like to examine how 
they perform this role at both the synchronic and diachronic levels. 
On a broadly synchronic axis, the classic gathers and defines the literature of its 
period. The heterogeneous collection of texts from a particular period coalesce into a 
fairly homogeneous family of texts as successive generations of readers relate them to 
their horizon of expectations and in this process these texts become part of the prejudices 
of a common horizon of expectations. 157 Certain works are recognised as being the high 
point, or `classic' expression of that period or style of literature or art. As such, these 
texts gather the other texts of that period under them, even those which were originally 
alternatives or rivals to the text which was eventually recognised as a classic. 158 A classic 
can also create and define the norms for a genre by which successive works are judged, 
the "classic is also the seed that generates a line of successors and thus initiates a 
history. " 159 
In either case, in retrospect or prospect, the advent of the classic is not just 
historical but is a historic event. It gathers a history to it, organizes and unifies 
history. The classic makes history and thus is not merely the object of historical 
research but also its condition. The locus of unity in diversity, the classic is the 
still point of sameness and continuity in the succession of generations. 160 
Calvin's commentaries demonstrate how classic texts contribute to continuity at 
the synchronic level. During the early phases of the Reformation, various Reformers 
experimented with different genres or styles for biblical commentaries. Philip 
Melanchthon approached the exposition of the Scriptures in order to expound 
157 Jauss; "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory, " 38. See my discussion of Jauss' 
sixth thesis in chapter 3. 
158 My argument at this point is built on the levelling down effect of tradition which Heidegger 
argued was one of the dominant elements which gave tradition continuity. Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 164-5; Frede, "The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project, " 60. The 
classic represents a unity in diversity' in the manner that it gathers and organises history. 
Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 139; Ricaeur, Time and Narrative, 3.173. 
159 Weinsheimer, 138. 
160 Ibid., 139. 
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theological loci. This meant that the issues discussed were not primarily related to the 
subject matter of the text but were organised around and determined theological loci. 
The result is that the commentary uses the text in order to reach the concepts which 
Melanchthon thought they taught. Martin Bucer perceived the weakness of 
Melanchthon's approach and attempted to synthesise it with a running commentary 
which followed the text more closely. While his commentary follows the text more 
closely, it jumps to a theological discussion when relevant issues are mentioned in the 
text. "The result, however, was two books in one.... The reader was not made to enter 
into an engagement with the document and its words, for the very length and difficulty 
of the work erected a formidable barrier between the apostle and his readers. " 161 Calvin, 
by contrast, adopted the same model he used for his earlier commentary on Seneca's De 
Clementia. His biblical commentaries are characterised by a stricture which is 
immediately familiar to most reader's today: the original text opens each section of the 
commentary followed by his comments on the passage which follows the order of the 
text. The combination of Calvin's exegetical style and his emphasis on clarity and brevity 
are three of the distinctive features which continue to function as norms for how 
commentaries are written today. 162 As classics, Calvin's commentaries `gather and 
define' our view of Reformation commentaries, that is until one actually reads other 
commentaries from that period and realises the diversity of commentary genre which was 
practised among the Reformers. 163 
161 Thomas H. L. Parker, Calvin's New Testament Commentarics 2nd ed. (Louisville: John 
Knox Press, 1993), 88. 
162 Karl Barth is a vivid illustration of this when he pleas for a return to Calvin's style of 
commentary. "For example, place the works of Jalicher side by side with that of Calvin: 
how energetically Calvin, having first established what stands in the text, sets himself to 
re-think the material and to wrestle with it, till the walls which separate the sixteenth 
century from the first become transparent! 
... 
If a man persuades himself that Calvin's 
method can be dismissed 
... 
he betrays himself as one who has never worked upon the 
interpretation of Scripture. " Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 'trans. Edwyn C. 
Hoskyns, translated for the sixth edition ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968; 
from Der Romanbrief, 1918), 7. The two most important virtues for the commentator 
according to Calvin are: clarity and brevity. Parker, 85-93. Even the genre of a 
Harmony, which Calvin adopted and modified from Osiander, functioned as a norm for 
future commentators. Bugenhagen's Monotessaron historiae evangelicae 
lationogermanicum (1566) and Martin Chemnitz' Harmoniae(1641-45) are two 
examples of later commentaries which were patterned on Calvin's work. Sean Kealy, 
Matthew's Gospel and the History of Biblical Interpretation, Mellen Biblical Press Series, 
vol. 55a (Lewiston, N. Y. and Lampeter Wales: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 226,238. 
163 For examples of the different commentaries from that period see "Reception During the 
Reformation, " in the following chapter. A similar case could be made for other 
commentaries uch as Peter Abelard's work on Romans. Abelard's commentary under 
the pseudonym of Hugh of St. Victor, "Allegoriae in Novum Testementum" Migne AL, 
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Classics preserve and bind a tradition together on the diachronic axis also. Our 
dialogue with classical texts occurs at three different levels according to Jauss. First, the 
classic shapes our prejudices at a pre-reflective level. The classic's compelling disclosure 
of truth has entered into the memory and prejudices of our tradition through previous 
readers and interpreters. At the same time, we are already familiar with the classic 
through secondary and tertiary sources, references, and illusions in other works. 1 
Second, at the institutional level, the classic often plays an important role in the 
educational curriculum. This is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the 
classic text can be used to develop the phronesis and historically-effective consciousness of 
the individual and community as Hegel and Gadamer argue. On the other hand, if the 
classic is not presented in a manner which is open to the `otherness' of the text, then it is 
in danger of being assimilated into the present horizon of expectations. We naively 
"reproject our present horizon" onto the classic and as a result, our horizon of 
expectations is not enlarged, provoked, or changed from this type of interaction with the 
classic. 165 In such cases, one must ask if this text can be considered a classic in that 
context. 166 This is why the fusion or mediation of horizons must remain an active 
synthesis by raising to consciousness the historical distance, and the tension this creates, 
between the classic and the present horizon of the reader. 167 
175.879-904; Rolf Peppermüller, Abaelards Auslegung des Rbmerbreifs, Beiträge zur 
Geschichte und Philosophie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen, vol. 10 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1972). 
164 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Continuity of History and the Existential Movement, " 
Philosophy Today trans. Thomas Wren, 16 (1972), 238. "The corpus of classic texts 
constitutes an iterable linguistic praxis; and the so-called intertextuality of literature thus 
appears to be, at least in part, a recourse for overcoming chronic change and localism in 
the connotations of the vocabulary. " Felix Martinez Bonati, "The Stability of Literary 
Meaning, " in Identity of the Literary Text, 240. 
165 Jauss, "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 53. The ideological criticism that classics can function as 
tools for suppression or domination reveals the danger of assimilating such texts naively 
into our present horizon. However, a classical text can still function even within such 
distorted conditions of communication. Warnke, "Legitimate Prejudices, " 98. 
1 66 One of the dangers here is that the classic will be reduced to the level of the 'textbook' as 
Kuhn uses the term. In this case, the classic's assimilation to the present horizon will 
only confirm the prejudices, methods, and practices of the current community. The 
diversity of questions and answers embodied within the tradition will be homogenised 
and the reader will most likely view his tradition as a linear accumulation of knowledge 
or progress from the earliest period until the present. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 165-7,177; idem, Essential Tension, 228-31; Ormond Rush, "Reception 
Hermeneutics and the "Development" of Doctrine: An Alternative Model, " Pacifeca, 6 
(1993), 128. Gadamer also raised this point, that the naive assimilation of a text is one 
element which gives rise to continuity within a tradition. Gadamer, "The Continuity of 
History, " 238. 
167 Jauss, "Minutes of the Colloquy, " 52; idem, Towards, 25-6; Gadamer, "The Continuity of 
History, " 239. 
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Third, the classic contributes to the continuity of a tradition through what Jauss 
terms the `summit dialogue' of authors. '68 If the lowest level is pre-reflective, and the 
second level can operate either through a naive assimilation or active mediation between 
the horizons, the highest level takes place through the reflective dialogue between authors 
who are often considered part of a tradition's literary canon. 
Pascal as a reader of Montaigne, Rousseau as a reader of Augustine, Levi-Strauss 
as a reader of Rousseau are examples for the summit level of dialogue between 
authors. The dialogue between authors becomes significant (Epoche-machen) in a 
literary-historical sense through the appropriation and reassessment of the 
predecessor, who was recognized as being significant. 169 
This is the level at which the open and active conversation with our tradition takes 
place. l7o 
The summit dialogue between authors is both archaeological and anticipatory in 
nature. The way in which an author revives a concept or question from an earlier author 
is an example of the archaeological function of the classic. 171 The biblical commentary 
fulfils this function not only in the manner that it seeks to explicate the biblical text but 
also when it revives or enters into dialogue with a previous interpreter's commentary. 172 
In the next chapter, I hope to demonstrate this point by examining how Aquinas and 
Calvin revive aspects of Augustine's interpretation of the parable of the Wedding Feast. 
Not everyone accepts the archaeological function of the classic. Michel Foucault 
claims that any idea of a relationship we may think we possess with a classic is mistaken. 
When cultural paradigm shifts take place, our relationship with the classical texts is 
broken. 173 The main example he employs is how our relationship with the classics of 
Rome and Greece was severed during the cultural shifts of the Enlightenment. For 
Foucault, history is not continuous but is a chain of broken epochs which are 
transitioned by wholesale transformations in the discursive practices which constituted 
168 Jauss uses two German metaphorical terms to describe this level. The first is "die 
Gipfeleben, " the highest level, or better, the peak level.. The second is "Hohenkamm, " or 
ridge of high peaks. The image is that of the silhouette of ridge line of a mountain 
range. See: Jauss, "Der Leser, " 336-7. 
169 Ibid., 336. 
170 Gadamer, "The Continuity of History, " 238-9. 
171 Jauss, "Tradition, Innovation and Aesthetic Experience, " 383. 
172 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 104-5. 
173 Instead of paradigm shifts, Foucault coined the term `episteme'which referred to "the total 
set of relations that unite at a given period the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems. " Michel Foucault, The 
Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (N. Y.: Pantheon, 1972), 191. See 
also: idem, The Order of Things (N. Y.: Random House, 1970). 
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our culture. 174 The texts which arc recognised as classics are the result of political 
decisions to legitimate the existing social order. Their role is to ideologically condition 
the people. 175 There are two problems with Foucault's position. First, as Cornel West 
points out, this position is based on the concept of the unending play of interpretation 
which I argued was not valid in chapter two. 176 If we accept Foucault's position, then no 
one can claim that their view is better than the accepted one. 
In a world where there is only the unending play of difference nothing can rightly be evaluated to a place of continuing validity, not even the equal entitlement of 
the conflicting differentia 
- 
their right to be heard, their right to equal 
participation in the field of discourse, and so forth. Nothing can claim 
permanent entitlement, nothing superiority, not even justice. The allowable 
result is what Fox-Genovese calls the `worst forms of political domination, ' 
namely, the rule of power. '77 
Second, this position misses the fact that in the humanities classics cross paradigm 
boundaries. 178 Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the summit dialogue between 
authors. 
Since every act of interpretation is provisional, classical texts anticipate successive 
acts of interpretation. 179 The socially formative power of classics can be seen in the way 
they can serve as historical markers which define a period or induce paradigm shifts. As 
such, the classic anticipates the future effects it will have upon its tradition. The 
enduring nature of the classic and its normative status combine so that the anticipatory 
and archaeological functions of the classic fulfil an important cohesive role within a 
tradition. 
The summit dialogue level is the most significant level for researching the 
reception of a text for two reasons. The first is obvious, this is the level which defines the 
shape of a tradition the most. It is at this level that new, or authoritative interpretations 
174 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 146. 
175 Brown, Boundaries of our Habitation, 68; Mary O'Brien "Feminism and the Politics of 
Education, " Interchange, 17 (1986), 93. 
176 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 226; also see my discussion in chapter 2, "The 
Enlightenment: Pushing Play to One Side of the Field. " 
177 Brown, 71. 
178 Felix Martinez Bonati, "The Stability of Literary Meaning, " in The Identity of the Literary 
Text, 240-1; Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 165-7. 
179 See chapter 1, 'Tannenberg's Defense of Universal History. " According to Pannenberg, we 
can understand our present only in light of the future which is open to revision thus, 
every text and interpretation anticipates future texts. Weinsheimer makes a similar point 
to mine when he argues that classics are `prophetical' in that they project a history of 
successive texts and interpretations which will engage the classic. Weinsheimer, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 138. 
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of a classic are concretized. 180 This is especially true for the post-history of biblical texts 
which have played a significant role in shaping the Christian tradition. Luther's 
interpretation of Romans 1: 17 is a good example of an interpretation which has been 
recognised as a classic interpretation and serves as one of the key defining points in the 
tradition. The reception of this newly disclosed fold in the potential meaning of a text 
will then undergo the historical process of reception itself whereby the "innovative 
understanding of the individual reader has been publicly acknowledged, accepted by the 
academic canon of exemplary authors, or sanctioned by cultural institutions. "181 
Theological classics reveal to us the twists and turns of the Christian tradition and at the 
same time, supply it with continuity. They present us with accepted questions and 
answers with serve as boundaries of our hermeneutical playing field. 182 The second 
reason why this level is important is that a lot of our best textual evidence is often located 
at this level. This is a lamentable effect of history, we preserve the "events and 
developments on the grand scale 
... 
and ignoring what has sometimes been called the 
history of `ordinary life'. "183 At the same time, we cannot overlook the sheer quantity of 
material which the Christian tradition has accumulated over two thousand years; much 
of this at the institutional level in the form of homilies, theological treatises, 
commentaries. There is also a rich diversity of sources at the institutional level which 
includes paintings, sculpture (especially in churches and cathedrals), music (Handel's 
Messiah), and other forms of literature (such as Milton's Paradise Lost). 
This concludes my discussion of the philosophical and hermeneutical aspects of 
reception theory. In the next chapter, my emphasis shall turn to the application of 
180 Jauss' essay, "The Dialogical and the Dialectical Neveu de Rameau: How Diderot Adopted 
Socrates and Hegel Adopted Diderot, " is an example of this. The thrust of the essay is 
that Diderot revived the openness of the Socratic dialogue in contrast to the 
philosophical monologism of his day. Hegel adopts Diderot's use of moi and lui to show 
how through the alienation of the self and sublation the individual develops. At the 
same time, Hegel corrects a latent Platonic impulse in Diderot's thought. Hegel's 
interpretation of Diderot would not have been "adequate" in France before 1774, but it 
was appropriate in the context of German idealism around 1805. 
181 Idem, "Theses on the Transition, " 139. When confronted with the overwhelming amount 
of material the primary consideration "historical consideration must surely be the major 
criterion: the most common and the most influential interpretations must be given 
priority.... " John F. A. Sawyer, "The Ethics of Comparative Interpretation, " Currents in 
Research: Biblical Studies, 3 (1995), 158,161-2 
182 Brown, Boundary of our Habitation, 75-8. 
183 As a result much of the effect and influence of the biblical texts and their commentaries on 
the church and society "is probably beyond recovery, and what little I can offer in this 
regard must remain anecdotal, at best suggestive of a vast iceberg submerged beneath the 
waves of history. " Markus Bockmuehl, "A Commentator's Approach to the 'Effective 
History' of Philippians, " Journal far the Study of tie New Testament, 60 (1995), 66. 
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reception theory to the interpretation of Matthew 22: 1-14, the parable of the Wedding 
Feast, from the early church to the Reformation. My research will focus primarily on the 
relationship between commentaries for two reasons. First, in order to limit the scope of 
research, and second because, in this case, no relevant sources from other fields for this 
passage could be found. Until now, I have included examples from the history of 
interpretation to illustrate the significance or application of a particular aspect of 
reception theory or hermeneutics to biblical interpretation. The next chapter will 
primarily consist of an extended example through which I hope to be able to illustrate 
the some of the distinctive contributions of reception theory. 
PART III: CASE STUDY 
CHAPTER 5; 
THE RECEPTION OF THE PARABLE OF THE WEDDING FEAST: 
ORIGEN, AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS AND CALVIN 
The Wirkungsgeschichte of Matthew 22: 1-14, the parable of the Wedding Feast, I 
believe presents an illustrative and illuminative case study for the practice of reception 
theory in biblical studies. This chapter is not intended to serve as a definitive or 
exhaustive history of the interpretation of the parable of the `Wedding Feast' in Matthew 
22, nor is it intended to function as a proof for reception theory. Rather, what I hope to 
accomplish is to demonstrate the relevance of reception theory by examining certain 
facets of this text's history of interpretation from the Patristic period up to and including 
Calvin's commentary on the parable. 
This parable was chosen for several reasons. First, because parables are largely 
fictional or internally representative by nature, they are closer to Jauss' concern with 
literary or poetical forms of texts. Second, the fictional or internally representative nature 
of parables offer a greater polyvalency of interpretation than a text which is more strictly 
didactic, historical, or more externally representative. Because a parable possesses a
greater potential for a wider range of interpretations, hopefully it will demonstrate the 
usefulness of reception theory in a more transparent manner. However, there is also the 
possibility that the history of this text's interpretation may reveal the limits or weaknesses 
of reception theory because of the higher degree of play of interpretation inherent in a 
parable. And third, I have selected this particular parable because there is not a large 
amount of literature written on it compared to some of the other parables such as the 
'Good Samaritan. '1 At the same time, this parable touches on several important 
Some of the more detailed studies on this parable can be found in: Francis W. Beare, "The 
Parable of the Guests at the Banquet: A Sketch of the History of its Interpretation, " in 
The Joy of Study: Papers in Honor of F. C. Grant (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1951), 1-14; Robert 
W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutics and Word of God The Problem of Language in the New 
Testament and Contemporary Theology (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1966), 163-98; Eta 
Linnemann, "Überlegungen zur Parabel vom grossen Abendmahl" Zeitschrift fr die 
Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 51 (1960): 246-55; Wolfgang Trilling, "Zur 
Überlieferungsgeschichte d s Gleichnisses vom Hochzeitsmahl Mt 22,1-15; " Biblische 
Zeitschrift 4 (1960): 251-65; and Richard Chenevix Trench, Notes on the Parables of our 
Lord 13th revised ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1877), 219-47. 
. 
ý'. 
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theological issues such as the Gentile mission, the eschatological judgement, and 
invitation to salvation. As such, the norm forming potential for this parable appears to 
be considerable. 
I. LIMITATIONS IN THE FIELD OF PLAY: 
EARLY TRAJECTORIES OF INTERPRETATION 
Even though the allegorical method was the most widely used method to 
interpret the parables in church history, it is held in derision by many today. 2 Ever since 
Adolf Julicher, modern exegetes have mercilessly criticised it for producing 
misunderstandings of the text 3 Julicher's book, Die Gleichnissreden Jesu, is credited with 
making the shift to the historical-critical method in order to determine the "original and 
proper meaning of the parables. "4 One of the common complaints which modern 
theologians raise against the allegorical method concerns the way they perceive that the 
biblical text was reduced to a pre-text into which the allegorist read his or her 
preconceptions during the Patristic period. 
It is Patristic allegorization that sticks in the gullet of modern theology 
... 
at all 
levels this allegorization is something deplored 
... 
Why is this? Basically, I think 
because we feel that there is something dishonest about allegory. If you interpret 
a text by allegorizing it, you seem to be saying that it means something which it 
patently does not. It is irrelevant, arbitrary: by allegory, it is said, you can make 
the text mean anything you like. 5 
Ambrose and Augustine's detailed interpretations of the parable of the `Prodigal Son' 
(Luke 15: 11-32) would seem to support such charges. 6 
2 Craig L. Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables (Leicester: Apollos, 1990), 15-19. 
3 James Barr ascribes this prejudice against allegorical method of interpretation to the widely 
held view that allegorical correspondences are by nature non-historical and thus as a 
method it is held "to be entirely or almost entirely invalid. " James Barr, Old and New In 
Interpretation: A Study on the Two Testaments (London: SCM Press, 1966), 103-4. The 
idea. that the parables were not originally allegories when Jesus taught them is a view 
which has been widely adopted as a result of Julicher's work and has been debated in 
recent times. 
4 Warren S. Kissinger, The Parable: ofJesus: A History of Interpretation and Bibliograph» ATLA 
Bibliography Series, ed. Kenneth E. Rowe (Metuchen, N. J. and London: Scarecrow 
Press, 1979), xiii; A. M. Hunter, Interpreting the Parables (London: SCM Press, 1960), 
38; James C. Little, "Parable Research in the Twentieth Century I: The Predecessors of 
J. Jeremias, " Expository Times 87 (1976): 357. 
5 Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), 96-7. Following Gadamer, Louth attributes the modern attitude towards 
allegory to the prejudices which theology has inherited from the Enlightenment. These 
prejudices include the search for an objective meaning in a text through the use of 
methods, the Romantic concept of meaning located in the reconstruction of the author's 
intentions, and the attempt to break free from tradition. Ibid., 98-107. 
6 Ambrose, Expositio Evangelii secundum Luca» VII. 212-44 (S. C. 52.88-98); Augustine, 
Quaestronum Evangeliorum, 11.19 (C. C. S. L. 44B. 62-3). Even modern exegetical 
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More recently, allegory has come under criticism from a more sophisticated 
biblical hermeneutic. The question no longer concerns whether a parable contains one 
point or moral, as Jülicher argued, or is open to multiple meanings which the allegorists 
tended to find. Rather, the problem now revolves around the manner by which a parable 
projects a `narrative world'. Allegory is chastised for breaking this projected world up 
into a series of cognitive truths which results in the fracturing of this world into a 
collection of theological truths. It approaches a parable as a source of propositional 
truths and misses the projected world into which the reader or hearer is meant to enter 7 
From the perspective of reception theory, the allegorical method of interpretation 
is significant for that fact that the interpreter is concerned with applying the text to his 
audience's situation. In this sense, the competing schools of Alexandria, which focused 
on the sensus allegoricus, and Antioch, with its emphasis on the senses litteralis, shared a 
common goal, "the transposition of the canonical text 
... 
out of its historical past and 
into the present; rendering it not only understandable, but also, so to speak, up-to- 
date. "8 The school at Antioch tried to save the past literal meaning encoded in the text 
by translating it into a form which was understandable in the present. While in 
Alexandria, they did not set aside the literal meaning, but sought "to interpret the text for 
the recipient's changed situation in such a way that the new spiritual meaning is still 
justified as an adaptation of the old, literal meaning. "9 Jauss views both of these 
positions as two sides of the same coin. They both attempt to form the same link with 
the text: one is more reconstructive by nature and the other more applied. The unity of 
interpretation, explanation, and application in the allegorical method will contribute to 
the manner by which the various interpretations and receptions of the parable and its 
interpretations will actively shape the Christian tradition; it will, hopefully, demonstrate 
the norm forming function of interpretations. '0 
The diversity of interpretations offered during the Patristic period tests the 
applicability of reception theory to this form of biblical genre. However, this diversity 
practices do not escape this same criticism. "Norman Perrin has pointed out that there 
is perhaps no plainer example of the exegete's presuppositions affecting his exegesis than 
in parable interpretation. " Kissinger, xvii-xviii. 
7 Dan Otto Via Jr., The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1967), 4,25-42,79-87. 
8 Hans Robert Jauss, "Limits and Tasks of Literary Hermeneutics, " Diogenes, 109 (1980), 98. 
9 Idem, "The Theory of Reception: A Retrospective of its Unrecognized Prehistory, " in Literary 
Theory Today, ed. Peter Collier and Helge Geyer-Ryan (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), 55. 
10 This decision has another advantage in that we have an extended period in church history in 
which one particular method was practised. 
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begins to coalesce into a few distinct trajectories or traditions of interpretation after 
researching many of the homilies and commentaries written on this parable during the 
Patristic period. While it is not possible to label a particular interpretation according to 
only one particular trajectory because these trajectories often overlap with each other, the 
following three trajectories of interpretation are offered as a means of classification and in 
order to help facilitate the discussion in the first section of this chapter. 
A. Polemical-theological interpretation: does the father who invites the guests to the 
feast in the parable represent a God who is both gracious and judgmental? 
B. Kerygmatic or Ethnic-Ethical interpretation: how do the invited guests and their 
responses to the invitation represent different types of people and their relationship 
to salvation? 
C. Soteriological interpretation: what is the significance of the wedding garment for 
the life and salvation of the Christian? 
A. Polemical-Theological Interpretation 
Various Gnostic interpreters, the Valcntinians in particular, appealed to the 
parables in order to substantiate their doctrines. I l Irenaeus clearly realised that the 
various parables and metaphors in the New Testament were open to the "crafty 
manipulations" of the Gnostic teachers who forced the meaning of the text to reflect 
their theological position. 12 In response to this, Irenaeus and Origen argue that this 
parable should be understood as teaching the orthodox doctrine that there was one god 
who both saved and exercised judgement. Thus, when interpreted correctly, the parable 
of the Wedding Feast conflicts with the Valentinian teaching that the Old Testament 
and the New Testament spoke of two different gods. While Irenaeus does not mention 
the Valentinians directly, his concern to refute their teachings is clearly seen in the first 
lines of his exposition of this parable. "For he makes known through these his words, the 
tt For example, the Valentinians interpreted the symbolism of the numbers 1,3,6,9 and 11 in 
the parable of the `Workers in the Vineyard' (Matthew 20: 1-16) as symbolising the 
thirty aeons of the Pleroma since the sum of these numbers totalled thirty. Irenaeus, 
Adverses Haereses, I. 1.3 (P. C 7.467-70; Libras quinque adversus haereses, ed. W. W. 
Harvey [Cambridge: Typis Academicis, 1852] 1.16-20). See also Tertullian, Liber de 
Anima, XVIII (P. L 2.719-22; English trans.: Ante-Ncene Christian Library, 15.449-54) 
for his refutation of the Valentinian interpretation of the parable of the 'Ten Virgins' 
(Matthew 25: 1-13) to show that the intellect is not above or higher than the bodily 
senses and what we learn through them. 
12 Irenacus, Adversus Haena, 1.3.6 (P. G< 7.467-70; Harvey, 1.16-20); Frances M. Young, 
Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of the Christian Culture (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 19- 
20. Bertrand de Margerie S. J., An Introduction to the History of Exegesis: The Greek 
Fathers, trans. Leonard Maluf (Petersham, MA: Saint Bede's Publications, 1993), 1.52-3. 
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Lord clearly declared all, that there is one king and Lord of all, the Father. "13 This 
theme runs through his explanation of the parable in the character of the father who 
prepared the wedding feast for his son, invited everyone, burnt the city of those who 
killed his messengers, and cast the guest without the wedding garment into the outer 
darkness. In particular, the action of the father casting the guest without the wedding 
garment into the outer darkness demonstrated that the same Lord that invites us to 
salvation also exercises judgement. 14 
Origen specifically addresses the heretical teachings of the Valentinians that the 
God who is portrayed as judgmental in the Old Testament and the God of the New 
Testament were two different beings. 15 The fact that the king is portrayed as good (he 
invites all to the feast he has prepared) and just (he destroys the cities of those who killed 
his servants) in the parable confirms that God possesses both of these traits (mercy and 
righteousness) without contradiction according to Origen. Thus, God is the same God 
in both Old and New Testaments. In his comments on Matthew 22: 1-14, Origen picks 
up this line of argument at several points 16. He asks, "What does it this mean to you? Is 
the one who gets angry the same as the one preparing the feast for his son, the father of 
Christ, or is the one who gets angry different from his father? "17 For Origen, the answer 
lies in the manner in which God accommodates himself to our understanding through 
13 "Manifeste enim et per haec verba sua ostendit Dominus omnia, et quoniam unus rev et Dominus 
omnium Pater. " Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV. (viii. 5 (P. (2 7.1095; Harvey, 2.281; 
Eng. trans. in: Five Books of S. Irenaeus Against Heresies, trans. John Keble, in A Library of 
the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church [Oxford: James Parker & Co., 1872], 426). This 
is one of the distinctive elements of Irenaeus' exegesis, to show that the same God is at 
work in both Testaments. Margerie, 1.53, '56. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Origen, De principiis, 5.2 (On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth [Gloucester, MA: 
Peter Smith, 1973; originally London: S. P. C. K., 1936], 101-3). According to 
Valentinian teachings, the God of the Old Testament was a demiurge while in the New 
Testament, we see redemption accomplished through the `aeon' of Christ who united 
himself with the man Jesus to bring the knowledge (gnosis) of salvation to mankind. The 
best Christian sources on Valentinianism are found in Irenaeus, Adverses Haereses, I and 
111.4 (P. G. 7.438-706,855-57))and Tertullian, Adversis Valentianos, (P. L. 2.559-632). 
These and other documents on the Valentinians are collected in Werner Förster, ed. 
Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, trans. R. Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972; 
from Die Gnosis, Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1969-71), especially pages 121-243. 
16 Like Irenaeus, he does not mention the Valentinians by name in this section of his 
commentary but his attack on their theology corresponds with the same criticism he 
makes against them in book X. 12 of his commentary on Matthew and in De principiis. 
17 Origen, In Mattheium, XVII. 18 (Matthduserkllirung ed. Erich Klostermann, Die griechischen 
christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte ed. Ernst Benz, vol. 10 [Leipzig: J. 
C. Hinrichs, 19351,637. A partial English translation of this parable is available in 
Harold Smith, Ante-Nicene Exegesis of the Gospels vol. 5, Translations of Christian 
Literature- Series VI [London: S. P. C. K., 1928], 21-25). 
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anthropomorphisms and anthropopathism. While we will never be able to fully 
understand God apart from such human analogies until our sins and weaknesses have 
been done away with at the resurrection of the dead, we can still understand the deeper 
truths of God which are taught through these anthropomorphisms. The father's action 
of sending his army to burn the city of those who reject the invitation should not be 
taken as teaching that God is a vindictive judge. Rather, it is an analogy to help us to 
understand something of God's righteousness and judgement and, therefore, the literal 
(fleshly) meaning of these anthropomorphisms was not the goal of biblical interpretation, 
but they were the starting point to reveal deeper spiritual truths about God. 18 
The polemical-theological trajectory of interpretation, in particular its anti- 
Gnostic polemical interpretation, died off once the questions which the Valentinians 
raised were no longer being asked. These were not questions or issues picked up by later 
exegetes. In other words, Irenaeus and Origen's interpretations were, in part, answers to 
questions which arose through confrontations with Valentinian teachings. Once these 
questions were no longer being asked, we no longer see answers along this line being 
found by later commentators in the text. 
B. Kerygnatic or Ethnic-Ethical Interpretation 
The main questions addressed in this trajectory of interpretation are (1) the issue 
of the kingdom of God being taken from the Jews and given to the Gentiles, and (2) the 
interpretation of what the different characters response to the invitation might signify. 
These may appear as separate categories but the degree to which these two issues overlap 
in the exegesis of the parable makes such a distinction difficult and possibly pointless. 
The first point to be noticed in this trajectory of interpretation is that it arises 
from the answers which were given in the polemical-theological trajectory. When 
Irenacus argued that the parable taught that God was the same God in both Testaments, 
part of his argument was based on the idea that the first servants sent by the king to 
invite the guests to the feast referred to the prophets in the Old Testament and the 
servants who were sent later were the apostles. 19 In doing so, he employed a typological 
form of interpretation which was practised in the early church. This allowed Irenaeus to 
18 Origen, XVII. 18-19 (G CS. 10.635-40). One of the errors of the Valentinians was that they 
interpreted these anthropomorphisms at a literal level. Idem, Dc principiis, IV. 11.1-2 (Butterworth, 267-73); Manlio Simonetti, BiblicalInterpresation in the Early Church: An 
Historical Introduction to Patristic Bxegesi. & trans. John A. Hughes, eds. Anders Bergquist 
and Markus Bockmuehl (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd, 1994), 42. 
19 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, IV. lviii. 6 (P. G. 7.1095-6; Harvey, 2.281). 
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recognise that there was a continuity between the two Testaments implicit within the 
parable. Jesus was taught about in the Law, spoken of by the prophets, but now has been 
clearly proclaimed by the apostles. 20 Thus, Collingwood's logic of question and answer 
provides us with a model by which to understand the continuity and divergence in the 
history of this parable's interpretation. The questions which Valentinianism raised were 
answered by Irenaeus and Origen arguing that this parable demonstrated, at an 
inferential level, that God was the same in both Testaments. This answer then leads on 
to questions concerning the relationship between the Jewish nation in the Old Testament 
and the Gentiles in the New Testament within the context of this parable. These are not 
totally new issues being raised but are genetically related by the logic of question and 
answer to the previous interpretations. 
The area of greatest consensus in the history of this parable's interpretation is the 
view that this parable teaches the replacement of the Jewish nation with the Gentiles as 
the recipients of the Kingdom of God. In fact, this opinion is almost universally held 
throughout the history of the church. Even today it is difficult to find a reader who 
would not understand the parable in this manner. This is all the more surprising when 
we consider that there is nothing within the parable that explicitly makes this point. 21 
The dominant impetus for this view arises from the manner in which the intertextual 
relationships within the Gospel of Matthew function to enable or restrict the range of 
play of understanding. 22 A quote from Jonathan Culler on the role of intertextuality 
helps us to understand this process and as a result why the concept of replacement is 
consistently recognised by the various interpreters in the parable of the Wedding Feast. 
`Intertextuality thus has a double focus. On the one hand, it calls our attention 
to the importance of prior texts, insisting that the autonomy of texts is a 
misleading notion and that a work has the meaning it does only because certain 
things have previously been written. Yet in so far as it focuses on intelligibility, 
on meaning, 'intertextuality' leads us to consider prior texts as contributions to a 
code which makes possible the various effects of signification. 23 
20 Ibid., IV. 14.2-3; IV. 26.1 (P. G. 7.1011-12; Harvey, 2.185-6); Simonetti, 19-22. 
21 "Contrary to what one is often led to believe, one discovers that, even when the so-called 
'criterion of dissimilarity' is applied to these parables (Mt. 22, Lk. 14), they are 
remarkably free of what is otherwise dearly known of an evangelist's or the early church's 
christology, soteriology (together, the kerygma), ecclesiology or view of missions. " Eugene 
E. Lemcio, "The Parables of the Great Supper and the Wedding Feast: History, 
Redaction and Canon, " Horizons in Biblical Theolog 
,8 (1,1986), 8,14. 
22 For a fuller discussion of intertextuality see "Thesis 2" in chapter 3. 
23 Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 104. See my discussion of intertextuality in 
relation to Jauss' second thesis in chapter 3. 
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The significance of the relationship between the parable of the `Wedding Feast' 
and the preceding parable of the `Wicked Tenants' (Matthew 21: 33-4 1) is brought by 
the manner in which the successive r ading of the parables within one of the Gospels shapes 
the competency of the reader to understand the later parables in the Gospel. Between the two 
parables, Matthew records the following statement, "Therefore I tell you, the kingdom of 
God will be taken away from you and given to a people that produces the fruits of the 
kingdom. " (RSV, Matthew 21: 43) This is an important intertextual reference which 
causes the reader to recognise the replacement theme not only in the parable of the 
Wicked Tenants but in the Wedding Feast also. 24 Thus, the manner in which Matthew 
has arranged and redacted his material shapes the competency of the reader to 
understand the parables through their successive relationship within the text. This is 
especially important if we consider that texts were experienced in a linear fashion in the 
ancient world. As they were read aloud, the meaning of the text developed in the linear 
succession of its elements. 25 What is interesting to note though, is that none of the 
commentaries prior to the Reformation referred to Matthew 21: 43 in order to defend the 
replacement concept. I think this is not only because of this verse's proximity to the 
parable but also because the same concept is taught at several other locations in the New 
Testament and was a widely held doctrine in the history of the church. Therefore, such a 
reading would seem obvious and natural and would not need justification. 
This would seem to indicate that aspects of the reader's horizon of expectation which 
arise from 'intertextuality'arc more stable over time than those aspects of the reader's horizon 
that arise from the prejudices which are handed down through the effective history of a 
tradition. 26 On the one hand, we must admit that in a purely semantic manner the text 
24 This is especially important if we consider the `linear' nature by which texts were read during 
that period as opposed to the manner by which we approach the Bible according to the 
individual sections today. "A text was a 'linear' reality, like a piece of music, its secrets 
gradually unveiled through time, as the performance unfolds, depending for the 
communication of shape on conventional forms, on repetition and allusion, on mimesis (imitation) and on the consequent anamisis (recollection) of themes, phrases, narratives, 
that have gone before. " Frances Young, The Art of Performance: Towards a Theology of 
Holy Scripture (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990), 108. Trilling makes the 
case even stronger by attempting to show that the two parables are structurally parallel to 
each other at several points such as Lord/King, rejection of servants, the transferral of the 
vineyard/invitation, destruction of the unworthy. Trilling, "Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte 
des Gleichnisses vom Hochxeir mahl Mt 22,1-15, " 254-7. 
25 The practice of reading aloud extended to reading in private also. George Kennedy, New 
Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1984), 5-6. 
26 For a discussion of the manner in which a text is inscribed and fixed as opposed to spoken 
discourse see: Paul Ricceur, Interpretation Theory. Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning 
(Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 25-44. 
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is fixed and thus, stable in one sense, in that its message is inscribed and can be passed on 
to countless generations with little change. On the other hand, we must remember that 
Gadamer and others have shown that every time we understand a text, we understand it 
within our horizon and thus, understand it differently. What this particular instance 
indicates is that `intertextuality' can in certain instances play a very strong role in 
stabilising the meaning of the text across successive horizons of understanding. 
When other passages are cited to justify or explain the replacement heme they 
tend to be either Matthew 8: 11-13 or Romans 2: 13-16. Irenaeus appealed to Matthew 
8: 11-13 to show that "through the preaching of the apostles many from the east and the 
west shall believe in him and recline in the kingdom of heaven with Abraham and Isaac 
and Jacob, participating with them in the banquet. In this regard, we see one and the 
same God who first chose the patriarchs, visited his people, and then called the 
Gentiles. "27 
Not only is the theme of replacement recognised in the parable, but some of the 
commentators also perceive a reason why this took place. This line of interpretation 
most likely sprang from the early church's confrontation with Judaism and served as an 
apologetical argument not only for God's rejection of Israel but also for his election of a 
new people, the Gentile church. According to Origen, the different reactions to the 
invitation represent the different divisions between human souls. Those who were first 
invited represent the noble Jerusalemites whom God fed with strong teachings in the Old 
Testament and desired to come to the feast 28 However, they were not willing to accept 
the invitation and as a result are guilty of rejecting the food God has to offer. 29 
Chrysostom takes a similar line of thought but pushes the point much further. Both 
before and after the crucifixion, God has tried to persuade the people of Israel and to win 
27 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, IV. Iviii. 10 (Harvey, 2.284-5). Jerome is one of the few who 
defended the replacement interpretation. For him, Romans 2: 13-16 provides the 
reference to explain why the Jews were rejected at this point in the parable. "When the 
Gentiles do the law by nature, they condemn the Jews who do not follow the written 
law. " Jerome, Commentariorum in Mattheum, III lines 1694-1704 (C. C. S. L. 77.201). 
28 I have translated "EVyEVwv Ttvwv y, vxtaV 'IopaT1AiTK& v" as "noble souls of the 
Jerusalemite's. " This phrase appears to point to their special relationship with God as the 
children of his covenant in the Old Testament. Origen, In Mattheium, XVIL22 (G. C. S. 
10.644). 
29 "To fTOIIIaCÖIzEVOv &pIOTOV & QTpEäS kV TNEVGIaTIKO'ls AOy(OIc Tpogf s, Origen, 
In Mattheium, XVII. 22 (G. C. S. 10.643). In the context of his discussion of the parable, 
"the meal" refers to the "strong and eloquent teachings" found in the Bible. Jerome 
follows Origen when he understands the "bulls and the fattened ones" carnal metaphors 
which refer to the spiritual; the doctrines of God's law. Jerome, Commentariorum in 
MattheumIII lines 1664-75 (C. C. S. L. 77.200). "at QTEpEal i oaV Kal Ao'yIKal TWV 
µvoTrlpI 
.v TOO 
AEOV Tpoq)ai. " Origen, XVII. 15 (G. CS. 10.629). 
231 
them over. Their unwillingness to accept the invitation demonstrates an ungrateful 
attitude towards God's providential care for them. "What then could be more ungrateful 
then they, when being bidden to a marriage, and that of a King's marriage, and of a King 
making a marriage for his son? "30 Not only that, but he interprets the parable as 
teaching that they are guilty of having killed the prophets, then the son (making an 
intertextual connection between this parable and the Wicked Tenants), and then they 
refused the invitation. Thus, according to Chrysostom, their response to the invitation 
reveals an escalation from the lesser crime of negligence to the greater crime of murder. 
The responses of those who reject the invitation and abuse the servants leads to a 
prophetical statement concerning the destruction of the nation of Israel which 
Chrysostom perceived as having been historically fulfilled. The destruction of Jerusalem 
by the Romans was the fulfilment of the King sending his army to burn the city in 
Matthew 22: 7.31 This historical-prophetical interpretation appears to have its roots in 
Irenaeus who understood this section of the parable in light of the sovereignty of the 
Lord as taught in the Old Testament. All men, armies, and nations belong to God and 
are his instruments for judgcment. 32 In the eastern Greek tradition, Theophylact 
continued Chrysostom's interpretation of this point some seven hundred years later 
when he cites Josephus' narration of the destruction of Jerusalem as proof of the 
fulfilment of the prophetic element of this parable. 33 This shift from a salvation-history 
to a historical-prophetical interpretation illustrates a common element between 
prophetical and allegorical interpretation: both require that the reader possess a code in 
order to determine the relationships between the text and its referent. In this instance, 
the two main elements in the replacement theme, the guilt of the nation of Israel and the 
city referring to Jerusalem, provides the common ground where the prophetical and the 
salvation-history codes overlap. 
In contrast to the historical-prophetical view, Origen read this section according 
to a framework of pure spiritual teaching. Those who have rejected the invitation are 
destroyed by God, not through human agency but through the host of God's angels. In 
this way the burning of the city in the parable represents the destruction of not only the 
30 Chrysostom, Commentariorum in Matthaeum, LXIX. 1 (P. G. 58.647; N. A. 
-N. F. X. 421). 
31 Ibid.; also Eusebius, Psalmos, XLIV. 4 (P. G. 86.1.19-24). 
32 Quoting Psalm 24.1, Irenaeus, Adverw Haereses, IV. lviii. 8 (AG 7.1066; Harvey, 2.282). 
33 Theophylacti, Enarratio in Evangelium Mattlau, MIL 117 (P. G. 123.387,386). For 
Theophylact, one of the reasons why the Jews rejected the invitation is that they were 
not willing to listen to what the prophets had to teach them, the prophets were not able 
to persuade them. 
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ruler of this age but also of the false teachers and "what is falsely called knowledge. "34 In 
the Western Latin church, Origen's more spiritual or doctrinal interpretation of the 
judgement by the king in the parable was received by Jerome35, Gregory the Great36, Leo 
the Great37, and Thomas Aquinas. 38 
Once the reasons for the transfer of the kingdom from the Jews to the Gentiles 
was recognised, it was an understandable step to proceed to ask questions about the other 
characters in the parable. If those who ignore and kill the messengers represent the 
Jewish nation, then who are those who return to their farms and businesses, or those 
found on the outer roads? For Origen, the excuses offered by these characters teach that 
some people are entangled in the affairs of this world and as a result, place the concerns 
of this world before the kingdom of God 39 Because they have their hearts set on gaining 
wealth, they miss out on the meal that God has to offer them. 40 In this way, Origen 
introduces an ascetic dimension into the interpretation of this parable which gains almost 
universal acceptance by those who follow him. 41 
It is worth noting that the early commentators are fairly restrained in drawing out 
the allegorical significance of the excuses of those who turn away and return to their 
farms or businesses. This restraint is most clearly seen if we compare the interpretation 
of this parable with Augustine's interpretation of the parable of the Great Feast in Luke 
14. There, each of the excuses is allegorically explained. The man who goes to check on 
34 Origen, In Matthaeum, XVII. 23 (G. C. S. 10.648). While he does mention the destruction of 
the city of Jerusalem in his commentary it plays a secondary role to what he sees as the 
more important teaching of the parable at this point. 
35 Jerome admits that this judgment may also refer to the destruction of Jerusalem by the 
Romans under Vespian and Tatian. Jerome, Commentariorum in Mattheum, III lines 
1688-93 (C. C. S. L. 77.200-1). 
36 Joannis Maldonati, Commenterii in Quatuor Evangelistas (London and Paris: Moguntiae, 
1853-54: originally in 1596), 2.303-4; A Commentary on the Holy Gospels, trans. George 
J. Davie, Catholic Standard Library (London: John Hodges, 1888), 2.230. 
37 Leo the Great, Sermon L (P. L. 54.305-8; The Fathers of the Church, 93.214-17). 
38 Thomas Aquinas, Canna Aurea: In Matthaeum, 1.11.22.7. Aquinas mentions Chrysostom's 
prophetical view and Jerome's possibility that it could be read both ways. However, in 
citing the fathers he places Gregory the Great and Origen's views after Chrysostom and 
Jerome. Thus, when reading the Canna Auren, one is lead to the conclusion that 
Origen's view is the preferred interpretation as it comes at the conclusion to his 
discussion of this verse. 
39 Origen, In Matthaeum, XVII. 15 (G. C. S. 10.629). 
40 The parable of the Pearl of Great Price illustrates this point for Origen. He believes that 
parable demonstrates the correct disposition one should have: a person should be willing 
to forsake all in order to possess what God has to offer. Origen, In Matthaeum, XVII. 23 
(G. C. S. 10.646). 
41 Almost half of Chrysostom's discussion of this parable is dedicated to praising the virtues of 
the ascetic lifestyle. Chrysostom, Commentariorum in Matthaeum, LXIX. 2-4 (A. Cy. 
78.651-54; N. P. 
-N. F. X. 423-26). 
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a farm he has purchased represents the spirit of domination. The five pair of oxen signify 
the five senses and this, in turn, speaks about the things of this world and the seeking of 
physical proof for the gospel as Thomas did. And the one who has married a wife is 
guilty of the lusts of the flesh 42 When we return to the history of the interpretation of 
Matthew 22: 1-14, Theophylact offers one of the more fanciful interpretations but in 
contrast to Augustine's interpretation of the parable of the Great Feast in Luke 14, he is 
very restrained. According to Theophylact, the one returning to his field denotes those 
who love the flesh, for the field functions as a symbol for the body. The one who returns 
to his business is a person who loves profits. "This parable shows those who fail in the 
spiritual wedding, and those who fail to have a friendship or relationship with Christ. If 
you fail in these two, you fail in all others either because of carnal hedonism or because of 
their desire for gain. "43 Hilary of Poitiers presents a good example of how most of the 
commentators understood the excuses of those who turned away from the invitation 
when he states that this section of the parable represents "those who are caught in the 
ambitions of this age 
... 
and many on account of the longing for wealth in business are 
held back. "44 This ascetic perspective persisted through the Medieval period also. 45 And 
finally, some draw out the ethical point that those who turn back to their farms or 
businesses are guilty of the lesser crime than those who mistreat and kill the servants. 46 
If the polemical-theological trajectory of interpretation died out because those 
questions were no longer being asked, then the kerygmatic or ethnic-ethical trajectory 
demonstrates just the opposite. One of the conclusions which this trajectory reveals is 
the manner in which Origen's interpretation of this passage was so widely received up 
until the fifth century. It appears that each commentator is dialoguing with Origen. In 
the eastern Greek tradition, Chrysostom's historical-prophetical reading of the king 
sending his army to burn the city represents a divergence from Origen's comments. The 
Latin church to a large extent agreed with Origen's spiritual understanding that this 
42 Augustine summarises his discussion of the excuses with: "The lust of the flesh, I have 
married a wife. The lust of the eyes, I have bought five pairs of oxen. The ambition of 
life, I have bought a farm. " Augustine, Sermo, C)QI. 6 (P. L. 38.646; Sermons on Selected 
Lessons of the New Testament vol. 1, S Matthew. S. Mark, S. Luke [London: John Henry 
Parker, J. G. F. and J. Rivington, 1844], 1.463) 
43 Theophylacti, Enarratio in Evangelium Matthaei, XXII. 117 (P. G. 123.383,384) 
44 Hilary of Poitiers, In Matthaeum, 22.5 (S. C. 258.148) 
45 Vpalafrid Strabo, Glossa Ordinarsa, Evangelium Matthaeum XXII. 5 (P. L CXVI. 156); 
Thomas Aquinas, Catena Aurea: In Matthaeum, 22.5. 
46 Origen, In Matthaeum, XVII. 15 (G. C. S. 10.629); Jerome, Commentariorum in Mattheum, III 
lines 1674-88 (C. C. S. L. 77.200); Hilary In Matthaeum, 22.5 (S C. 258.148) 
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referred to God's judgement against false doctrines which is exercised through his host of 
angels. 
C. Soteriological Interpretation 
The parable of the Wedding Feast concludes with the incident of the king 
entering the feast to inspect the guests and having the guest not wearing the wedding 
garment cast into the `outer darkness. ' The severity of this action and its eschatological 
overtones quite naturally raised questions about the nature of this guest's transgression. 
In order to discuss the interpretation this action, I think it is best if we take a step back 
and consider the overall context of the wedding feast as it would have been understood 
within the horizon of Jesus' and Matthew's audiences. In the Old Testament, marriage 
was often used as a sign for the covenent relationship between God and Israel (Hosea 
2: 19; Isaiah 54: 6; and Ezekiel 16: 7). The Rabbis often spoke of the covenant at Mount 
Sinai in terms of a marriage contract, with Moses serving as the friend of the groom and 
Israel as the bridc. 47 In the prophetical books of the Old Testament, this theme was 
given an eschatological dimension, with the arrival of the Messiah, the wedding bond 
would be renewed. 48 This appears to have been an active element in the background to 
both Jesus' and the New Testament author's use of this term. 49 However, as we saw in 
the replacement theme, it is not Israel who shall be the bride but those who are members 
of the new covenant community. 50 
Origen's commentary demonstrates that these concepts are part of his horizon of 
expectations. As he initiates his discussion of this passage, he writes "In this parable we 
can clearly see the idea that the human king is God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. 
And the wedding feast for the king's son signifies the restoration (&TroKCtTdGTaott) of 
the bride, the church of Christ to Christ, her bridegroom. "51 The term, 
QTrOKQTäaTaatc, `restoration' is a very theologically significant term in Origen's 
47 H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch 
(Munich: Beck, 1922 
- 
1961), 1.969,2.393. See the article by Harald Riesenfeld for the 
allegorical references in this and other parables to certain Old Testament themes, "The 
Parables in the Synoptic and Johannine Traditions, " Svensk Exegetisck Arsbok, 25 (1960): 
37-61. 
48 Ibid., 1.517; Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds., Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), s. v. 
"yaµicw. " by Ethelbert Stauffer, 1.654-55. 
49 "In the symbolic language of the East, the wedding is the symbol of the day of salvation, as 
the language of the Apocalypse bears witness: `The marriage of the Lamb is come. '" 
Joachim Jeremias, The Parabks ofJesus (London: SCM Press, 1963), 117. 
50 Stauffer, "yai taw, " 1.655. 
51 Origen, In Matthaeum, XVIL 15 (G. CS 10.628). 
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vocabulary. He uses it to refer to restoration of creation at the eschaton and also the 
present nature of the believer's restored relationship to Christ. 52 It possesses a dual 
temporal reference which plays an important role in how an interpreter approaches the 
question of the wedding garment. Given the dual temporal framework within which the 
`wedding' is understood we can see how the interpretation of the significance of the 
wedding garment in the parable could be open to a wide range of speculation. Does the 
wedding garment relate to one's admission to the present church (Ephesians 5: 32)? Or is 
it something which one needs for admission to the eschatological marriage (Revelation 
19)? 
Normally with an image or symbol, such as the `wedding garment' there are 
multiple resonances as to how this symbol is understood. Symbols contain a surplus of 
meaning as Paul Ricceur argues. This surplus is the result of a tension between the literal 
interpretation of the symbol and its metaphorical interpretation. In this instance, the 
"wedding garment" is not a literally a material piece of cloth but metaphorically speaks of 
something else which concerns this person's relationship to God. It is through the 
assimilation or mediation of these conflicting interpretations (the literal and the 
metaphorical) that an extension of meaning takes place. This "tension is not translatable 
because they [metaphors and symbols] create meaning. This is not to say that they 
cannot be paraphrased, just that such a paraphrase is infinite and incapable of exhausting 
the innovative meaning. "53 The relevance of this for Wirkungsgeschichte concerns how 
different interpreters perceive the different referential dimensions or possibilities of a 
symbol. "There is no need to deny the concept in order to admit that symbols give rise to 
an endless exegesis. If no concept can exhaust the requirement of further thinking borne 
by symbols, this idea signifies only that no given categorization can embrace all the 
semantic possibilities ofa symboL"54 At the same time, a symbol's interpretations may 
extend the symbol into something which is more than was previously recognised or 
collapse it into something which is less through the attempt to clearly explicate the 
meaning of the symbol. 
52 G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), s. v. 
"&'ROKaTaoTÜOIc, " 195; for the Jewish background to this term see Strack-Billerbeck, 
IV. 799-976. This term ultimately will play a decisive role in Origen's downfall, in both 
the Origenist controversy in the fourth century and especially the anathema published 
against Origen in 532 A. D. he is criticised for teaching that everything, including the 
demons, will be restored to the position they occupied before the fall. Margerie, History 
of Exegesis, 1.96,226; Simonetti, Bi6Gcal Interpretation, 51, note 2. 
53 Ricceur, Interpretation Theory, 52. 
54 Ibid., 57 emphasis mine. 
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In the case of the symbol of the wedding garment, there are already certain pre- 
established understandings concerning the meaning of this symbol which were inherited 
from the Old Testament, Jewish, and early Christian interpretive traditions. The 
interesting issue is which of the various interpretative choices are adopted and why. Very 
early in the Patristic period the concept of the `garment' or `robe' was understood as a 
reference to the rite of baptism. Because the early interpreters approached the New 
Testament with this functioning as part of their preunderstanding, it is not surprising to 
find "that the sacramental theology attested in the patristic catecheses was refracted in the 
exegesis" at various points. 55 Post-baptismal reinvestment conveyed the idea of the 
restoration of the individual to their proper relationship with God and inclusion in the 
new covenant community. 56 Tertullian spoke of this in the following manner, "He [the 
baptism candidate] receives the former garment, this clearly points to that which Adam 
by transgressing had lost. "57 Baptism is the rite by which one receives the garment of 
forgiveness which restores a person to his or her original relationship with God which 
Adam had forfeited. This is what allowed one to enter the wedding feast, the church. 58 
However, this view was not widely received and fell out of use by the end of the third 
century with Cyril of Jerusalem being one of the last to expound this interpretation. 59 
55 Yves Tissot, "Patristic Allegories of the Lukan Parable of the Two Sons (Luke 15: 11-32), " 
trans. Donald G. Miller, in Exegesis: Problems of Method and Exercises in Reading (Genesis 
22 and Luke 15), ed. Francois Bovon and Grdgoire Rouiller, Pittsburg Theological 
Monograph Series, ed. Dikran Y. Hadidian, vol. 21 (Pittsburg: Pickwick Press, 1978), 
377. 
56 See also Jeremias' discussion that "investiture with anew garment is therefore a symbol of the 
New Age. " Jeremias, The Parables ofJesus, 130; 188-89. 
57 While Tertullian is addressing the issue of the cebaptism of those who had fallen, away his 
views at this point are similar to his view of baptism. Tertullian, Depudicitia, 9.16 (P. L. 
2.105 1). S. Thelwall translated this difficult sentence as "He receives again the pristine 
garment 
- 
the condition, to wit, which Adam by transgression had lost. " "On 
Modesty, " in The Writings of Tertu&an, trans. S. Thelwall, Ante-Nicene Christian 
Library, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1880), 
79. In this chapter, Tertullian focuses primarily on the parable of the prodigal son, and 
his discussion of the garment/robe is that which the father commands to be placed on 
the younger son when he returns. However, Tertullian explicitly links this with the 
wedding garment in our parable in 9.11. Thus, the intertextual connection between the 
robe (oToXhv 'thv 1rpt )Trlv in Luke 15: 22) and the wedding garment (Mugu c 
ydpov) forms a connection between his understanding of the two parables. 
58 Clementine Homilies, VIII. 22, in Ante-Nicene Christian Library ed. Allan Menzies, vol. 17 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1870), 147. 
59 In his "Lectures on Baptism, " he cites this parable to teach that the wedding garment denotes 
baptism and even more significantly, it is the eschatological garment of salvation. The 
garment speaks of the remission of sins by which our souls are cleansed and we are 
adorned with salvation as Isaiah prophesied. "Let my soul rejoice in the Lord: for He 
hath clothed me with a garment of salvation, and a robe of gladness: He hach crowned 
me with a garland as a bridegroom, and decked me with ornaments as a bride. " (quoting 
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Origen's commentary provides an alternative interpretation of the wedding 
garment, one which is difficult to summarise because he recognises several New 
Testament teachings or referential possibilities in the wedding garment. His 
commentary also provides the seed bed for his successors to develop and clarify the 
meaning of this garment. From our perspective, Origen's multiplicity in references and 
meaning for the symbol of the wedding garment stands in contrast to modern exegetical 
practices which search for a clear or stable meaning to the text. However, I think one of 
the reasons why his work was so widely received in the Patristic church was for this very 
reason; his polyphonic interpretations provided a rich seed bed for subsequent 
interpreters' theological reflection on the passage. 
Origen's discussion of the parable is divided into two sections. In the first 
section, he explains the interpretation of the parable in a fairly straightforward, yet 
allegorical, manner. When the guests enter the wedding feast, they remove their old 
clothes, which represents their evil lives and what is foreign to the wedding feast, and put 
on the proper garment. This garment is a heart of compassion (quoting Colossians 
3: 12), "For this is the wedding garment. "60 The image does not end there, for he writes 
that the one not wearing the garment represents the person who has not had his character 
transformed, been renewed, or put on the Lord Jesus Christ. 61 Origen attempts to bring 
together several New Testament metaphors relating to salvation in his interpretation of 
the wedding garment. On the one hand, he establishes cross references to other New 
Testament metaphors in order to reinforce his point that the wedding garment speaks 
about the transformed life of the believer. On the other hand, he does not harmonise 
these different metaphors into one image, but rather preserves their distinctive 
contributions and thus, his interpretation of the wedding garment is polyphonic by 
nature. 62 Origen did not reject the historical nature of the biblical accounts but rather 
searched for a meaning that was richer and fuller than a literal or historical approach 
would allow. The polyvalent nature of the Bible and the allegorical method allowed for 
this. "Origen declares the whole Scriptural record to be God's symphony, wherein the 
inexpert listener may think he perceives jarring notes whilst the man whose car has been 
Isaiah 61: 10) Cyril of Jerusalem, "On Baptism" §2 The Catechetical Lectures, 3 (N. P. 
- 
N. F. 7.14). Jeremias argues that Isaiah 61: 10 functions as the contextual background to 
the wedding garment but does not mention Cyril's earlier recognition of this same 
intertextual connection. Jeremias, The Parables ofJesus, 188-89. 
60 Origen, XVII. 16 (G. C. S. 10.632). 
61 Ibid., XVII. 16 (G. C. S. 10.632-34). 
62 Young makes the point that Origen's use of cross references often bring out multiple referents 
for a passage. Young, Biblical Exegesis, 135-37. 
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well trained realises the fitness and grace with which the various notes are worked up into 
one harmonious composition. 1163 
In the second section of his discussion of the parable of the Wedding Feast, he 
attempts to "draw out the deeper meaning of the parable according to the wisdom of the 
Spirit. "64 Origen goes to great lengths to explain how God condescends to employ 
anthropomorphisms so that he may reveal himself to us. 65 This self-revelation of God 
means that in both Old and New Testaments we possess "strong, spiritually rational 
food" which nourishes and strengthens our lives. And because of the incarnation we can 
partake in fellowship with Christ which transforms us. 66 It is through this process of 
sanctification that we grow in faith, godliness, and good works which constitutes "the 
garment of virtue, the wedding garment made with radiant material. "67 The guest who 
is not wearing the wedding garment in the parable signifies those in the church who have 
not taken off their old life or partaken in this process of spiritual growth and 
transformation. The father's judgement of the guest without the proper attire serves as a 
warning to all in the church that we should not be satisfied with where we are at 
spiritually but should constantly press on to the more "mature and sweet fruit (grapes) of 
excellence (äpeiijs). "68 Origen's interpretation of the wedding garment is varied and 
rich, but at the same time the multiplicity of New Testament metaphors and references 
which he cites are clustered around the transformation which takes place in a believer's 
63 R. L. P. Milburn, Early Christian Interpretation (London: Black, 1954), 50; Karen Jo 
Terjensen, "`Body', 'Soul' and 'Spirit' in Origen's Theory of Exegesis, " Anglican 
Theological Review 67 (1985), 17-30. 
64 Origen, XVII. 17 ff (G. CS. 10.634 ff. ). Origen follows the Rule of Faith which taught that 
the Bible was inspired by the Holy Spirit and possessed an obvious meaning and one 
that was deeper and hidden from most readers. Idem, De principii; I. Preface; IV. III. 14 
(On First Principles, Butterworth, 1-6; 310-12); Young, Biblical Exegesis, 23-24. 
65 The idea of condescension serves to explain why the Gnostic sects misunderstood these 
figures of speech in the Bible, but more importantly it serves the hermeneutical function 
of explaining how the transcendent God can communicate with mankind. Origen, 
Contra Celsus IV. 15 (A. G. 11.1045); idem, Sermon, XVII (P. G. 12.703). 
66 Origen, XVII. 21-22 (G. C. S. 10.642-46). Part of Origen's argument in this section is to 
counter the Gnostic views that God could be identified with human emotions or 
suffering as we saw in the section on anti-Gnostic trajectories of interpretation. 
67 Origen, XVII. 23-24 (G. CS. 10.646-52), especially the start to § 24. This same process of 
spiritual transformation performs an important role in Origen's hermeneutic. "The 
more the soul conforms, through the reception of grace and the practice of virtues, to the 
resurrection of Christ, the more it surrenders itself to the Logos growing within it, 
allowing the Word to transform it into his likeness, the more the divinity begins to show 
through the glorified humanity of Christ and the letter of the Scripture and the 
mysteries begin to be perceived beneath their clothing as image. " Margerie, The History 
of Exegesis, 1.104. 
68 Origen, XVII. 24 (G CS 10.651). 
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life. 69 As such, Origen preserves, as Ricccur would say, the metaphorical surplus of 
meaning in his interpretation of the symbol of the wedding garment. 
Perhaps the greatest contrast between Origen's work and those who follow him is 
the manner in which they risk undo closure of the disclosive potential of the symbols 
within the parable for the sake of clarity or precision of interpretation. Jerome follows 
Origen's general view of the wedding garment but in a more legalistic manner. Through 
obedience to the laws and commands of the Lord, the new garment is woven or 
completed. The garment represents our taking off our old defiled self at conversion and 
putting on the new man in Christ. The one entering the feast without the new garment 
is guilty of defiling the wedding feast by wearing sordid clothing (their old life). 70 The 
application Jerome draws from the parable is similar to Origen's, it teaches us that it is 
not the entrance, or beginning the new life that is important, but how the believer 
finishes it? i 
Hilary of Poitiers narrows Origen's interpretation down also, but takes an 
approach which is more textually controlled compared to Jerome's. Hilary recognises the 
tension between the literal and metaphorical meanings behind the symbol of the wedding 
garment. He attempts to resolve this tension by asking a series of very literal questions 
concerning how the guest entered the feast without the proper garment in order to show 
that the garment could not refer to something external to a person's life which would 
have been visible to others. It can not refer to a special type of garment worn on festive 
occasions since everyone, including the poor, was invited. The fact the servants did not 
notice the impropriety guest, he argues, also demonstrates that it could not have been a 
physical garment. Therefore, it must refer to something inside the person, which allowed 
the guest to deceive the servants but could not escape the notice of God. 72 This points 
to an interpretation of the wedding garment which denotes the forgiveness of our sins by 
grace and the efficacious nature of God's invitation to the wedding feast which 
transforms our lives. 73 Hilary concludes that, "the wedding garment is the glory of the 
69 That a passage or idea in the Bible would have a multiplicity in meaning is not a problem for 
Origen. Rather for him, "the Word of God is inexhaustibly rich and the human reader 
cannot exhaust its meaning 
... 
" Simonetti, 43. 
70 Jerome, Commentariorum in Matrheum, III lines 1705-26 (CC. S. L. 77.201-2). 
71 Ibid., lines 1736-39 (C. C. S L. 77.202). 
72 Hilary of Poitiers, In Matthaeum, 22.7 (S. C. 258.148-50). Hilary's commentary is an 
excellent illustration of Ricaur's thought on the manner in which the tension between 
the literal and metaphorical meaning of a symbol or metaphor creates a surplus of 
meaning. Ricceur, Interpretation Theory, 52. 
73 Hilary of Poitiers, In Matthaeum, 22.6 (S. C. 258.148). 
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Holy Spirit and the radiance of the heavenly garment 
... 
which is reserved in immaculate 
condition until the feast in the kingdom of heaven. "74 
In both Hilary and Jerome, we see a narrowing down of Origen's polyphonic 
understanding of the wedding garment to much more specific interpretations. This 
demonstrates two important hermeneutical points. First, as Ricccur pointed out that the 
explication of a metaphor or symbol always results in an expansion and reduction in the 
possible meaning of that symbol or metaphor. The different trajectories which the later 
commentators took from Origen represent an expansion of meaning at the collective 
level, but at the individual level there is a reduction in the signification of symbol. 
Second, according to the logic of question and answer, not all questions can be asked 
within each horizon. The different answers which these commentators find in the 
symbol of the wedding garment are the result of different questions which were being 
asked within their respective horizons, within the contexts in which they ministered. 
The collapse, reduction, or clarification of the meaning of the wedding garment 
reaches its most forceful argument in the work of Augustine. In reading Augustine's 
fortieth sermon, one is struck by the parallels it has with Hilary's commentary, and it 
raises the question of how familiar he was with Hilary's work. For Augustine, the 
garment must be worn on the heart or else the servants would have stopped this guest 
from entering the feast improperly attired. Like Hilary, Augustine does not see the 
responsibility for inspecting the guests resting with the servants but is God's prerogative 
alone. "The Master of the house saw him, the Master of the house inspected, the Master 
of the house separated him out. "75 The meaning of the wedding garment is an 
important question since it entails such a serious punishment and separates the good 
from the evil. 76 According to Augustine, it cannot refer to baptism or faith since both 
good and evil have access to these and are what allow one to enter the feast (the present 
church). 77 In a similar manner it cannot refer to the sacraments, fasting, church 
leadership, or the working of miracles. 78 Love is the only indispensable thing Augustine 
can conceive of which could differentiate the guests in this manner. Love is the greatest 
74 Ibid., 22.7 (S C. 258.150). Once again this dual temporal reference of the wedding comes 
through. 
75 Augustine, Sermo, XC. 4 (P. L. 38.566; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.336). 
76 Ibid., XCV. 5-6 (P. L. 38.583; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.337-9). 
77 Ibid., XCV. 7 (P. L. 38.583-4; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.369-70). 
78 Ibid., XC. 5 (P. L. 38.561-2; Sermons on Selected Lesson 1.338). 
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command and without it we are nothing. 79 It is related to faith since true faith works by 
love and we cannot love without faith. This love is two fold, it must be exercised toward 
God and man. It is also dynamic in that it must be constantly cultivated and extended. 80 
"So let charity be advanced, so be it nourished, that being nourished it may be perfected; 
so be the weddinggarment put on; so be the image of God, after which we were created, 
by this our advancing, engraven anew in us. For by sin it was bruised, and worn 
away. "s 1 
Augustine's interpretation of the wedding garment clearly defined the meaning of 
the wedding garment and seems to have become the received meaning for this symbol 
until the Reformation. 82 Gregory the Great is a good example of the reception of 
Augustine's interpretation when he argues that the garment could not be faith or baptism 
but must be love. In the eastern Greek tradition, Theophylact's' commentary 
demonstrates Augustine's influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, in a tradition 
which had largely rejected Augustine's theology. The clearest indication of Augustine's 
influence here is seen Theophylact's interpretation that the wedding garment is not faith 
or good works but is love in our hearts 83 Perhaps the most important exception to this 
is Thomas Aquinas who balances Augustine's view by attempting to bring out some of 
the other resonances of meaning which Origen raised. 84 
Summary 
The aim of this section has been to demonstrate something of the character of 
interpretations during the Patristic period in terms of three trajectories of interpretation 
of the parable of the wedding feast. Before I move on to the next section in this chapter, 
I propose to summarise some of the conclusions so far. First, I have tried to show that 
the impression of many modern writers that the exegetical practices of this period were 
79 Ibid., XC. 6 (P. L. 38.562; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.338), citing Matthew 22: 37-39 and I 
Corinthians 13. 
80 Ibid., XC. 8,10 (P. L. 38.5.64,566; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.341,344). 
81 Ibid., XC. 10 (P. L. 38.566; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.334). 
82 Leo the Great appears to be one of the few who reject Augustine's interpretation. He argues 
that the garment is the new self which conforms to the resurrection and is put on by 
obeying God's commands and partaking in the spiritual feasts (the sacraments? ). 
Sermon, 50 (P. L. 54.305-8; The Fathers of the Church, 93.214-17). 
83 "'0 pfi Muoa ievos cnTXäYXa OLIKTIPi. IWV. Xprlo r6 MTQ, (pAa6EA(ptav. " 
Theophylact, Enarratio in Evangelium Matthaei, XXII. 118 (A. G. 123.387,388). This 
may have come to Theophylact through Maximus, for whom charity was an important 
theme. 
84 It is interesting to note that Aquinas attempts this by appealing to Hilary and Jerome's works 
in relation to citations from Origen's commentary. Aquinas, Catena Aurea 22.11-12. 
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unrestrained is mistaken. Origen, in particular, is often charged with taking an arbitrary 
allegorical approach which possessed no working criteria, and it resulted in his reading all 
sorts of meanings into the text. "But this is to see only part of the picture. Origenist 
allegory was controlled by a view of scripture's unity and consistency which allowed the 
exploitation of texts from all over scripture to throw light on one another and build up a 
working-model of a spiritual world to which biblical images consistently referred. "85 The 
interpreters from this period were fairly restrained in their approach within the terms of 
their exegetical goals and tended to follow distinct trajectories of interpretation which 
resulted from the prejudices which they inherited and from the influence of previous 
interpretations. 86 This also allowed for a diversity in their interpretations of the parable 
since each of these trajectories contained two or three views and the trajectories 
overlapped creating the possibility for a number of different permutations and 
combinations. Their interpretations were not wooden replications of previous 
interpretations nor were they the result of the free play of an unrestrained allegorical 
approach. 
Second, the prejudices which the Patristic exegetes brought to the text are what 
shaped the field of play for their exegetical activities. For example, the intertextual 
reference to Matthew 21: 43 directs the reader's expectations in relation to this parable 
and thus, the replacement theme figures so strongly in their interpretations. Also, the 
theology of the interpreter functions in the background as a guide which gives meaning 
to the individual parts of the Bible, such as this parable, and even to the individual items 
and characters within the parable. Their interpretations were genuine attempts to 
interpret the parable in light of the questions of their particular horizon and were shaped 
by their historical situation within the Christian tradition. 
Third, we see that not all interpretations are of equal validity, priority, or weight 
in relation to the text. Among those I have discussed so far, Origen's commentary was 
the most widely received or influential commentary on the parable up to the fifth 
century. 87 The interpretation he offered and the future questions which his commentary 
85 Young, Biblical Exegesis, 152. 
86 In the doctrinal development of the church, a set of agreed upon symbols arose which 
became "the basis for a refined allegorical treatment of scripture, so that dogma and 
spirituality were not divorced and spirituality was `disciplined' by the `orthodox' 
understanding of key texts. " Young, The Art of Performance 123. Metaphors and 
symbols are bounded by the world in which they occur, they are not open to unlimited 
play of interpretation. Ricceur, Interpretation Theory, 58-61. 
87 This study substantiates Margerie's point that all of the great exegetes of the early church 
were dependent on Origen's exegetical works. "He is the first great master of exegesis. 
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raised (such as his successors attempts to clarify and define the wedding garment) 
demonstrates the importance of his work. The theological and referential richness of 
Origen's commentary facilitated future commentaries by allowing later interpreters to 
`recognise more' in the parable. In this sense, his commentary functioned as a classic 
interpretive text on this parable (and may have for the entire gospel as well). This stands 
in contrast to the movement of certain trajectories of interpretation into a cul-de-sac which 
were not picked up by future interpreters. The abandonment of certain trajectories resulted 
from the fact that the questions which those interpretations originally attempted to 
answer were no longer being asked. The prime example is the anti-Gnostic trajectory of 
interpretation. 
The play of interpretation which the early interpreters realised within these 
trajectories of interpretation provokes our modern theological prejudices because one of 
the prejudices which Gadamer argues that we have inherited from the Enlightenment is 
the search for an objective or stable meaning to the text. However, for the Patristic 
fathers the text had multiple levels of signification or reference. But this did not lead to 
an unlimited field of play in their interpretations. Rather, because they were at home in 
their tradition they were able to discern which interpretations resonated with the text. 
This ability came from their participation in their tradition, specifically within the 
orthodox faith, their interaction with the biblical text, the situation in which they 
ministered, and the concepts and interpretations passed down to them from previous 
concretizations of the parable's meaning. 
II. THE RECEPTION OF AUGUSTINE'S ECCLESIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
In the previous section, I focused on the broader diachronic trajectories in the 
history of a the parable's interpretation which led up to Origen, and how Origen's 
polyphonic interpretation preserved an openness to the meaning of the parable and 
which, in turn, became the seedbed for future commentators. In this section, what I 
propose is to examine one particular interpretation's reception: Augustine's 
ecclesiological interpretation of the parable. This will then lead into Aquinas' and 
Calvin's appropriation of Augustine's interpretation in part three of this chapter. 
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Augustine makes several very interesting and innovative exegetical moves in his 
interpretation of the parable 88 Not only does he understand this parable as a paradigm 
for the church but also as a justification for the use of force against heretics. In order to 
clarify the exegetical shifts he makes, it is necessary to explore the background which 
shaped his and his audiences horizon of expectations. 
When Augustine inherited the bishop's seat at Hippo, he stepped into the midst 
of a long standing and difficult conflict with the Donatist schism. 89 Far from being an 
old problem, the Donatist schism was a wide spread movement and possibly the 
dominant church in Augustine's see. 9° Without going into great detail on Donatism, 
there were two main questions that this situation raised for Augustine. First, what was 
the nature of the church? And second, how should the church respond to schismatics 
such as the Donatists? 
A. What is the Nature of the Church? 
The question concerning the nature of the church arose from the inability of 
Cyprian's teachings in the Unity of the Catholic Church to answer new questions which 
the Donatist situation raised about the nature of the church. Both Donatists and 
orthodox theologians appealed to Cyprian to defend their position, each with a 
defensible cause. The inability to find a resolution to this debate sprang from two 
doctrines which Cyprian taught. First, he taught that schisms were never justified. This 
is based on his doctrine that if a person were to step outside the church, they also stepped 
outside the possibility of salvation. Therefore, the church could never be divided, since 
there could only be one true church at any time. Second, Cyprian held that a bishop 
All who came after him, even those who reacted against him, such as Saint Jerome, owe 
nearly everything to him in every domain. " Margerie, The History of Exegesis, 1.112-13. 
88 In discussing Augustine's interpretation of this parable, we must keep in mind that he often 
harmonises the accounts in Matthew 22: 1-14 with the parable of the Great Feast in 
Luke 14. See: Augustine, De Consensu Evangelistarum (C. S. E. L. 43; The Harmony of the 
Gospel in N. A. 
-N. F. 6.65-236). At the same time, he differentiates between the two 
parables at other points. 
89 Prior to Augustine's ascension to bishop, the Roman government had tried both force and 
toleration in its attempt to control the Donatist movement. However, neither approach 
was successful. This was most likely due to the fact that "it was an African movement 
and its members were determined to assert their own independence, not only of the 
Catholic church but, also in more subtle ways, of the power of imperial Rome. " 
Frederick W. Dillistone, "The Anti-Donatist Writings, " in A Companion to the Study of 
St. Augustine, ed. Roy W. Battenhouse (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1956),, 178; 
179; Willis, 346-61. 
90 For the most widely cited discussion on this issue see: Geoffrey Grinshaw Willis, Saint 
Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London: S. P. C. K., 1950), especially 49,176-9, 
346-61. 
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who lapsed under persecution was no longer worthy to administer the sacraments or hold 
church office since he had stepped outside the church and thus, forfeited his office. 
The event that ignited the debate over Cyprian's teachings was the election of 
Caecilianus as the bishop of Carthage in 312 A. D. 91 The rigorists opposed his 
appointment since he received his orders from Felix of Aptunga who was alleged to have 
been a traitor during the Diocictianic persecution. 92 Therefore, Caecilianus' 
appointment was not valid, and the rigorist party appointed Majorinus as a rival bishop, 
who was quickly succeeded by Donatus. This resulted in a series of appeals and counter- 
appeals all the way up to the Emperor and the Bishop of Rome. In every case, 
Caecilianus was vindicated. The debate raged over a question Cyprian never addressed, 
`What happens if the bishop repents? ' As a result it was possible to read Cyprian as 
teaching that once a person betrayed the church they could never hold office in the 
church again and that once a person repented, they were restored by grace and could 
once again administer the sacraments and hold office. The Catholic church held the 
latter position and the Donatists the former. 93 At a deeper level, the problem revolved 
around the concept of holiness. The Donatists believed that the church was 
contaminated by traitors, such as Felix, and they wanted to protect or restore the purity 
of the church. 94 
Augustine attempted to resolve the question the Donatist schism had raised over 
this ambiguity in Cyprian's teachings. In his solution, Augustine relied heavily on the 
parables, especially the parable of the Wedding Feast and the parables of the Dragnet and 
the Tares in Matthew 13. Augustine interprets these three parables according to a 
realised eschatological (he gives more weight to the present realisation of the wedding as 
the church) but at the same time he still maintains an eschatological dimension in God's 
judgement. 95 
The parables of the Dragnet and the Tares teach that the present church has both 
good and evil members just as "good and evil" were invited to the wedding feast. This is 
91 Augustine, Epistle CLXXXV. 4 (CS. E. L. 57.3-4; The Fathers of the Church, IV. 144-45). 
92 Such an appointment was intolerable since Cyprian taught that once a member of the clergy 
had lapsed they could no longer hold a church office. Dillistone, 178. 
93 In this section, I will use "Catholic church" according to Augustine's definition of the term 
as the "universal" or "world-wide" church. Augustine, Epistle, CLXXXV. 2 and 4 (C. S. E. L 57.2-4; The Fathers of the Chur% IV. 142-45). 
94 "In other words, every `quisling, ' every collaborator, everyone tainted with pro-traitor 
sympathies must ruthlessly be exposed and excluded from membership or office in the 
Church. " Dillistone, 188. 
95 For him, "the kingdom of heaven is the church now. " Louis Berkhof, The History of 
Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1975: originally 1937]), 230. 
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seen in the fact that both the wheat and the tares grow together until the harvest and the 
dragnet captures both good and bad fish. 96 In taking this position, Augustine followed 
Cyprian's view that the church is a mixed community. There will always be tares among 
the wheat. 97 This is not a criticism of the church but rather should serve as an incentive 
to make sure that we are of the wheat. 98 For in the future, God will harvest the wheat 
from the tares, separate the good fish from the bad, and expel the guest who does not 
have the wedding garment on. 99 This act of winnowing or judgement is reserved for 
God alone, it is not something which his servants in the church can perform. Thus, 
Jesus' command of "smite utraque crescere usque ad messem' (Matthew 13: 30) is the 
grounds for tolerance concerning heretics and sinners within the church. This is a 
meaningful theological contribution which Augustine makes to ecclesiology. 
"Augustine's wider and more patient view of the nature of the Church's holiness, never 
condoning sin yet recognizing that men could not act as final judges, has commended 
itself to the conscience of the vast majority in the Church of subsequent generations. "100 
While the tares cannot be excluded because of some outward manifestation, they 
are separated from the wheat on the inside according to Augustine. The fact that the 
servants did not notice the guest without the wedding garment illustrates this point. '0' 
It is in light of Augustine's confrontation with the Donatist schism that his argument 
that the wedding garment cannot refer to baptism, faith, the sacraments, or church 
offices takes on a greater significance. The true traits of the church and salvation do not 
consist in the proper administration of church offices and sacraments but whether you 
have been cleansed by God and put on the garment of love. In this way, Augustine 
makes a distinction between those who are formally members of the church and those 
96 According to Augustine, the Donatist position was unrealistic since they understood the 
church to be composed only of wheat and criticised the Catholic church for being 
infested with tares. Augustine attacked both of these points. On the one hand, the 
Donatists were not as pure as they claimed. "Look at the hordes of Circumcellions, look 
at the convivial drunkards, look at the lewd teachers. Do you call these wheat? " On the 
other hand, the Catholic church was being blamed for the sins of the few tares. 
Augustine, Epistle, LXXVI. 2-3 (CS 
. 
EL. 34.326-27); idem, Epistle, XLIII. 14-15 
(C. S. E. L 34.96-7). 
97 Jerome may provide a link between Augustine and Cyprian when he had to deal with a 
similar problem concerning those who wanted to exclude clergy who were once 
associated with Arian teachings. Jerome, DialogresAdvenws Luciferianos (P. L. 23.177). 
98 Augustine, Epistle LI (C. S. E. L. 34.143-49); idem, Sermo, XC. 1 (P. L. 38.599; Sermons on 
Selected Lessons, 1.333-4) 
99 Augustine, Sermo, XC. 4 (P. L. 38.560-1; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.336-7); also Epistle, 
LIII. 21; L. XXVI. 2-3; XCIII. 15; Comm litteras Petiliani, III. 11.3. 
too Dillistone, 189. 
101 Augustine, Sermon XC. 4 (P. L. 38.566; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.336). 
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who have cloaked their hearts with love and are true members of the Body of Christ. '02 
Thus, we can see how Augustine "finds material ready to hand" in the parable of the 
Wedding Feast. 103 
B. How to Handle the Schismatics? 
It is difficult to succinctly summarise Augustine's position on how to deal with 
the Donatists because his position developed over time and also because he did not 
exercise a blanket policy towards them but examined many cases on an individual 
basis. 104 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, I believe we can summarise his 
approach as follows. 105 First, the Donatists were to be approached with love and 
through dialogue in an attempt to win them over. 106 If persuasion failed, coercion could 
be applied. But this raised a theological question about the use of force to bring about 
conversion. The traditional view held that freedom of choice (voluntas) was an essential 
aspect of true religious conversion and that any religion which resorted to force only 
constructed a man-made artifice. By contrast, Augustine realised that God used 
discipline and the impingement of divine and human laws to make a person wise. 
Examples of this could be seen in God's disciplining and chastising Israel in the Old 
Testament, the function of the Law as a paedagogus, the apostle Paul's being afflicted 
with blindness, or our own personal fear of death and pain. These things can be used by 
God to either shape or break the force of habit in a person. Thus, Augustine saw two 
poles at work in a person's moral and spiritual life: external pressure and internal 
freedom. 107 
When we examine his interpretation of the parable of the Wedding Feast, we see 
how Augustine "finds material ready to hand" for dealing with the Donatists. The 
sending of the servants by the king to invite the guests shows the first approach: to reach 
out in love and persuasion. Then, he sees the external, coercive element introduced in 
102 Ibid., XC. 6-10 (P. L. 38.562-6; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.338-44). 
103 Willis, 134. 
104 See the following for an excellent discussion of the development of Augustine's positions on 
the use of coercion: P. R. L. Brown, "St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion, " in 
Augustine, ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris, Great Political Thinkers, vol. I (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 1997 [originally given at the Fourth International Congress on Patristic 
Studies: 1963]), 382-91. 
105 Both Willis and Brown show how Augustine's approach developed over time and how he 
carefully applied it to different situations as they arose. 
106 This would fit with his Manichean background, for they practiced public debate in order to 
spread their teachings. Brown, 384. 
107 Brown, 386-87. 
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the phrase "compelle intrare" (Luke 14: 23). 108 His understanding of this phrase reveals 
the polarity which operates in a person's inner life. "Compel them, saith he, to come in. 
Let compulsion be found outside, the will arise within. "109 This compulsion is directed 
at the heretics and schismatics who are represented by those who are found along the 
hedges by the servants (Luke 14: 23). However, even this compulsion should be 
undertaken from a position of love in a manner similar to the way a father disciplines his 
child or a physician treats his patients. 110 It is for the good of the one being treated and 
should be withdrawn once it has achieved its beneficial effect. "The compelle intrare of 
the parable thus becomes the classic text of Saint Augustine at this time against the 
Donatists. "t 11 
How then does Augustine harmonise his interpretation of "compelle intrare" with 
the tolerance he saw in his interpretation of the parable of the Tares, "sinite utraque 
crescere ad messem"? First, compulsion may be used by civil authorities to break the force 
of habit so that a person may freely embrace the truth. 112 The co-operation between the 
church and the civil government on issues such as the Donatist schism represents a shift 
in church state relations which took place with Constantine. Irenaeus, who wrote before 
this cultural shift, viewed the civil government as an agent of God's judgement. If a 
person does good, they should have nothing to fear, but if they do evil they should be 
108 Augustine's comment "comp. -Me intrard' occurs in his synthesis of the two parables in his 
Harmony of the Gospels However, at another point he takes the position that Matthew 
and Luke recorded two different parables spoken by Jesus. Augustine, De Consensu 
Evangelistarum, II. LXII (C S E. L. 43.242-3). While the Harmony of the Gospels is 
dated around 399 Congar notes that Augustine was already involved with the Donatist 
controversy and that his comments on this passage are specifically addressed to this 
problem. Yves Congar, "Introduction, " in Traitfs anti-Donatistes in Bibliotheque 
Augustinienne, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, vol. 28 (n. p.: Desclie de Brouwer, 1963), 24f 
109 Brown quotes this passage from Augustine's Sermo, CXII. 8 in the Latin as follows: 
"Compelle eos intrare, foris inveniatur necessitas, nascitur intus voluntus. " However, he 
does not give the source for which text he is quoting this from. The Migne edition 
contains a slightly different textual variation on this important sentence: "Coge, inquit 
intrare, foris inveniatur naYssitas, nascitur intus voluntuc" Augustine, Sermo, CXII. 8 (A. L. 
38.647-8; Sermons on Selected Lessons, 1.465). Since both verbs, eogo and compel4 
convey the ideas of to gather together, collect, and to compel by force, there is not much 
difference between the meaning of these two variants. 
I 10 Augustine, Epistlti CLXXXV. 7 (C. S. E. L. 57.6; The Fathers of the Church, IV. 147-48). 
Brown observes that Augustine's usual term for coercion is not cohercitio from which we 
derive our term with it negative overtones. But rather Augustine uses correptio which 
means "`rebuke' 
- 
defined by its aim, correctio, `setting straight'. " Even in his choice of 
terms Augustine wanted his audience to understand that coercion was not a punishment 
but a corrective process. Brown, 114. 
111 Willis, 134; cf. Congar, 22-48. 
112 Augustine gives examples of former Donatists whom he believes this policy has truly 
liberated. Augustine, Epistlti CLXXXV. 7,13 (CS EL. 57.6,12; The Fathers of the 
Church, IV. 147-48,154). 
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afraid, "For he does not bear the sword in vain. "113 For him, civil government was an 
agent under God's sovereign control much as the storm clouds were. By the time 
Augustine writes, he can appeal to Christians who hold office in the civil government to 
enact Godly legislation. 114 Thus, Augustine's interpretation also involves answering new 
questions in the relation between church and state. Questions which will arise again in 
the late Medieval period. Second, and perhaps even more significantly in the history of 
the effect of his interpretation, he makes a fine point in his discussion of the parable of 
the Tares. As long as there is the possibility that some of the wheat may be injured the 
tares should not be rooted out. But once the wheat is firmly rooted, universally 
accepted, and there is no danger of schism, then severe discipline may be exercised 
against the schismatics. 115 But even in this extreme instance, the first approach should 
be to reach out in love and bear with patience their errors. 
III. AQUINAS AND THE MEDIEVAL RECEPTION OF AUGUSTINE'S VIEW 
One to the first things which one notices during the Medieval period is that, as a 
whole, the impact of Augustine's work during this period is hard to overstate. "The 
influence of Augustine on the later biblical exegesis of the Latin Middle Ages was 
enormous. With Jerome, Gregory the Great and the Venerable Bede he was one of four 
great authorities, and would probably have been reckoned the greatest of the four. "' 16 
However, when we examine the reception of Augustine's interpretation of the parable of 
the Wedding Feast, we notice that the medieval scholars are very selective in their 
appropriation of his exegesis. In respect to the understanding of "compete intrare", none 
of the early medieval exegetes viewed Augustine's interpretation as being normative. 117 
113 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, N. lviii. 8 (Harvey, 2.282-3; P. G. 7.1096-7) 
114 His letter to tribune and count Boniface is an example of this. Augustine, Epistle, 
CLX)ÜXV. 1 (CS. E. L. 57.1; The Fathers of the Church, IV. 141) 
115 Literally, "severe discipline should not sleep, " "non dormiat seueritas discipline" Augustine, 
Contra Epistulam Parmeniani, 111.2.13 (C. S. E. L. 51.116-18). 
116 Gerald Bonner, "Augustine as Biblical Scholar, " in The Cambridge History of the Bible: From 
the Beginnings to Jerome, ed. P. R. Ackroyd and C. F. Evans, vol. 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 
1970), 561. 
117 Bede is a good example in that he follows Gregory's interpretation rather than Augustine's. 
Bede, In Matthaei Evangeilum exposito, XIII (P. L. 92.68-69); Beare, "The Parable of the 
Guest at the Banquet, " 10. Christian Druthmarus (also known as Christian of Stavelot) 
follows Augustine in recognizing the wedding garment as love, but on the whole is closer 
to Jerome's commentary, although he is fairly original as an exegete. Christiani 
Druthmari, FApositio in Matth eum Evangelistam, caplet LII (P. L. 106.1438-1441, esp. 
1440). In his commentary on this parable, Sedulius Scottus refers to Jerome on almost 
every verse and Gregory the Great almost as much but only makes a passing reference to 
Augustine's comment that these parables are similar (Sedulius disagrees and sees them as 
different parables). Sedulius Scottus, In Matthaum, CCXXI-CCXXII (Kommentar zum 
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Gregory the Great's interpretation of the `wedding feast' is a good example. He 
interprets the "wedding" as a reference to the incarnation, the wedding of the divine 
being with human flesh which took place in the virgin's womb. I 18 Gregory's concept 
that the wedding took place in the incarnation was widely received during the Medieval 
period and can be seen in the manner in which it is one of the first points mentioned in 
both the Glossa Ordiana and in Aquinas' Catena Aurea. At the same time, Gregory 
agrees with Augustine that the invitation of the "good and the bad" to the feast 
represents the present mixed nature of the church. 119 However, he disagreed with 
Augustine's interpretation of "compelle intrare'. According to Gregory, some people 
understand the invitation but are held back from accepting the invitation by their desires 
for satisfaction and success in the world. The phrase "compelle intrare" did not refer to 
the use of human force against such people but spoke of the manner in which their 
desires are constantly frustrated in this life, and as a result, they turn in brokenness to 
their Maker. 120 Thus, there is a shift from human (Augustine's view) to divine agency in 
the fulfilment of this injunction in Luke 14: 23. 
A. Horizontal Shifts 
In order to understand the reception of Augustine's interpretation of the parables 
of the Wedding Feast (Matthew 22) and the Great Feast (Luke 14) during the late 
Medieval period, there are two factors which we need to consider. The first concerns the 
historical changes in the nature of the church during this period. Europe was politically 
fragmented after the fall of the Western Empire in the fifth century. This meant that the 
church was faced with the larger challenges of maintaining some form of episcopal 
continuity and converting the pagans than confronting the challenge presented by diverse 
theological positions. Also, during this period, the threat from heretics was fairly 
Evangelium nach Matthäus, Bengt Löfstedt, ed., [Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1991], 495- 
501). 
118 Gregory the Great, Homilia in Evangelia, II. XXXVIII. 3 (P. L 76.1283; Nora Burke, Pope 
Saint Gregory the Great. " Parables of the Gospeh (Dublin: Scepter, 1960), 35). 
119 "Ecce jam ipsa qualitate convivantium aperre ostinditur quia per has regis nuptial praesen 
Eccksia designatur, in qua cum bonis et malls conveniunf Gregory the Great, Homilia in 
Evangelia, II. XXKVIII. 7 (P. L. 76.1285; Burke, 38). Gregory expands on this theme by 
comparing the church to the structure of a pyramid. The wide base represents those 
who are carnally minded in the church while the narrow top represents those who are 
spiritual. 
120 "Mhile they try to navigate the high seas in pursuit of important affairs, they are 
continually driven back by contrary currents towards the shores of humiliation. " 
Gregory the Great, Homilia in Evangelia II. XXXVIII. 9 (PL 76.1271; Burke 115). 
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sporadic and was never a serious threat. Thus, the church dealt with heresies as they 
arose rather than formulate a consistent policy to deal with them. 
Several important cultural shifts took place in the eleventh century which 
dramatically changed all this. Monastic reforms, for example at Cluny, introduced a 
renewed spiritual vigour in the church. At the same time, the papacy underwent 
institutional and doctrinal reform. A sense of spiritual unity grew both inside and 
outside the church during this century. 121 The consensus behind the First Crusade of 
1095 is one manifestation of this sense of spiritual unity. As a result of this new sense of 
Christendom which unified society, heretics were now viewed as a threat to society. 122 
The rapid spread of Catharism in the twelfth century presented one of the first real 
heretical challenges to the medieval church and was perceived as a threat which would 
rupture the Christian foundation to society in southern France. At first, the secular 
authorities attempted to stem the spread of Catharism through legislation. But it was 
not long before the church recognised this as a secular intrusion into what it considered 
to be an essentially ecclesiastical domain. 123 
The second factor which needs to be considered is shifts in the semiotic code by 
which medieval exegetes recognised unbelievers, heretics, and schismatics within the 
biblical texts. The background to the medieval semiotic code is found in the teachings of 
the church fathers. According to Augustine, Chrysostom, and Jerome, the parable of the 
Tares taught that the heretics should be left alone because some of the wheat may be 
killed if an attempt was made to remove the tares. 124 Jerome appealed to the fact that a 
121 For a detailed study on the cultural and religious shifts which took place during this period 
see: Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Herery. " Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to 
the Reformation, 2nd cd. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 3-104, 
122 An example of this is seen in the manner in which Aquinas compares heresy with that of a 
counterfeiting money. However, heresy is much more dangerous since money only 
supports temporal life. Aquinas, Summa Theologia Q. 11, art. 3. (Summa Theologia, 
Latin text with English translation edition, Thomas Gilby, trans. [London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1975] 32.88-89). Mircea Eliade, ed. The Enryclopedia of Religion (N. Y. 
and London: Macmillan, 1987) s. v., "Inquisition, The, " R. C. Finucane, 7.251. 
123 In 1215, Innocent III called for episcopal councils to enforce the antiheretical canons of the 
Fourth Lateran Council. However, it was the emperor Frederick II who incorporated 
these policies into official imperial legislation at his coronation in 1220. Heresy was 
now officially classified as treason, which could be punished with having the tongue cut 
out to burning at the stake for the more serious offenders. The Inquisition is recognised 
as having come into being either with the adoption of Frederick's imperial laws into 
ecclesial law in Rome in 1231, by Gregory the IX or with Innocent's bull Ad extirpanda (1252). Bernard Hamilton, The Medieval Inquisition (London: Holmes and Meier, 
1982); Charles G. Herbermann, Edward Pace, Conde Pallen, et al. eds., The Catholic 
Encyclopedia (London: Caxton, 1910) s. v., "Inquisition, " Joseph Blamer, 8.26-38. 
124 Chrysostom, Commentariorum in Matthaeum, XLVI. 1-2 (P. G. 58.477-78). 
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heretic may become a defender of the faith. 125 In the East, Theophylact followed this 
line of thought. If Matthew had been killed before he was converted he would never 
have written his Gospel. 126 In the West, Bede almost copied Jerome's interpretation of 
this passage. 127 The result was that up until the twelfth century, the "smite utraque 
crescere' of Matthew 13: 30 was interpreted in such a manner that allowed a certain 
amount of toleration within the church concerning the treatment of heretics. 128 
The widely received interpretation of the parable of the Tares helps us to 
understand their interpretations of the parable of the Wedding Feast. This is especially 
evident in relation to the third invitation issued by the father in the parable to the people 
on the `highways. ' Medieval scholars recognised this as a reference to the to roads 
outside the city of Jerusalem. This was understood to signify not only that these people 
were Gentiles (outside the city of God) but also that they are poor, sick, and down 
trodden. Gregory the Great set the pattern for many to follow when he explicates this 
section as teaching that the third group of people refers to the poor and sick Gentile 
sinners who accept the invitation to the feast because they have nothing left in this 
world. 129 Thus, compulsion is conceived as rescuing the weak and sick souls so that they 
may enter the kingdom. 130 
This raised the question of why those invited in the third invitation were living in 
such a mean condition. The fact that they were distant from the king indicated that 
their lives were characterised by flawed morals or behaviour. 131 The reason why the 
Gentiles are in this state is because of errors of their teachings, the religious and 
125 Jerome, Commentariorum in Mattheum, 11.815-34 (C. CS 
. 
L. 77.106-7). 
126 Theophylacti, Enarratio in Evangelium Matthaei, XIII. 30 (P. G. 123.283-286) 
127 Bede In Matthaei Evangeilum exposito, XIII (P. L. 92.68-69). However, it is debated 
whether this commentary is the work of Bede or that of Rabanus; Roland H. Bainton, 
"Religious Liberty and the Parable of the Tares, " in Early and Medieval Christianity, The 
Collected Papers in Church History of Roland Bainton, vol. 1 (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1962), 101-4. 
128 The persistence of this interpretation can be seen as late as the twelfth century when the 
Bishop of Liege, Wazo, was questioned about the forceful coercion of heretics. In his 
reply, he appealed to the fathers (most likely Chrysostom in particular) that the tares 
should be allowed to grow with the wheat since one who is a tare today may in the 
future become one of the wheat. Leodiensis Vita Vasonis, 25B-C (P. L. 142.752). In 
stating this, I realise that such a generalised statement does not express every view from 
this period, but a full discussion of this would go beyond the confines of this chapter. 
129 Gregory the Great, Homilia in Evangelia II. XXXVIII. 7-8 (P. L 76.1269-70; Burke 112). 
130 Peter Comestor, Historia Scholastica: Historia Evangelica, cap. CXXVIII (P. L. 198.1605) 
131 "Ldtusautem uiarum defretus actionum intelligimus, quia illi plerunque facile ad Deum 
ueniunt... " Sedulius Scottus, In Matthaeum, 22.8 (Kommentar zum Evangelium nach 
Matthäus, Bengt Ldfstedt ed. [Freiburg: Herder, 1991], 2.498). 
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philosophical doctrines which they have been taught. 132 Thus, the invitation to the 
wedding feast is a call to convert to Christianity and its teachings. Peter Comestor's 
comments on this passage in the. Historia Scholastics summarises this view well. "The 
weak and the crippled, good and evil were induced/persuaded. For no one is excluded 
from the kingdom due to weakness in body, rather they are (as it were) frequently 
compelled. "133 
B. Aquinas' Reception of Augustine's Position 
It is against this background that Aquinas' interpretation of the parable of the 
Wedding Feast stands out so dramatically. Before I discuss his comments on that 
parable, let us return to the parable of the Tares briefly. In the Catena Aurea, Aquinas 
identified the tares as heretics. He begins his discussion of the "smite utraque crescere" 
clause in Matthew 13: 30 by citing Augustine that the tares and the wheat should grow 
together so that the wheat will not be harmed in an attempt to remove the tares. 134 He 
followed this with similar quotations from Jerome and Chrysostom. The manner by 
which Aquinas places six different citations from these three authors in succession leads 
one to the premature conclusion that Aquinas is arguing for a position of "toleration". 
But then he introduces an abrupt turn of thought by returning to an extended series of 
citations from Augustine which begins with "This was at first my own opinion, that no 
man was to be driven by force into the unity of Christ. "135 And concludes with "And it 
is wonderful to see him [referring to Paul's conversion] who entered into the gospel by 
the force of bodily affliction laboring therein more than all those who are called by word 
only. "136 The conclusion which Aquinas wants the reader to draw is clear, when there is 
no danger of harming the wheat, the tares should be rooted out. 
This thought is developed further in the Summa Theologie in questions 10 and 
11 under the topic of "Consequences of the Faith. " Here Aquinas prescribes the 
guidelines for how compulsion is to be practised by the church. One of the principles for 
132 Paschasius Radbertus, Expositio in Evangelium Matthaei X. XXII. 911 (P. L. 120.746); 
Anselm, Enarrationes in Evangelium Matthaei, cap. 22.8-10 (P. L. 162.1437). 
133 The way in which he parallels "induxerunt bons et malol" with "compellil' indicates that he 
is using these verbs in a manner in which their semantic domain overlap each other. 
They are both referring to compelling people to accept the invitation by inducing or 
persuading them, not by force. Peter Comestor, Historia Scholastics, cap. CXXVIII (P. L. 
198.1605) 
134 Aquinas, Catena Aurea, 13.30, citing Augustine, Contra Epistulam Parmeniani, 111.2 and 
Quaest. in Matthaeum, 12. 
135 Ibid., citing Augustine, Epistl6 XCIII. 17. 
136 Ibid., citing Augustine, Epistle CLXXXV. 22. 
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the application of the use of coercion concerns the distinction between htretici and 
infideles. Heretics are those within the church who have abandoned the orthodox 
position while infidels refer to unbelievers in general. One of Aquinas' strengths is the 
manner by which he is able to synthesise what was previously seen as competing views. 
By making the distinction between heretics and infidels, Aquinas is able to embrace 
Chrysostom's position that heretics should be tolerated. But not without some 
modification. He shifts Chrysostom's stance from understanding the `tares' as a reference 
to heretics to interpreting the `tares' as a reference to infidels. 137 
He then synthesises Chrysostom's with Augustine's position. Aquinas does not 
adopt Augustine's view on the role of force or coercion on the will, but takes the earlier 
position that faith is voluntary, therefore conversion should not be forced. However, this 
only applied to infidels who were not hindering the faith. 
Nevertheless, the faithful, if they are able, should compel them not to hinder the 
faith whether by their blasphemies or evil persuasions or even open persecutions. 
It is for this reason that Christ's faithful often wage war on infidels, not indeed 
for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even were they to conquer 
them and take them captive, they should still leave them free to believe or not, 
but for the purpose of stopping them obstructing the faith of Christ. t38 
While a person cannot, and should not, be compelled to believe, once a person does 
convert, they are under obligation to keep the faith and thus may be "compelled to hold 
to the faith. " Thus, Augustine's "compelle intrard' is adapted by Aquinas as a reference to 
heretics, not infidels. 139 This force is only to be exercised when a person's heresy is 
publicly known and presents no danger of creating a schism if an attempt was to be made 
to remove the heretic. 
Drawing on Augustine's interpretation of the parable of the Wedding Feast, 
Aquinas argues that an attempt to persuade the person of their error should be practised 
first. In contrast to Peter Comestor and Anselm, Aquinas interpreted those on the outer 
roads as heretics, not as infidels in need of salvation. While this shift' may seem like a 
inconsequential point, the conclusions which Aquinas draws from them are quite 
significant. If a heretic refuses to return to the orthodox position then he or she is to be 
excommunicated from the church and then handed over to the secular court. "As for 
137 Aquinas, Summa Theologin, Q. 10, art. 8 (Gilby, 32.60-61). 
138 Aquinas, Summa Theologie, Q. 10, art. 8 (Gilby, 32.62-63). This section is most likely a 
reference to the Crusades which were occurring at that time. Gilby, 62-63 note a. 
139 Once again Aquinas opens by discussing the position of toleration and uses Augustine's 
change of mind on this matter to introduce the practice of coercion. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologin Q. 10, art. 8. (Gilby, 32.60-65). 
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heretics their sin deserves banishment, not only from the Church by excommunication, 
but also from this world by death. "140 This not only follows Augustine's balance of 
authority between ecclesiastical and secular authorities but also defends the position by 
which the office of the Inquisition operated. With Aquinas, the Medieval church's 
concept of dealing with infidels, heretics, and schismatics reaches its most articulate 
position. The enduring reception of Aquinas' exposition of these passages is 
demonstrated by the fact that even as late as the sixteenth century his work was still being 
cited in inquisitorial trials. 141. Thus, it is through Aquinas that Augustine's interpretation 
of the parable of the Wedding Feast is received during the late Middle Ages. 
However, while Aquinas' use of Augustine appears to follow Augustine fairly 
closely, there are several significant differences. Augustine attempted to formulate 
answers to the questions raised by the Donatist schism. His concern was not primarily in 
controlling or restraining Donatism as a heretical movement, but his concern arose 
because of the violence which resulted from this movement, especially in their attacks 
against the orthodox communities and clergy. At the same time, he exercised a great deal 
of care in the practice of his concept of coercion. But once his text entered into the 
effective history of the Christian tradition it went beyond his intentions. 
For several hundred years, Augustine's interpretation was not received as 
normative. With the historical shifts which took place during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, a horizon of expectations opened up which allowed Aquinas to once again 
recognise Augustine's comments on "compelle intrare as relevant to his horizon. Even 
though the office of the Inquisition was established and the Crusades were taking place 
by the time Aquinas appropriated Augustine, his work in the Catena Aurea and Summa 
Theologin served to justify these institutions through his re-appropriation of Augustine's 
interpretation of the parable of the Wedding Feast. 142 Aquinas' appropriation of the 
meaning and significance of the parable through his reception of Augustine's comments 
resulted in a concretization of the meaning of the parable which serves as an excellent 
example of productive and norm-building function of biblical commentaries and other 
forms of theological literature. 
140 Aquinas, Summa Theologie, Q. 11, art. 3 (Gilby 32.88-89). 
141 He gives the example of the trial of Claes de Praet in 1556 who appealed to Matthew 13: 30 
in his defence, "Why do you not let me grow until the harvest? " To which the examiner 
replied, "Because the master of the field gave this command to his servants lest they hurt 
the wheat and pull it out along with the tares, but I can skirt along the edge and pluck 
out one or two here and there sometimes six or eight or even then or twelve, and 
sometimes a hundred without hurting the wheat. " Bainton, 106. 
142 See the translator's note on Q. 10, article 8.1 in Gilby, Summa Theologie, 32.62-63. 
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While Aquinas carefully stipulated how compulsion was to be applied, history has 
demonstrated that the reception and practice of his interpretations were not as careful or 
restrained. Augustine could never have envisioned the Crusades or the Inquisition but 
his defence of the use of force to compel the obstinate clearly helped defend these 
institutions through Aquinas' reception of his interpretation. This should serve as a 
warning that biblical interpretation should be engaged with an eye to the future. The 
exegete should carefully consider the implications of their interpretations for future 
generations just as a marksman carefully considers the trajectory his projectile will take. 
IV. RECEPTION DURING THE REFORMATION 
The Reformation presents us with several interesting aspects in the reception 
history of Matthew 22: 1-14. It is not uncommon to find works on the history of biblical 
interpretation claiming that Luther and especially Calvin were not only the fore-runners 
to modern exegetical practices, but also that they shared more in common with modern 
exegetes than they did with their medieval predecessors. 143 However, recent work in this 
area has convincingly shown that work of the early Reformers demonstrates a high level 
of continuity in their exegetical interests with the medieval scholars. 144 While a detailed 
discussion of these issues is not possible here, I think the evidence from the Reformer's 
writings supports the latter perspective. 
A. Martin Luther's Expositions and Bucer's Enarrations 
Luther's cursing of the allegorical method employed by the fathers, and in 
particular the "clever tricks" of Origen, as being "nothing but rubbish" appears to give 
the impression that he was making a strong break from Patristic and medieval exegetical 
practices. 145 But at other places, he is quite hospitable to their allegorical interpretations. 
This is particularly obvious in the introduction to his teaching on the parable of the 
143 Perhaps the classic text to make this argument is: Frederic W. Farrar, History of 
Interpretation (Grand-Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961; originally, N. Y.: Dutton, 
1886). For more recent works which hold to this view see: Hans Joachim Krauss, 
"Calvin's Exegetical Principles, " Interpretation 31 (1977), 9-18; William W. Klein, Craig 
L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard, Jr., Introduction to BiblicalInterpretatien (Dallas: 
Word, 1993), 39-41. 
144 For an excellent collection of articles which demonstrates this view see: Richard A. Muller 
and John L. Thompson, eds., Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation: Essays 
Presented to David C. Steinmetz in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday (Grand Rapids and 
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1996). 
145 Martin Luther, Table Talk, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappen, vol. 54 in Luther'' Works, 
Helmut T. Lehman, ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 46-7,406, A. M. Hunter, 
Interpreting the Parabks (London: SCM Press, 1960), 32. 
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Wedding Feast. "This Gospel presents to us the parable of the wedding; therefore we are 
compelled to understand it differently than it sounds and appears to the natural ear and 
eye. Hence we will give attention to the spiritual meaning of the parable and then notice 
how the text has been torn and perverted. " 146 
Like many of the previous commentators, he understood the invitation to the 
feast to have been extended to the Jewish nation first and then, because they rejected the 
invitation it was extended to the Gentiles. 147 The thrust of the parable concerns the 
proclamation of this invitation, the gospel, throughout the whole world but very few 
people embrace it. However, Luther broke with previous interpretations of the parable at 
three critical points. The first concerned what the feast referred to, the second was the 
significance of the excuses, and third was what the wedding garment symbolised. The 
feast to which the king invites the guests in the parable is not seen primarily as a reference 
to the church by Luther, but rather it points to the richness of the teachings in the Bible. 
If all the food of the kings were gathered into one pile it could not compare with the 
"smallest word of God. " This is why Jesus compared it to a marriage feast in the parable 
according to Luther. 148 "Wherefore the supper here is nothing else, but a very rich and 
sumptuous feast, which God hath made through Christ by the Gospel, which setteth 
before us great good things and rich treasures. "149 
The excuses which those who were invited gave reveal that our relationship to 
God should take priority over our relationship to the things of this world such as 
business or family. Most of the Patristic and Medieval scholars would agreed with 
Luther's exposition of the excuses so far. However, Luther did not go as far as 
Chrysostom and teach that the Christian should withdraw from the world. Instead, he 
took a softer position, we "should not cleave to them in our hearts. "150 The reason why 
those who were invited refused the invitation is because they did not possess enough ftaith 
in Christ to abandon their dependence on work, family, and other worldly concerns. As 
a result, Luther sees these characters as symbolising those who think that they can obtain 
salvation through their own good works. 15t "Wherefore no man cometh to this supper, 
146 Beare, "The Parable of the Guests at the Banquet, " 11 quoted from a sermon preached on 
the 20th Sunday after Trinity. 
147 Luther, "A Sermon of Dr. Martin Luther Concerning the Bidding of Guests to the Great 
Supper, " in Devotional Writings Martin 0. Dietrich ed., vol. 42 in Luther's Works, 191. 
148 Luther, "An Exposition of the Lord's Prayer" in Luther's Works, 42.56. 
149 Ideen, "A Sermon of Dr. Martin Luther Concerning the Bidding of Guests to the Great 
Supper, " in Luther's Works, 42.191. 
150 Ibid., 42.192. 
151 Hunter, 32. 
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but he that bringeth with him a sincere faith, which God preferreth and loveth above all 
creatures. "152 Faith now becomes the central theme in the parable. The wedding 
garment is interpreted in accordance with this theme; the lack of the wedding garment 
signifies the absences of sincere faith in that individual. 153 Thus, Luther makes a sharp 
turn in this aspect of the parable's interpretation especially since the time of Augustine. 
The feast is no longer recognised as the church, but it refers to the invitation to feast on 
the rich truths of the gospel. This also allows Luther to shift from Augustine's 
ecclesiological approach to ask questions about what this parable taught in relation to 
salvation through faith. 
Luther's approach to the parable appears to be characterised by the same degree 
of allegorical method as those who came before him. However, what he counted as the 
proper reference for the symbols in the parable had undergone a significant shift due to 
the questions which were being raised by him and other Reformers. His interpretation of 
the parable is inferior to previous interpretations in two respects. First, in comparison to 
the unified and holistic interpretation which the Patristic and medieval scholars offered, 
Luther's interpretation is very fragmented. He draws out two distinct points, the gospel 
and faith, but it is difficult to see how in his explication of the parable they relate to each 
other logically or in the narrative structure of the parable. By contrast, most of the 
interpretations we have examined to this point present the parable in a manner in which 
all the elements are related to each other within the overall structure and narrative of the 
parable. Second, his interpretation of the wedding garment as faith not only reflects the 
Reformer's emphasis on salvation by faith but, like Augustine, it reduces the surplus of 
meaning in this symbol to a single concept. This is a point which John Maldonatus 
justifiably criticises not only Luther but the other early Reformers. '54 
One of the more significant exegetical moves which Luther makes concerns the 
interpretation of "compe& intrare. " Luther argues that this phrase should not to be 
understood in terms of "outward compulsion, as some interpret it, that wicked and 
ungodly ones should be violently driven to the supper 
.... 
" A reference most likely 
directed at the Catholic position on this passage which had come down from Aquinas. 
In fact, the use of force to compel the "wicked and ungodly" to the feast results in no 
152 Ibid., 42.913. 
153 Beare, 11. 
154 See below, "Maldonatus, Not Everything is Faith. " 
259 
benefits to either the church or the person being compelled. 155 There are two reasons for 
this. First, sincere faith requires a free act of the volition. And secondly, within the 
context of the parable itself, the feast is no longer the church but the gospel. While 
someone could be forced into the church or to comply with its teachings and practices, it 
is difficult to see how this could be applied to compelling a person to feast on the gospel. 
Instead, Luther understands this compulsion to refer "only to the conscience, and is 
inner and spiritual. -156 
While there is no evidence that suggests that Luther changed his interpretation of 
the parable of the Wedding Feast, his stance on toleration did shift over time. The 
threats presented by the radical Reformers at Müntzer, Karlstadt, and the Peasants' 
Revolt resulted in his seeking to protect the established Protestant churches. This shift is 
best seen in his interpretation of the parable of the Tares. In his earlier works, he wrote 
that there will always be some measure of heresy in the church and that some degree of 
toleration should be extended toward the heretics. As time progressed, he taught that 
Protestant princes should defend the unity of the church and the truth of the gospel 
preached within their jurisdictions. In his final position, he argues that the heretics 
should not only be refuted by the ministers teaching but also punished by the civil 
magistrates. 157 
Martin Bucer's commentary agrees with Luther's interpretation of the parable of 
the Wedding Feast at almost every point. Towards the end of his discussion of Matthew 
22: 1-14, he makes a significant digression and comments on the "compelle intrare" in 
Luke 14: 23 for several pages. 158 Compulsion must be understood in relation to the 
sending of the servants by the father. These servants went out to every part of the 
kingdom and found the poor, crippled and blind and through their diligence and 
perseverance commended the kingdom of God to everyone they found. In a manner 
very similar to Comestor's comments on this phrase, Bucer says that the king had his 
155 Luther, "A Sermon of Dr. Martin Luther Concerning the Bidding of Guests to the Great 
Supper, " in Luther's Works, 42.194-5. 
156 Ibid., 42.195. 
157 Ole Peter Grell, "Introduction, " in Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, 
Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
5; Bainton, "Religious Liberty and the Parable of the Tares, " 110-13. 
158 Bucer thinks that the parables of the Wedding Feast in Matthew and the Great Feast in 
Luke 14 are the same parable, but does not remark on the relationship between the 
different accounts in his commentary. Martin Bucer, Enarrationes per Petuae, in Sacra 
Quatuor Evangelia, ad Academiam Marpurgensem de seruanda unitate Ecclesiae 
(Argentorati: Georgium, 1530), 165-67. 
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servants compel them to enter the feast through persuasion. 159 The people were 
compelled to enter the feast on account of the diligent and persistent ministry of the 
prophets, apostles, and evangelists. 160 
Whereas Luther only vaguely referred to "the others" who misinterpreted 
"compelle intrare", Bucer attributes the abuse of this phrase's meaning to the popes who 
twisted its meaning in order to legitimatise their use of imprisonment and the death 
sentence as a means to enrich the church, not to bring glory to God. According to 
Bucer, the error in their interpretation was simple, the text says, "compelle intrare', 
compel them to enter. 161 It does not speak about the use of force against those who 
create divisions or spread false teachings, but it refers to the tireless effort by God's 
servants to exhort and persuade the people to accept the invitation to the heavenly feast 
which God has prepared. The apostle Paul's ministry serves as the prime example of this 
type of compulsion. On the recipient's side, only those who willingly and gladly 
accepted this invitation were worthy to receive it. Thus, decisions made under the threat 
of force would be of no avail as Luther had claimed. 162 
B. Calvin's Commentary and Institutes 
Calvin's interpretation of the parable of the Wedding Feast occurs at two 
locations: in his Harmony of the Gospels and in Book IV of the Institutes of the Christian 
Religion. While Calvin enjoyed the advantage of having access to Luther and Bucer's 
work on this passage before he wrote on this parable, his views on the parable raise some 
very interesting questions especially in light of their work. 163 Because his discussion of 
159 The parallels with Comestar not only include the same argument and use of compeUd induco 
but also "quasi compe! lerenx" Ibid.; Peter Comestar, Historia Scholastics, cap. CXXVIII 
(P. L 198.1605). 
160 "... ad sua caena uelut compellerent, ut tande conuiuatu numerus imp/eretur. " Bucer, 165. 
161 "Quidam abutuntur hoc ditto, ad comprobandam uim, qua caraerum & mortis metu, ad 
approbanda Papse comments quoslibet compellunt. Scriptum est, inquiunt, Compelle 
intrare. " Bucer, 166. 
162 Ibid. 
163 While I cannot date Luther's sermons which I cited above, nor prove that Calvin had access 
to them, he did have access to Luther's other works. In the case of Bucer and other 
Reformers such as Melanchthon and Bullinger, Calvin not only read their commentaries 
but commented upon their work in his commentaries. Thomas H. L. Parker, Calvin's 
New Testament Commentaries, 2nd ed. (Louisville: John Knox Press 1993), 60-77,87- 
90. 
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the parable is briefer in the Institutes and is chronologically prior to his Harmon); I shall 
examine that text first. IM 
Like the other Reformers, Calvin interprets the parable around the central themes 
of the faith and the gospel. The feast refers to the gospel and the invitations signify the 
"outward preaching of the word. "165 The invitation to attend the feast corresponds to 
Calvin's doctrine that God extends a general call of salvation to everyone. At the same 
time, there is a special call that is issued to believers only and takes place through the 
ministry of the Holy Spirit illuminating the preaching of God's word in the believer's 
heart. 166 The successive sending of the servants to invite the guests refers to the general 
calling. 
The guest without the wedding garment should "be understood as applying to 
those who enter the church on profession of faith but not clothed with Christ's 
sanctification. " 167 The binding and casting of this guest into the outer darkness serves 
two purposes. The fate of this imprudent guest serves as a warning against hypocrisy 
within the church. At the same time, the king's actions should serve as an 
encouragement to believers who are disheartened over the low moral or spiritual state of 
the church since it demonstrates that God will purge the church of all who are not true 
bclicvers. 168 The special call to salvation is sometimes experienced only temporarily by 
an individual and because of ungratefulness on their part God withdraws the offer of this 
grace to them. "God will not forever bear such dishonors 
... 
but as their baseness 
deserves will cast them out. "169 The result is that they are in an even "greater blindness" 
than their previous state. Calvin does not specifically identify this teaching to a passage 
in the parable, but the impression is fairly clear that it is related to his understanding of 
the guest without the garment being expelled. 
164 In Harmoniam ex Matthaeo, Marco et Luca Compositam Commentarii first appeared in 1555 
while the Inititutio Christiane Religioniswas first published in 1539, but underwent 
several revisions during Calvin's life. 
165 John Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, Book IV, ch. xxiv, §8, trans. John T. 
McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 2.974. 
166 "For this call is common also to the wicked, but the other bears with it the Spirit of 
regeneration [cf. Titus 3: 5], the guarantee and seal of the inheritance to come [Eph. 
1: 13-14], with which our hearts are sealed (II Cor. 1: 22] unto the day of the Lord. " 
Ibid., 2.974-5. 
167 Ibid., 2.974. 
168 Ibid., 2.975. This reflects Calvin's teaching on the nature of the church. The church was 
both visible and invisible: the invisible church comprised all true believers, the visible 
church was the actual, mixed church which included everyone who professed to be a 
Christian. Institutes IV. I. 7 (McNeill, 1960 edition, 2.1021-22). 
169 Ibid., 2.974. 
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The second place where Calvin examines the parable of the Wedding Feast is 
found in his Harmony of the Gospels. Calvin did not write individual commentaries on 
the synoptic gospels, but like Augustine, chose instead to compile a harmony of the 
gospels. It is only natural then that Calvin places the parable in Matthew 22 alongside 
the parable of the Great Feast in Luke 14. After an introductory section comparing 
Matthew and Luke's accounts, Calvin begins his exposition of the parables. 170 
Like Luther, Calvin wanted to be seen as making a break from the previous 
tradition of interpretation. His statement that "... we ought not to attempt an ingenious 
explanation of every minute clause" at the conclusion of his discussion of the parable of 
the Wedding Feast is one example of this. 171 This criticism appears to be a directed at 
the allegorical interpretations from the Patristic and medieval exegetes. However, like 
Luther, Calvin is guilty of his own criticism when he examines each particular element of 
the parable as closely as those he criticised. His interpretation of the various characters 
and their action in the parable also agrees with most of the allegorical interpretations 
offered by the Patristic and medieval scholars. 172 Those who were invited to the feast 
but rejected the invitation and had their city burned symbolise the Jewish nation. 173 
The different excuses which the business person and farmer gave represent how the cares 
of the world entangle and impede our entering the kingdom of God. This is a universal 
condition of humanity and not just a failure on the part of the Jewish nation. As a result, 
Calvin laments that "hardly one person in a hundred can be found who prefers the 
kingdom of God to the fading riches. "174 The lame and blind who are found on the 
outer roads are once again recognised as a reference to the Gentiles. Their invitation to 
170 Calvin argues that these two accounts relate the same parable. While Luke's setting is 
preferred and Matthew filled out more of the details "there is remarkable agreement 
between them on the main points of the parable. " loannis Calvini, In Harmoniam 
Matthaeo, Marco et Luca Compositam Commentarii, sect. XIII. 121 Matth. 1-2, Ad 
Editionem Amstelodamensem ed. (Berolini: Apud Gustavum Eichler, 1833), 40-1: Eng. 
trans., Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, trans. 
William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 1.167-9. 
171 ", 
.. 
unde colligimus, non esse subtilster excutiendas singular partieulas" Calvin, In Harmoniam, 
XIII. 121 Matth. 11 (43); Pringle's translation, Commentary on a Harmony of the 
Evangelist, 1.175. 
172 While much of Calvin's exegesis overlaps with Patristic interpretations, his use of the fathers 
differs from that of the medieval exegete. He uses their interpretations but he does not 
appeal to their authority in order to substantiate his argument. David C. Steinmetz, 
"Calvin and Patristic Exegesis, " in Calvin in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 135-7. 
173 Calvin., In Harmoniam, XIII. 121 Matth. 4 (41-2); Pringle, 170-1. 
174 Ibid., XIII. 121 Matth. 4 (42-3); Pringle, 171. This echoes a similar lament made by Origen 
and Gregory the Great. Origen, In Matthaeum, XVII. 24 (G. C. S 10.652); Gregory the 
Great, Homilia in Evangeli4 II. XXXVIII. 7 (P. L. 76.1285; Burke 38). 
263 
the feast speaks about the initiation of the Gentile mission and the inception of the 
church according to Calvin. 
There are several significant points in Calvin's commentary which deserve 
attention. The first is the subtle manner by which he explicates the significance of the 
feast. As he begins his discussion of the parable, he speaks of the feast in terms of the 
kingdom of God. But when he reaches verse 22: 9 where the invitation is extended to the 
destitute on the outer roads, Calvin no longer speaks of the feast in reference to the 
kingdom of God. Now he explicitly identifies the feast as the Church. "What the 
prophets had obscurely foretold about creating a new church is now plainly 
explained. "175 In this way, his exegesis of the parable follows the narrative logic of the 
parable closer than previous interpreters had-176 
The second point concerns his interpretation of the wedding garment. The 
king's casting the guest without the garment into the outer darkness illustrates that God 
will judge and remove those who pollute the church. "The general truth conveyed is, 
that not all who have entered the Church will become partakers of everlasting life, but 
only those who are found to wear the dress which befits the heavenly palace. 977 So far 
his commentary agrees with his discussion in the Institutes 178 The wedding garment 
symbolises "putting on Christ" while the man without the wedding garment signifies a 
person who has not put off his old self with its pollution. 179 Thus, the lesson that should 
be learned from the parable is that an external profession of faith is not sufficient for 
salvation. 
The third point in his commentary which deserves attention involves the 
differences between his commentary and the Institutes. In the Institutes the general and 
special call of God were the prominent teachings which Calvin recognised in the parable. 
However, these calls are not mentioned at all in his Harmony of the Gospels In fact, he 
even makes the point that he will not enter into a discussion of "the eternal election of 
God" in the Harmony 180 While these two works do not contradict each other, they do 
175 "ha quod obscurius de creanda nova Eccksia praedictum frerat a Prophetic. clare exprimic" 
Calvin, In Harmoniam, )(Ill. 121 Matth. 9 (42); Pringle, 172. 
176 This is not to deny that other interpreters did not follow the narrative logic of the parable, 
but that Calvin's exegesis at this point followed it more closely. Instead of reading the 
feast as the church throughout the entire parable, Calvin sees the reference changing at 
verse 22: 9 in the parable. 
177 Ibid., XIII. 121 Matth. 11 (43); Pringle, 174. 
178 Idem, Institutes, 2.974. 
179 Ibid.; idem, In Harmoniam, XIII. 121 Matth. 11 (43); Pringle, 174. 
180 Ibid., XIII. 121 Marth. 14 (43); Pringle, 175. 
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illustrate Collingwood and Gadamer's point that meaning of a text is related to the 
questions one asks the text. In the Institutes, Calvin was concerned with questions about 
various theological locz in the commentary he was addressing a different agenda, to 
explicate the meaning of the biblical text. This stands in contrast to Bucer who tried to 
combine both a discussion of the theological loci and a commentary into a single work. 
A solution which Calvin did not find satisfactory and chose instead to write his Institutes 
and commentaries 'as complementary works. 181 The difference between Calvin's 
hermeneutical interests in the Institutes and his commentaries results in different 
questions being asked which yield different answers in his works. 
The most remarkable aspect of Calvin's commentary is his adoption of 
Augustine's "compelle intrare". "It will excite more general surprises to find the great 
Reformer maintaining the right of the civil magistrate to punish heretics, and even to 
inflict on them the last sentence of the law. "182 While Calvin does mention that `compel 
them to enter' is an allusion to the fact that the gospel is not just a verbal invitation but 
that it is accompanied with "exhortations fitted to arouse our minds" in a manner very 
similar to Luther and Bucer, he devotes more attention and force of argument to support 
his adoption of Augustine's position. 183 Because his appropriation of Augustine is so 
important, I will quote this passage at length. 
And yet, I do not disapprove of Augustine's frequent use of this passage against 
the Donatists, in order to recommend that godly princes may lawfully issue edicts 
to force the obstinate and rebellious to worship the true God and (maintain) the 
unity of the faith. Although faith is voluntary, nevertheless we see that such 
means are profitable for breaking their stubbornness, who unless they are forced 
will not be obedient (or submit). 184 
There are four aspects to Calvin's reception of Augustine's position which are 
important. First, force may be used to "compel obstinate and rebellious to worship the 
true God. " In Calvin's Geneva this meant the execution of heretics such as Servetus and 
181 Parker, 88-90. 
182 Pringle, "Translator's Preface" in Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, xv. 
Steinmetz's claim that "In every case, explicit and anonymous, in which Calvin has 
referred to Patristic exegesis, he has quarrelled with it. " is clearly an overstatement. 
Especially, when we consider Calvin's explicit approval of Augustine's view on this 
passage. Steinmetz, "Calvin and Patristic Exegesis, " 136. 
183 Calvin., In Harmoniam, XIII. 121 Luc. 23 (42-3); Pringle, 173; Luther, "A Sermon of Dr. 
Martin Luther Concerning the Bidding of Guests to the Great Supper, " 42.195; Bucer, 
Enarrationes, 165. 
184 "Interea non improbo, quoll Augustus hoc testimonio saepius contra Donatistas usw est, ut 
probaret, piorum principum edictis ad veri Dei cultum et frdei unitatem licite chi praefractos 
et rebels: quia, etsi voluntaria estfides, videmus tame., its mcdiis utiliter domari eorum 
pervicacam, qui non nisi coacti parent" Calvin, XIII. 121 Luc. 23 (43); Pringle, 713. 
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the repression of the Anabaptists movements. For Calvin, the purpose of compulsion 
was not conversion as Augustine argued, but "to vindicate the honour of [God] by 
silencing those who sully His holy name. "185 Second, the goal of compulsion was to 
"maintain the unity of the faith. " This reflects the medieval character of Calvin's 
thought-world. The Reformers could not fathom how a person could leave his family 
and occupation and become a wandering evangelist. To ignore these social relationships 
was seen as introducing a destabilising element into society. But for the Anabaptists these 
were worldly concerns. 186 Third, this force was to be exercised by godly princes. Calvin 
taught that Christians should extend toleration to others unless they were "firmly 
committed to making propaganda for error. "187 Inside the church, the truth was to be 
defended by means of proper teaching and the exercise of church discipline. Outside, the 
civil magistrate was in a different situation, he was "under obligation to repress error. "188 
The relationship between ecclesial and civil authorities is discussed in his commentary on 
Daniel 4: 1-3. Once again Calvin appropriated Augustine. Since the magistrate is God's 
representative, he has authority to exercise the use of force and the Christian magistrate 
in particular should be ashamed if he is indulgent with heretics. 189 And finally, while he 
held to the Reformation's and the earlier church's view that faith was voluntary, we see 
him adopting Augustine's teaching that force can serve the purpose of subduing those 
who are obstinate. While many Protestants were divided over the idea of religious 
tolerance, Calvin was a strong advocate that civil magistrates should use the sword to 
defend the faith against heretics and schismatics. As the Protestant church established 
itself in Northern Europe, the Reformers' role shifted from dissidents attempting to 
reform the church to ecclesiastical leaders who sought to consolidate and protect the 
Reformation churches. It was in this context that Calvin's appropriation of Augustine's 
185 Roland H. Bainton, Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Michael Servetus: 1511-1553 
(Beacon Press, Boston, 1960), 170. 
186 Hans Kasdorf, "The Anabaptist Approach to Mission, " in Anabaptism and Miuiorn ed. 
Wilbert R. Shenk (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1984), 51-69; Franklin H. Littell, "The 
Anabaptist Theology of Mission, " in Anabaptism and Mission, 20. 
187 Paul Wooly, "Calvin and Toleration, " in The Heritage ofJohn Calvin: Heritage Hall Lectures 
1960-1970, John Bratt ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), 141. 
188 Ibid., 141-5. 
189 Calvin, Daniel 1: Chapterr 1-6 trans. T. H. L. Parker, Calvin's Old Testament 
Commentaries, D. F. Wright ed., vol. 20 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 153. For an 
excellent discussion of the actual mechanics and workings of the secular and ecclesial 
government of Geneva see: E. William Monier, Calvin's Geneva, New Dimensions in 
History: Historical Cities, ed. Norman F. Cantor (N. Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1967). 
Especially chapters 5 "The Church of Geneva to 1564" 125-143; and 6 "The Secular 
Arm" 144-164. 
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"compelle intrare" was received and became a norm for church-state relations in 
Switzerland and parts of France especially in relation to radical reformers and 
Anabaptists. 190 
Calvin's adoption of Augustine's position was mediated through the prejudices 
which he inherited from the medieval period, and in particular from Aquinas, and not 
directly from Augustine. This is reflected in the four points I have just discussed. 
Calvin's goal of maintaining the unity of the faith was not the same as Augustine's desire 
to restore the wayward back to the church. 191 Christian rulers during the medieval 
period swore an oath to advance the glory of God by suppressing doctrines contrary to 
his glory. The use of force to constrain heresy and provide an inducement for heretics to 
abandon their views was part of canon and civil law in the late middle ages. 192 Thus, 
Calvin's reception of Augustine was shaped by the horizon in which he lived, his 
historical position in the Christian tradition, and in particular by classic texts, such as 
Aquinas' works. The manner by which Aquinas mediates Calvin's appropriation of 
Augustine is an example of the summit-dialogue between authors which Jauss discusses 
in relation to role of classic texts in a tradition. 
C. A Critique of Calvin by way of his Contemporaries 
In this section I will examine two texts which through their relationship to 
Calvin (and the other Reformers at certain points) allow us to say something about the 
appropriateness of Calvin's exegesis. The first is John Maldonatus' commentary on 
Matthew and the second is the Geneva Bible. 
1. Maldonatwa, Not Everything is Faith 
Maldonatus is significant not only because he was a Catholic exegete who was 
contemporary of the Reformers and very familiar with their work, but also because he 
was regarded as a master of exegesis whose works were widely received for several 
19 0 Ole Peter Grell, "Introduction, " in Tolerance and Intolerance, 3-6. Some Reformers, such as 
Jean Bonneau, who disagreed with this view were eventually forced to adopt Calvin's 
position. Philip Benedict, " Un roi, une loi, dews fois Parameters for the History of 
Catholic-Reformed Co-existence in France, 1555-1685, " in Tolerance and Intolerance, 
70-1. 
191 Bainton, 170. 
192 Benedict discusses these responsibilities in relation to the duties of the medieval rulers. 
Benedict, 68. 
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hundred years. 193 Like Calvin and Luther, Maldonatus also professed a distrust for the 
allegorical method. 194 
One of his common criticisms of the Reformers was their tendency to read all the 
parables according to the framework of salvation by faith. In his comments on the 
parable of the Dragnet in Matthew 13, Maldonatus writes that all the fish caught in the 
net (which symbolises the church) are Christians and have entered the church by faith. 
The fact that some are good and some are bad points to the conclusion that only those 
who practice good works are saved. This refutes those he labels as the modern heretics, 
Calvin and Luther, who teach that "all who have faith will be saved. "195 To support his 
interpretation of the parable of the Dragnet, he appeals to Augustine. 
It may well be said that, although Saint Augustine refuted no class of heretics so 
completely as the Donatists, yet that he wrote his many works against them, and 
not only against them but also against the followers of Luther and Calvin long 
after. This is so great a matter, that whoever reads them may substitute the word 
`Donatists' with the followers of Luther and Calvin. 196 
According to Maldonatus, the Parable of the Wedding Feast teaches two main 
ideas: (1) many are called but few come, and (2) that all who enter the church will not be 
saved. 197 He questions Calvin's interpretation of the significance of the wedding 
garment. "The followers of Calvin say that it is faith 
- 
for everything is faith with them 
when they themselves have no faith; nor 
... 
do they consider that that guest came only by 
faith, without which he could not have entered the guest-chamber 
- 
that is, the 
church. "198 Therefore, the marriage garment cannot symbolise faith. Maldonatus cites 
193 Often the Reformers called him maledicentiuimus Maldonatns (evil speaking) but, at the 
same time, praised him for his learning and thinking. George J. Davie, "Introduction, 
Life of John Maldonatus, " in A Commentary on the Holy Gospels, trans. George J. Davie, 
Catholic Standard Libra,, % vol. 1 (London: John Hodges, 1888), ix. 
194 For example, in his discussion of the parable of the persistent widow he writes, "Haec 
simplicia 
. 
runt et ad sensum literalem pertinent, alie: senses allegorieo: si quir quaerit, legal 
Aguctinum, Theophilum, Antiochemim, Anartarium. " Joannis Maldonati, Commentarii in 
Quatuor Evangrlistas (London and Paris: Moguntiae, 1853-54; from the 1596 ed. ), 
1I. 316. 
195 Ibid., I. 192-3; Davie, I. 146. This same point is brought out in his discussion of the 
wedding garment. Ibid., 1.306; Davie, 1.229. 
196 Ibid., 1.192-3; Davie, 1.146. 
197 While he does not personally interpret the parable allegorically as Calvin and Luther did, he 
does discuss seven main elements of the parable by way of citing the church fathers' 
interpretations and then offering his opinion as to which he thought was best according 
to grammatical or theological grounds. Joannis Maldonati, Commenterii in Quaeuor 
Evangelism (London and Paris: Moguntiae, 1853-54; from the 1596 ed. ), 1.304-6; 
Davie, 1.224-9. 
198 "Neque considerant homines valde, ut sibi videntur, acusi, invitatum ilium non nisi perfidem 
venire, ant in coenaculum, id gist, in Eeciesiam ingredi potuiue. Venire enim est credere. " Ibid., I. 306: Davie, 11.229. Maldonatus does not treat Calvin's commentary fairly at this 
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various church fathers to support his position much like a medieval exegete did, but he 
does so with a critical eye on their exegesis and the grammatical structure of the text. 199 
To support his position he calls Tertullian, Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Gregory the 
Great, and Theophylact who all viewed "that the wedding garment is charity, good 
works, and a life answering to the faith in Christ. "200 While Maldonatus recaptures some 
of the breadth of play to the interpretation of the wedding garment, he concludes his 
comments on the parable by restricting the play of meaning to "good works". 201 This 
was most likely a result of his polemical activity against the Reformation. 
What is more significant, is his mentioning the question about "compelling them 
to come in". If Calvin's reception of Augustine's position is striking, then so is 
Maldonatus' denial of it. For him, this phrase cannot mean that a person should literally 
be forced to convert. Rather, it is a metaphor for inducing and exhorting people to 
accept the gospel, "almost to appear in a manner compelled. "202 Luther, Bucer, and 
especially Maldonatus' interpretation of the phrase, "compel them to come in" 
demonstrate, on a synchronic plane, that by the time of the Reformation the horizon of 
expectations had shifted so that Augustine's interpretation would not have been 
recognised as an appropriate interpretation. If this is so, then we must question Calvin's 
appropriation of Augustine's position as forcing an agenda upon the text which most 
commentators at that time would have realised was doing violence to the meaning of the 
text. 
This is especially crucial since one of Calvin's hermeneutical criteria was that an 
interpretation should follow and explain the mind of the author. The degree to which 
the interpreter strays from this principle, is the degree to which "he leads his readers away 
from it [the truth of the text]. "203 I think we can safcly say that, even within his horizon, 
point. For Calvin does mention that the question whether it is faith or works is a 
"useless controversy; for faith cannot be separated from good works, nor do good works 
proceed from any other source than from faith. " Calvin, XIII. 121 Matth. 11 (43); 
Pringle, 174. 
199 When he finds differing interpretations among the church fathers for a passage, Maldonatus 
goes with the one he thinks is best, often against tradition or the majority of 
commentators. In particular, he often rejects Augustine's interpretations on the grounds 
of grammar or theology. Davie, "Introduction, Life of John Maldonatus, " viii. 
200 Maldonatus, 1.306; Davie, 1.229. 
201 Ibid. 
202 " Compelle intran, non 
. 
ugniEirat, ad, f Odem cogendos esse Im mines, std adeo mgandos, adeo 
incitandos, at quodammodo compeUi videantur. " Ibid., 1.307; Davie, 1.232. In his 
discussion of the parable of the Great Feast in Luke 14, Maldonatus does not even 
mention this phrase at all. Ibid., 11.250-1. 
203 Parker, 91, quoting Calvin's preface to his Commentary on Romans. 
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it is surprising, perhaps even self-contradictory. In the light of his contemporaries 
commentaries, Calvin should have recognised that Matthew and Luke could not have 
had the use of coercive force in mind. As a result, his commentary did not address the 
subject matter of the parable. Instead, he adopted Augustine's ecclesiological 
interpretation, though modified through the history of its reception, to support his 
concept of church-state relations in Geneva and to maintain the medieval ideal of the 
unity of the faith in the midst of the changes of the sixteenth century. Calvin it appears 
is guilty of Luz's complaint that "because the reality of churches did not correspond to 
the reality of the texts, very often the interpretations served as an excuse or an alibi. "204 
From the perspective of reception theory, if Calvin had been open to the claims of the 
text (or what his contemporaries recognised as the claims of the text) then his prejudices 
should have been provoked in his engagement with the text. This should have caused 
him to question his appropriation of Augustine (and Aquinas') view. 
2. The Geneva Bible's Annotations 
The Geneva Bible makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
Calvin for several rcasons. 205 Calvin was very interested in influencing the English 
authorities toward embracing the Reformation in a more whole-hearted manner. 206 It 
represents the appropriation of Calvin's theology by English scholars who sought refuge 
in Geneva from Queen Mary. 207 In the Geneva Bible's annotations on Matthew 22: 1- 
14, the translators followed Calvin's Harmony almost point by point. The notes are 
designed to function by (1) helping the reader identify with the characters in the text, (2) 
showing the reader how to apply lessons from the text, and (3) filling in the gaps in the 
text for the reader. The goal was to decode the Bible for the average reader, but in many 
places, such as the parable of the Wedding Feast, it also functioned by encoding the 
reader's cxpectations. 208 This is seen by the way the notes guide the reader to recognise 
that the parable teaches the mixed nature of the church and that God suffers hypocrites 
204 Luz, Matthew in History, 49. 
205 The following article provides a dear outline of the significance of the Geneva Bible from 
the perspective of reception theory. Michael Jensen, "'Simply' Reading the Geneva 
Bible: The Geneva Bible and its Readers, " Literature and Theology, 9 (1,1995): 30-45. 
206 Parker, 8. 
207 Also, when Luther's and Calvin's commentaries were translated into English during the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the translators used the Geneva Bible as the biblical 
text. Thus, English understanding of the Reformers would have been coloured though 
the perspective of this translation. John David Alexander, "The Genevan Version of the English Bible. " D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1956,249-5 1. 
208 Jensen, "'Simply' Reading the Geneva Bible, " 40-4. 
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for a time in the church but will "fanne them out. "209 Concepts which represent a 
specific trajectory in the reception history of the parable, the trajectory from Augustine to 
Calvin. 
Like Calvin, and contrary to Maldonatus, the annotators interpret the wedding 
garment in terms of the changed life which proceeds from true faith. However, on the 
crucial question concerning compulsion in Luke 14: 23, the annotations read "The 
conpulsiö cometh of the feling of the power of Gods worde, after that his worde hathe 
bene preached. "210 This reflects Luther, Bucer, and Calvin's explanation in the 
Institutes 
- 
that "compelle intrare" refers to the exhortations of the evangelists and the 
inward illumination of the Spirit of the gospel message. 211 
The fact that the translators and commentators of the Geneva Bible were seeking 
refuge under Calvin displays a critical difference between their horizons of expectations, 
even though they were geographically and chronologically contemporary. They stood in 
the shoes of the Anabaptists, whose obstinacy Calvin sought to restrain. For them, the 
civil authorities in England represented a hindrance to the Gospel, not a partner to the 
church as was Calvin's experience in Geneva. This difference between their horizons was 
reflected in the annotations at other points. 
"The single most important feature of the Geneva Bible, to both the laity and the 
clergy, consisted in the marginal notes. "212 However these marginal notes were also very 
controversial. Archbishop Parker thought the Church of England should issue a new 
translation to replace the Geneva Bible because of its `bitter' notes. 213 The notes on 
Exodus 1: 19, where the Egyptian midwives refused to obey Pharaoh's order to kill the 
Jewish babies when they were born, is a good example. The notes read "Their disobience 
herein was lawful, but their dissembling evil. " In 1603, Dr. John Reynolds presented the 
209 Matthew 22: 11-13, note f, Geneva Bible. 
210 Luke 14: 23, note f, Geneva Bible. 
211 Calvin, Institutes, III. )0UV. 8; 2.974. 
212 Lloyd E. ferry, "Introduction, " in The Geneva Bible, A Facsimile of the 1560 Edition ed. (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969; from The Bible and Holy 
Scriptures Contained in the We and Newe Testament. [Geneva: Routland Hall, 1560]), 
15. 
213 Alfred W. Pollard, ed. Records of the English Biba: The Documents Relating to the Translation 
and Publication of the Bible in English, 1525-1611 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1911), 297. Referring to the Geneva Bible Archbishop Parker wrote, that a new 
translation should be commissioned because the Geneva Bible is being used, "as for that 
in certaine places be pulikely vsed sum translations which have not byn Labored in your 
Realme having inspersed diverse preiudicall nots which might have ben also well spared. " 
"Archbishop Parker to Queen Elizabeth, " Pollard 295; reprinted from original in Record Office, Domestic State Papers, Eli. tabes4 vol. xlviii, 6, I. 
271 
following argument for a new translation in which "no marginall notes should be added, 
hauing found in them which are annexed to the Geneua translation (which he sawe in a 
Bible giuen him by an English Lady) some notes very partiall, vntrue, seditious, and 
sauouring too much of daungerous, and trayterous conceites. As for example, Exod. 
1,19, where the marginal note alloweth disobedience to Kings. "214 
If the translators of the Geneva Bible did not sec fit to follow Calvin's 
commentary on the meaning of "compelk intrare" but went with his interpretation found 
in the Institutes, the other Reformers, and the church fathers, then we must once again 
question Calvin's interpretation. In this case, Jauss' concept of `culinary art' can function 
as a critical tool against Calvin's appropriation of Augustine. Calvin's interpretation was 
tied to his historical, cultural, and political/ecclesiological horizon that his appropriation 
of Augustine at this point reduces to `culinary art'. It was not capable of being applied in 
different horizons of interpretation, rather it was an interpretation offered to meet the 
immediate needs of his situation. The rejection of his interpretation of "compel them to 
come in" by the translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible demonstrates the 
inappropriateness of Calvin's understanding of this passage for an audience which did 
not share Calvin's cultural and historical situation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that I have been able to demonstrate in this chapter that reception 
theory offers several productive directions or methods for biblical interpretation and its 
history. Since I have offered a summary at the end of each section of this chapter, I will 
focus primarily on the Reformers in the conclusion. First, in the preceding section I have 
tried to show the role and significance which previous interpretations play in shaping 
new interpretations, specifically how medieval and Patristic interpretations played such 
an influential role in the commentaries of the Reformers. As such, it is difficult to 
separate the text from the history of its interpretations and the effects of those 
interpretations. The Wirkungsgeschichte of the biblical texts "belongs to the texts in the 
same way that a river flowing away from its source belongs to the source. "215 Second, 
the `summit dialogue' between authors was clearly seen in the Augustine-Aquinas-Calvin 
trajectory of interpretation. This trajectory also demonstrated the norm-forming 
potential of biblical interpretations and the importance of a hermeneutic of 
consequences. Third, several conclusions can be reached about Calvin's interpretation of 
214 Pollard, Records, 46. 
215 Luz, Matthew in History, 24. 
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the parable of the Wedding Feast by employing Jauss' idea of synchronic studies. Calvin 
should have realised that his appropriation of Augustine's "compelle intrari' was not a 
legitimate interpretation or application of the text because it was not closely related to the 
question which the author originally intended to answer, or as Jauss would say, it would 
have been an idea foreign to the original horizon of reception. The questions which we 
ask of the text must be appropriate to the answers with the text gives. Questions about 
the nature of the church and how to preserve its unity were central elements in 
Augustine's horizon of expectations when he approached the biblical texts. In the 
parable of the Wedding Feast, he found answers to these questions. Calvin most likely 
recognised that Augustine's questions and answers resonated with similar questions he 
was asking within his horizon about social unity and consolidating the gains of the 
Reformation. However, it is the inappropriateness of Calvin's questions which falsify his 
answers. 216 Because Calvin's interpretation was tied to his historical and cultural 
horizon, his appropriation of Augustine's "compel e intrare" was not capable of being 
received by other horizons of interpreters, especially once the Enlightenment's concept of 
toleration was accepted. One of the reasons why we find his adoption of Augustine's 
position so striking today is because we are heirs of the Enlightenment and toleration is 
almost a virtue in contemporary society. As a result, Calvin's comments on this passage 
provoke our prejudices and call them into play. Finally, the acceptance of Calvin's 
interpretation by the early Reformation church in Switzerland reflected the shift from 
their being ` outsiders' who sought to reform the church to `insiders' who sought to 
protect the gains they had made. As such, it demonstrates once again the norm-forming 
power which occurs in the reception of any particular interpretation. Ideas have 
consequences. 
216 "When a preceding interpretation can be falsified, for the most part this indicates neither 
historical errors nor objective 'mistakes, ' but rather falsely posed or illegitimate questions 
on the part of the interpreter. " Jauss, Towards, 185; Ricccur, Time and Narrative, 3.173. 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Reception theory presents a hermeneutical model which involves a three-way 
dialogue. It integrates the history of the text's reception into the traditional 
hermeneutical model which is concerned with the dialogue between the interpreter the 
text. Dobschütz, Ebeling, and Froehlich were sensitive to the need to incorporate this 
third element into biblical hermeneutics and church history. The resources for 
constructing an adequate framework for this hermeneutical model are found in the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the literary hermeneutics of 
Hans Robert Jauss. 
I have attempted to establish that Gadamer's work is in part a reaction against a 
shallow positivistic approach toward history which is our inheritance from the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism. While a detailed examination of the historical-critical 
method was omitted for the sake of space, there are two concepts in this approach of 
which Gadamer is particularly critical. These are the imposition of a methodological 
approach from the natural sciences into the humanities and the reduction of classical 
texts, such as the Bible or Plato, to lifeless relics from the past. 
Gadamer rehabilitates the concept of tradition and demonstrates how we not 
only belong to our tradition, but must learn to listen and dialogue with it as well. 
Hegel's thought on experience, sublation, and the I/Thou relationship allow Gadamer to 
present a viable alternative to historicism. Collingwood's logic of question and answer 
provides a model for how to engage the past in an authentic and open dialogue while at 
the same time is concerned about the subject-matter under discussion. In contrast to the 
lifeless facts of historicism, Gadamer argues that approaching the past in this manner will 
produce a historically-effected consciousness, wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein 
Historically-effected consciousness is characterised by an openness on the interpreter's 
part which consists his knowing that he still has something to learn from his tradition. 
The priority which Gadamer attributes to the question is a weakness which Pannenberg 
recognises in Gadamer's work. Jauss adopts the logic of question and answer but is able 
to reconcile Pannenbcrg's criticism by assigning it to the second level of reading. 
In the second chapter, I argued that while Gadamer emphasises the historical 
thrownness of the reader, his view does not reduce to a post-modern view of tradition 
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characterised by plurality, relativity, and discontinuity. Tradition and historical 
knowledge are not an unrestricted field of free-play. The play of tradition takes place 
within certain defined boundaries and in the course of play, the boundaries for the 
playing field are reconfigured. Our experience with works of art and texts exemplify this 
form of play. Through the categories of presentation, transformation into structure, 
representation, and imitation, Gadamer demonstrates how there can be differences 
between performances of a work and at the same time maintain a continuity between 
different performances. It is through the performance of play that tradition formation 
occurs. Thus, in a tradition there will be different concretizations (performances) of the 
meaning of a text and at the same time criteria for recognising what constitutes an 
appropriate or inappropriate interpretation of a text. But this is a two-way street. Not 
only does Gadamer open up the possibility for new and diverse understandings of a text 
but in the play of understanding, the reader's prejudices are raised to consciousness and 
questioned as well. 
Jauss' work allows us to actually formulate a hermeneutical model which is more 
than just theoretical. If there is a central thrust to his work, it is the attempt to place 
history at the centre of literary studies. I have attempted to demonstrate that he is able to 
introduce some methodological considerations into literary hermeneutics in a manner 
which avoids Gadamer's criticism of positivistic approaches to method. This makes 
reception theory a more practical hermeneutic for the Wirkungsgeschichte of the Bible in 
several areas. First, it transforms Gadamer's passive fusion of horizons into an active 
meditation between the horizons. Jauss' hermeneutical tool of the horizon of 
expectations allows us to compare not only the original horizon in which the text was 
written or first read with our horizon but also successive horizons in which the meaning 
of the text was concretized. Second, the norm-forming function integrates literary and 
general history, or in our case, biblical interpretation and church history. I showed how 
this also resolves one of the more significant criticism of Gadamer's work: the lack of any 
form of ideological critique. Third, I established how Jauss faithfully develops Gadamer's 
hermeneutic in its application to literary theory. The historical situatedness of the 
interpreter within successive horizons of understanding is not a liability for literary theory 
or biblical interpretation but is one of its most liberating aspects. It demonstrates the fact 
that each generation must engage the text anew; to ask it new questions and to find new 
answers which are appropriate to their horizon. 
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I concluded by applying reception theory to the parable of the Wedding Feast in 
Matthew 22. The internally representative nature of parables and the modern perception 
that the allegorical method is hermeneutically unconstrained proved to be a good case 
study to demonstrate several positive aspects of reception theory for biblical studies. One 
of these was the manner in which previous interpretations and the prejudices which 
constitute our pre-understanding determine what we recognise in a text. In the parable 
of the Wedding Feast, the symbol of the wedding garment and the responses of the 
different characters in the parable who reject the invitation provide numerous 
illustrations of this point. Another aspect of reception theory which proved very useful 
was the summit-dialogue between authors: how Augustine recognised an answer to the 
pressing needs of his horizon within the parable of the wedding feast, how Aquinas 
appropriated Augustine's interpretation, and how Calvin adopted Augustine's position 
prejudiced by Aquinas. The Wirkungsgeschichte of this parable demonstrated many of the 
points concerning the role of the classic within a tradition. 
In the introduction, I observed how the need for a hermeneutic which 
incorporated both biblical studies and history was raised by Ebeling and Froehlich. It is 
hoped that I have established how Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic and Jauss' 
reception theory answer that call and provide the theoretical framework for its 
application to the reception history of the Bible. Is it worth the effort to apply reception 
theory to the biblical text? I believe it is for three reasons. First, the Christian tradition is 
filled with a rich treasury of biblical interpretation and application in a wide diversity of 
historical situations. Not only does this treasury provide the interpreter with a historical 
map which reveals legitimate and illegitimate interpretations of the text, but it also 
provides the interpreter with hermeneutical resources and insights which may have been 
forgotten in the transmission of the tradition. Second, the norm-forming power of texts 
helps to explain how the reception of biblical texts and previous interpretations of the 
Bible have shaped church history. Third, the practice of reception theory leads to the 
development igebildct) of the interpreter's wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein. We learn 
who we are as a result of our tradition and our position within that living tradition. But 
in order to learn how we belong to a tradition, we must first learn how to listen to it. 
This is perhaps the most significant contribution which reception theory presents to 
biblical hermeneutics, a means by which we can not only study past interpretations but 
listen to them as well. 
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